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PREFACE
"Our army has quietly melted away into peaceable
citizens," Benjamin Rush wrote several months after the
American war for independence. They have, he wrote,
"returned to their former occupations and now form a part
of the yeomanry of our country." Unlike many revolutionary
struggles, the American Revolution did not end in military
tyranny, with the military subverting the civilian govern-
ments or undermining the revolution. For the most part, the
American military forces upheld Congress and the state
governments, as well as the goals of their revolution,
thereby preventing what the American revolutionaries feared
^ost--anarchy and military tyranny. "Perhaps no Army in the
world," William Livingston observed early in 1783, "has ever
paid a more sacred regard to the civil authority than the
American Troops have done throughout the whole course of the
war." Several months later, William Gordon wrote George
Washington that he was rejoicing the war was ending "without
my ever hearing or knowing, that you have in any one
instance
„1
set at defiance or encroached upon the civil power.
v
The reasons why the American military forces did not
subvert the civilian governments and undermine the American
Revolution are varied and inter-related. In this disserta-
tion I have attempted to explain and analyze them by focusing
primarily on the civil-military relationship. It is by
understanding the dynamics of that relationship that we can
better appreciate why Benjamin Rush, William Livingston,
William Gordon, and the other American revolutionaries were
pleased with the conduct of their military forces during the
war, and the fact that they had peacefully disbanded. So,
to a large extent, this dissertation is a study of the civil-
military relationship, especially with respect to the most
important aspect of it. That aspect is the process by which
the civil and military revolutionary leaders kept their
revolution from being undermined by anarchy and military
tyranny--how they preserved the American Revolution. Thus,
this dissertation is primarily an analysis of how the
revolutionary leaders controlled their military forces and
why those forces remained subordinate to civilian control.
In each chapter I have explained and analyzed, in
the context of the civil-military relationship, the
various
ideological, institutional, organizational, political,
and
T ^ iQ "Tetters of the Reverend William Gordon.June 18, 1/Bj, i^eriierb ui. 1-7-70 i7qq " PMHS 63
Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799 ,
TlHb
(October 1929-June 1930): 492.
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personal factors that contributed to keeping the military
subordinate to civilian control. In doing so, I have
attempted to explain why civil supremacy was so important to
the revolutionary leaders, especially with respect to
preventing anarchy and military tyranny.
Basic to understanding the civil-military relation-
ship is an understanding of the ideological basis of the
American Revolution. At the ideological heart of the
2
American Revolution was the fear of power. Because the
military possessed the ultimate physical power, they were
feared and distrusted by the American revolutionary leaders
throughout the war. The basis for this fear and distrust
is explained in the first chapter. The next two chapters
discuss how the fear and distrust was translated into policy,
particularly with respect to the size and length of service
of the Continental Army, reliance on the militia, selection
of military leaders, and insistence on civil supremacy.
Because of their fear of military power, the American
revolutionaries developed an institutional structure that
allowed them to control and direct their military
forces.
This structure, at both the national and state
levels, is
detailed in the fourth and fifth chapters.
Bernard Bailyn, "The Central Themes °^^the
American
Revolution: An Interpretation," Stephen ^^^^^^ (^"^niU
Hutson, eds., Essays_on_^he_^e^^
university of North Carolina Press for the
I^^^itute ot
Earlv American History and Culture, 1973), p.y
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The sixth chapter presents an assessment of the way
the military leaders kept the army under control. They
realized that a well-disciplined army was not only necessary
to defeat the foreign and domestic enemies, but would be
less likely to threaten the lives, liberties, and properties
of their fellow citizens.
Despite the efforts to keep the military under
control, there were times during the war when they not only
challenged the civilian authorities but also posed a threat
to the success of the Revolution. This was due, to a large
degree, because the military came to be dissatisfied with
the American governments and people, for a variety of
reasons. These reasons are discussed in the seventh chapter.
In the eighth chapter I have explained how the
military's dissatisfaction often resulted in their threaten-
ing and violating the lives, liberties, and properties of
the American people. Additionally, as is discussed in the
ninth chapter, the military, often as a result of their lack
of faith in the civilian governments, frequently
interfered
with or involved themselves in civilian affairs.
These
actions by the military had their negative aspects,
as they
raised the specter of military tyranny; but, as is
frequently
explained in this dissertation, the military's
participation
in civilian affairs also had a positive side.
viii
The real testing of the civil-military relationship
took place during the summer and fall of 1780 and the follow-
ing winter, and again during the winter of 1782-1783 and the
following spring. It was during those periods, as is
discussed in the tenth and eleventh chapters, that the
civilian governments were most threatened by the military,
as certain civil and military leaders believed the military
should play a larger role in national affairs. These
leaders believed that Congress and the state governments
were incapable of marshalling the necessary resources of the
continent to ensure military victory, as well as to compen-
sate the military and other public creditors. Why the
military did not undermine the civilian authorities during
these critical times is analyzed in the last three chapters.
Also discussed in those chapters is how the military forces
were used by the civilian leaders to uphold the civilian
governments, as well as to ensure their peaceful re-estab-
lishment at the end of the war.
One would think that two hundred years after the
American war for independence ended that this dissertation
would not be necessary, in that the question why the American
military did not undermine the Revolution by subverting the
civilian governments would have been fully addressed and
answered. But it has not been. Neither has the
civil-
military relationship been adequately covered. In
part,
ix
this lack of analysis of the civil-military relationship
accounts for the lack of explanations given for the success
of the American Revolution. And by success, I do not mean
only winning the war. The American revolutionaries believed
their revolutionary struggle could only be judged successful
if it was conducted and concluded without the military
subverting the civilian governments , even if such military
action ensured military victory. As Elbridge Gerry informed
Joseph Trumbull, "It is the fixed Determination of Congress
to preserve the civil above the military and the authority
of that will not be surrendered, should it be necessary to
3
disband the army in preserving the sam.e."
Until about twenty-five years ago most books dealing
with the American war for independence addressed civil and
military themes separately. And when the two themes were
combined the focus was primarily on the question of why
America achieved military victory. Rarely did they address
the question of why the American Revolution v/as not under-
mined or subverted by the American military forces. Those
scholars who attempted to answer this question did so in
terms of explanations involving the conservative American
revolutionary ideologies. Rarely was the role and importance
^Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777,
Joseph Trumbull Papers, CSL.
X
of the civil-military relationship acknowledged except in
4
a cursory way.
During the past twenty-five years scholars have
begun to analyze the American war for independence in ways
rarely, or not fully, attempted earlier. In doing so, they
have provided us with many valuable insights into both civil
and military aspects of the Revolutionary War. VJith respect
to the civil-military relationship, scholars such as VJalter
Minis , Samuel P . Huntington, Daniel Boorstin, Arthur A.
Ekrich, Jr., and Louis Smith, during the 1950s began discuss-
ing the war from a standpoint of the relationship of the
country ' s armed forces and its government and people
.
Although they raised important questions about that relation-
ship during the war, pointing out its im.portance to
understanding the war and the revolution, they did so in a
general way, not going into specifics, other than to detail
the American fear of standing armies and their reliance on
5
the militia
.
"^John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections
on The Military Struggle for American Independence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. xi , xiii; James Kirby
Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respectable Army: The
Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789 (Arlington
Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1982), pp. 210-212.
^Walter Millis, Arms and Men: A Study in American
Military History (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956);
Samuel Huntin^n, The_Soldier and the State: The_Theory^^
Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap
pF¥^ of the Harvard University Pr^s, 1957); Arthur A.
xi
During the 1960s, scholars continued to acknowledge
the importance of the civil-military relationship in under-
standing American history, but that relationship during the
Revolutionary War remained virtually ignored. Marcus
Cunliffe's book on civilians and soldiers in early American
history, for example, only devoted two pages to the Revolu-
tionary War.
A new military history school developed during the
1970s and with it came more attention to the civil-m>ilitary
relationship during the Revolutionary War. This school can
be traced back to Don Higginbotham ' s 1971 work The War of
Ame r
i
can Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and
Practice, 1763-1789 ."^ According to John Shy, Higginbotham ' s
work, more than any previous general account of the Revolu-
tionary War, attempted to relate the military and non-military
segments of the war.^ Subsequent works by John Shy, John
Ekrich Jr., The Civilian and the Military: A H i story of the
American Antimilitar ist^fTidition (New York: Oxford Univer-
sitv Pr^rigSG) r T.nni.s SmithTTmerican Democracy and
Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1951)
;
D^HTiirjrB5^Fstin, Tj2e_^mericans : The Colonial E_xperience
(New York: Random House, 19 5 8) .
^Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians^e Martial
spirit in America 1775-1865 (Boston: Little,
Brown and
Company, 1968) , pp. 40-41.
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1971).
^John Shy, "The American Revolution: The
Military
conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War ,
"Stephen G.
S^tz and ?ames H. Hutson, eds . , Essays^the_American
Revolution , p. 122n . 1
.
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Ellis, John Todd White, Charles Royster, Jonathan Gregory
Rossie, Lawrence Delbert Cress, James Kirby Martin, Mark
Edward Lender, Richard H. Kohn , and Higginbotham addressed
aspects of the civil-military relationship during the
9Revolutionary War.
For the most part, these historians continued to
discuss the civil-military relationship in terms of the
standing army controversies and the reliance on the militia.
But they also began discussing the actual dynamics of the
civil-military relationship in terms of civil supremacy and
Ibid., pp. 3-31; John Shy, A People Numerous and
Armed: Reflections on the Military Strug g le for American
Independence
,
op. cit. ; John Ellis, Armies in Revolution
(Nev; Yorkl Oxford University Press, 1974); John Todd White,
"Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory and Mili-
tary Practice during the American Revolution." Ph.D.
dissertation, George Washington University, 1978; Charles
Royster, A Revolutionary People at War : The Continental Army
and American Charac ter , 1775-178 3 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early Am.erican
History and Culture, 1979); Lawrence Delbert Cress, Ci tizens
in Arms: The Army and Mi lit ia in Amer ic an Society to the War
of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1982) ; James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A Respect-
able Army: The Military Origin s of the Republic, 1763-1789 ,
op. cit.; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists
and the Creation of the Mi li^tary Establishment , 17 8 3-180 2
(New York: Free Press, 1975) ; Don Higginbotham, Military
Leadership in the American Revolution," Leadership in the
Ame rican Revolution , Library of Congress Symposia on the
American Revolution (VJashington DC: Library of Congress,
1974), pp. 91-111; Don Higginbotham, "The Debate Over National
Military Institutions: An Issue Slowly Resolved, 1775-1815,"
William M. Fowler, Jr., and Wallace Coyle, eds . , The^American
Revolution: Changing Perspectives (Boston: Northeastern
university Pre¥i',T981) , pp. 149-168 ; Jonathan Gregory Rossie,
The Politics_of Command in the^^ican_Revolution (Syracuse:
Syracuse "University Press, 1975)
.
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military subordination. Their efforts, nevertheless, were
limited in both scope and depth. As John Shy wrote in 1973,
referring to the civil-military relationship, "basic research
in this direction has hardly begun." In 1976, he wrote "the
debated questions are not very good ones, and truly good
questions are yet to be debated seriously." Martin and
Lender, in 19 82, wrote that the new military history of the
Revolutionary War has addressed many new subjects, but "there
is still much left to be learned." "Thus," they added, "all
of us have an obligation to keep raising new questions and
^ ..10
working v;ith extant documents.
I hope this dissertation has raised and answered
important questions regarding the civil-military relation-
ship during the American war for independence, and has
contributed to a better understanding of why that war was
conducted and concluded without the American Revolution
being undermined by military tyranny. There are more
ques-
tions to be asked and answered, however, before
we finally
have a firm grasp on why the American Revolution,
unlike so
many other revolutions, did not succumb to
military tyranny.
iee^aTi'o^bTd . , p . 211.
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To a large degree, this means analyzing the civil-military
relationship more fully from an institutional, organizational,
and personal perspective, particularly at the state and local
level. This dissertation, I believe, can be the starting
point for others to evaluate further this important subject.
This dissertation, which has taken longer to write
than it took the American revolutionaries to win their
Revolutionary V7ar, would not have been completed without the
help and encouragement of many people. Particularly merit-
ing my thanks are my colleagues at the National Archives
and Records Service, especially Mr. Jack Saunders, Dr.
Michael Kurtz, Dr. Sharon Gibbs Thibodeau, the members of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation Appraisal Task Force,
and the staff of the Accession and Disposal Branch of the
Washington National Records Center, all of v;hom encouraged
me to finish this dissertation. A special note of thanks is
due Mr. John P. Butler, compiler of the index to the papers
of the Continental Congress, who kept alive my interest in
the American Revolution.
I owe a debt of gratitude to the staffs of the
various manuscript repositories and libraries where I did
my research, especially the inter-library loan staff and
Miss Melinda Mcintosh of the University of Massachusetts
library. A special debt of gratitude is owed Miss Mary M.
Wolfskin of the Library of Congress, who was of great help
XV
and encouragement during the latter stages of completing
this dissertation
.
My mother and step-father, Lexie and Thomas McCraney,
warrant more thanks and gratitude than words can express. I
am sure finishing this dissertation will be thanks enough
for them. Also warranting my thanks is my typist , Mrs . Mary
Ann Steed, who saved me from making many errors of omission
and commission . Needless to say
,
any remaining errors are
my responsibil ity
.
I could not conclude this preface without thanking
my dissertation committee , especially Dr . Win fred Bernhard
,
who patiently guided me through the doctoral program, and
Dr. Hugh Bell, who, among other things, suggested the title
of this dissertation
.
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ABSTRACT
Preserving the Revolution
Civil-Military Relations During
The American War for Independence
1775-1783
February 1984
James Gregory Bradsher, B.A., Oregon State University
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor VJinfred E. A. Bernhard
Explained and analyzed, in the context of the civil-military
relationship, are the reasons why the American Revolution
was not undermined by an American military tyranny. The
early chapters are devoted to explaining the ideological
and historical background of the American revolution with
respect to American fears of power, anarchy, standing armies,
and military despotism; the American's faith in their
militia; and their insistence on civil supremacy being the
guiding principle of the civil-military relationship. Also
detailed is how the Continental Army was created, structured,
and maintained so as to minimize the possibility of it
subverting the civilian governments. Additionally addressed
in the early chapters are the personal and political dyna-
mics of the civil-military relationship. How the
xvii
Continental Congress and state governments controlled and
directed their inilitary forces, as well as how the military
controlled themselves, is detailed in the middle chapters.
Also included in these chapters is an analysis of the mili-
tary' s often critical opinion of the civilian governments
and the American people; explanations for those instances
when the military threatened and violated the lives,
liberties, and properties of their fellow citizens; and a
discussion of the military's frequent involvement in and
interference with the civilian governments and the political
process. The last chapters are devoted to an analysis of
the civil-military relationship during the last four years
of the Revolutionary War, when it was most severely tested,
and when the American Revolution was most susceptible to
being undermined by a domestic military tyranny. Special
attention is given in these chapters to the factors which
prevented the Continental Army from subverting the civilian
governments, particularly during the last year of the war.
Also included, in the last chapter, is an analysis, in the
context of several contemporary works on civil-military
affairs, of the reasons for the American Revolution not
being undermined by the American military forces.
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CHAPTER I
A CONSERVATIVE AND JEALOUS GENERATION
At the time of the American war for Independence
there was no definable 'American mind,' as Americans shared
no common ideology; nor one set of political, social
religious, or economic beliefs. They lived in different
geographical regions, which were in some respects, more
closely tied to England than to one another. The American
colonists, nevertheless, particularly those identified as
Whigs, on the eve of the revolutionary struggle, found the
"things that divided them were negligible and the things
that united them were fundamental.""'" Understanding what
the fundamental things that united them were, will enable
us better to understand not only the nature of the American
Revolution, or at least how the Whigs perceived it, but
will also enable us to understand the operation of the
civil-military relationship during the war and how the
American military forces were controlled and directed during
-""Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason: How
Europe Imagined and America_Rean zed_the ^En^D^ten^
(Garden~Clty, New York Anchor Books, 1978), pp. 138-lJy.
2the war, and how and why the revolution did not result in a
military tyranny
.
Probably the most fundamental belief shared by the
American VJhigs in 1775 was, in James Burgh's words, that
"the people can never be too jealous of their liberties."^
This idea was not limited to the American VJhigs but could
be found also in some American Tory circles, as well as
among the English Whigs. So pervasive was it during the
era of the American Revolution that Samuel Adams was
prompted in 1783 to observe that his was an "Age of Jealousy."
"Jealousy," stated Adams, who was one of the greatest pro-
ponents of jealousy as a public virtue, "is the best Security
of publick Liberty." His cousin, John Adams, also acknowl-
edged the importance of jealousy in the political arena
.
Preparing notes for an oration in the spring of 1772, he
wrote "The only Maxim of a free Government, ought to be to
trust no Man 1 iving , with Power to endanger the public
Liberty" and that "Liberty, under every conceivable Form
of Government is always in Danger."^
Burgh , Political Pi squisitions , 3 : 311
•
^Samuel Adams to John Adams, November 4, 1783,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:288; Samuel Adams to
Elbridge Gerry, April 23, 1783, ibid., 302; John Adams
Diary, Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:59, 58,
Americans during the era of the American Revolution
were constantly reminded about the misuse of power. Addi-
tionally, they were warned not to undervalue their liberty.
Eternal vigilance, Patrick Henry told them, was the price
of their liberty. Americans were indeed vigilant, so much
so that their vision was often limited, particularly with
respect to actions by the British ministry after 1765.
Their belief in the misuse of power by the British ministry
was a major factor in the development of the conviction that
they were conspiring to deprive the Americans of their lives,
liberties, and properties. This conviction (and, by the
early 1770s, a fear) is important to the understanding of
the ease with which many Americans in 1775 turned out to
defend their liberties. This fear of conspiracy, as well
as jealousy of power, also is important to understanding
the mental framework under which the revolutionary leaders
operated. It is especially crucial to explaining how the
revolutionary governments and military forces were organized
4
and functioned during the war.
The conviction that the British ministry was
conspiring to deprive the Americans of their lives.
^Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to New
Hampshire 9:846; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [ ]
Bradsha^TT December 8, 1765, Field, Unpublished Letters o f
Charles Carroll o f Carrollton , p. 101; Gordon Wood, Th^
Creati^iT^ the American Re^blic 1776-17^ (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of
Early American History and Culture, 1969), pp. 41-42.
liberties, and properties, began around the time of the
Stamp Tax debate, and increased with each successive minis-
terial action.^ According to Gordon Wood, "By the 1770 's
there v/as hardly a piece of Whig writing,
. . . that did
not dwell on this obsessive fear of a 'Conspiracy.'"^ The
British ministers were not plotting to overthrow the libert
of the Americans during the decade before Lexington-Concord
Their policies, however, were seen in that light by many
Americans . It is not essential to recite all the British
policies and the American responses to demonstrate how and
why Americans came to their point of view, for there have
been numerous works written on that subject. The special
relationship between the British ministry and army, as it
was perceived in America, particularly in Massachusetts,
however, needs to be discussed. This is because the ten
year observation and reflection upon the perceived conspira
torial design to overthrow their liberties by force of arms
left a deep impact on the American Whigs, especially with
regard to how they controlled their own military forces
during the war,
^John Adams Diary, March 6, 1774, Butterfield,
DAJA, 2:90; John Adams Autobiography, ibid., 3:290; John
Ma^s to Abigail Adams, July 6, 1774, Butterfield, AFC,
1:125.
^Gordon Wood, The Greation_o^he_A^^^
1776-1787, p. 39.
5Despite warnings between 1766 and 1768 that, if the
ministry sent an army to enforce unconstitutional legisla-
tion, Americans would regard the move as an infringement
of their rights and a serious grievance, an army was sent
to Boston late in 1768 to protect the Customs Commissioners.
To many American ^-Jhigs the sending of an army was
substantial proof of a conspiratorial plan on the part of
the ministry to have a "standing army and swarms of crown
officers, placemen, pensioners and expectants, co-operating
to subdue America to the yoke" and "to keep the whole conti-
g
nent in subjection." Already they had witnessed what the
army had done in New York City, where periodic battles had
Speech of Benjamin Franklin before the House of
Commons on February 13, 1766, Leonard W. Labaree et al.,
eds., The Papers o f Benjamin Franklin , 21 vols. (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1959-1978) , 13:142; A Report of the
Record Commissioners of the City of Boston Containing the
Boston~Town"Records , 1758 to 1769 (Boston: Rockwell and
Churchill, 1886), p. 263; Charles Carroll of Carrollton to
[Edmund Jennings?], September 28, 1765, Rowland, The Life
of Charles Carroll of Carrollton 1737-1832 with his Corres-
pondence and Public Papers , 1:73; Same to same, September 30
,
1765, in ibid., 74; Thomas Cushing to ?, May 9, 1767 , MHSC,
4th ser., 4:348; The New-Hampshire Gazette , August 5, 1768.
^Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule , pp. 13 and
64; see also ibid., p. 6; John Wentworth to Dr. Becham,
August 9, 1768, Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire , p. 1;
The Massachusetts House of Representatives to Dennys De Berdt,
January 12 , 1768 , Cushing , Writings of Samuel Adams , 1:146;
"Determinatus" is The Boston-Gazette, and Country "Journal ,
August 8, 1768; The Boston-Gazette, and Country Jouriral,
September 26, 1768; Carl Bridenbaugh, Mi tre and Scep trej_
Transatlant ic Faith, Ideas, Personalitie s, and Politi^
1689-1775 rNew"York: Oxford University Plress, 1962), p. 288.
6taken place during 1766 and 1767 betv/een soldiers and
citizens. Before 1768 ended, they would also learn of the
death of two citizens in Annapolis at the hands of the
Royal Marines and of the St. George's Field massacre outside
King's Bench Prison in London where a pro-VJilkes crowd was
9fired upon by British regulars. It is not surprising then
to find a Boston town meeting in June 1768 declaring "every
person soliciting or promoting the importation of troops
should be pronounced an enemy to the town and province, and
a disturber of the peace and good order of both.""'"^
The British army arrived in Boston during the late
summer of 1768 to Mather Byles's pun that the colonist's
grievances had been "red-dressed. Within months, the
army had become a nuisance and a threat, as guards were
placed about the town, the Boston neck fortified, and the
The New York Journal, or, the General Advertiser ,
October 23, November 6, 20 (supplement), 1766, March 26,
1767 ( supplement) ; The New-York Gazette, June 5, August 14,
September 25, 1766; Elihu S. Riley, "The Ancient City." A
History of Annapolis, in Maryland. 1649-1887 (Annapolis:
Record Printing Office, 1887), p. 164; and John Shy, Toward
Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of
the American Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965) , p. 395.
•-^John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts:
The Provincial Period (Boston: Henry Barry, 1857), p. 356.
'"'John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield, DAJA,
3:289.
citizenry challenged at night by the guards. """^ Many
Bostonians questioned whether the use of force was a very
suitable means of changing their sentiments, believing the
insolent use of military power always had been despised by
people who retained a just sense of liberty; believing also,
with James Burgh, that "Good government is a surer way to
keep the peace , than keeping up a formidable and expensive
13
army." John Lathrop, minister of the Old North Church,
preached that government established by the sword should
fall, and "in its stead another might be established, more
agreeable to the great nature of man, and constant with the
14great ends of society." As to the charge by the Customs
Commissioners that Boston was ruled by a mob, an editorial
in The Boston-Gazette , and Country Journal on September 12,
1768, denied their existence, warning that "in a free
country I am afraid a standing army rather occasions than
prevents them .
"
Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule , pp. 11, 16,
34; Richard Gary to ?, July 24, 1769; A. L. Elwyn, Papers
Relating to Public Events in Massachusetts Preceding the
American Revolution (Philadelphia: T. K. and P. G. Gollins
for the Seventy-Six Society, 1856), p. 122.
""^Burgh, Political Disquisitions , 2 : 348; see also
Dickerson, Boston "under Military Rule , pp. 29 , 34 , 62;
"Vindex," The Boston-Gazette, and Gountry Journal ,
December 5, 12, 1768; "Shippen," in ibid., January 30, 1769;
Samuel Adams to Dennys De Berdt, November 6, 1779, Gushing,
Writ ings of Samuel Adams , 1:446.
•'"'^Gited in Ola E. Winslow, Meetinghouse Hill
1630-1783 (New York: Macmillan Gompany, 1952), p. 277.
8Mobs did exist before the army arrived, but not in
the numbers and frequency as they did once the army arrived.
These mobs, generally gathered to taunt the soldiers during
1769 and 1770, created an explosive situation. Thomas
Povmall told Parliament in February 1769 that "The people
of that country and the King's troops are . . . set in array
against each other." The sword was yet to be drawn, he told
them, but the hand was upon it. "The word for action is not,
indeed, yet given; but mischief is on tiptoe, and the
slightest circumstance" he predicted, "would in a moment
15
throw everything into confusion and bloodshed." His pre-
diction of bloodshed came in the form of the "Battle of
Golden Hill" in New York City in January 1770 and the
1
6
"Boston Massacre" in March 1770.
This shedding of blood convinced many Americans
that the ministry intended to enslave them, even though
the troops were removed from Boston and the Townshend Acts
repealed. After all, as it v/as frequently emphasized, the
""^Cited in John Stetson Barry, The History of
Massachusetts: The Provincial Period , pp. 380-381.
^^ The New York Journal, or, the General Advertiser ,
January 18 (supplement), January 25, February 8, March 1
(supplement), March 26, 1770; Parker's New-York Gazette;
or, the Weekly Post Boy, January 22, February 5, 1770; Th^
Boston-Gazette, and Country Journal, February 19, 1770
(supplemelTt) ; Lee R. Boyer, "Lobster Backs, Liberty Boys,
and Laborers in the Streets: New York's Golden Hill and
Nassau Street Riots," NYHSQ 57, no. 4 (October 1973):
281-308; Hiller B. Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 22.
British army still remained in force on the continent, out
of Colonial control, and ready for the next step in the
1
7
conspirator's plans. One T^erican Whig, who in particular
went to great lengths after 1770 to convince others of the
danger posed by the army still remaining in the colonies,
and of the existence of a ministerial plot, was Samuel
1
8
Adams. Besides writing letters to other Whigs and
establishing a committee of correspondence in the fall of
177 2, he carried on a newspaper campaign under the name of
1 9
"Candidus" m The Boston-Gazette, a nd Country Journal ,
Perhaps the most important source for publicizing the
belief of a conspiracy and the dangers of a standing army
during the decade before the war were the annual Boston
20
Massacre sermons, which were begun m 1771.
17Thomas Cushing to Benjamin Franklin, November 6,
17 7 0, A . L . Elwyn
,
Papers Relat ing to Public Events in
Massachusetts Preceding the American Revolut ion , p. 171 ;
'^Tndex"," " The~Boit'on"Ga zette , and Count ry Journal ,
December 57~~12, T9'7~^6^7 "17 6 8 ; Dicker son, Boston under
Military Rule , p. 29.
"^^Samuel Adams to Arthur Lee, July 31, 1771, Cushing,
Writings of Samuel Adams , 2:190; Same to same, October 31,
lT71 , ibidT"! 266-267 ; Same to same, September 27, 1771,
ibid., 235; Samuel Adams to Henry Marchant, January 7, 1772,
ibid., 308.
19August 19, September 23, October 7, 1771
"^^John Adams Diary, March 5 , 1773 , Butterfield,
DAJA, 2:79; Samuel Adams to John Dickinson, April 21, 1774;
Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:104; John Adams to
Jedidiah M^e, January SV'iSle, Adams, Works__of__John^^^^
10:230; "Mentor" in The_Bo s^on__ Even i
n
g -Po s t , February 11,
17 70; A Report of_the7"Record Comm i ssioners of the City of
10
Referring to the whole Whig arsenal of literature
against standing armies and citing contemporary instances
of tyranny, the first three sermons, given by James Lovell,
Joseph Warren, and Benjamin Church, detailed how the British
army in their midst was a threat to their liberty. The
fourth sermon, delivered by John Hancock and most probably
drafted by Samuel Cooper, was perhaps the best example of
bringing together the two themes of standing armies and
conspiracies. By the time the fifth sermon was given by
Joseph Warren in March 1775, it was not very difficult for
him to demonstrate that the military in their midst was
21
truly the sword of a conspiracy. Printed sermons, appeals
from the pulpit, pamphlets, and letters to editors augmented
the massacre sermons in the propaganda war the five years
22previous to the war.
Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through 1777
(Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887) , pp. 47-48 .
Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution in
America, pp. 17-38; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the
American Revolution 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 19 7.
^^John Adams' notes for a Braintree oration sermon,
Spring 1772, Butterfield, DAJA , 2:58; Alice Baldwin, The New
England Clergy and the American Revolution (Durham, North
^
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1928), pp. 113-114; Philip
Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763-1783 ,
pp 194-245; John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts^
The Provincial Period, p. 439; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude
to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain 1764-1776 (New
York- Vintage Books; A Caravelle Edition, 1965), pp. 103-106;
T W. A. Bostonian [Charles Chauncy] , A Letter to aFriend^
Giving a Concise but jus t, representation of the hardsh ips
11
Boston town meetings, the Boston Committee of
Correspondence, and the Massachusetts House of Representa-
tives during 1772 and 1773 also insisted the army in America
was the result of a conspiracy to undermine their
23liberties. In May 1773 the town meeting informed their
representatives to the General Assembly that "standing
armies have forever made shipwreck of free states and no
people jealous of their liberties ever patiently suffered
mercenary troops to be quartered and maintained within their
populous cities" and "We cannot therefore but resent those
standing troops within our capital cities, appointed execu-
tioners of tyranny, and prepared instruments to massacre
the defenceless citizens, at the nod of any master who may
have authority to appoint or discharge, reward or punish
them." This armed force they argued was going to be used
by the ministry to complete "their infernal plan of enslav-
mg America.
and su f
f
erings of the late ac t of the Bri tish-Parliament
(Boston : Greenleaf ' s Printing Office, 1774).
2 3
A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City
of Bo ston Containing the~Boston Town Records, 1770 through
1777
, pp. 84, 101, 106; Boston Committee of Correspondence
to Elijah Morton, June 19, 1773; Cushing, Writings of Samuel
Adams, 3:42; Massachusetts House of Representatives Petition
to the King, June 23, 1773, in ibid., 47.
^^A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City
of Boston Containing the "iBoston Town Records, 1770 through
1777, ^~133.
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This "infernal plan" appeared all that more
apparent when the Ministry responded to the dumping of the
tea in Boston harbor by a series of coercive measures,
culminating in the appointment of General Thomas Gage as
Governor of Massachusetts and the arrival of additional
military forces to support him. Shortly after their arrival
during the first week of September 1774, Gage had the Boston
neck fortified and began seizing gunpowder and cannon from
colonial magazines. Bostonians reacted much the way they
had in 1768, as they were, in Samuel Adams's words, once
again "threatened with that great evil , " a standing army.
Hannah Winthrop believed "the dissolution of all government
gives a dreadful prospect" and expressed her fear that "the
troops give an horrid prospect of an intended battle."
Agreeing
,
Joseph Warren reported "the troops are availing
themselves every opportunity to make themselves more
formidable , and render the people less able to oppose them"
and stated "the treatment which we receive from the soldiery
makes us think they regard us as enemies rather than as
25fellow subjects . "
^^Samuel Adams to John Dickinson, April 21, 1774,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams , 3:104; Hannah Winthrop
to Mercy Warren, September 27, 1774, "Warren-Adams Letters,"
MHSC, 72 (1917): 33; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams,
September 29, 1774, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of
Joseph Warren (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1865),
pp. JsT^^TsT-' see also John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 5,
177 4 , Butter fie Id, AFC , 1:12 5.
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Conventions held in Massachusetts during August and
September expressed their fears that Britain was attempting
2 c.
"to execute their wicked designs by military force." The
best known convention, held in Suffolk County produced, by
the pen of Joseph Warren , the Suffolk Resolves, which
explained how Boston came to have her streets ^'thronged with
military executioners" and set forth the workings of the
27
perceived British conspiracy . The Reverend Gad Hitchcock
of Pembroke, Massachusetts, in a May 1774 election sermon,
stated "Our danger is not visionary , but real ; our conten-
tion is not about trifles, but about liberty and property."
"If I am mistaken in supposing plans are formed and executing,
subversive of our natural and chartered rights and privileges,
and incompatible with every idea of liberty, 'all America
2 8
is mistaken with me.'" Indeed, the Massachusetts Whigs
were not alone in their fears of a conspiracy and the belief
the army was to be the sword of that conspiracy. Their
beliefs and fears were also shared by others in New England.
In New Hampshire, John Sullivan, as "A WATCHMAN,"
in a broadside addressed "To the Inhabitants of British
^^Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts, p. 657; see also ibid., pp. 612, 616, 620,
624, 644-6T5T
^'^Ibid., pp. 602, 603-604 .
2^Cited in J. T. Headley, The Chaplaj^n5_aiid Clergy
of the Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner, 1864),
p.
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America" on the day before Christmas 1774, warned that a
2 9standing army had been sent to enslave America. Earlier
that year a town meeting in Coventry, Connecticut, expressed
its belief that "by coercive measures, and military force,"
Boston would be dragooned into compliance "with the arbi-
tary will of the British ministry "^^ The clerk of the
Connecticut Committee of Correspondence believed the acts
against Boston were "part of the general System, as one
Operation of the general plan long since concerted, for
Subjugating the Colonies, and rendering their Lives, and
properties, subservient to the Will & Pleasure, of a British
31
Parliament, or rather of their Ministry." This prospect
was not limited to New England. In Alexandria, Virginia,
on October 24, 1774, Nicholas Cresswell recorded in his
diary that "The New Englanders by their canting, whining,
insinuating tricks have persuaded the rest of the Colonies
that the Government is going to make absolute slaves of
„32
them.
"
^
^Hammond , Letters and Paper s of John Sullivan
,
p . 51
.
^^Hinman, A Historical Collection , p. 75.
^•'"Silas Deane to the Committee of Correspondence
of Boston, June 13 , 1774 , Ford, Samue^lachley JVebb , 1:28;
see also Deane ' s letter to the various colonial committees
of correspondence, dated June 4, 1774, ibid., 1:25.
^^Nicholas Cresswell, Journ al_ ol_Ni chola s__Cre s swe 11
,
1774-1777 (New York: Dial Press, 1924), p. 44.
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With respect to Virginia, Cresswell's observation
had great validity. George Washington, for instance,
believed the ministry was "pursuing a regular plan at the
expense of law and justice to overthrow our constitutional
right and liberties." "Is not the attack upon the liberty
and property of the people of Boston," he asked a Tory
neighbor, "a plain and self-evident proof of what they are
33
aiming at?" Many Whigs in Virginia shared Washington's
feelings concerning what they considered, in Richard Henry
Lee's words, "a Systematic plan of despotism. " '^'^ Elsewhere
in the colonies belief in a conspiracy, aided by a standing
35
army, was just as strong. In September 1774 , as the first
33George Washington to Bryan Fairfax, July 20, 1774,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
3:321; and Same to
same, July 4, 1774, ibid., 228.
^^Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams, April 24 , 1774 ,
Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee , 1:108; see also Same
to same, June 23 , 17 74 , in ibid., Ill; Edmund Pendleton to
Joseph Chew, June 20, 1774, Mays, Letters and Papers of
Edmund Pendleton , 1:93; Adam Stephen to Richard Henry Lee,
August 27 , 1774 , Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry
Lee, 2:208; Broadside of An Association signed by 89 members
oF~the Late House of Burgess [May 27, 1774] in Schreevan,
Revolutionary Virginia, 1:97; Resolution of Fairfax County,
July 18 , 1774 , ibid. , 129
.
"^^Baltimore Committee of Correspondence to Committee
of Correspondence at Norfolk and Portsmouth, June 17, 1774 ,
Purviance, Baltimore Town during the Revolutionary War ,
p. 153; Ralph Izard to Edward Rutledge, July 13, 1774, [Anne
Izard Deas, ed.], Correspondence of Mr. Ralph Izard, of
South Carolina, from the year 1774 to 1804 ; with a short
Memoir (New York: Charles S. Francis and Company, 1844), p. 203
Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia , 1:52; Stephen E.
Lucas, Portents of Rebellion: Rhetoric and Revolution m
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Continental Congress met in Philadelphia to discuss the
colonial fears and concerns, Thomas Willing a resident of
Philadelphia and future member of the Continental Congress,
wrote "I am no great Politician but as an American I both
See and feel the chains which are prepared for me.""^^
The first Continental Congress shared and expressed
the fears and concerns of the American colonists, particu-
larly with respect to the sword of the conspiracy, the
standing army in their midst. Thomas Jefferson, one of the
Virginia delegates, had already during the summer written
A Summary View of the Righ t s of Bri tish America, which
served as instructions for the Virginia delegates to the
Congress. Jefferson stated that "single acts of tyranny
may be ascribed to the accidential opinion of the day; but
a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period,
and pursued unalterable thro' every change of ministers,
too plainly a deliberate, systematically plan of reducing
3 7
us to slavery." Congress, agreeing with Jefferson's
Philadelphia, 1775-76 (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 19T6) , pp. 96-125.
^^Thomas Willing to General Frederick Haldimand,
September 20, 1774, Thomas Willing Balch, ed . , Willing
Letters and Papers edited with a Biographical E ssay of
Thoma^l^TllTmg^^oFT^ (Philadelphia
Allen, Land,~a'nd Scott, 1922), pp. 43-44 .
37Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:125.
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interpretation of events, declared their belief in a
conspiracy to overthrow their liberties by a standing
38
army
.
General Gage, understanding the feelings of the
colonists towards his occupation of Boston, attempted to
minimize the presence of his army, assuring the Provincial
Congress that "Britain can never harbor the black design
of wantonly destroying, or enslaving, any people on
39
earth." Nevertheless, Boston was considered an armed
camp and suffered many of the ill effects of the occupa-
40
tion, much as it had between 1768 and 1770.
3 R
Ford, JCC, 1:63-73, 82-101.
39 . •Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts, p. 20; see also Abigail Adams to John Adams,
October 16, 1774, Butterfield, AFC , 1:173.
^^Same to same, September 14, 1774, ibid., 151-152;
Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren, [January 25, 1775],
ibid., 179-180; Abigail Adams to Edward Dilly, May 22,
[1775], ibid., 201; Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat
Paine, September 27, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS,
Same to same, October 16, 1774, ibid.; Samuel Adams to
Richard Henry Lee, March 21, 1775, Gushing, Writings of
Samuel Adams , 3:206-206; John Andrews to William Barrell,
August 1, 1774, Winthrop Sargent, ed. , "Letters of John
Andrews, Esq., of Boston, 1772-1776," PMHS (1864-1865),
8:333-335; Same to same, October 2, 1774, ibid., 371; Same
to same, October 2, 1774, ibid., 381; Same to same,
January 2, 1775, ibid., 392-393; Same to same, January 21,
1775, ibid., 395-396; Philip Padleford, ed. , Colonial
Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert Honyman ' s Journal for March and
April (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1939),
^T~TT; [John Boyle], "Boyle's Journal of Occurences in
Boston 1759-1778," NEHGR 35 (January 1931): 7; Thacher,
Military Journal of the 7\merican Revolution, p. 12.
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Boston alone did not feel the presence of the
British army during the six months previous to the outbreak
of the war, as Gage frequently sent troops into Boston's
environs. These forays caused great alarm and provided
more fuel to the Whig argument that Britain intended to
4 1rule by military might. The Massachusetts Provincial
Congress protested what they considered Gage's aggressive
actions, believing that if he did not cease he would find
himself embroiled in a civil war. They did not have great
expectations of Gage relenting, as they were convinced the
army was garrisoned upon them with the "express design"
of executing "acts of the British parliament utterly sub-
versive of the constitution of the province" and "enforcing
submission to a system of tyranny." A December 30, 1774,
Boston town meeting echoed similar beliefs, being utterly
convinced the army, the tool of the ministry, was set on
overthrowing the liberties of 7\merica. So did John Adams,
as "Novanglus," in The Bo ston-Gaze tte, and Country Journal
on February 6th and 13th, 1775. In a pamphlet published
in Boston late in 1774, Charles Chauncy stated the design
of Britain to enslave Massachusetts and the North American
^''"Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the American
Revolu^tion 1775-1776 (New York: The Free Press 1975) ,
^^'T8"5-'186; Elwin L. Page, "The King's Powder, 1774,"
NEQ 18, no. 1 (March 1945): 83-92.
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colonies was "so obviously visible."''^ Many, if not a
majority of Americans, agreed with Chauncy. Many more
would be convinced after Lexington and Concord.
About two months after the war began, the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress, responding to Gage's
proclamation of pardon, stated the British ministry had
for several years been executing a plan to enslave America,
adding it "is a proposition so evident, that it would be
an affront to the understanding of mankind to adduce proofs
4 3m support of it." Other legislative bodies and indivi-
duals were, however, more willing to elaborate the steps
by which the ministry had intended to enslave them, and
4 4thereby justified war and eventual independence.
4 2 Lincoln, Journal s of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts, pp. 31, 69; A Report of the Record Commis -
sioner s of the City of Boston Containing the Boston Town
Record's, 1770 through 1777, pp. 209-212 ; T. wT A. Bos ton i an
[Charles~Chauncy ] , A Letter to a Friend, Giving a Concise
but just, representat ion of the hard ships and sufferings
of tHe late ~act of~the Br itish-Parliament , p. 24; see also
ibid
. , p . 26 .
'^^Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congres s of
Massachusetts
, p. 344.
'^'^Oration given by Peter Thacher on March 5, 1776,
at Watertown, Massachusetts, Niles, Principles and Acts of
the Revolution in America , p. 24; Resolution of Maiden,
Massachusetts, May 27, 1776, ibid., p. 157; Charge to
Charleston's Grand Jury on October 15, 1776, by Judge William
Henry Drayton, ibid., p. 82; Charge to Charleston's Grand
Jury on April 23, 1776, by Judge William Henry Drayton in
Gibbe s
,
Do^ume^n taryJ^istory_ of_the America n Revolution,
2:187-10 8"; Proclamation by Governor Jonathan Trumbull,
June 18, 1776, Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony_of
Connecticut, 15:451; Hinman, A_J^storical Collection, p, 175;
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American jealousies of their liberties had helped
to conjure up a conspiracy during the 1760s and events
during the first half decade of the 1770s confirmed it,
especially after the introduction of the Coercive Acts
during the summer of 1774. By that time most Americans
were asking fundamental questions regarding what the con-
spirators desired of them, their status within the Empire,
and how to prevent the conspiracy from coming to fruition.
Timothy Matlock, when asked during the summer of
1783 why he had fought during the revolutionary war,
responded simply, "Liberty and Property. "^^ Liberty, for
most Americans, as well as Englishmen, was understood in
the Lockean sense, that is, liberty was equated with the
right to life and property. These were the things the
Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island
, p. 4 3; Moultrie,
Memoirs of the Revolution , 1:52-53; Preamble of South
Carolina ' s March 26, 1776 Constitution in Hemphill, Extracts
from The Journals of the Provinci al Congress of South Caro-
lina I TTS^I 7 7 6 , p~. 257; ~Bartie 11 , Records of Rhode Island,
7:388; Fourth New Hampshire Provincial Congress to Governor
Wentworth, June 8, 1775, in Bouton, Documents and Records
Relating to New Hampshire , 7:509-510; Virginia's Constitu-
tion of June 1776, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson , 1:378;
The Declaration of Independence as adopted by the Continental
Congress, July 4, 1776, ibid., 430-431; Benjamin Rumsey to
William Rumsey, June 3, 1776 , in James F. Vivian and Jean H.
Vivian, eds., "'A Jurisdiction Competent to the Occasion':
A Benjamin Rumsey Letter, June, 1776," MHM 58, no. 2 (Spring
1972) : 152.
^^Cited in Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the
Confederation [1783-1784] , Alfred J. Morrison, trans, and
^dTr"2"vors. (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1911), 1:65.
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American ^Vhigs desired from society, and these were the
things they believed the British ministry was attempting
to deprive them of, particularly so by the end of 1774.
By that time, according to Theodorick Bland, the colonists
had the choice of contending for their liberties or giving
them up to "arbitrary Power. "^^ Philip Schuyler, shortly
after the war had begun, wrote the Americans had a choice
of being ruled by a military despotism, or fighting for
47their rights and freedom. Throughout the war it was
repeatedly stated the goals of the colonists were to protect
4 8their liberties and properties.
Four years into the war, in Dunlap's Pennsylvania
Packet, or, the General Advertiser , on July 3, 1779,
Benjamin Rush, as "Leonidas," wrote that liberty was the
initial goal of the American struggle, not independence.
Independence, however, he believed was necessary now to
4 f\
John Adams Diary, September 6, 1774, Butterfield,
DAJA , 2:125.
"^^Philip Schuyler to John Cruger, April 29 , 1775 ,
Tuckerman, Philip Schuyler , p. 85.
'^^John McKesson to George Clinton, June 7 , 1775 ,
Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:195; General
Association of Goshen, New York, April 29, 1775, Calendar
of Historical Manuscripts, 1:5; Association of the 2d
Brookhaven [New York] Company, June 8, 1775, ibid., 48;
General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly Books ,
p. 158; Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress ,
p. 38; Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania
During the Revolution (Harrisburg: R. L. Meyers and Company,
1901)
,
p.Te:
"
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ensure that liberty was obtained. Rush was correct about
independence not being an initial goal of the revolutionary
struggle. In his autobiography, he wrote that "Not one man
in a thousand contemplated or wished for the independence
49
of our country in 1774." Most Americans in 1775--certainly
before the outbreak of the war, and to a large degree after-
ward--en joyed and basked in their place within the British
Empire, as they were perhaps the freest and wealthiest
people in the world. Despite their decade long dispute
with the mother country, Americans, for the most part, were
proud to call themselves subjects of the crown. A
constitutional dependence they accepted ; however , what they
took to be the undermining of that dependence and the
replacement of it by unconstitutional subjugation, they
51
opposed, actively so beginning m the 1760s.
Just as independence was not desired by most
Americans in 1775, neither was war. "The Idea of taking
up Arms against the parent States," Samuel Ward reported
late in 1774 , "is shocking to Us." That fall, George
Washington stated "it is the ardent wish of the armest
^
^Corner , Autobiography of Benjamin Rush , p . 119
.
^"^Baron De Kalb to Due de Choiseul, March 2 , 1768 ,
Kapp, Kalb , p. 64
.
^^Charles Carroll of Carrollton to [Edward] Jennings,
May 29, 1766, Field, Un^ublish^^
ton, D. 117.
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advocate for liberty, that peace and tranquility upon
constitutional grounds, may be restored, and the horrors
52
of civil discord prevented." Americans hoped for peace
during the winter of 1774-1775, many still believing that
it was not too late to accommodate their dispute with the
. , ^ 53
ministry
.
This desire for a peaceful accommodation was due
primarily to the fear many T^ericans had that with war
would come tv;o things they greatly feared: anarchy and
military despotism, both of a domestic variety. We must
remember the ^Vhig leaders, who for the most part were
members of the colonial elite, did not desire a change in
either their social or political environment. They were
basically conservative men, content with their deferential
society. They were planters, doctors, lawyers, well-to-do
54
artisans and farmers, and college graduates. They were
Samuel Ward to John Dickinson, December 14, 1774,
Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the American Revol ution
1766-1775, pp. 176-177; George Washington to Robert MacKenzie,
OcFober 9, 1774, Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington,
3 : 246-247.
^^Joseph Warren to Arthur Lee, February 20, 1775,
Lee, Arthur Lee , 2:265.
^"^J. M. Toner, The Medica]^_Men of the Revolujbion,
with a briefHistory_o^fJLh^:^
C^^TtiHiFE^lTXrmy , Chaining th^e_name^ofJ^arl)^_Tw^^
Hm^dr^cTTh^n^ans (Philadelphia: Collins, 1876), p. 131n.l;
DiTId^HiIi^pl^yT^om King's Col lege_to_ Col umbi^_ 1746-^^^^^^
(New York: ColumbiaTini^ef srt7"Press , 1976), p. 210; Howard
Peckham, "Collegia Ante Bellum: Attitudes of College
24
the conservative ruling class, many of whom sat in the
5 5
colonial assemblies. War for these men meant the
possibility of change in their status. "The Powerful
People" observed one Maryland merchant-planter, "love Ease
and are not fond of Change, especially those that are
5 6
uncertain and tend with danger." War also meant the
possibility of a Cromwell imposing a government upon them
worse than that they labored under. A war also meant a mob
might be unleashed— a mob v/ho , if not creating a state of
anarchy, would at least undermine the stable political and
social structure of colonial America.
The farthest thing from the Whig's minds in 1774-
1775 was that of undermining the domestic
political order.
There was no real "who should rule at home"
debate in most
of the colonies, and even where such
debate took place, it
was relatively insignificant, as the
American Whig leaders
Professors Toward the American Revolution,"
PMHB 95, no. 1
(January 1971) : 70.
^^David Ammerman, In_the_ConHnoi^^
«Bl^_t^^^^Coerc^^
^^^!S'°Ch:rI
'
^^~!?lZof'po'^Ul nn^ Revoluti^
vrrrinia!'^3 : 304 ;'G^^^^^^^
^rologue_to_I^^ PP. ^66-
56stephen West to 7. January 10 ^^^]\' ^.^JfJ^'^^''
Skaggs, Root^i>f_Maryliyil^ '
'
Connecti5TrtrT3?i^i^H^;55cni7i?iF; 1973), p. 152-
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were, at least until the war began, satisfied v;ith their
place both in America and within the Empire. They simply
desired a return by the British ministry to the salutary
neglect that dominated the colonial relationship prior to
George III assuming the throne. According to a convention
in Westmoreland County, Virginia, "That so far from
endeavouring or desiring to subvert our ancient, and to
erect a new form of government, we will, at the risk of our
lives and fortunes, support and defend it as it existed,
and was exercised until the year 1760." Justifying their
meeting, the First South Carolina Provincial Congress stated
they desired neither innovation, alteration, or independence
Their concern was only with stopping the repeated arbitrary
acts of a wicked British ministry. "The universal claim
is," Joseph Reed told the Earl of Dartmouth, "to be restored
to the state we were in 1763, though a line drawn at that
period includes some of those laws to whose principles and
binding authority we are now opposed.
"^"^
It is understandable, therefore, that these Whig
leaders desired a peaceful resolution of their dispute with
the ministry. It is also understandable that they would
^"^Richard Barksdale Harwell, ed . , T^e _Comm itte es
of Safety of Westmoreland and_Fincastle_^ocee_dings_of^^^^
c51IHt^rc^iniTtti^i-1774 State Library Publi-
^^5ns;n5TnrTRTHhS^d : Virginia State Library, 1956) ,
pp. 4 0-41; Hemphill, Extra_ctsJronLthe^^^^
Provincial Congresses of__Soutj2__C_arolHia J^^^^ P- ^^'
jB-^h-R^id-t^^the-E^Firof Dartmouth, [October 15, 1774.],
Reed, Joseph Reed_, 1:83.
employ moderate means to achieve a redress of their
grievances. Thus, beginning in the 1760s, a carefully
controlled and directed protest, put forth in constitutional
terms, was utilized by the Whig leaders. The protest,
beginning with the non-importation associations formed as
a result of the Stamp Act, and continuing with the estab-
lishment of committees of correspondence during the early
1770s, was generally led by a relatively conservative group
of Whigs. They believed that by orderly means, within a
framework of political association , their grievances could
be safely redressed
.
Some forms of mob protest, if not necessarily
encouraged, was acceptable to the VJhig leaders, if they had
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part in directing the actions of the mob. This form of
protest was, however, little used, for it frequently got
out of control and resulted in the destruction of property.
Additionally, many Whigs opposed mob actions, since mobs
only served as an excuse for the ministry to send more
^^Gordon S. Wood, "The Democratization of Mind in
the American Revolution," in Leadership in the Americaji
Revolution : Paper^s_presented at the Third Libr^^j^y_gi
Conq"re¥s"~Sympo'^^ on the American Revo3ajtj^_^_^^ ,
introd'uction by Elizabeth Hammer Kegan (Washington:
Library of Congress, 1974), pp. 63-88.
^^Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution:^
Colonial Radical_s and the Developmen t of American O.PPgsiz.
tIorr"to Britain, T76"5^17 7 6 (New York: Vintage Books, 1972),
pp^T^TsT"
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troops to America. As the colonial protest escalated after
the announcement of the Coercive Acts, concern about mob
5 0
violence increased. John Adams, although calling for the
people to arm themselves, nevertheless desired they remain
peaceful in their protest. "Brutus," in Virginia, raised
a voice against rashness and unchecked violence
,
arguing
prudence and moderation would give greater weight to their
protest. Anthony Benezet, a Quaker leader in Philadelphia,
also argued for moderation, stating they should protest "as
reasonable men [ , ] as Christians." Joseph Warren desired
the Whig leaders to "restrain everything which tends to
weaken the principles of right and wrong, more especially
6 2
with regard to 'property.'"
The Whig leaders responded to Warren's plea by
calling on the people to restrain themselves in their
protest. Even the creation of the Continental Congress
^^Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, October 10, 1774,
Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb , 1 :41-4 2
.
John Adams to Richard Cranch, September 18, 1774,
Butterfield, AFC , 1:160; John Adams to Abigail Adams,
October 7, 1774, ibid., 165.
^^ The Virginia Gazette (Purdie ) , July 14 , 1775 ;
Anthony Benezet to Elias Boudinot, April 17, 1775, Revolu-
tionary War Collection, BPL; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams,
May 26, 1775, Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph
Warren
, p . 4 9 5 .
James Russell Trumbull, Hi_story_of__Nor th^ampt^^
Massachusettsfrom Its Settlement_in^l654 . 2 vols.
TNoFtHampton: Press of Gazette Printing Company, 1902),
2:351- The Essex Gazette, September 20, 1774; Lincoln,
was a move by the Whig leaders towards controlled and
moderate protest
.
During the summer of 1774, despite the calls for
a non-violent response to the Coercive Acts, random and
organized acts of violence against both persons and property
took place, particularly in Massachusetts, v;here Tories and
IVhigs sparred with one another, as well as the soldiers and
citizenry. These confrontations were not limited to
Massachusetts. In Nev; Hampshire in mid-December, upon
learning that British troops were on their way to garrison
Castle William and Mary, the fort at Newcastle, well
organized and directed mobs assaulted the fort, removing
gunpowder and cannon. A similar seizure of powder v;as
made in Charleston, South Carolina, in April 1775, about
three weeks before news arrived regarding the war having
begun in Massachusetts. Mob activities also took place
at the Westminster Court House in the New Hampshire Grants
Journals of Each Provinci al Congress of Massachusetts ,
pp. 7 0"^ 650^651 ; Walker,
~
New Hampshire' s Five Provincial
Congresses
, p . 15 ; Charles Z • Lincoln , The Con stitutional
History of New York , 5 vols. (Rochester: Lav/yers
Co-Operative Publishing Company, 1906) , 1:51-53.
Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine,
September 13, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS; Herbert
James Henderson , Pj^t^l.Pgl.i t ics__in _ the Continental Congress
(New York: McGraw-Hill,' 1974) , pp\ 26 , 34-35'.
^
^The Ma s_sacliu se t t_s _G_a ze_tte ; ^nd._t^hg_Bo5_ton Weekly
News-LetteF~QT~February 23, 17 75 discusses the mob
activrties^in Massachusetts between August 1774 and
February 1775
.
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as Tory Vermonters who supported New York's claim to that
land fought New Hampshire VThigs. Violence occurred in
other colonies as well, thereby contributing to the
unsettled state of affairs in the colonies.
This unsettled state of affairs prompted John Adams
to describe the times as "very discouraging."^^ His wife,
Abigail, late in August 1774, described the colonial
situation as being unsettled, stating "The Rocks and quick
6 8Sands appear upon every side." As 1775 began, Whigs
found themselves with a very volatile situation, as mobs
and anarchy reared themselves from the unrest, and the
threat of war loomed as a real possibility with each British
69
army excursion into the Boston hinterlands.
6 6Theodore Cracket and Martin Andresen, "Fort
William and Mary: A Case Study in Crowd Behavior," HNH
29, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 215, 217-220; Elwin L. Page, "The
King's Powder, 1774," NEQ 18, no. 1 (March 1945): 83-92;
Theodore Chase, "The Attack on Fort William and Mary," HNH
18, no. 1 (April 1963): 20-34; David Duncan Wallace, The
History of South Carolina , 4 vols. (New York: American
Historical Society, 1934) , 2:120-121; Henry W. Bellows,
H
i
storical Sketch of Col. Benjamin Bellows, Founder of
Walpole : An Address, on Occasion of the Gathering of his
Descendants to the Consecration of his Monument, at Walpole,
H . , Oct. lT~, 1854 . With An Appendix, con taining an
accoun t of the family meeting (New York : John A. Gray,
1855)
, pp. 47-48.
r n
John Adams to William Tudor, July 24, 1774,
William Tudor Papers, MHS
.
^^Abigail Adams to John Adams, August 19, 1774,
Butterfield, AFC , 1:142; Same to same, SeptcmJDer 2 , 1774 ,
ibid., 147.
Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, Septem-
ber 13, 1774, Robert Treat Paine Papers, MHS; Philip
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Many Americans believed a peaceful solution could
be found to end their grievances with the mother country.
But most Whigs believed the conspirators in England had
no thought of compromise or accommodation with the colonies.
These Whigs agreed with John Adams, that by the time of the
Tea Party the die had been cast and the "people have passed
the river and cut away the bridge. ""^"^ With the arrival of
the army during 1774 and early 1775, the Whig belief in the
intentions of the ministry was confirmed.
It was not only the American Whigs who believed a
conspiracy had begun. iMany Tories and British officials
believed that a few radical Whigs were responsible for all
the unrest, and that they were conspiring to have the
British North American colonies independent. These American
conspirators, it was believed, had begun agitating for
American independence as much as twenty years beforehand,
sowing the seeds of rebellion primarily in Massachusetts.
One British officer, in Boston during the summer of 1774,
suggested that it would "require a great length of time,
much steadiness, and many troops, to re-establish good
Padleford, ed. , Colonial Panorama 1775: Dr. Robert
Honyman ' s Journal for March and April , p. 41.
"^^John Adams to James Warren, December 17, 1773,
Adams , Works of John Adams, 9 : 333 .
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order & government" in the colonies as a result of the
7
1
damage done by radical I'Jhigs.
Thus, as 1775 began, many Americans and Englishmen
believed the other was attempting to subvert the English
constitution, and that war was a real possibility as a
result. These beliefs were most deeply held in Massachusetts,
particularly in Boston, which by the fall of 1774 had become
a fortified garrison, and a powder keg, much as it had
during the winter of 1769-70, prior to the massacre. Gage
had attempted to calm the people, by keeping military
movements and actions to a minimum. He realized, as did
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one Bostonian, "The spirit of the people want calming."
Nevertheless, he also realized that the presence of his
army needed to be maintained, if the radical leaders were
to be awed into submission. To do this he periodically
sent the army into the hinterlands, both as exercise and
to familiarize them with the terrain should war begin.
One such foray in September almost resulted in war, as
thousands of militia, believing that war had indeed begun,
converged on Cambridge and Worcester, ready to retaliate.
'^"'"Hugh Earl Percy to Edward Harvey [?], August 21,
1774 Charles Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters of Hugh Earj^
Percy fr^om_Bo^on_andJ^\^^ (Boston: Charles E
Goodspeed , 1902), p. 36.
^^Joseph Greenleaf to Robert Treat Paine, Septem-
ber 13 , 1774 , Robert Treat Paine Papers, flHS.
should that be necessary. This demonstration of force by
the Americans led one British officer to remark "this
country is now in as open a state of rebellion as Scotland
was in the year M5." This officer suggested affairs in
Boston v;ere "in the most Critical Situation imaginable."
"Nothing less," he believed/ "than the total loss or
conquest of the Colonies must be the End of it. Either
indeed is disagreeable , but one or the other is now
7 3
absolutely necessary." Gage, agreeing, early in 1775
called on Lord Dartmouth to request the ministry take
decisive action, suggesting a respectable force be put into
the field and the most obnoxious radical Whig leaders
seized
.
^
^
About the time Gage was making his request, the
Earl of Chatham, in the House of Lords, called for the
removal of the British army from Massachusetts because, he
argued, "the very first drop of blood will make a wound
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that will not easily skinned over." On the other side
"^^Hugh Earl Percy to the Duke of Northumberland,
September 12, 1774, Charles Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters
of Hugh Ear]^Percy_£rom_^Bos_to£^ York 1774-1776 , p. 37
Hugh EarT"Fercy to Thomas Percy, October 27, 1774, ibid.,
p. 40.
"^^Thomas Gage to Lord Dartmouth, January 17, 1775,
John Stetson Barry, The History of Massachusetts^ l^ie
Provincial Period , 2:498.
^^Cited in ibid., 502.
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of the Atlantic in Boston, Joseph Warren agreed. "If once
General Gage should lead his troops into the country, with
design to enforce the late acts of Parliament," he predicted,
"Great Britain may take leave, at least of the New-England
colonies, and, if I mistake not, of all America. "^^
Once Gage's soldiers tightened their grip on Boston
and began venturing into its hinterlands, the Whig belief
in a conspiracy increased, as did their belief that a war
77
would soon take place. On January 17, 1775, The Morning
Chronicle and London Advertiser carried a letter from Boston,
dated December 8, 1774, stating "This country is now in open
rebellion; but we have not yet come to the last act, that
of fighting. "^^
With war a real possibility, the conspiracy all
that more apparent, Americans during the surimer of 1774
began preparing for armed conflict. The Continental
Congress, in mid-September, endorsed the Suffolk Resolves,
7 fi
Joseph Warren to Arthur Lee, February 20, 1775,
Richard Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, p. 418
"^"^ Joseph Reed to Mr. DeBerdt, September 26, 1774 ,
Reed, Joseph Reed , 1:81; Abigail Adams to Mercy Otis Warren,
[February 3, 1775], Butterfield, AFC, 1:183; William Eddis
to ?, March 13, 1775, Aubrey C. Land, ed., Letters from
America: William Eddis (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 100; Extract of a letter
from Boston, November 8, 1774, in The London Chronicle ,
January 12 , 1775 , cited in Margaret Wheeler Willard, ed . ,
Letters on the American Revolution, 1774-1776 (Boston:
Houghton Mi f f lirTlZompany , 19 25), p. 6.
7 8 Ibid.
, p. 6
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which suggested Americans begin military preparations, and
at Richard Henry Lee's urging, on the third of October,
recommended the individual colonies attend to the organiza-
tion and discipline of their militia. Even if war did not
take place, it was argued, a disciplined militia was needed
to quell the domestic convulsions which grew with intensity
and number during the fall and winter of 1774 and 1775.^^
Many colonies and individuals, congressional
endorsement notwithstanding, began turning their attention
to military preparations particularly with respect to
forming independent military organizations, as well as
organizing and/or disciplining their militia. During the
late fall of 1774 and throughout the winter most colonial
provincial conventions and congresses encouraged and made
8 0preparations for war. Even where the provincial bodies
did not formally encourage military preparations, such
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Ford, JCC, 1:31-36; 39, 53-54, 54n.; John Adams
to Abigail Adams, October 7, 1774, Butterfield, AFC, 1:165.
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,
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,
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,
7:262-264; Schreevan, Revolutionary
Virginia
,
2:374-375; Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial
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, pp . 3 3, 41, 71; Massachusetts
Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War: A Compilation
from the Archives , 17 vols. (Boston : State Printer, 1896-
1908 ) , 1 :x-xii ; Force, American Archives , 4 th ser.,
1:1031-1033, 1118, 1182; Bernard Knollenberg, Growth of the
American Revolution 1766-1775, p. 178.
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preparations took place, as militia units began improving
themselves and independent military bodies were formed.
These military preparations reinforced ministerial
and Tory beliefs that the radical Whig leaders desired a
The Pennsylvania Journal, and Weekly Adve rtiser
,
December 28, 1774; ibid., March 29, 1775; Selsam, The
'
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776
, pp. 74-75; Charles" H.
Lincoln
,
The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvan ia 1760-
1776
.
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in History, no. 1 (Boston: Ginn and Company for the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, 1901), pp. 210-212; William P. Clarks,
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to the Present Time (Philadelphia: Charles J. Hendler, 1909)
.
pp. 83, 91-92; Graydon, Memoirs
, pp. 122-123, 122n.;
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PMHB 79, no. 1 (January 1945): 15; W. A. Dorland, "The Second
Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry," ibid., 45, no. 3 (1921):
259; Charles Ramsdell Lingley, The Transition in Virginia from
Colony to Commonwealth
, pp. 66, 106-107, 117, 131; Henry,
Patrick Henry
,
1:251-252; Richard Cecil Garlick, Jr., Philip
Mazzei, Friend of Jefferson: His Life and Letters
, The Johns
Hopkins Studies in Romance Literatures and Languages, extra
vol. 7 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), p. 42;
Howard R. Marraro, trans.. Memoirs of the Life and Peregri-
nations of the Florentine Philip Mazzei: 1730-1816 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1942)
, p. 209 ; Rutland, Papers
of George Mason
,
1:210-211, 229-232; The Maryland Gazette
,
December 22, 1774; ibid., January 5, 12, 19, 1775; "The
Baltimore Independent Cadets," MHM 4, No. 4 (December 1909):
372-374; A. A. Gunby , Colonel John Gunby of the Maryland
Line: Being Some Account of his Contribution to American
Liberty (Cincinnati : Robert Clarke Company, 1902) , p^ 27";
Mary Carson Darlington, Fort Pitt and Letters from the
Frontier (Pittsburgh: J. R. Weldin and Company 1892) , p. 201;
J. G. Rosengarten, The German Soldier in the Wars of the
United States (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1886) ,
pp. 13, 33; William Eddis to ?, March 13, 1775, Aubrey C.
Land, ed.. Letters from Ajnerica: William Eddis , p. 100;
Upton, Revolutionary New Hampshire, p. 40; Frank Greene
Bates, Rhode Island and the Formation of the Union , Columbia
University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law,
vol. 10, no. 2 (New York: Macmillan Company for Columbia
University), p. 56n.2; William Staples, Annals of the Town of
Providence, From Its First Settlement, to the Organization
military solution and, therefore, they must be stopped
before a full-scale revolutionary war began. On April 16,
1775, Gage received a letter from Lord Dartmouth telling
him to act decisively with the "rebels." Gage interpreted
this to mean he was authorized to seize the main colonial
military stores at Concord, as well as prominent radical
Whigs, such as John Hancock and Samuel Adams. Therefore,
on the nineteenth of April, Gage marched a large portion
of his army to Concord. At Lexington they were greeted by
the militia, who sttod their ground before them. Shots were
fired, men fell dead in greater numbers than had in the
streets of Boston five years previously. It was not a
massacre, it was war; the American Revolution which had
begun in the minds of many Americans during the 1760s as
they came to believe the British ministry was conspiring
to undermine their liberties and properties, became now
a war for the preservation of their lives, liberties, and
properties, and eventually, their independence.
Joseph Warren, by the evening of the nineteenth,
in his capacity as head of the Massachusetts Committee of
Safety, with the assistance of General William Heath, was
of the City Government, in June, 1832 (Providence: Knowles
and Vose, 1843), pp. 248-249; Paul Francis Gleeson, "The
Newport Light Infantry," RIHSC
,
33, no. 1 (January 1940): 1
o n
John R. Alden, "Why the March to Concord?" AHR
69, no. 3 (April 1944): 446-454.
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attempting to give direction to what was a chaotic situation,
as thousands of militia poured into eastern Massachusetts.^^
By the evening of the twentieth, approximately
twenty thousand militia had formed themselves into a loose
chain around Boston. Not all these men were under control
of military or civilian leaders, as they had simply appeared
on the scene in small groups or as individuals. The Committee
of Safety compounded this problem that evening by calling
on towns to send more men, not specifying particular units.
On the twenty-first, realizing the need to organize and
control the military force in Massachusetts, the Committee
of Safety formally created an army of eight thousand
Massachusetts militia to serve until the end of the year.
On the twenty-second, the Provincial Congress resolved
that a voluntary army of almost twenty thousand be raised
to serve until December, and the next day, the Provincial
Congress decided a combined colonial force of thirty thousand
would be needed. Joseph Warren, who was already in his
capacity as Chairman of the Committee of Safety, attempting
to give direction to the assembled military forces, was on
the twenty-second, elected President of the Provincial
Congress. To assist him, Generals Ward and Thomas were
^^Allen French, The First Year of the American
Revolution (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1934) , p. 48 .
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named senior major generals. A month later, Artemas Ward
was appointed commander-in-chief of the assembled colonial
forces, and during mid-June, Massachusetts appointed three
more major generals, John Whitcomb, Joseph Frye
, and
Joseph Warren, to assist in controlling the military forces. ^'^
The other New England colonies during late April
and May responded to Massachusetts' call for assistance.
Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire sent twenty-
three thousand soldiers, under the capable direction of
Nathanael Greene, Joseph Spencer, Israel Putnam, and John
O C
Stark, to the seige of Boston.
This enthusiasm and support was not confined to New
England. A martial spirit, which had risen during the
winter, increased in intensity throughout the colonies,
with the result of thousands rushing to arms.^^
84 .Lincoln, Journal s of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts
, pp. 148, 520; Willard M. Wallace, Appeal^to
Arms: A M i litary History of^_t^he_An^
York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 27; Richard Frothingham,
Life and Times of Joseph Warren
, p. 4 68; John Gary, Joseph
Warren : Physician , PoITtician , Patr iot (Urbana : University
of Illinois Press, 1961)
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and Sailors of the Revolu tiona ry War , 1 : x iv ; ATTen'"'French
,
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, pp. 72 , 73
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Ibid., pp. 77-78, 77n.5; Willard M. Wallace,
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Revolution
, p. 27~
8 6John Adams to Abigail Adams
,
May 29 , 177 5 , Butter-
field, AFC
,
1:207; John Adams to Issac Smith, Jr., June 7,
1775, ibid., 213; John Adams to William Tudor, July 6, 1775,
William Tudor Papers, MHS; Robert Hooper, Jr. and Reuben
Haines to John Lowdon, August 13, 1775, in Charles Henry
39
Another result of this martial spirit was several
unwanted armed confrontations. In New York City, for
example, in June, when the Royal Irish Regiment was attempt-
ing peacefully to leave the city, Marinus Willett and an
armed mob stopped them and carried off their supplies and
arms, maintaining the city committee's permission for them
to leave peacefully did not include the removal of their
arms. Earlier Willett, John Lamb, and Isaac Sears had a
mob break open the city's arsenal without proper authoriza-
tion. A similar incident occurred in Connecticut, where,
at New Haven, late in April, Benedict Arnold, at the head
of the Second Company of the Governor's Guard, forced the
city's selectmen to turn over the city's powder and ball
to him, or else have it taken by force. In Virginia, during
April, the militia took matters into their own hands and
attempted to force the issue of the Governor's authority
Hart, "Colonel Robert Lettis Hooper: Deputy Quarter Master
General in the Continental Army and Vice President of New
Jersey," PMHB 36, no. 1 (1912): 66; Benjamin Rush to Thomas
Ruston, October 29, 1775, Butterfield, Letters of Benj amin
Rush
,
1:91; Thacher, Military Journal of the Ameri can
Revolution
, p. 16; David Ramsey, The Hi story o^f the American
Revolution
,
2 vols. (Trenton: James J. Wilson, IsTI)
,
1:253;
Report by M. Bonvouloir in Philadelphia, December 28, 1775,
Durand , New Mater ials for the History of the American
Revolution
, pp . 2~, 9l George Gilmer to Thomas Jefferson,
[1775]
,
Papers, Military and Political, 1775-1778, of
George Gilmer, M.D., of 'Pen Park,' Albemarle County, Va . , "
VHSC, new series, 6:103; Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston,
May 11
, 1775, Saunders, NCCR, 9 : 1246 .
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over the colony. They were persuaded from the use of arms
at the last moment by the intervention of Edmund Pendleton
and other Whig leaders.
These military related activities frightened many,
if not most, colonists who hoped for a peaceful resolution
of their grievances. "Why raise a military spirit," asked
one prominent Tory, "that may furnish unmanageable adven-
turers on this side of the water unfriendly to a province
in which you and I have something else to lose?"^^ The
North-Carolina Gazette on the twelfth of May raised a
question that was frequently asked when it stated "The
'Sword is now drawn' and God knows when it will be
sheathed." In Massachusetts, where thousands of armed men
8 7Malcolm Decker, Brink of Revolution: New York in
Crisis 1765-1776 (New York: Argosy Antiquarian, 1964),
pp. 192-193; "Colonel Marinus Willett's Narrative," in
[Henry B. Dawson, intro.], New York City During the American
Revolution. Being a Collection of Original Papers (Now First
Published) from the Manuscripts in the Possession of the
Mercantile Library Association, of New York City (n.p.:
Privately Printed for the Association, 1861) , pp. 53-65;
Decker, Benedict Arnold
, pp. 45-46; Wallace, Traitorous
Hero, pp. 36-37; G. H. Hollister, The History of Connecti-
cut from the First Settlement of the Colony to the Adoption
of the Present Constitution" 2 vols. (New Haven: Durrie and
Peck, 1855), 2:165n.; The Virginia Gazette (Purdie)
,
April 23, 1775, supplement; Edmund Pendleton to George
Washington, April 21, 1775, Mays, Letters and Papers of
Edmund Pendleton , 1:102.
William Smith to Philip Schuyler, May 16, 1775,
Bernard Mason, The Road to Independence: The Revolutionary
Movement in New York 1773-1777 (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1966), p. 174.
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from various colonies had gathered, Whig loaders were quite
concerned about military-civilian confrontations and about
the possibility of a Cromwell rising from out of the ranks.
Samuel Adams was most concerned, primarily because his
colony was the seat of war. From Philadelphia he reminded
one Massachusetts Whig leader that "It is always dangerous
to the liberties of the people to have an army stationed
among them, over which they have not control." "History,"
he observed, "affords abundant instances of established
armies making themselves the masters of those countries,
which they were designed to protect." Most Massachusetts
Whig leaders shared Adams's concerns, especially because
so many of the troops in their colony were not under their
control, and because the army, "if it deserved the name,"
according to John Trumbull, "was an assemblage of brave
enthusiastic, undisciplined country lads," with "officers
in general quite as ignorant of military life as the
,,89troops
.
So as to get a better hold on the military forces
in their colony, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress on
May 15, 1775, ordered that a committee be appointed to
8 9 Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775,
Cushing, Wri tings of Samuel Adams , 3 : 230; John Trumbull,
Autobiogi^pHy ,~Rernrni scens^^ ter_s of John Trumbull,
from "r7"56"'to T8~4l "(New"""York "and" London : "w'i ley and Putnam,
184n 18":
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prepare an application to the Continental Congress desiring
that body to take some measure for "directing and regulating
the American forces." The following day their report to
that effect was adopted, and an appeal was formally made
to Congress requesting they assume responsibility for the
control and direction of the army gathered around Boston.
In making this appeal, Joseph Warren reminded Congress of
the various reasons for the necessity of such a measure,
stating "as the sword should, in all free States, be
subservient to the civil powers; and as it is the duty of
the Magistrates to support it for the people's necessary
defense, we tremble at having an Army (although consisting
of our own countrymen) established here, without a civil
power to provide for and control them." Ten days later,
in a personal appeal to a member of Congress, he wrote that
"unless some authority sufficient to restrain the irregu-
larities of this army is established, we shall very soon
find ourselves involved in greater difficulties than you
m • • ..90can well imagine.
Congress, receiving Massachusetts' appeal on the
second of June, did not immediately act upon it, as other
90Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congres^s_of^
Massachusetts, p. 2 24; Joseph Warren to the Continental
Congress
,
May 16, 1775, Force, American Archives , 4th ser.,
2:621; Joseph Warren to Samuel Adams,~May 26, 1775, Richard
Frothingham, Life and Times of Joseph Warren, p. 4 95.
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questions regarding the war itself had to be answered first.
On the fourteenth, Congress authorized the first Continental
troops: ten companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Maryland, who were to serve one year. Ethan
Allen and Seth Warner, representing Vermont's Green Mountain
Boys, appeared before Congress later in June and, although
that body did not adopt them as a separate Continental unit,
nor endorse their plan for an invasion of Canada, recom-
mended to the New York Convention that these troops be
employed by them under officers of their own choosing. As
Congress was now taking an active role in directing military
affairs, it was suggested they remove themselves from
Philadelphia to Boston to give immediate direction and
control to the military forces there. Realizing this was
neither practical nor necessary. Congress rejected the
suggestion. They did, however, on the fifteenth of June,
resolve to appoint a commander-in-chief of the Continental
forces, who would take direct control of the Continental
91
Army
.
Because the main body of the army apparently was
to be in Massachusetts at the seige of Boston, most New
England delegates to Congress preferred a New Englander
^^Ford, JCC, 2:76, 89 , 91 , 104 , 105; Ward, The
War of the Revolution, 1:139-14 0; James Benjamin Wilbur,
Ira~XlTen"~Founder~ of Vermont 1751-1814. 2 vols. (Boston:
Houghton^Mif f 1 in~Company , 1928), 1:65-67.
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be appointed commander-in-chief. Their first choice was
Connecticut's Israel Putnam, a well-known veteran of the
French and Indian War and currently active at the seige of
Boston. Another New Englander considered a likely candi-
date, if by no one other than himself, was John Hancock.
Philip Schuyler of New York, who, like George Washington
of Virginia, served on all four military committees of
Congress during May and June, was considered by many
9 2northerners as a good choice.
Not all New Englanders were so narrow in their
provincial loyalties that they could not conceive of
appointing a southerner commander-in-chief of a mostly
northern based and soldiered army. Elbridge Gerry, Joseph
Warren, and James Warren, realizing the importance of
demonstrating that the colonies were indeed bound by the
same cause, agreed they could accept a non-New Englander,
such as the professional soldier Charles Lee, or George
9 3Washington, a southerner with military experience. Lee,
the preceding year, had been, with Israel Putnam, named
one of the two "greatest military characters of the present
^^Ford, JCC, 2:53, 79-80, 90.
9 3James VJarren to John Adams, May 7, 1775, "Warren
Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917): 47; Elbridge Gerry to the
Massachusetts Delegates to Congress, June 4, 1775, Austin,
Elbridge Gerry, 1:79.
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age." Thus, by mid June when a vote was taken for the
commanding general, three men stood the highest in the
estimation of the delegates. They were: Washington, Lee,
and Putnam.
Putnam, though thought of highly by many delegates,
suffered in their estimation because at age fifty-seven he
was considered too old for active campaigning. Additionally,
Putnam suffered because of his lack of presence in
Philadelphia where he would be able to lobby personally,
as Lee and Washington were able to do. Lee, a pensioned
British officer, was generally liked by most of the dele-
gates . However
,
many considered him too politically radical
to be trusted with command of a revolutionary army. Another
factor hindering Lee ' s chances of selection for the top
post was the fact he was not a native. Nevertheless, Lee
made certain his presence was felt by the delegates, as he
95frequently drilled regiments of Pennsylvania militia.
As the time approached for voting, it appeared that
Washington had the fewest disadvantages, and most probably,
the greatest advantages.
Washington v;as known to many of the delegates, in
one of his numerous roles in colonial society, such as
^^The Boston_-Ga^zette^_an^
August 22,T7T4T
^^George Cuthbert to John Dalling [1776], "Notes
and Documents," PMHB 64, no. 2 (April 1942): 209.
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soldier, squire, planter, legislator, and member of the
First Continental Congress. One of his early champions,
Benjamin Rush, when Congress met, quickly made certain that
more was known about him, by having reprinted in
Philadelphia's newspapers, part of the Reverend Samuel
Davies's 1755 sermon which predicted the then Virginia
militia major Washington would serve his country substan-
tially in the future. To demonstrate his willingness to
serve in a military capacity, Washington attended every
session of Congress in his militia uniform. Additionally,
he was placed on all four military committees appointed
during April and May.^^ At forty-three, Washington was just
the right age, neither too old for field duty, nor young
enough to be foolish. He seemed perfectly mature enough
for the responsibility that must surely be that of the man
selected to command the colonial military forces. He was
modest, discreet, amiable, virtuous, and as a Connecticut
delegate observed, "Sober, steady, and Calm." Being a
southerner was an important consideration for the southern
delegates who preferred one of their own, as well as some
96
David Freeman Hawke, Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary
Gadfly (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970), p. 130;
John Adams to Abigail Adams, May 29, 1775, Butterfield,
AFC, 1:207; Ford, JCC, 2:53, 78-80, 90.
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northern delegates, who desired to demonstrate the cause
of New England was the cause of all America.
Washington's name was the only one offered in
nomination, and he was unanimously elected. The follow-
ing day, the sixteenth of June, having been officially
informed of his selection, Washington appeared before
Congress and told them he did not want the five hundred
dollars a month salary that had been voted him, as he did
not wish to profit from the cause of liberty. He asked
and received, however, the promise he would be reimbursed
for his expenses, which he would present at the termination
99
of hostilities.
After the selection of Washington, Congress
proceeded to the selection of his major subordinates.
Although some desired Charles Lee to be his chief deputy,
it was believed that a New Englander should have second
place. But instead of selecting Putnam, Artemas Ward,
97 Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, June 17, 1775,
Joseph Trumbull Papers, vol. 1, CSL; see also John Adams
to Abigail Adams, June 11 [-17] , 1775, Butterfield, AFC,
1:215; John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775, Adams,
Works of John Adams , 9:358-359; John Adams to Benjamin Rush,
March 19, 1812, John A Schutz and Douglas Adair, eds .
,
The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush ,
1805-1813 (San Marino, California: The Huntington Library,
1966)
, pp. 211-212 .
^^Ford, JCC, 2:90.
^^Acceptance of Appointment as General and
Commander in Chief, [June 16, 1775], Fitzpatrick, Writings
of v:ashington, 3:292-293 .
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then commanding the troops at the seige of Boston, was
chosen. Charles Lee, because of his experience, was given
the third spot. Putnam was chosen next, because Connecticut
had supplied so many soldiers and Philip Schuyler was chosen
fifth to stimulate a patriotic spirit in New York.'^'^^
On the twenty-second of June, eight brigadier
generals were selected. Seven of them were from New
England, and the eighth, Richard Montgomery, was from New
York. Horatio Gates, a retired British major on half pay,
and a resident of Virginia, was selected Adjutant General
with the rank of brigadier general
.
Although only Gates, Lee, and Montgomery could
actually be called veterans, John Adams wrote his wife
that "Our Army will have a Group of Officers, equal to any
service." She responded a month later from Braintree that
the appointments of Washington and Lee gave universal
satisfaction. Another Braintree resident reported that
10 2everybody applauded the appointment of Washington.
On the twentieth of June, V7ashington was directed
by Congress to enforce discipline, to retain as Continental
"'"^'^Ford, JCC, 2:97, 99 .
'^"Ibid.
,
103, 97.
102John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 18, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC, 1:224; Abigail Adams to John Adams,
July 16
,
1775", ibid., 246; John Thaxter to John Adams,
June 27, 1775, ibid. , 234
.
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troops those soldiers that had already enlisted, and
authorized him to increase his army to a number not
exceeding twice the size of the enemy. The army was
now under some direction and control. Congress and the
colonies now turned their time and attention to the
direction and form of governments.
Besides voicing their concern about an unchecked
military force in their midst and a desire for continental
control and direction of the military forces in their
colony, the Massachusetts Whigs also expressed their concern
about the collapse of the hitherto legitimate governmental
authority. This concern was not exclusively that of
Massachusetts, as it was voiced throughout the colonies,
for it was all too well known from the Whig understanding
of history, that in the confusion accompanying revolutions,
mobs and the military often gained the upper hand and
established their own forms of tyranny over life, liberty,
and property. It was partially because of these fears
and the desire to keep the colonial protest moderate during
1774 and 1775, that the leading Whigs attempted to control
the protest by directing it by and through the committees,
conventions, and provincial congresses. Although these
bodies were of an indefinite tenure, vague in their
authority, and irregular in their mode of functioning, they
1 {)'>,
Ford, JCC, 2:100
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represented, for the Whigs at least, a responsible means
of controlling and directing their protest. War, however,
necessitated strengthening these revolutionary bodies so
as to prevent a governmental vacuum. Therefore, there was
great interest expressed in legitimizing the revolutionary
authorities in their assembled bodies. It must be remem-
bered that the Whigs saw government as the ultimate guarantee
of social order, which was something they, for the most part,
desired to remain unchanged; and believed that liberty could
only prevail within the context of stable political insti-
tutions. Liberty, their desired goal, required order;
order, law; and law, government. Government, legitimate
and stable, therefore, was the key to not only waging a
successful war with Great Britain, but also preventing
domestic anarchy and military tyranny.
Domestic anarchy and military tyranny were indeed
great concerns to most American Whigs during the early
stages of the war, particularly with respect to the need
for establishing legitimate governments. John McKesson,
of New York, worried that unless the New York government
began properly to function, the mob would direct matters
"at their pleasure," and that happening would induce the
Continental Congress "to put the Colony under military
government, directed by a Ma jor-General and an army."
Another New Yorker expressed similar fears. "I fear
Liberty," wrote Alexander McDougal 1 , "is in danger from
the licentiousness of the people on the one Hand, and the
army on the other." "The former," he believed, "feel their
own Liberty in the extreme, and we are too fond from our
Zeal to encourage the latter, for the advancement of the
Public Safety, to connive at many undue exertions of their
Power, which may in the end be fatal to us."''"^'^
Even more than the fear of military tyranny early
in the war, was the fear of anarchy; a fear that had been
ever present from the first colonial protests of the early
1760s. It is not surprising then to find many Whig leaders
calling for the establishment of stable and legitimate
governments as a means of limiting the possibility of
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anarchy taking place. "The great necessity of going
into matters of government as soon as possible," according
to John Langdon, was to do so "before the people's minds
are too much poisoned with that levelling spirit, and while
subordinating to the Powers that Rule (more especially as
104 John McKesson to Deputies of New York Albany,
Dutchess, Westchester, Ulster and Suffolk, December 1,
1775, Force, American Archives , 4th ser., 3:1755; Alexander
McDougall to John Jay, March 20, 1776, Morris, John Jay ,
p. 237.
"""^^John Jay to Alexander McDougall, April 11, 1776,
ibid., p. 254; Caesar Rodney to John Haslet [?], May 17,
1776, Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney , pp. 79-80;
Bernard Mason"r~The Road to Independen ce: The~^evolut ionary
Movement in New York, 1774-1777, p. 140.
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it's of the people themselves) is put in their minds.
In New York, "A Free Citizen" in the ConstitutJ^nal^
on April 24, 1776, stated is government was not firmly
established the "ungovernable fury of a mob" would be
unleashed upon them. Several weeks earlier, John Adams
wrote General Heath that "Government must be assumed or
anarchy reign, and God knows the consequences ." """^^
The consequences, as was earlier mentioned, was the
fear that eventually the military would be forced to do
that which the civil government was originally designed for
and therefore result in the loss of liberty by all Americans,
much as it had happened in England the previous century under
Cromwell and the Major-Generals . This belief was constantly
stated between 1774 and 1776 . ""-^^
106John Langdon to Josiah Bartlett, June 24, 1776,
in "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection," HM 6 , no. 8
(August 1862): 240; for similar view see James Daune to
Robert Livingston, Jr., June 7, 1775, Bernard Mason, The
Road to Independence: The Revolut ionary Movement in New
York, 1773-1777
, p. 174.
"^^^John Adams to William Heath, April 15, 1776,
MHSC, 7th ser
.
, 4:10.
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Probably the colony most concerned about forming
a government was Massachusetts, whose leaders were anxious
about being occupied by an army not completely of their own
making, as well as being concerned about the potential for
mob violence. Besides appealing to Congress in May to
assume control and direction of the army, the Provincial
Congress asked Congress what type of government they should
establish. Congress debated the question of forming govern-
ments for a week before recommending on June 9, 1775, that
Massachusetts adopt a provincial assembly and council based
on their old colonial charter. Acting upon this recommenda-
tion, Massachusetts, during July, adopted such a government . "''^^
New Hampshire and South Carolina also asked Congress for
advice, and were told during the first week in November to
go ahead and establish a form of government suitable to the
people of their respective colonies."'"''"^ Because of the
concern expressed during the winter of 1775-1775 by the
other colonies about their respective forms of governments.
Congress, after long debate, on May 10, 1776, told the
1 OQ
Ford, JCC, 2:76-78, 83-84; Lincoln, Journals of
Each Provinc£al_Conqress of Massachusetts , pp. 2 30, 359.
^^^Meshech Weare to the Continental Congress,
July 8, 1775, Bouton, Documen^s and Records Relating to^
New Hampsh ire , 7:561; J^slah Bartlett and John Langdon to
Matthew^'rhornton , November 3, 1775, ibid., 641; Ford, JCC,
3:298, 307, 319, 326-327.
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provincial governments that where government was insufficient
to exigencies of affairs, they were to adopt such governments
"best conduce to the happiness and safety of their consti-
tuents in particular, and America in general." A preamble,
penned by John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Richard Henry
Lee, explained the resolution was necessary for the
"preservation of internal peace, virtue, and good order,
as well as for the defence of their lives, liberties, and
properties •
With congressional approval for government forming
in May and a declaration of independence proclaimed in July,
Whig leaders eagerly turned their energies and attention to
forming new governments. The first task in each colony was
the agreement upon a constitution or acceptance of the
existing colonial charter, for by doing so they would
legitimat i ze the governments which would give direction and
control to the war effort. The desire to form governments
quickly under new constitutions or existing charters was
not unanimous amongst the Whig leaders, for some believed
that since the war would be either won or lost on the battle-
field, their energies could better be directed to the use
112
of the sword rather than the pen. When Robert Morris
-^^^Ibid., 4:342 , 357-358
-^-^^Speech of William Livingston of New Jersey before
the New Jersey Council and Assembly at Princeton on
September 11, 1776, as reported in Thg^Pennsy Ivania Gazetjz^e,
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learned that the Maryland delegates to Congress returned
to their colony to help draft a constitution, he wrote
Gates that all America seemed to be much too caught up in
constitution making, calling it the fruit of a premature
declaration. "We are disputing about liberties,
Priviledges, Posts, and places, at the very time we ought
to have nothing in View but the securing those objects and
placing them on a footing as to make them worth contending
1 1
O
for amongst ourselves hereafter." ^ Most Whigs, however,
believed that formally forming governments would not only
help prevent anarchy and military tyranny, but would enable
them to better direct military affairs, thereby enhancing
the chances of winning the war. "Nothing will tend more
to Endure Success in the prosecution of the War," argued
Caesar Rodney, for "there is nothing so conducive [to] . . .
114War, as a well Regulated Government." Therefore, many
colonies proceeded to establish governments on sure
political foundations by adopting written constitutions
.
By the summer of 1777, ten states had adopted constitutions,
October 1, 1776; Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson,
November 3, 1776, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee,
1:224 .
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Robert Morris to Horatio Gates, October 27, 1776,
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and two had agreed to retain their colonial charters, it
is somewhat ironic that the state most concerned about
government forming--Massachusetts--did not adopt its
constitution until 1780. During the interim it had relied
on its colonial charter as the basis for its revolutionary
government
.
These relatively hasty fashioned constitutions, and
the governments elected under them, were not, as a rule,
referred to the people as a whole for approval. Although
a democratic impulse had been awakened during the decade
and half before the war, as many people became involved in
the political arena for the first time and gained confidence
in themselves to govern, most Whig leaders, with their fears
of anarchy and mob rule as well as their heritage of
deferential politics, were not too enthusiastic about wide-
spread popular participation in government. The Whig
leaders, even before the war, had attempted to keep all
control and direction of all protest in their hands. But
with the establishment of committees, conventions, and
congresses during 1774 and 1775, the base of political
authority and participation was greatly broadened. By the
spring of 1775, at least seven thousand men had served on
those bodies; thereby, as a result, giving the revolutionary
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governments a good stable manpower pool from which to draw
once the war began. "'""^^
For the most part, the Whig leaders were able to
keep political power in their hands and to write constitu-
tions and form governments under them much as they desired,
despite the governmental process becoming slightly more
responsive to public opinion and the geographic shift of
power in some states. Government may have gone from a
basis upon the King's will to that of the people, but that
did not mean the people could be trusted. They were not,
during the American war for independence."''"'"^
The constitutions for the most part were relatively
conservative in nature and content. In many instances
colonial charters were simply rephrased to reflect the
changed political condition . Rhode Island and Connecticut
did not even bother to write new constitutions, simply
Gouverneur Morris to Thomas Penn, May 20, 1774,
Force, American Archives , 4th ser., 1:342-343; John Adams
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"
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forming new governments under their existing colonial
charters. Similarly, the whole legal system was held
intact in several states, as colonial laws and English
common law remained in force where it did not conflict with
the newly framed constitutions . "^"^"^
Just as continuity with the past was held with
respect to the forms of government established under the
constitutions and the laws remained basically the same, so
did much of the leadership, as many of the colonial elite
took positions in the new governments. Even many funda-
mentally conservative leaders, some of whom became Tories
eventually, early in the war accepted election to the
revolutionary governments on the theory that, as Governor
Franklin stated, "It is, perhaps, best that Gentlemen of
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Property and Sense should mix among these People, as they
may be a means of preventing their going into some Extra-
,,118
vagances. in Delaware, for instance, the Assembly,
attempting to represent both the Whig and Tory complexion
of the state, selected John McKinly their first chief
119
executive. Although the upper houses did become some-
what more representative in both function and composition,
the membership of most of them remained much in the hands
of the elite who had held positions in the colonial govern-
ments. This was, in part, in keeping with the desire to
maintain an aristocratic representation, thereby providing
for a better balance in the newly established governments.''"^^
The other branches of government remained to a large extent
in the hands of the people, or the same class of people,
who had held political office before the war. It has been
estimated that over 20 percent of men holding higher office
during the colonial period assumed positions in the
118Governor VJilliam Franklin to the Earl of
Dartmouth, June 5, 1775 , New Jersey Archives , 1st ser . ,
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revolutionary government. Similarly, it has been estimated
that of the higher officials elected during the revolu-
tionary war--that is, the governors, lieutenant governors,
secretaries, treasurers, attorney generals, judges of
superior courts, and councillor s--at least 50 percent had
held seats in the lower houses of the colonial governments.^^"'"
Even in Pennsylvania, which probably had the most radical
change in personnel, 30 percent of the men elected to its
various bodies in 1776 had prior office-holding experience . """^^
For the most part, the change from colonial status
to statehood was effected with order and regularity, as a
12 3great continuity was maintained with the past. During
the 1790s, Alexander Hamilton supposedly told a French
visitor that "In Europe they always speak of the American
Revolution, but our separation from the mother country
cannot be called a revolution. There have been no changes
121James Kirby Martin, Men m Rebellion, Higher
Governmental Leader s and the Coming of the American
Revolution, pp. 13, 14, 16,^36'," 407~52; Patrick J. Conley,
"Revolution's Impact on Rhode Island," RIH 34, no. 4
(November 1975) : 122
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in the laws, no one's interests have been interfered with,
everyone remains in his place ." "'"^'^
Although forming governments and creating an army
were of major importance in the minds of the whig leaders,
particularly as constructing each carefully would prevent
anarchy and military tyranny, just as important to many was
the necessity of not only keeping the government and mili-
tary virtuous, but the people themselves. Virtue, meaning
the willingness to sacrifice individual self-interest to
the greater good of society, was widely believed by the
Whigs to be the essence of the republicanism they sought
125
to obtain. "Virtue, my young Friend," John Adams wrote
William Tudor, "Virtue alone is or can be the Foundation
of our new governments, and it must be encouraged by Rewards,
in every Department civil and military." "The only founda-
tion of a free Constitution," he wrote a minister, "is pure
124Cited m Robert B. Douglas, trans, and ed., A
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More, Chevalier de Pontigibaud] (New York: D. Appleton and
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Virtue, and if this cannot be inspired into our People, in
a greater Measure than they have it now, They may change
their Rulers, and the forms of Government, but they will
not obtain a lasting Liberty ,
-they will only exchange Tyrants
and tyrannies." The Reverend Samuel McClintock certainly
agreed. "Virtue," he wrote a member of Congress, "is the
basis of a republic." "Without it," he added, "we shall
be in a worse state than if we had remained as we were,"
Samuel Adams, agreeing, wrote late in 1775 that "Virtue is
our best Security ." "^^^
These beliefs about virtue were shared by just about
all Whig and Tory political leaders in America, particularly
the former. The revolutionary generation, well-read in
classical and Whig literature, were ever conscious of the
role of virtue in history, especially in Roman history, but
even more so in their recent history. By the 1750s many
Americans, particularly those visiting Albion, believed the
government , and to a lesser extent , the people , of England
had lost their virtue and had become corrupted. This belief
12 6John Adams to William Tudor, November 14, 1775,
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grew during the 1760s and, by 1770, it was a generally held
view in America that England was so corrupted that the
process of the dissolution of the Constitution and the
Empire had begun. The presence of the standing army in
America was just another evidence of that taking place for,
after all, James Burgh had told them that standing armies
always grow where there is an increase in corruption and
decrease of attention to 1 iberty . "'"^'^
Just as the Puritans one hundred and fifty years
before them, Americans in 1775 to a large extent believed
England had gone too far down the road of corruption,
particularly because of the conspiratorial designs of its
leaders, to be returned to a state of virtue. Therefore,
to most Whigs it was only a matter of extricating America
from the yoke of tyranny, by the most peaceful means
possible. War, however, changed the peaceful means into
those of military conflict. In either case, by 1774,
American Whig leaders had become more concerned about
12 7Ernest Cassara, The Enlightenment in Amer ica
(Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), p. 1707 ChaFle's' Carroll
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keeping the American people froi. becoming corrupted and
losing their virtue, than trying to save England from herself
John Adams in the spring of 1772, preparing notes
for an oration, noted that it was an unalterable truth "that
the People can never be enslaved by their own Tameness,
Pusillanimity, Sloth or Corruption." "The Preservation of
Liberty," he wrote, "depends upon the intellectual and moral
character of the People." His young friend, as noted
earlier, William Tudor, also learned this lesson. Before
a Boston audience on March 5, 17 79, he reminded them that
before a nation is completely deprived of freedom, "she must
be fitted for slavery by her vices." This view was widely
held by most Americans. General Greene, for instance, noted
in his journal during the summer of 1783 that morality and
religion were the great pillars of good government. "Ruin
the morals and corrupt the manners of any people," he
wrote, "and they will soon become the fit instruments of
128tyranny and despotism."
More was just done than talking about the need for
virtue. Beginning during the summer of 1774, as conflict
with England seemed all the more likely, besides often
12 8 John Adams Diary, Spring 1772, Butterfield,
DAJA, 2:58; Niles, Principles and Acts of_the Revolution
in America, p. 37; Nathanael Greene's Journal for
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putting the debate in moral tones, efforts were made to
fortify the people's virtue. The Association established
by the First Continental Congress, for example, urged the
colonies to adopt provisions to discourage extravagance,
dissipation, and to ban such things as horse racing, gambling,
billiards, dances, places, and any type of frivolity. Com-
mittees and conventions throughout the colonies complied,
many having previously done so. During the winter of 1774-
1775, these bans were so generally adhered to, that by the
time the war began, one colonist reported Americans were
under a great influence of moral rectitude. During the war
itself, as will be discussed later, great interest and con-
cern was constantly expressed about the state of the virtue
of the American people. The Whig leaders knew that good
government, a virtuous people, and a well-directed and
controlled army were necessary for victory over both domestic
and foreign enemies. It was assumed that if any of those
three factors faltered, anarchy and military tyranny would
result; the things they feared even more than a military
12 9defeat at the hands of the British army.
1 ?Q
Ford, JCC, 1:75-80; The Virgin ia Gazette (Purdie
and Dixon), July 21, 1774; Saunders, NCCR 9:1025; Thacher,
Military Journal of the American Revolution, p. 17; Hoadly,
Fubnc~~Reco"rds~o"f'"the_Colony of Connecti cut , 14:440 ; Leora
MFEacheFrr'and^rsFber~M
.
Williams, eds. Wi^l^iioS^^Hzl^—
-^i^-*?^"^^
Safety Commi_ttee_Minutes 1774-1776 (Wilmington: Wilmington-
Ne\^ Ha'noverecounty AmerTcan Revolution Bi-centennial Associa-
tion, 1974), pp. 13, 14, 20; Abigail Adams to John Adams,
October 31, 1775, Butterfield, AFC, 1:307.
CHAPTER II
FEAR OF STANDING ARMIES AND
FAITH IN THE MILITIA
After the initial adoption and organization of the
army in Massachusetts, and the selection of the cominander-
in-chief and his subordinate general officers, Congress,
as discussed earlier, turned its attention to the political
arena. This concern about politics, however, was not long
lasting nor complete, as serious questions about the army
had not been sufficiently addressed or answered. For the
most part, these involved the nature of the army and its
length of service. Both related directly to the nature of
the conflict and to the colonial fear of standing armies,
even those of their own making. It was a generally
accepted belief that too small a force would be defeated
before the colonists had a chance to petition for redress
of grievances, and too large a force had the disadvantage
of making the ministry believe that the colonists were
unwilling to compromise and desired a full-scale war and
independence. Too large a force also had the disadvantage
of making the impression on most Americans that Congress
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desired a full-scale war and independence. Another important
consideration concerning the size of the army was the belief
held by most Americans that a large army would pose a threat
to American liberty, particularly if the soldiers, long
enlisted, thought of themselves as, and indeed became, pro-
fessionals. Thus Congress initially decided upon a
relatively small army, not to exceed twice the size of the
enemy, to serve a year. The colonial governments also
limited their military enlistments, in most instances to
the end of 1775, in the belief, and apparent hope, that the
war would be peacefully resolved by then.
Washington, by September, realizing that the war
would probably not be resolved by the end of the year and
that his army would soon disband on him, began urging
Congress to provide for a new army before the time of
enlistments of his present army expired . He preferred a
sizeable army, enlisted for a long enough period so he would
not constantly have to recruit and train it. However, after
meeting with a committee of Congress who came to camp in
October, and receiving the advice of his general officers,
as well as civilian leaders who frequently visited the army,
Washington agreed to the one year enlistments, accepting
the arguments that it was not safe to enlist an army for a
longer period, nor would it be likely he could find men wlio
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would enlist for a longer period."^
Congress, after talking to the committee after its
return from Washington's camp, provided in November for an
army of slightly over twenty thousand, to be enlisted for
one year beginning January 1, 1776.^ Congress believed
they were doing the right thing in limiting the size of the
army, and its length of service for it was widely believed
that a large, long enlisted army would bring with it more
disadvantages than advantages.
By 1775, most Americans believed standing armies,
long enlisted and not subject to proper restraints, to be
a threat to liberty. They agreed with Samuel Adams that
"A standing Army, however necessary it may be at sometimes,
is always dangerous to the Liberties of the people" and
"that standing Armies are formidable Bodies in civil Society
& the Suffering them to exist at any time if from Necessity,
& ought never to be of choice.""^ This attitude had
developed first in England during the seventeenth century,
expanded upon and codified in Whig literature during the
"'"George Washington to Hugh Mercer, September 26,
1776, Fitzpatrick, Wri^tings_^fJ^ashin^ 4:121.
^Ford, JCC, 3:321-322.
^Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7 , 1776, in
"Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917): 197; Samuel Adams
to John Scollay, April 30, 1776, Cushing, Writings of
Samuel Adams, 3:287.
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eighteenth century, and transported to America as part of
the intellectual baggage/ Americans, by 1775, like their
English kinsmen, had a long heritage of fearing standing
armies and a wealth of literature upon which to draw to
justify and reinforce their fears.
Fears and concerns about standing armies began in
England early in the seventeenth century, as the soldiers
of James I and Charles I were perceived as a serious threat
to English liberties. Parliament responded to the fears
and concerns by providing in the 1628 Petition of Right
prohibitions against the peacetime quartering of troops in
private homes and martial law trials of citizens. During
the Civil War concern about standing armies increased,
especially after the introduction of the New Model Army,
Pride's Purge, and rule by the Major Generals. Concern
about the military continued during the Restoration period.
When Clarendon was impeached in 1667, the first charge
levelled against him was that he desired a larger standing
army. Between 1674 and 1677 Parliament adopted numerous
checks against a standing army, and during the Exclusion
Crisis (1678-1681) attempted to disband the army. James II 's
apparent interest in using the army as a tool to coerce his
4
"Answers to Mr. Mason's objections to the new
Constitution, recommended by the late Convention," by
Marcus [James Irdell] (Newbern, North Carolina: Hodge and
Willis, 1788) , in Ford, Pamphlets on the Constitution ,
p. 363.
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subjects renewed intense opposition to the standing army,
especially after he had given command to Irish Catholics
and diverted funds from the militia. This concern about
the standing army was one of the factors causing the
Glorious Revolution in 1688.^
This revolution was for many Americans in 1775 the
central event in English history. Besides establishing
Parliamentary supremacy, Parliament established the princi-
ple in the Declaration of Rights that "the raising or
keeping a standing army within this kingdom in the time of
peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament is against
law." This principle was reaffirmed by Parliament in the
1689 Mutiny Act. This principle was not lost on the
Americans, especially during the 1760s, as their concerns
grew about a standing army in their midst.
^
Interest in standing armies continued during the
1690s, as a whole body of anti-standing army literature
flourished. Among the most notable were Sir William
Temple's Observations on the United Provinces (1690) and
Viscount Robert Molesworth's Account of Denmark, An Account
of Denmark as it was in the year 1692 (1693) . The debate,
Burgh, Pol_iti_caj^ Disquisitions , 2:355, 426; Lois G.
Schwoerer, "No Standing ArmiesjJ|_,"" pp. 3, 18-32, 62-63, 71-72,
95, 136, 146.
^Ibid., pp. 137, 147, 152.
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and thus the literature, increased after peace was concluded
with France in 1697 and the size of the peacetime army was
decided. Between the fall of 1697 and the spring of 1699,
England was engulfed by a pamphlet war on the need for and
size of a standing army in peacetime."^ John Trenchard wrote
the best-knovm pieces against standing armies in a pamphlet,
co-authored with Walter Boyle, entitled "An Argument Showing
That a Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government,
and Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the
English Monarchy" (1697), and in his "A Short History of
Standing Armies in England" (1698)
Although not as intense as during the late seven-
teenth century, debate continued frequently in England
during the eighteenth century, producing a wealth of anti-
standing army literature by Andrew Fletcher, Catherine
Macaulay; Henry St. John, first Viscount Bolingbroke
;
William Blackstone; and James Burgh. Perhaps the best known
works produced during the eighteenth century against stand-
ing armies were those by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,
particularly their "Cato's Letters" which were published
in The London Journal between November 5, 1720, and July 27,
1723; and Joseph Addison's play, Cato, A Tragedy (1713),
7
Ibid., pp. 4, 155-187; Lois G. Schwoerer, "The
Literature of the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1G99,"
HLQ 28, no. 3 (May 1965): 187-212.
72
which opened in Anierica in 1749 and in book form went
through fourteen editions between 1767 and 1787. Probably
the best known work in America was that of James Burgh.
His P^tical_Di^quisiti^^^^
Errprs,_Defects,_andJ.bus_es
,
upor^j;acts_and^i^
Ancient and_Modern, was published in three volumes in
Philadelphia in 1775 and was frequently cited in colonial
newspapers and pamphlets.^
It was not only from the English writers Americans
developed their interest in and concern about standing
armies. They also had in their possession a wealth of
literature regarding the military produced by the classical
writers such as Scipio and Livy. A good nuinber of Americans
were aware of the conspiracies of Tarquin and Cataline,
and even more, of those of Julius Caesar, as well as of
8
,Schwoerer, ^o_St_an(Ung_ArmiesJV;_ pp. 190-19 6 ;
Burgh, Polit i^l_pd^squisa^ion^ 2 : 344 ; Andrew Eliot to
Thomas Hollis, June 28, 1770, "Letters from Andrew Eliot
to Thomas Hollis," MHSC
,
fourth series, 4 (1858): 452;
H. Trevour Colburn, Th£_Lamp_of_Exper^encej^ Whig History
and the Intellectual Origins of the Amerrcarr'Revorutron^
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carol ina^risi",~"r9 65T,
p. 24; Frederic M. Litto, "Addison's 'Cato' in the
Colonies," WMQ, third series, 23, no. 3 (July 1966):
440-477; John Adams to James Burgh, December 28, 1774,
Adams, Work s of John Adams
,
9:351; Charles H. Lincoln, The
Revolut lonary Movement in Pennsylvania 17 60-1776, pp. 2 30^
231; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, " James~^Burgh and
American Revolutionary Theory," PMHS 73 (January-December
1961) : 38-57 .
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the fact that more than half of the Roman emperors were
overthrown by the military.^
Americans also developed their ov^n literature
against standing armies during the eighteenth century
although, for the most part, this literature relied upon
the seventeenth century English Whig literature of
Harrington, Coke, and Sidney, as well as that of
Machiavelli .^^
Contemporary history also played an important part
in conveying Americans to the belief, expressed by Burgh,
that "When a country is to be enslaved, the army is the
instrument to be used. The example of Sweden in 1772
being taken over by the military was well known in America.
The best source Americans had to draw upon to
convince them of the danger of standing armies was the
British army in their midst after 1768. It was this army
which convinced many Americans that England intended them
9Louis B. Wright, Tradition and the Founding
Fathers (Charlottesville: University Press~6F~vrrgTriia
,
1975), pp. 106-116; Charles F. Mullett, "Classical
Influences on the American Revolution," The Classical
Journal 35, no. 2 (November 1939): 97; Burgh ,~ PoITtTcal
Disquisitions
, 2:430.
^^Schwoerer, "No Standing Armie si" p. 19 6.
"'"^Burgh, Poli tica l D isquisitions, 2:349.
''^Ibid.. 370.
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ill-will and helped focus the constitutional debate with
England
.
As early as December 1766, after a temporary visit
by British troops to Boston the previous month , concern
was expressed about a more permanent body of troops being
introduced into that, or any, metropolis. "Virtue and
liberty," Samuel Adams wrote, would be threatened and the
body politic v;ould be greatly injured if indeed any army
came to Boston on a permanent basis.
"'"'^
Large numbers of British troops did come to Boston
in 1768 and, by the summer of 1769, had become the source
of heated debate, as they were viewed as an unnecessary
evil."'"^ At the time of the general election. May 31, 1769 ,
a committee headed by James Otis remonstrated the Governor,
stating the Council had declared the military unnecessary,
reminding him that "the experience of ages is sufficient
to convince, that the military power is ever dangerous, and
-'^Samuel Adams to Dennys De Berdt, December 10,
1766, Gushing, Writings_of Samuel_^dams , 1:112; see also
Samuel Adams to GhristSpher Gadsden, December 11, 1766,
ibid., 108-111.
-^^Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pownall, May 11, 1769,
Frederick Tuckerman, ed . , "Letters of Samuel Cooper to
Thomas Pownall, 1769-1777," AHR 8, no. 2 (January
1901).
30? same to s;me, July 12, 1769 , ibid., 314;
Notes prepared
for' an oration during the spring of 1772 by
John ^^arns in
his diary, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:58; Dickerson,
Bos ton_und_er
Military Rule, pp. 39, 43, 47, 79.
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subversive of free constitutions," and asking the fleet
and soldiers be removed from their city, especially during
the session of the Assembly >^ In June, when Governor
Bernard did not remove the army, the House adopted a set
of resolutions declaring the establishment of a standing
army in peace without their consent was "an invasion of the
natural rights of the people" and its continued presence
was "unconstitutional" and a "dangerous innovation, mani-
festly tending to enslave the people. ""'"^ The troops
nevertheless remained, suffering physical and verbal
harassment throughout the winter of 1768-1769 as passions
about their presence increased unabated. The result was
the Boston massacre of March 5, 1770.
The day after the imassacre, the Boston town meeting
asked Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson to remove the
troops, stating they were "obnoxious to a free people and
''"^The Massachusetts House of Representatives to
Governor Francis Bernard, May 31, 1769, in Bradford,
Speeches of the Governors of^_Ma_ss^achu setts 1765-1775,
pp. 166-167; The House of Representatives Resolution of
May 31, 1769, is in ibid., p. 168.
^^Resolution of the Massachusetts House of
Representatives , June 29, 1769, ibid., p. 178; a similar
resolution was adopted on June 21 , 17 69, ibid
. , p. 174
.
17Samuel Cooper to Thomas Pov;nall , January 1 , 1770 ,
Frederick Tuckerman, ed . , "Letters of Samuel Cooper to
Thomas Pownall, 1769-1777," AHR 8, no. 2 (January 1901):
314 .
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abhorrent to a free constitution The troops were
removed, leaving behind reinforcement to the belief that
living in peace with a standing army was impossible
.
"Let it be the DETERMINED RESOLUTION of every Man," wrote
'Consideration' in Th e New-Hampshir^_Gazette on March 23,
1770, "that a standing Army shall 'never' be permitted in
AMERICA, without the free consent of the House of Commons,
in the province where they reside." The line over which
the ministry could not cross was now drawn in the mind of
many colonists. A determined resolution did indeed greet
the next occupation of an American city, Boston, in 1774.
When large numbers of British troops were introduced
into Boston during the summer of 1774 to enforce the
Coercive Acts, a great protest was raised. The Provincial
Congress quickly informed Gage of their displeasure. He
must surely know, he was told, "that barely keeping a
standing army in the province, in time of peace, without
consent of representatives, is against law, and must be
considered as a great grievance," and that their "lives.
1
8
A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City
of Boston Containing the Boston Town Records, 1770 through
1777 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), pp. 3-4.
19Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis, June 28, 1770,
"Letters from Andrew Eliot to Thomas Hollis," MHSC, 4th ser.,
4:452; John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British
Army i n the Coming of the Tunerican Revolution (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, l965)
, p . 376.
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liberties, and properties" were greatly endangered whilst
under the cannon of his standing army.^°
The Massachusetts Whigs were not alone in protesting
the occupation of Boston. Throughout the colonies many
individuals and legislative bodies expressed opposition,
generally reminding the ministry and its royal representa-
tives in America that keeping a standing army in the
colonies during peace, without the consent of the legisla-
21tures
,
was unconstitutional
.
Concern about standing armies did not end with the
shots fired at Lexington and Concord. Two months into the
war, when a negotiated settlement seemed possible,
resolutions and statements regarding standing armies were
incorporated into such documents as the Virginia Resolutions
on Lord North's Conciliatory Proposal and the Rules and
22Orders of Rhode Island ' s Army of Observation . Fears and
concerns about standing armies were codified during the war
in the colonial declarations of independence , constitutions
20 Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts
, pp. 42-43, 43.
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and bills of rights, which frequently contained prohibitions
on peacetime armies without the consent of the legislature.^^
Fears and concerns were also frequently expressed in wartime
orations, sermons, and pamphlets, including the annual
Boston Massacre orations. Nor did this concern cease with
war's end. Richard Henry Lee, early in 1784, discussing
the possibility of a standing army during peace, wrote James
Monroe that he agreed with the latter 's observation that
the consequence of standing armies v;as the termination of
liberty. "It is really unfortunate for human freedom,
safety, and happiness," he wrote, "that so many plausible
arguments are ever at hand to support a system which both
reason & experience prove to be productive of the great
23Proceedings of the Convent ion of De 1 aware State
Held a t New-Castle on Tuesday the Twenty-Sevinth'" of ~Augi^
,
1776 (wTlmington : James Adams," 1776), p. 2 07n^rnutes~oF~the
Convention of 1776, Hazard, Penn sylvania Archives , third
series
,
10:770; Saunders
,
NCCR"^ 10 : lO^OT; Bouton , Documents
and Records Relating to New Hampshire , 9 : 856 ; WalFon^
Record s of Vermont
,
1:95; Rutland, Papers of George Mason,
1:288; Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American
Revolution (Baltimore : Waver ly Press, 1941), pp. 107, 110;
Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, eds.. The Popul ar Sources
of Pol itical Authority : Documents on the Massachuse tts
Constitution of 17 80 (Cambridge : Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press
, 1966), p. 446; Lewis Preston Summers,
His tory o f Southwest Virginia , 17 7 6 -17 8 6, Washington County
1777 - 1 8 7
O'
TRrchmond""J . L. 'Hi'll Printing Company, 1903),
p. 401.
^^Niles
,
Principles and Acts of_the^ Revolution in
America, pp. 23, T7^3T~'5'5;^6nas Clark, A Sermon^^
Before^H is Excell ency John Hancock^__ Esq, ; Governor;
May 307 TTSl" Being "the Fir st^ bay_of G^enera
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human evils-Slavery . "^^ ^he Confederation Congress agreed
with Lee, establishing in June 1784 only an eighty-man army,
stating that in time of peace standing armies were inconsis-
tent with principles of republican government, dangerous
to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted
into destructive engines for establishing despotism.
The revolutionary generation continued the debate
on the necessity of standing armies during the 1780s and
1790s before finally resolving in 1796 to rely henceforth
on the militia, the bulwark of the republic. This policy
would remain in force, during peacetime at least, until
the twentieth century. At the time of the ratification of
the Constitution, as well as at its drafting, the size and
role of the military were carefully scrutinized and the
resulting debate produced numerous proposed amendments as
many ratifying conventions and individuals believed the
27
military should be more carefully checked. Standing
25 Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 5,
17 84, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, 2:287.
^^Ford, JCC, 26:524, 538-540, 551-553.
27 .Elliot, The Debates m the Several S tate Conven-
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,
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Rutland, Papers of George Mason , 3:998; Richard Henry Lee
to WillianTshippen, Jr., October 3 , 1787 , Ballagh, Let^ters
of Richard Henry Lee , 2:442n.; "Brutus" in The New-York
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armies, "Brutus" wrote in Tl;^Gw-York_Jourr^^^
Register on January 17, 1788, were dangerous to the
liberties of the people, "but I presume it would be useless
to enter into a labored argument, to prove to the people
of America, a position which has so long and so generally
been received by them as a kind of axiom."
A major part of the axiom was that if standing
armies were to exist, they be enlisted for only a short
2 8period. American Whigs, for the most part, in 1775 were
Journal, and Weekly Reg ister, January 10, 1788; "Federalist#41," by James Madison, Jacob E. Cooke, ed
.
, The Federalist
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Philadelphia. With Answers to the principal objections that
have been raised against the system. By a citizen of
America" (Philadelphia: Prichard and Hall, 1787), in ibid.,
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(Boston: n.p., 1788), in ibid., p. 10.
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Austin, Elbr idge Gerry, 1:208; March 4, 1782, Boston
massacre oration by George Richards Minot in Niles,
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, p. 55;
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Fullman and George M. Elsey, intro., Coloni^al^^Soc^iety of
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convinced their safety rested in an army enlisted for a
limited period, generally meaning one year. Two decades
after the war David Humphreys, reflecting on this limited
enlistment period, wrote that the "honest, but unexperi-
enced rulers, were so much more alarmed at the very name
of a standing army to be raised from their own countrymen,
than they were at the ravages of the enemy, as to neglect
levying soldiers for the war until our cause was reduced
29to extreme danger .
"
Humphrey's observation was indeed accurate, as the
military were greatly hampered by limited enlistments early
in the war.^^ Montgomery's unsuccessful attack on Quebec
was unadvisedly attempted on the night of December 31, 1775,
simply because his army's term of enlistment was up the next
31day. Washington and the other generals complained about
Montgomery's defeat and the fact that their own army, in
the middle of a seige, would be soon disbanding, stating
29 David Humphreys to Governor Trumbull, September 23,
1803, David Humphreys, The Miscellaneous Works of David
Humphreys (New York: T. and J. Swords, 1804), p. 362.
"^^Pierce Butler to [Arthur Middleton?] , March 21,
1776, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of
Hon. Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of
Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926): 140.
31 Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, December 5,
1775, Force, American Archives , 4th ser., 4:188-190; George
Washington to President of the Continental Congress,
February 9, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:315.
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they knew of no other example in history of such a thing
happening. Washington also complained that short
enlistments were hurting his attempts to discipline his
army, which in turn hampered any attempt to take Boston or
prevent defeat should the British army attack.
Montgomery's defeat and Washington's complaints
about the size and state of his army prompted some members
of Congress to contemplate the possibility of extending the
term of enlistment, or at least, making military service
more attractive, thereby getting one year re-enlistments
at the beginning of the year. In January 1776, the subject
of enlistments was raised in Congress, with the suggestion
of three years or for the war enlistments being made. The
northern colonies
,
adamantly opposing either suggestion
,
caused the debate on enlistments to be curtailed . But
debate on the pressing subject of enlistment could not be
put off for long, and in late February in was renewed with
vigor. Some delegates v;anted an army enlisted for the war;
others for a year ; still others for a limited period
,
generally set at three years. John Adams was not opposed
3 2 Same to same
,
January 4 , 1776 , ibid . , 208
;
Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, Box 1, WLCL.
^^George Washington to Joseph Reed, February 1,
177 6 , Fit zpa trick, Writings of Wash^^g jgjl^ 4:300; George
Washington to President of the Continental Congress,
ibid
.
, 316 .
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to some soldiers being enlisted for the war, but did not
believe the whole army should be. Roger Sherman was opposed
to any soldiers being enlisted for the war, believing it
not only dangerous, but putting those enlisted into a state
of slavery. James Wilson, realizing that compromise was
needed, suggested the least dangerous system be adopted,
which he stated to be the fixing of the number of men needed
for each campaign be enlisted only, and only for that
34
campaign. This debate produced no system, as no agreement
could be reached among the delegates as to the safest means
of enlisting their army. Learning that no decision had
been made, and quite disappointed about Congress's apparent
lack of backing the military in their needs, Charles Lee
wrote Washington that the New England delegates believed
that "by means of a shorter engagement the whole country
v;ould be soldiers . A curious whim this . Who the d-1 can
fill their heads with such nonsense?" He suggested
Washington impress upon Congress the absolute necessity for
longer enlistments
.
Richard Smith Diary, January 19, 1776, Burnett,
LMCC, 1:319; James Duane, Notes on Debates, February 22,
1776 , ibid., 360-361; John Adams Autobiography, Butterfield,
DAJA , 3:371, 388.
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,
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Washington had no immediate reason to make such a
request, because in mid March the British evacuated Boston,
and the need for a large, long enlisted army disappeared.
This situation was short-lived, however, as a large British
army arrived off New York late in June and American forces
in Canada were forced to retreat. Interest in the state
of the army was thus renewed both in and out of Congress,
as many believed that the war was to be prolonged and
therefore a large, long enlisted army would be needed.
This became even more necessary once the resolution for
independence had been introduced in Congress in June and
declared in July. Debate was renewed on the enlistment
question, and late in June Congress agreed to offering a
bounty of ten dollars to induce men to enlist, and provided
for a three year enlistment. Congress did not rely
completely on longer enlistments to improve America's
military capacity, deciding earlier in June that temporary
troops could be raised for limited periods to meet emergen-
cies. Thus, a ten thousand man "Flying Camp" was authorized
by Congress to serve until December 1, 1776. This force,
under an officer appointed by Washington, was designed to
protect New Jersey and Philadelphia, while Washington and
3 6the main army remained in New York.
3 6Elbridge Gerry to Horatio Gates, June 25, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC , 1:506; John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons,
June 22 , 1776 , Hall, Samue l Hold en Parsons , p. 45; Ford,
JCC, 4:412-413; 5:418, 483, 508.
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On August 21, 1776, Washington's ari.y was soundly
beaten on Long Island and within weeks Manhattan fell.
Enlistments waned, as the American forces retreated. A
ten dollar bounty was all but meaningless as an inducement
for enlistments, particularly with inflation making
substantial state bounties seem all that more attractive.
Washington, who had been somewhat hesitant and circumspect
in his appeals to Congress for a more permanent and regular
army, in September appealed for a longer enlisted army, one
that could be enlisted for the war, thereby making it
subject to the discipline needed to defeat the British army
in what was increasingly appearing to be a protracted
37
struggle. "The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the
Evils to be apprehended from one, are remote," he wrote
Congress, but for the lack of one ruin would result. His
general officers expressed similar beliefs, as they began
their own lobbying campaigns. Mercer, who Washington
appointed commander of the "Flying Camp," wrote Congress
that "Enlistments for a short period is the bane of military
37George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, September 2, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings
of
^
Washing ton
,
6:5-6; Same to same, September 24, 1776,
ibid
.
, 109 ; George Washington to Philip Schuyler,
September 4, 1776, ibid., 11; George Washington to Lund
Washington, September 30, 1776, ibid., 137.
3 8George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, September 24, 1776, ibid., 112.
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service/' maintaining that "numbers and discipline must
prevail." Heath wrote one member of Congress that victory
would only happen when America had a regularly enlisted and
disciplined army, which, he stated, could not be achieved
as long as Congress and the states relied upon the militia
and short enlistments. Similarly, Greene argued that with
an army engaged for the war, disciplined, and properly
officered, "everything is to be expected. "^^
Many members of Congress sympathized with the plight
of the generals, particularly after the report of a commit-
tee of Congress placed the blame of the Canadian setback on
short enlistments, and as Washington retreated before the
enemy, with his force diminishing in size on a daily basis.
Yet, John Adams reported that Congress, because of the fear
many members had of a large, long enlisted standing army,
would not provide for a large, well-disciplined, long-
enlisted, and well-compensated army; at least not at the
39Hugh Mercer to the Continental Congress,
Sepgember 4, 1776, Force, American Archives , 4th ser.,
2:158; William Heath to John Adams, July 20, 1776, MHSC
,
7th ser., 4:11; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene [?],
September 28, 1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael
Greene , 1:303.
"^^Ford, JCC, 5:617.
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41present time. Adams underestimated, somewhat, the
willingness of his fellow congressmen to compromise their
principles and fears to practical realities, especially
after the declaration of independence. Treason, after all,
was punishable by death. Thus, during the late summer of
1776 more delegates were willing to accept, and in some
cases demand, that Congress adopt three years or for the
war enlistments, with proper inducements to assist recruit-
42
mg. One delegate, shortly after learning of the Long
Island defeat, explained that it might have been a good and
proper idea at the beginning of the war to have had long
enlistments, but they did not because they had no money,
provisions, nor government. Now they had all three, and
it was, he suggested, necessary to have a long-enlisted
43
army. Noticing the change of attitudes of his fellow
delegates, Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph Trumbull that
41John Adams to Samuel H. Parsons, August 19, 1776,
Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons , p. 46; John Adams to William
Heath, August 3, 1776, MHSC , 7th ser., 4:14-15; John Adams
to Henry Knox, August 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC , 2:61.
^^North Carolina Delegates of the Continental
Congress to the North Carolina Council of Safety, August 10,
1776, Saunders, NCCR, 10:740; Arthur Middleton to William H.
Drayton, September 14, 1776, Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator,
"Correspondence of Hon. Arthur Middleton: Signer of the
Declaration of Independence," SCHGM 27, no. 3 (July 1926):
144 .
^^Josiah Bartlett to [Nathaniel?] Folsom,
September 2, 1776, "Declaration of Independence," HM, 2d ser.,
5, no. 5 (November 1868): 213.
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"Congress seems now determined to have an Army of some
Duration and to give sufficient Bounties for the purpose;
I wish it had been sooner acceeded to, but We must move
4 4
with the Waters."
Early in September, a committee of the whole
suggested raising ninety regiments for a five year period
unless sooner discharged by Congress. One delegate,
believing this necessary, wrote the Governor of his state
that "the liberties of the country
. . . cannot be estab-
lished but by a large standing army." Another wrote his
Governor that "a powerful army of regular troops must be
46
obtained, or all will be lost." After two weeks of debate.
Congress on September 16, 1776, decided to raise eighty-
4 7
eight battalions to serve for the war. The President of
Congress, in a circular letter to the states, explained this
44 Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, September 12,
1776, Burnett, LMCC , 2:84.
45Josiah Bartlett to William Whipple, September [ ],
1776, [Alfred Langdon Elwyn] , Letters by Josiah Bartlett,
William Whipple, and Others. Written Before and During the
RevoTuFion TPhTTadeTphia : Henry B. A"shmead, 1889), p. 44.
"^^William Ellery to [Nicholas Cooke]
,
September 7,
1776, Staples, Rhode Isl and in the Continental Congr ess,
p. 84; Richard Henry Lee to Governor Patrick Henry,
September 15, 1776, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee,
1:215.
"^"^Ford, JCC , 5:762 ; Robert Morris to George
V7ashington, March 5 , 17 77 , Sparks, Correspondence .of_the
American Revolution, 1:348.
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decision, stating that "Without a well disciplined Army,
we can never expect success against veteran Troops; and it
is totally impossible we should have a well disciplined
Army, unless our Troops are engaged to serve during the
.,48
war
.
Before this enlistment policy could be implemented.
Forts Washington and Lee were captured and Washington's
army suffered defeat at White Plains. Morale declined and
with it, so did recruits, despite the encouragements and
efforts by Congress, the States, and individuals to spur
4 9
men to the colors. Also hampering enlistments was the
bounty war waged betv;een Continental and state recruiters.
The state recruiters had a decisive advantage, as they were
able to offer higher bounties for less time in service than
their Continental counterparts. Additionally, Congress had
cut the avenue off for those who desired to enter the
Continental Army for a short time, when they only provided
for the war enlistments. To ameliorate this latter diffi-
culty, Congress offered an option of a three year enlistment.
4 8President John Hancock to the Several States
(Circular), September 24, 1776, Burnett, LMCC , 2:99.
4 9
John Adams to Abigail Adam.s, October 8, 1776,
Butterfield, AFC , 2:140; President John Hancock to the
Rhode Island General Assembly, October 9, 1776, Bartlett,
Record s of Rhode Island , 8:31, 32; Nicholas Cooke to William
Ellery", November 30, 1776, Staples, Rhode Island in the
Continental Congress, p. 102.
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with all the benefits earlier offered except the one hundred
acres of land.^° The other difficulty, that of the bounty
war, was not subject to such quick solution, as the states
were adamant in their desires to protect themselves first
before concerning themselves with the safety of the conti-
nent as a whole.
The states, besides maintaining a regular militia
establishment, also raised what were known as State Troops.
These soldiers were generally raised to defend the state
where they were raised. They were paid and equipped by the
states; engaged for full-time service for a fixed period of
time, ranging from three months to three years, depending
upon the state and the time during the war in which they
were raised. Unlike the militia, they often received a
bounty for their service; and they took orders from the
state governments, not from the Continental Congress or
Continental officers. Not all state troops fit this com-
posite description, for some were not paid, but lived off
plunder; some served under Continental officers; some were
not required to serve full time and some served outside
their state. Very few state troops, indeed, fit the
description just given; but neither do they fit either the
description and definition of militia or Continental
soldiers. The exact number of such troops that served
^°Ford, JCC, 6:944-945.
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during the war is unknown. However, the ficjure must have
been considerable for many states provided for such troops
as a regular part of their military establishment
.
While the states bolstered their own defense at the
expense of the common good during 1776, Washington faced a
very critical situation as the year came to a close, as his
army was almost non-existent. A week before Christmas he
wrote his brother that unless every nerve was strained "the
52game is pretty much near up." He placed the blame for
this state of affairs on short enlistments and the insist-
ence of the states upon relying on the militia.
Washington did more than just complain to his
brother. He set about planning some sort of an offensive
to catch the British off guard, thereby giving some credence
to hopes of eventual victory. Additionally, he began lobby-
ing the civilian leaders for a larger, more permanent army.
Fred Anderson Berg, Encyclopedia o f Continenta l
Army Units : Battalj^ons, Regiments and Independent Corps_
THFrrrsburg
,
Pennsylva"nia : Stackpole Books, 1972), pp. 117-
119; Albert E. Van Dusen, Connect icut (New York: Random
House, 1961), p. 150; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History
of Georgia, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company,
rs 8 3T,~Tr2 8 1 ; Chandler, Rev?!^
3:25; Peele, Lives_of_Dist ingui^hed_!^rt}^ P- 63
George Washington to John Augustine Washington,
December 18 , 177 6 , Fitzpatrick, Wrrting£_o£JVash d^g
6:398 .
^^Ibid., 398; George Washington to Lund Washington,
December 10, [-17], 1776, ibid., 347.
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He informed them that he did not lust for power but needed
more troops, enlisted for the war, because short enlistments
and the militia were not remedies for the critical situation
in which the new states found themselves- He was joined
in his lobbying by General Greene, who informed one Governor
that "Short enlistments has been in a great measure the
Source of all the misfortunes that we labour under." Greene
realized that Congress in the beginning of the war "by
attending to speculative principles rather than real life
their maxims in War have been founded in folly," However,
he believed that Congress "in time will be as able
Politicians in military matters as they are in civ[i]l
55Governm [e] nt .
"
Their complaints fell on deaf ears, particularly
after Washington's successes at Trenton and Princeton, for
it appeared Washington, supported by temporary forces, would
be able to win the war that spring. Besides, it was
frequently argued, large, long enlisted, armies were ever
dangerous, and expensive. Thus, rather than taking active
measures to assist Washington with his forthcoming spring
S 4
George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, December 20, 1776, ibid., 402; George
Washington to Governor Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776,
Bart let t, Reco_rd^ of Rhode Isla nd, 8:113,
^^Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 21,
1776, Sho\^an, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:375.
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campaign. Congress resorted to expedients, which they
believed were safer and cheaper.
The major expedient was calling on the states to
draft their militia to fill up the Continental battalions,
something that General Lee had suggested during the fall
of 1776, when the army was desperate for men. Congress in
April 1777 suggested a militia draft and the following
year recommended that such drafts be for nine months
service. By the time Congress had made their recommendation
about a draft, both Massachusetts and New Hampshire had
5 6
already adopted procedures for drafting militia.
Many believed that a draft would cause many to
join the Continental battalions and receive a bounty, rather
57
than being drafted and receiving nothing. This did not
happen, as men refused to serve, even if drafted, or, if
they did serve, were more willing to join a state unit for
a larger bounty and a shorter term of enlistment. "Drafting
^^Charles Lee to James Bowdoin, November 30, 1776,
"The Lee Papers," NYHSC 5 (1873): 323-324; Ford, JCC
7:262-263; 10:200; John Henry, Jr., to the Speaker of the
Maryland House of Representatives, H. R. Nicholas, March 6,
1778, Browne, Mairylaj2d_Arc^^ 16:528; Bouton, Documents
and Record s Relating to New Hampshire , 8:760; Jonathan
Smith, ~'^^Uovj Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the
Revolution," PMHS 15 (October 1921-June 1922): 350, 350-351,
357 .
^^Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, April 29,
177 7 Lee , Memoi r of the Lif e of ^iclwd_Hen^r>^L^ 2:38,
94
in any shape is so unpopular a measure," Washington was
informed late in 1778 by Edmund Pendleton, "that our
Assembly have laid it aside and depend for recruiting our
Regiments upon high bounties only, which I fear will fail,
as 'tis difficult to reach the Point of avarice now in
fashion .
"
Besides being unpopular with most Americans, it was
also disappointing to V7ashington and the other military
leaders. Most states were unwillinci to draft for more than
a year, and several states only required three months
59 . .
service . Addi t lonally , another complaint lay with the
fact that some drafted militia were not incorporated into
Continental battalions and thus served under their own
officers
,
frequently of their own choosing . Despite the
shortcomings of the militia drafts, a system of which
Washington called a waste of time, men drafted often pro-
vided the strength the army needed to get through another
campaign, particularly in the south late in the war. Even
^^Edmund Pendleton to George Washington, December 22,
1778
,
Mays, Lette£S_ai2dJPapers^jo£_Ed^
1:276-277.
"
^^George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, May 17,
1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 96; Clark, NCSR
12:574-577 , 661-663; Hugh F. Rankin, The J^qrtli_Caro^^
Continentals (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Pre'ssT 1971) , p. 246; Jonathan Smith, "How Massachusetts
Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS 55 (October 1921-
June 1922) : 354
.
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Greene, who generally opposed using militia in any form,
urged the southern states to fill up their Continental
battalions by the militia draft.
In addition to calling for a draft, Congress also
requested, as they had no authority to require, the states
to send militia to the assistance of the Continental forces.
Often Washington and other general officers were delegated
the authority to make such calls. These calls usually
requested service for a limited period, generally three
months. In several instances, the states complied, sending
their militia where they were needed for periods ranging
6
1
from one month to a year.
Another expedient Congress resorted to was calling
for volunteers, either individually or by units. Throughout
the war voluntary or independent military units were formed
in most states, often at the suggestion of state authori-
ties, but generally as a result of military necessity.
6 0George Washington to William Livingston, June 18,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 19:28; Nathanael
Greene to Abner Nash, December 15, 1780, Greene, Nathanael
Greene , 3:88.
^"""Ford, JCC, 3 : 324 , 414 ; 8 : 666-667 , 711-712; 10:88,
309-310; 11:684; 15:1108, 1331; 20:58, 635, 720. Circular
to the States from Washington and the Congressional
Committee at Camp, June 2, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 18:468-470; James B. Jackson, "Our Forgotten
RegTm'enTtT^The Second Delaware Militia, 1780," DH 9 , no. 1
(April 1960): 7-8, 10, 13, 18, 44; Jonathan Smith, "How
Massachusetts Raised Her Troops in the Revolution," PMHS
55 (October 1921-June 1922): 349-350, 356-361.
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Congress in the spring of 1778 called on "young gentlemen
of property and spirit" to form volunteer troops of light
horse to serve until the end of that year.^^ Volunteer
light horse units were frequently employed during the war,
as young men established such units in Virginia, North
6 3Carolina, and Maryland. Volunteer infantry units were
also formed, frequently for frontier defense, but they also
saw duty during major campaigns, such as in Rhode Island
64m 1778. Besides the volunteer units, many individuals
served as volunteers, frequently as aides-de-camp, such as
6 2
Ford, JCC, 10:213-215.
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, ...The Virginia Gazette (Dixon-Hunter)
,
April 20,
1776; The Maryland Gazette
,
May 28, 1779; The Maryland
Council to General George Washington, July 10, 1780, Browne,
Maryland Archives
,
43:218; [Amos Blanchard] , The American
Biography: Containing Biographical Sketches of the Officers
of the Revolution, and of the Principle Statesmen of the
Period, to which are added the Life and Character of
Benedict Arnold, and the Narrative of Major Andre (Wheeling
,
Virginia: F. Kenyon, 1833)
, pp. 291-292 ; Peele, Lives of
Distinguished North Carolinians
, pp. 60-61; Edward McCrady,
The History of South Carolina in the Revolution 1775-1780
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1901), p. 615; Edward
McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution
1780-1783 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1902), p. 13;
Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental
Army, p. 187.
64Ezekiel Price Diary, August 4, 5, 7, 1778, "Items
from an Interleaved Boston Almanac for 1778, Being a Diary
of Ezekiel Price," NEHGR 19, no. 4 (October 1865): 334 ;
Patrick Henry to George Washington, March 29, 1777, Sparks,
Correspondence of the American Revolution , 1:361; Thwaites
,
The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 1775-1777 , p. 225; Evans,
Thomas Nelson, pp. 73-77; Coleman, St, George Tucker , p. 49.
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James Monroe and St. George Tucker. Members of Congress,
as will be shown in a later chapter, also served as
volunteers
.
While Congress relied on expedients as the safest
and cheapest means of v;aging war, Washington suffered
military setbacks during 1777 and 1778. He and the other
generals blamed these setbacks on the civilian leaders who
preferred to rely on short term enlistments and short term
troops, rather than filling up the Continental battalions
•
General Wayne told the chief executive of Pennsylvania that
the salvation of his state depended upon filling up their
Continental battalions and not relying upon substitutions
.
Similarly, General Greene told John Adams that in order for
Congress to be feared, loved, and respected both at home
6 7
and abroad, the army must be established in its full force.
Washington often wrote public officials about the problem
Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National
Identity (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971), pp. 33,
33-34; Stevens, A History of Georgia , 2:130.
^^Baron De Kalb to Comte de Broglie, December 25,
1777, Kapp, Kalb , pp. 138-139; William Heath to George
Washington, March 21, 1778, Wade, This Glorious Cause ,
p. 127; Mordecai Gist to Robert Munford, October 24 , 1780,
"Letter of Genl. Gist to Col. Munford," MHM 4, no. 4
(December 1909) : 369
.
^^Anthony Wayne to Thomas Warton, February 10, 1778,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archive s, 1st ser., 6:251; Nathanael
Greene to~^ohn AdamsT^May 7, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg,
"The Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and
John Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 52.
of temporary expedients and short enlistments, telling the
chief executive of Pennsylvania, for example, that "No man
dislikes short and temporary inlistments more than I do.
No man ever had greater cause to reprobate and even curse
the fatal policy of the measure than I have."^^
Washington was realistic enough to realize that
Congress did not intend for him to lose the war, but at the
same time he knew Congressional policies based on fear of
standing armies and military tyrannies might result in
military defeat. He believed Whig jealousies of standing
armies and fears of military conspiracies were, under proper
limitations, proper because "standing Armies are dangerous
to a State," However, as he reminded a friend, America was
at war, where the American soldiers were "Citizens having
all the Ties , and interests of Citizens , and in most
cases
. . . totally unconnected with the Military Line."
Therefore , he believed , "We should all be considered
,
Congress
,
Army , &c . as one people , embarked in one Cause
,
in one interest; acting on the same principle and to the
same End." The army, he maintained, was not aiming at
unreasonable powers in calling for a larger, longer
6 8George Washington to Joseph Reed , August 2 2
,
1776, Fitzpatrick. Wri tings of Washing ton , 16:152; see
also George Washington~to the President of the Continental
Congress, November 18 , 177 9 , ibid . , 17:127.
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enlisted army, nor were they "naking strides, dangerous,
or subversive of Civdl Author ity ."
Many civilian leaders agreed with Washington and
his generals that the army should be made more numerous and
permanent, because the army and its leaders, had demon-
7 Dstrated they could be trusted. Besides, as one member
of Congress wrote the chief executive of his state, "the
danger of meeting an enemy disciplined and hardy with new
troops every campaign is alarming '^'^ Yet, opposition to
a large, long-enlisted army, remained strong. Throughout
the war the figure of a Cromwell with a well-disciplined
army at his comraand lurked in the imaginations of many
72Whigs. "I should despair of our cause," wrote one of
those who feared the army, "if our country contained 60,000
men abandoned enough to enlist for three years or during
69George Washington to John Banister, April 21,
17 78 , ibid. , 10 :290, 290-2 91, 291, 292.
70John Page to Arthur Lee , March 12 , 17 78 , Lee
,
Life of Arthur Lee
,
2:323; Robert Morris to the Commissioner
for American affairs in Europe , March 28 , 1777 , "The Deane
Papers," NYHSC 20 (1888): 34; James Madison and Theodorick
Bland to Thomas Jefferson, [January [23?] , 1781] , Boyd,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson , 4:436.
71Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 25,
1778
,
Burnett, LMCC, 3 : 100
.
72 Boston massacre oration of March 5, 1779, by
William Tudor, Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution
in America, pp. 37-40.
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the war."^^ if the militia and other temporary expedients
were not sufficient to assist Washington, it was argued,
certainly the French army would once it arrived in force. "^^
Washington, who was somewhat unwilling to make an
issue out of the size and duration of his army during 1779
,
began to vigorously lobby in 1780, hoping he could persuade
the civilian leaders of the necessity of giving him a more
permanent and well-supported army. In 1779, he had not
done so because Congress, he realized, needed to get its
own house in order before it could properly respond to his
pleas. Additionally, Congress in 1779 was making some
attempts on their ovm to get men to enlist, although not
for as long as V7ashington would have desired. But in
1780, with the appearance of the French army, Washington
believed that with a well-disciplined American army, the
allied forces would be able to defeat the British.
Using all the old arguments in 1780
, he explained
that short enlistments were expensive; hurt prisoner of war
exchanges; resulted in military setbacks; and that disci-
pline was hampered as the officers were forced constantly
7 3Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 1 , 1777,
Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Ru sh, 1:157.
Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 12,
17 80, Austin, Elbr idge_Ge£ry , 1:306.
"^^Ford, JCC, 13:388 .
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to be drill instructors, spending half the year getting the
troops into the field, and the other half in discharging
them. With a raw and undisciplined army, engaged for a
short period of time, he believed America was neither
ready for the purposes of offense or defense, and that the
British would continue to be tempted to keep fighting.
Only "Regular troops," he told Congress, "are equal to
7 7the exigencies of modern war." "In a word," he believed,
"short enlistments has been the primary cause of the
continuance of the War, every evil which has been experi-
7 8
enced in the course of it."
Greene joined Washington in lobbying for a more
79permanent army. He told Governor Burke that "Short
7 6George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, July 18,
17 80, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings of Washington, 19:195; George
Washington to Samuel Washington, August 31, 1780, ibid.,
481-482; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, July 10, 1780, ibid., 143-149; Same
to same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 408-410.
77George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 15, 1780, ibid., 20:49.
7 8George Washington to Samuel Washington, August 31,
1780, ibid., 19:482; see also George Washington to Fielding
Lewis, May 5 [-July 6,], 1780, ibid., 31.
^^Nathanael Greene to William Greene, September 5,
1780, RIHSC 6 (1867): 266; Nathanael Greene to Lewis
Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC 8 (1876): 468; Nathanael Greene to Thomas
Sim Lee, November 10, 1780, Browne, Maryla nd Archives 45:176;
Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody, December 8, 1780,
Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 2 (December 1823): 374.
102
enlistments are the bane of service," and Governor Nelson
that "Short enlistments are dangerous, and can give no
permanent security." "Don't be deceived, and trust your
liberties to a precarious force," he told Governor Nash.^°
"Nothing can save this country but a good permanent army,"
he wrote Knox, as well as the President of the Continental
Congress and Governor of North Carolina. This observation
seemed all the more valid after the defeat at Camden.
Washington believed if Congress would support him
by drafting the militia into the Continental Army to serve
the remainder of the war, or at least three years, he would
be able, with the help of the French, to subdue quickly the
British forces on the continent. A shorter period, particu-
S 2larly less than a year, he called "inadmissible."
Washington had civilian support in his desire for a more
8 0Nathanael Greene to Thomas Burke
,
April 8 , 1782
,
Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1) , Nathanael
Greene to Thomas Nelson, Jr.
, [1781] , Johnson, Nathanael
Greene
,
2:183; Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 15,
1780 , Greene , Nathanael Greene , 3:88.
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George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 19:408, 411
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83permanent army. Even Samuel Adams, a prime mover in the
process of conjuring up fear of standing armies, believed
it was wrong to carry on the war with temporary and
O A
expensive drafts of militia.
Congress, on October 3, 1780, adopted a wide-ranging
program to reorganize the army. Besides reducing the army
to fifty regiments of infantry. Congress called on the
states to fill up their lines for three years or for the
war, but stated that one year enlistments were acceptable.
The program was sent to Washington for his comments, which
he immediately provided. He was understandably upset.
Two months earlier he had told Congress short enlistments,
particularly one year enlistments, were "inadmissible."
Besides informing members of Congress and friends of his
opposition to congressional encouragement and acceptance of
8 3Nathaniel Peabody to Josiah Bartlett, August 6,
1780, Burnett, LMCC , 5:313; William Gordon to Horatio
Gates, October 5, 1780, "Letters of the Reverend William
Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799,"
PMHS 63 (October 1929-June 1930) : 440; John Hancock
inauguration address of October 25, 1780, reported in The
Independen t Chronicle. And the Universal Advertiser
,
November 4, 17 80.
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Samuel Adams to James Warren, November 20, 1780,
Cushing, Writings of Samuel Adams , 4:221.
^^Ford, JCC, 18:893-897; Samuel Huntington to
George Washington, October 4, 1780, Burnett, LMCC , 5:404;
George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, October 11 , 1780, Fitzpatrick, VJri
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short enlistments, he sent a circular to the states giving
reasons why he opposed short enlistments. He explained to
Jefferson that "\Vhile we preserve in the system of short
enlistments we shall experience misfortune and disgrace,
and ultimately, if it is persisted in we shall most probably,
lose the cause in which we are engaged. "^^ He confided in
John Mathews that his appreciation of congressional
jealousies of standing armies had previously kept him from
expressing his sentiments, but his silence would now be
"criminal" as "we are tottering on the brink of a preci-
8 7pice." Mathews and Duane explained to Washington that
Congress had given great weight to his views in their
deliberations, but the desire for economy and the necessity
of having short enlistments to enable those whose enlist-
ments would end on January 1, 1781, to re-enlist under terms
8 6George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, October 10,
1780
,
ibid., 186; Circular to the States, October 18, 1780,
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Washington to Horatio Gates, October 8, 1780, ibid., 137;
George Washington to William Fitzhugh, October 22, 1780,
ibid., 246-247; George Washington to George Mason,
October 22, 1780, ibid., 242.
George Washington to John Mathews, October 4,
1780 , ibid . , 115 .
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favorable to them, had prompted Congress to encourage one
year enlistments.^^
Initially, Washington hoped Congress and the states
would reject one year enlistments in favor of three year or
for the war enlistments. By the end of 1780
, this seemed
unlikely. Benjamin Lincoln reported from Massachusetts,
v;here he had gone to lobby, that the state would raise
troops for three years, but not for the war.^^ Reports
from other states were just as discouraging, if not more
so. Congress would not change their policy either.
Washington, instead of complaining, resigned himself to work
with what he had and hoped the French army could bail
America out of the critical situation they found themselves
in 1781. Washington did not push Congress on the issue of
the army because Congress, much to his approval, was attempt
ing early in 1781 to improve itself in its executive
functions, which he believed would enable them to better
provide for the army. Washington, it is true, did not
complain to Congress, but he was nonetheless displeased
8 8James Duane to George Washington, October 10,
1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:414-415; John Mathews to George
Washington, October 17, 1780, ibid., 422-423; Same to
same, October 30, 1780, ibid., 432.
89 Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington,
November [ ], 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letter Book, vol. 2,
p. 51, BPL.
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with congressional policy regarding the army, and frequently
shared his displeasure with family and friends.
By limiting the size and duration of the army, the
civilian leaders believed that the likelihood of a military
tyranny would be lessened. They also adopted two other
measures to ensure that they would not be faced with a
Cromwell. The first was reliance upon the militia. The
second was the insistence upon civilian control of the
military, be they militia or Continentals.
The first American troops at Lexington and Concord
were the militia and minutemen of the surrounding area.
Within several days, they were joined by militiamen from
Massachusetts and the neighboring colonies. Initially, it
was assumed that they would, numbering over twenty thousand,
be sufficient for a seige of Boston until the British
ministry withdrew the soldiers and Coercive Acts once they
realized the resolution on the part of the colonies to
resist both. The militia, it was also assumed, were adequate
to prevent domestic anarchy and to keep the Tories in their
place. Additionally, it was believed the militia were the
safest and cheapest means by which to fight the British, as
^^George Washington to John Parke Custis,
February 28, 17 81, Fitzpa trick. Writings o f Washington,
21:319; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, March 25,
1781, ibid., 375; George Washington to Fielding Lewis,
June 28, 1781, ibid., 22:283; George Washington to Richard
Henry Lee, July 15, 1781, ibid., 384.
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well as the internal enemies. "The sword, in the hands
of free citizens," Jonas Clark stated in the 1781
Massachusetts election sermon, "is the protection of
society; and the safety and defence of a people truly brave,
92truly free," Echoing a similar belief several years
earlier, Benjamin Rush expressed the desire of many by
stating, "The militia began, and I sincerely hope the
militia will end, the present war."
Americans during the eighteenth century v/ere reared
in the belief that a well-regulated militia, composed of
the so-called gentlemen freeholders, was not only the
natural strength but the only stable security for a free
94
state. Even Greene, who came to be highly contemptuous
91 Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams
, 3:250; Samuel Adams to
Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775, ibid., 230; George Mason
to Martin Cockburn
,
August 5, 1775, Rutland, Papers of
George Mason
,
1:245; George Mason to George Washington,
October 14, 1775, ibid., 255-256; Hemphill, Journals of the
General Assembly and House of Representatives 1776-1780
,
pp. 64, 67-68.
92 Jonas Clark, A Sermon Preached Before his
Excellency John Hancock, Esq.; Governor ;... May 30, 1781
,
p. 65
.
9 3Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 1, 1777,
Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush , 1:157.
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The Virginia Gazette (Pinkney) , February 2, 1775;
The New-York Gazette: and the Weekly Mercury , December 26,
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1776 to 1792 (Dover: James Kirk and Son, TsW) , p . 4 7 0 ;
March 23, 1775 resolve of the Virginia Convention, Boyd,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, l:161n.; Schwoerer, "No Stand-
ing Armies ! " , p. 194
.
108
of the military ability and character of the militia,
admitted to Jefferson that the militia were the "Great
9 5Bulwark of Civil Liberty." Benjamin Rush believed the
militia, when "properly commanded and led" wore "the best
troops in the world, especially in a war and country like
96
ours." So strong was this belief in the safety and
strength of the militia, it was codified in most state
constitutions and other fundamental declarations, as well
9 7
as in the Articles of Confederation. It was a faith that
existed just as strong after the war, codified not only in
the Constitution, but was the premise upon which the
American military establishment was based for over a
9 8
century. Forty years after the war, John Adams stated
95Nathanael Greene to Governor Thomas Jefferson,
November 20, 1780, Boyd, Papers of Thoma s Jefferson,
4:130-131. ^
"
96Benjamin Rush to Horatio Gates, February 4, 1778,
Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:199.
9 7
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1784, Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Le e, 2:287.
^^Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The FederaUsts
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that "neither schools, nor colleges, nor town meetings have
been more essential to the formation and character of the
nation than the militia. "^^
This faith in the militia developed early in
America. From the first settlement, the primary organized
defense against external and internal enemies was the
militia. This was more so during the seventeenth than
the eighteenth century, before the British regulars had
appeared in any significant numbers. The early militia
organizations were developed in each colony on much the
same lines as those they had left behind in England
.
By 1671 almost every colony had a formally organized
militia. These militia were adapted to the peculiar
environment and circumstances of each colony; although in
1957), p. 9; Luther Martin to the Maryland Legislature,
January 27, 1788, Elliot, The Debates in the Several State
Conventions
,
1:371; for debate in Virginia, see ibid.,
3:380, 384, 400, 588; for proposed amendments concerninq
the militia, see ibid., 1:328, 335; 3:659; 4:245.
99 John Adams to W. H. Sumner, May 19, 1823,
[William H. Sumner], Inquiry Into the Importance of the
Mil itia to a Free Commonwealth: In a Letter from William H.
Sumner,... to John Adams... with His Answer (Boston : Cummings
and Hillard, 1823), pp. 69-70.
"
^^*^Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States
Army (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 3-12; Douglas
Edward Leach, Arms for Empire: A Military History o f the
British Colonies in North 7\jnerica, 1607-1763 (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1973) , pp. 1-41.
"'^'"Lois G. Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies ! " , p. 14,
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most colonies they were subject to royal authority in the
form of the Governor who, acting as commander in chief,
issued commissions and directed the disposition of the
militia in his respective colony. Generally, militia
service was compulsory for all males between 16/18 and 45/60,
depending upon the colony and the time. Training usually
consisted of muster days: two to four days in the spring
on a compnay level basis and two to four days in the autumn
on the battalion level. As a rule, during peacetime, these
musters were not taken seriously. Besides a few short
drills and musketry practice, most muster time was spent
in food and drink as many viewed these gatherings as social
events. Actual service was usually limited to duty within
the colony, keeping with the English precedent of not
allowing trainbands to be taken outside of their counties
102
except if England was under actual invasion.
102
Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the
Seventeenth Century , 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company,
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1963): 175-185; H. Telfer Mook , "Training Day in New
England," NEQ 11, no. 4 (December 1938): 675-697; Douglas
Edward Leach, "The Military System of Plymouth Colony,"
ibid., 24, no. 3 (September 1951): 342-364; Robert W. Kenny,
Ill
With the introduction of British regulars into the
colonies in greater numbers during the wars of the eighteenth
century, reliance on the militia declined. During the Seven
Years War, however, there was a revival in militia training
and utilization, and the development of "Alarmist" companies,
which were the progenitors of the minutemen. With peace in
1763, interest in the militia declined once again, but a
decade later, the militia once again regained popularity,
as it appeared the militia were America's first line of
defence against the British should war begin. Once the war
began, it became a rather quickly established belief amongst
most Whigs that the American militia were among, if not the
best soldiers in the world. This belief became fixed in
the minds of many Americans, and remained relatively undis-
puted for over a century.
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,
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At a meeting of citizens in a park in New York City
on August 10, 1814, Marinus Willett told the gathering that
he was living witness to the fact that the American militia
were equal to the contest with British regulars. With the
militia he stated, "I have met them when their numbers were
double mine; and I have routed and pursued them."''"^-^ To
a degree these were the exaggerated words of an old man
reflecting on past glories, hoping they v/ould spur on a
patriotic spirit in the current generation to meet the
British regulars again as confident militiamen. There was
a touch of truth, however, to his statement, as Willett
was a relatively successful officer leading the militia
during the Revolutionary War. Other officers also had
successes with the militia, as at times the militia fought
well, although it was generally in conjunction with
Continental troops.
The militia behaved admirably at the battles of
Bennington, Oriskany, Saratoga, King's Mountain, Cowpens,
Springfield, and during numerous minor encounters during
104 . .
the southern campaigns. Thus, to a degree, faith m the
militia was justified. Nevertheless, problems existed in
"I
n T
Willett, Marinus Willett , appendix 10, p. 152.
"""^^Edward McCrady, The His tory of South Carolina
in the Revolut ion 1775-1780, p. 7 04; Robert C. Pugh, "The
Revolutionary Militia in the Southern Campaign," WMQ , 3d
ser., 19, no. 2 (April 1957): 154-175.
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using the militia. Some of the more obvious, i.e.,
plundering, lack of discipline, and the quality of the
militia officers, will be discussed in a later chapter;
the others, involving their worth, real and imagined, need
to be discussed here in order that we may understand the
militia in the context of their time, not as Marinus Willett
had, forty years after the fact.
A major problem with the American militia during
the Revolutionary War was that they often operated under
inadequate, narrow, and provincial laws that made it very
difficult to even mobilize the militia. Even when a
mobilization was called for, that was no guarantee the
militia would turn out, particularly when such calls were
made at times when the militia preferred to protect their
own homes or during the planting season .'^^^
Silas Newcomb to William Livingston, October 4,
1777 , William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1) ;
Philemon Dickinson to William Livingston
,
September 16
,
177 7, Sedgwick , William Livingston , pp . 24 4-24 5; Drayton
,
Memoirs of the American Revolution
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Lincoln Letter Book, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Micro-
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17 80, Boyd , Papers of Thomas Jefferson , 4:55; Lachlan
Mcintosh to George Bryan, December 29, 1778, Hazard,
Pennsylvania Archives , 1st ser., 7:132.
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It was also difficult, once the militia responded
to mobilization calls, to force them to remove from their
local area. The militia laws additionally made it
difficult, if not impossible, for the militia of one state
to come to the assistance of another state. "'^'^ And even
David A. Bernstein, "William Livingston: The Role
of the Executive in New Jersey's Revolutionary War," in
William C. Wright, ed.. New Jersey in the American Revolu-
tion I I, Papers Presented at the Fourth Annual New Jersey
History Symposium, December 2, 1972, Held by the New Jersey
Historical Commission at the State Museum Auditorium
(Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1973), p. 15;
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Manuscripts
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James R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke) , The Rear Guard of the
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when the militia were mobilized, and allowed to leave their
states, a problem existed with respect to their length of
service. Most states limited field duty to a fixed number
of days per tour of duty, often as few as ten days at a
108time
.
Because of the limitations placed upon them by
these restricting militia laws, military leaders constantly
complained they could not always use the militia when, where,
109
and how they were needed most. Often at crucial times
the militia enlistments or terms of service terminated and
108Mathias Williamson to William Livingston,
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they departed the field, despite the pleas of those that
remained behind . '^"'"^
But even when the militia were used, many times
they were quite deficient as they were generally not well
prepared for battle, nor well lead into it. As was stated
earlier, the colonial militia were, for many decades,
regarded as more of a concept of defense than a regular
system. Most colonies did not seriously train their
militia. Nevertheless, great faith was placed in them as
the proper and sure means of defense, even when they
demonstrated they were inadequate in the field, and examples
of them being so were numerous. Washington and others
blamed the disastrous campaign of 1776 on the militia. The
militia were also faulted for the failings of the Rhode
Island campaign of 1777, the American defeat at Minisink
in 1782
,
the losses at Boundbrook in 1777
,
and Norwalk in
1779, where, in the latter two instances, the militia
deserted in the face of the enemy. The militia also fared
poorly during the Danbury raid in 1777, and during the
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December 31 , 177 5 , Nathanael Greene Papers , vol . 1
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southern campaign, most notably at Camden, Guilford Court
House, and Blue Licks
Governor Jefferson was informed that the militia
in the south had one goal in mind, that being to avoid
action, as "Their greatest Study is to Rub through their
Tower [tour] of Duty with whole Bones." General Lincoln
told the President of South Carolina that the militia were
undependable
,
as they spent all their time trying to get
out of service. Washington complained late in the summer
of 1780 that "'No Militia' will ever acquire the habits
necessary to resist a regular force." Richard Henry Lee
earlier observed that "for sudden exertions the militia
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, September 17,
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certainly do well, but they cannot bear the continued
discipline of Camps and campaigns.""'"-'-^
Yet faith in the militia persisted. Besides the
belief in the dependability and safety of the militia, many
civilian leaders believed they were cheaper to use than a
regular military establishment
.
^"^^ Military leaders
constantly complained to these civilians of the high cost
of keeping the militia in the field. Greene complained
112Edward Stevens to Thomas Jefferson, February 8,
1781, Boyd, Papers ofJIlpmas_Je 4:562 ; Benjamin
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Thomas Conway to the Supreme Executive Council of
Pennsylvania, August 17, 1777, "Letters Colonial and
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that the militia, "like the locusts of Egypt, have eaten
up everything, and the expense has been so numerous, that
it has ruined the currency of the State." He told one
southern governor that "I think it an endless task to
attempt to arm and equip all your militia. Such a waste
of arms and ammunition as I have seen in different parts
of this state, is enough to exhaust all the arsenals of
Europe
.
Greene believed the use of militia was more than
just a waste of money. He believed it "the greatest folly
in the world to trust the liberties of a people to such a
precarious defence.""'""'"^ Other officers shared this opinion,
particularly after the disastrous campaigns of 1776 and
117
1777. General Wayne and his chief subordinates called
the militia a mere "passing cloud" that should not be
"^''"^Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781,
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118relied upon. General Stark, although successfully
commanding militia forces during 1777, stated he could not
put any dependence upon them.^^^ Heath told Washington
"It is vain to trust the militia. "^^0 ^^^y^^^^^^^ ^^^^
to this opinion very early in the war and became one of the
more outspoken critics of the militia system as it existed
during the war.
By the summer of 1776, Washington believed, as he
told Congress, the militia should not be relied upon,
because "To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly,
resting upon a broken staff." "To attempt to carry on the
War with Militia against disciplined Troops," he later told
Congress, "would be to attempt what the common sense and
common experience of Mankind will pronounce to be impracti-
121
cable." To the states he sent a circular during the fall
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,
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of 1780 telling them the idea of carrying on the war with
militia was "chimerical," declaring "I never was witness
to a single instance that can countenance an opinion of
Militia or raw troops being fit for the real business of
122fighting." He told his brother "the dependence which
the Congress has placed upon the militia has already
greatly injured and I fear will totally ruin our cause. ""^^^
General Lincoln joined Washington and Greene in
lobbying the civilian leaders to stop relying on the
militia and to put their faith and money, as well as their
enlistment energies, in regularly enlisted Continental
124
soldiers. It would be misleading, however, to suggest
that most critics of the militia wanted to do away with
them. From the beginning of the war, the militia were seen
by many whigs as a useful force, serving as escorts, guards.
122 Circular to the States, October 18, 1780, ibid.,
20:209.
12 3George Washington to Jack Washington
,
September 22, 1776, ibid., 6:96; also see his letters to
Lund Washington, December 10 [17], 1776, ibid., 347 ; to
same on September 30, 1776, ibid., 137; to John Augustine
Washington, December 18, 1776, ibid., 398; to the President
of the Continental Congress , December 20, 1776, ibid., 402;
and to Gouverneur Morris, May 8, 1779, ibid., 15:25.
12 4 Benjamin Lincoln to the President of the
Continental Congress
,
February 13 , 17 79
,
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Letterbook
,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers , MHS (Microfilm Reel
3 ) ; Ben j am in Lincoln to President Rawl ins Lowndes ,
January 12 , 17 79, ibid
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and in other limited duty, as well as, when trained
adequately, serving in conjunction with Continental
125troops
.
Because of the apparent usefulness of the militia,
as well as the reality of the states being unv/illing to
not rely on them, some Continental officers believed the
militia should be better prepared for the tasks they should
be expected adequately to handle. One officer. Baron von
Steuben, took an especial interest, primarily because of
his general interest in the discipline in the Continental
Army. In April 1779, he informed the executives of several
states he had devised a plan of general principles and rules,
which he enclosed, whereby, if adopted and applied, would
enable the militia to be more effective
,
particularly upon
those occasions when they acted in concert with the
1 2 GContinental troops.
12 5George Washington to Robert Howe, August 9, 1779,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 16:67; VJashing ton ' s
Circular to the"sFatis7 October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:209;
Robert Carter Nicholas to the Virginia Delegates in Congress
November 2 5, 1775, Boyd , Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 1:268;
Elbridge Gerry to [Samuel Adams], October 9, 1775, Austin,
Elbridge Gerry, 1:117; Samuel Adams to James Warren,
January~77~r7T6
,
Gushing
,
Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:251.
"""^^Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, April 20,
1779, Revolutionary V7ar Collection, BPL; Baron von Steuben
to Jonathan Trumbull, April 20, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser.,
2:389-390; Baron von Steuben to Joseph Reed, April 20, 1779,
Hazard, Pennsylvania A_rchives, 1st ser., 6:325; Baron von
Steuben to^Geofge Clinton ,' April 20, 1779, Hastings, Public
Papers of George ClJjn ton , 4 : 738-739 .
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Other officers, unlike Steuben, believed the problem
did not rest completely on the lack of discipline. The
major problem, they argued, were the militia laws which made
it difficult, and frequently impossible, to utilize the
militia to their best advantage . "^^"^
Hoping that the states would correct their deficient
militia laws, Washington, beginning in 1779, appealed to
Congress to request the states to put their militias on a
more respectable footing, and under such regulation as would
enable them to assemble rapidly when called into service . '''^^
The states did not quickly nor adequately respond to the
calls made by Washington and others to improve their militia
laws and the militia. Some civilian leaders did not
attribute the deficiencies of the militia to the militia
themselves nor the laws governing them, but to the general
12 9officers, including Continental generals , who led them
.
127William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of
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9 (January-June 18 97 ) : 411 ; Brunhouse , The Counter-
Revolution in Pennsylvania
, p . 39 ; John R. Anderson , "The
M i 1 i 1 1 a"Law"rn~Revo lu t ion a ry Nev; Jersey," PNJHS 76, no. 4
(October 1958): 282; ibid., 77, no. 1 (January 1959): 9,
12 ; Richard Dallam to Thomas Sim Lee , January 16 , 17 81
,
Browne
,
Maryland Archives , 4 7 : 20-21
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12 8George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 25, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington , 15:143-144.
John Adams to Abigail Adams, October 15, 1777,
Butterf ield, AFC, 2:354.
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Others, also unwilling to directly face the problems of the
militia, debated the civil rights question regarding the
raising of the militia and their service. "^^^ Such debate
caused General Moultrie to tell the President of the South
Carolina Senate that "by contending too much for the
liberties of the people you will enslave them at last;
remember, my friend, it has alv;ays been the maxim of all
communities, to abridge the people of some of those
liberties for a time, the better to secure the whole to them
in the future." Similarly, Governor Harrison told his
legislature that "Our fears of despotism seem to be carried
too far for a time of War and may in the end deprive [us]
of that Liberty we are contending for & bring on us the most
131
abject slavery."
Random militia successes, particularly early in the
war, convinced many Whigs that the militia, as constructed
and used, was indeed the bulwark of the country's defense
and, therefore, the state legislatures were lax in changing
their militia laws and state executives were frequently lax
"1
-3 QCharles C. Pinckney to General William Moultrie,
February 3, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs o f the American
Revolution , 1:299-300.
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William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney,
February 11, 1779, ibid., 311-312; Benjamin Harrison to
the Speaker of the House of Delegates, May 6, 1782,
Mcllwaine , Of f icia]_L£ttGr s_jDf_the_Gave£nors^_o^^
3:217.
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enforcing them. This was especially true after the militia
TOO
success at Bennington in 1777. The defeat of the militia
at Camden, however, awoke many to the dangers of relying
on the militia. The greatest defenders of the militia
realized that unless the militia system was improved, not
only would military defeats continue, but the proponents
of a large, long enlisted standing army, might be able to
do away with the militia system completely
. This was
something the ardent Whigs did not desire. Forty years
after the war, John Adams expressed the Whig view held by
most of the revolutionary generation, that being that
"Whenever the militia comes to an end, or is despised or
neglected, I shall consider this union dissolved, and the
liberties of North America lost forever.
"
132 James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, August 31, 1777,
Gardiner
,
Warren-Gerry Correspondence
, p . 79 ; Nathanael
Greene to Joseph Reed, March 18T"T7 81 , Hugh Talmage Lefler
and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of a Southern State:
North Carol ina , rev. ed., p. 226.
133 .
VJilliam Gordon to Horatio Gates, October 5,
1780, "Letters of Reverend William Gordon: Historian of
the Revolution 1770-1799," PMHS 63 (October 1920-June 1930):
44 0; James Madison and Theodorick Bland to Thomas Jefferson,
[January 23? , 1781] , Boyd , Papers of Thomas Jeffe_rson,
4:436; James Warren to Elbridge Gerry, August 31, 1777,
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, p . 79 ; James Warren
to John Adams , August 10 , 1777, "Warren-Adamis Letters,"
MHSC, 72 (1917) : 349.
^^"^John Adams to W. H. Sumner, May 19 , 1823,
[William H. Sumner] , Inquiry Into the Impor tance_of_the
Militia to a Free^ Commonwealth
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Seeing the militia under so much reproach, and
desiring to maintain it as the safeguard of the liberties
of America, many state leaders by mid war, and many more
by 1781, were calling for their state legislatures to enact
more effective militia laws, for as Governor Hancock told
the people of Massachusetts in his 1780 inauguration address,
it was the militia upon which "the safety of the Commonwealth
135naturally rests." Similarly, in Virginia, a committee
of the House of Delegates late in 1782, in calling for a
better militia law, stated "that a permanent body of
disciplined citizens is the only safe defence of any
136
republic." The state legislatures responded in many
instances to the demands for improving the militia laws."^^"^
135 .Cited m The Independent Chronicle, And the
Universal Adverti ser
, November 4 / 1780 .
~
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May 8 , 1779, Sparks , Correspondence of the American Revolu-
tion, 2:295-296; Thomas Burke's Address to the North
Carolina General Assembly, June 9, 1781, Clark, NCSR ,
22:1033; Speech of John Rutledge to the South Carolina
General Assembly, June 9 , 17 82 , Moultrie , Memoirs of the
American Revolution , 2:311.
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Despite the satisfaction the Continental officers
must have felt with the improved militia system beginning
in many states by 1780, there existed the ever present fear
that Continental battalions would be neglected and not
filled up. With the British occupying New York, Charleston,
and several other major cities in 1780 and 1781, it was
obvious to many that only successful seiges could be under-
taken by troops that could be depended upon to remain at
their posts in a disciplined manner for an unlimited period.
Only Continental troops fit this description, it was
13 8
argued. Simultaneously with the call for an improved
militia came reminders of the limitations of the militia.
Greene believed, as he told Jefferson, the militia could
serve some useful purpose "if they are not depended upon
as a principal but employed as an Auxiliary," reminding him
that "if you depend upon them as a principal the very nature
of the War must become ruinous to the Country. " In a
similar vein Washington told the Governor of Rhode Island
that the militia were only good for 1 ight parties to
skirmish, as they lacked firmness which was only acquired
James Madison , 5 : 308 .
Henry Knox to George Washington, Draft, May 23,
1780, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^5); George
Washington to the Cominittee of Cooperation of Congress,
May 25 , 1780 , Fitzpatrick, Writings J:^^ shing ton , 18:418;
George Washington to Daniel Brodhead, July '4, 1780, ibid.,
19:119.
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by habits of discipline and servicp "t ^e. i mean not to detract
from the .erit of the
.ilitia," he wrote, "their zeal and
spirit upon a variety of occasions, have entitled them to
the highest applause; but it is of the greatest importance
we should learn to estimate them rightly." Despite the
questioning of the nature and value of the militia, Joseph
Reed frankly admitted to Greene, "we must give up the
contest or cherish the militia . "l^^ And to a large degree,
the militia were cherished, often at the expense of military
efficiency. American Whigs feared any military body, even
their own militia. But of all military bodies, the militia
seemed the safest, as they were civilians temporarily in
uniform, unlike the Continentals who, in many instances,
were professional soldiers or, after several years of
service, became so.
A primary concern of the civilian leaders during
the American Revolution was ensuring their revolutionary
war was won without resorting to or resulting in a military
tyranny. This concern, as discussed in this chapter,
translated into actions that impacted on the size, complexion,
and leadership of the military. It also impacted, as will
139Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20,
17 80, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jef ferson
,
4:131; George
Washington to William Greene, October 18, 1780, Bartlett,
Rhode Island, 9:250; Joseph Reed to Nathanael
Greene, June 16, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:355.
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be shown in the next chapter, on how the civilians controlled
the military, particolarly with respect to ideological and
personal controls
.
CHAPTER III
CITIZEN SOLDIERS, CIVIL-MILITARY CONNECTIONS
AND CIVIL SUPREMACY
The American revolutionary leaders believed that
among the best means of ensuring their military would not
subvert the revolution would be to make sure the military
remained subordinate to the civilian governments and
leaders. To accomplish this, the revolutionary leaders
placed great emphasis on the quality, character, and conduct
of their officer corps. To a large extent, this meant
carefully selecting their military leaders and ensuring
they adhered to the concept of civil supremacy.
Early in the war, Charles Lee told a delegation of
Massachusetts civilian leaders at camp that American
liberties depended upon the quality and character of the
army, and that depended on their officers. About the same
time, Nathanael Greene wrote the chief executive of Rhode
Island that "without a good set of Officers the Troops will
be little better than a lawless Bandittie or an ungovernable
Mob."'^ Most American revolutionary leaders did not have to
-''"Charles Lee to the Commissioners from Massachusetts
at Camp, November 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
5 (1873) : 308; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke,
130
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be told about the importance of their officer corps, for
they realized that the officers would have a primary
responsibility for preventing anarchy and military tyranny,
as well as assuring military victory. It is not surprising,
therefore, the civilian leaders demonstrated great interest
and expressed concern about the selection and promotion of
their officer corps.
The revolutionary leaders desired officers who
shared the same beliefs and goals as themselves, who would
exert themselves in preventing any form of anarchy or
military tyranny, and who would subordinate themselves to
civilian control. The best method to select and promote
officers who met the above criteria, it was generally
assumed, was by giving that responsibility to the legisla-
tive bodies. It was believed they were best suited to
judge the quality and character of their fellow citizens.
Besides, it was argued, that by selecting and promoting the
officers, they would have more control over them.
Some soldiers, however, objected to the selection
of their officers by the legislative bodies, believing they
should themselves select some, if not all, of their own
2
officers. With respect to company grade officers, this
October 11, 1776, Showman, F^pers_^fJJathanael Greene, 1:313.
2
The Maryland Gazet te, July 18, 1776; Growl, "Mary-
land During and After the Revolution," p. 34; David Curtis
Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy 1753-1776, pp. 166-169.
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procedure had been adopted in several of the colonies before
3the war. Realizing that to recruit and maintain a suffi-
cient army some compromises were necessary, several
provincial legislative bodies and early state legislatures
provided for company grade officers to be elected by their
men. Although allowing for such a procedure, the North
Carolina Provincial Congress reserved to itself the exercise
of a veto of the selections made. Several colonies allowed
field grade officers to be elected by the company grade
officers, and Pennsylvania allowed for the selection of its
two Flying Camp generals by a committee composed of soldiers
and officers. At the other extreme, New Hampshire once
allov7ed field grade officers to appoint company grade
officers. Most colonies, however, reserved to the legisla-
ture the selection of the field grade and general officers,
and in many of the colonies the selection of company grade
officers was the responsibility of either the legislature
or a local civilian authority, such as a committee of
safety
.
^
3
Ibid., pp. 157, 159, 161; Lincoln, Journals of Each
Provincial Congress of Ma ssachusetts
, pp. 33-34, 35.
^Albert Bushnell Hart, ed
.
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r87^8 8",'~T9T~555'; Hoadly, PuiSl ic_ Recordsjof_the__State^_o^
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The initial selection of the field grade and company
grade officers were thus the responsibility of the colonies
to appoint, not that of the Continental Congress. This
meant the army Washington commanded during 1775 was composed
of officers selected by either the legislative bodies or
the soldiers themselves. Unimpressed by the quality of his
officer corps, Washington informally suggested to several
members of Congress that he be given power of appointment,
subject to the veto of Congress. He also formally requested
Congress allow him to appoint inferior officers of the staff
departments.^ Although Congress granted his request, his
on the Massachuset ts Cqnstitu^tjj^n 1780, pp 46-48-William P. Clark, Of frcial Jii^tory_6rTh¥ Militia and the
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Society of Delaware, 1941), p. 6; William Gustavus Whiteley,
5ll^B^o]jutjX)narY_Sol^^r^^ (Wilmington: James and
Webb, 1875), p. 10; Kenneth Coleman, Th^ American Revolutionm Georgia 1 763-1789 (Athens: University of Georg la^Press^
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suggestion was not taken up by Congress until October 1775,
when the question of appointment of the officers of the two
New Jersey regiments precipitated a debate. James Duane
suggested Congress have the responsibility, after consulting
the military, for appointing and promoting all officers.
Others agreed, believing the union of the colonies depended
upon breaking down provincial distinctions. These arguments
were countered by those that maintained it was safer to
leave the responsibility with the individual colonies for,
after all, soldiers would not enlist unless they had some
part in the selection, or at least knew the officers who
v;ould be appointed over them. Congress avoided making a
decision, by simply selecting the officers specifically
nominated by the New Jersey Provincial Congress. Neverthe-
less, discussion continued on the subject of officer
selection throughout the first winter of the war.
It was not, however, until September 1776, that
Congress made provisions for selecting and promoting the
officers that would command the large and relatively long
enlisted army they had just authorized. At that time,
Congress decided that generals would be selected, promoted,
John Adams Diary, Butterfield, DAJA, 2:202-204;
Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull, February 28, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC , 1:367; Minutes of the Provincial Congress
and the Counc il of Safety of New Jersey , pp. 212-213; Ford,
JCC, 3:285^8 9 .
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and cc^issioned by Congress and that all other Continental
officers would be selected by the states and commissioned
by Congress. 7 The military would be given no say in the
selection process, as it was considered "dangerous to the
publick liberty." At least that is how John Adams explained
it to several Continental generals.^
Washington and other officers questioned the wisdom
of Congress and the state governments with respect to
promotions.^ Initially, officers were promoted within the
regiments in their respective state lines. This lead to
many unqualified men being raised to positions of regimental
command through the attrition process within their regiment.
Realizing this was a problem, Congress late in 1778 recom-
mended to the states they promote regimentally to the rank
of captain, and then in the line of the state to the rank
of colonel. The following June, Congress told the states
they should make promotions within their respective lines.
The Board of War, after hearing numerous complaints from the
military about this latter system, suggested unsuccessfully
7
Ibid., 5:762-763.
gJohn Adams to General Nathanael Greene, June 22,
177 6, Adams, Work s of John Adams, 9:404; John Adams to
Samuel H. Parsons, June "22
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during the sunrner of 1780 that Congress rescind their
previous suggestion to the states as it had resulted in
much confusion in the military. The Board of War, supported
by Washington, desired a uniform system, preferably one that
provided for promotions within the line. Finally, on May 25,
1781, a plan acceptable to the military was adopted. It
called for promotions to Major General by seniority; to
brigadier general by brigade; to all other grades by line;
and to officers of units not attached to any state, by
^ 10regiment
.
Selection and promotion of general officers were
problems that faced Congress, the states, and the military
frequently during the first three years of the war. The
revolutionary leaders believed that well-qualified generals
would be the best instrument for controlling the officer
corps, who in turn could control the army. Therefore, great
care was exercised in their first selections, and all sub-
sequent promotions to and promotions of general officers.
At Baltimore, during mid February 1777, Congress debated
at great length the best method by which generals would be
selected and promoted. It was suggested that major generals
Ibid., 11:1157-1158; 14:779; 17:607, 670;
20:539-540; George Washington to John Sullivan, December 17,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:488; Same to
same. May 11, 1781, ibid., 22:70; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress, December 20, 1780,
ibid., 20:502.
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be appointed by Washington and the other generals. Richard
Henry Lee liked the idea, believing the military were in
the best position to judge the military merits of each
other. Most members of Congress, however, were adamant in
their opposition to letting the military have any say in
the selection. John Witherspoon argued that he had once
made the mistake of letting the seniors at Princeton elect
their commencement honormen
. This had resulted in much
confusion and ill-feeling. in stronger terms, Benjamin
Rush, in a sardonic manner, stated that if the military
were allowed to make the choice of the generals he would
"move immediately afterwards that all the civil power of
the continent may be transferred from our hands into the
hands of the army, & that they may be proclaimed the highest
power of the people." Agreeing, John Adams stated he was
distressed that some members of Congress were so disposed
to idolize an image which their own hands had molten; that
they paid superstitious veneration to Washington. [Note:
this was just six weeks after his victories at Princeton
and Trenton.] "Altho' I honour him for his good qualities,"
Adams remarked, "yet in this house I feel myself his
superior. In private life I shall always acknowledge that
he is mine. It becomes us to attend early to the restrain-
„11mg our army
.
'"'S. Weit Mitchell, "Historical Notes of Dr.
Benjamin Rush, 1777," PMHB 27, no. 2 (1903): 139, 140.
138
During the debates it became obvious that Congress
did not, for the most part, desire the military partici-
pating in the selection and promotion of their generals,
and that they desired the interests of the states be adhered
to whenever possible. Therefore, a compromise method of
promoting generals was adopted on February 19, 1777. it
was later referred to as the "Baltimore Resolution." it
provided for the selection and promotion of general officers
to be done by Congress, with them giving due regard for line
of succession, merit, and quota of troops raised and to be
1
2
raised by each state.
The "Baltimore Resolution" did not end discussion
on the procedures of selecting and promoting the general
officers, for many civilian leaders desired more latitude
in the rewarding and punishing of officers for demonstrating
their merit and for exercising control over their soldiers.
The best way many believed was by annual elections. Annual
1
3
elections had been suggested frequently earlier in the war.
12Francis Lewis to the President of the New York
Convention [Abraham Ten Broeck, February 18, 1777], Burnett,
LMCC
, 2:261; Thomas Burke's Abstract of Debates, February 12
19, 1777, ibid., 261; James Wilson to Arthur St. Clair,
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Elbridge Gerry to Henry Knox, February 7, 1778, Austin,
Elbridge Gerry
,
1:243; Gouverneur Morris to George
Washington^ hlay 27, 1778, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris , 1:170;
Ford, JCC, 7:131-133.
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Petition of the Privates of the First Battalion
of Militia, in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, [March 1776],
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During April 1775, in Fairfax County, Virginia, George
Mason reminded his fellow citizens, in his remarks at the
selection of officers for an independent company, that in
Rome the troops had lost their loyalty and attachment to
the Republic and gave it to certain generals. The way to
avoid this in America was annual elections. This would,
according to Mason, prevent undue influences of cabals.
During the debates in Baltimore, John Adams and several of
the delegates suggested that annual elections be adopted
as a means of controlling the military. "For my Part,"
John Adams wrote his wife, "I will vote upon the genuine
Principles of a Republic for a new Election of general
Officers annually, and every man shall have my Consent to
be left out, who does not give sufficient Proof of his
Qualifications."^^ Their suggestion of annual elections
was raised again during the fall of 1777 after several
military defeats. "There is but one way," Benjamin Rush
wrote John Adams, "of producing such a change in your army
as will rectify all the disorders which prevail in it. It
is by electing your general officers annually. In no other
14
"Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax
Independent Company," circa April 17-26, 1775, Rutland,
Papers o f George Mason 1725-^17 92^ , 1:230-231.
''"^John Adams to Abigail Adams, February 21, 1777,
Butterfield, AFC
,
2:166; see also John Adams Autobiography,
Butterfield, DAJA
,
2:371; John Adams to Nathanael Greene,
[March 1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:300.
14 0.
way will you ever purge the ar.y...l6
such a suggestion
was deeded by .any as a way of removing Washington, it was
not pursued with great vigor by its proponents after the
winter of 1777-1778
.
Despite the frequent calls during the first three
years of the war for better officers, the revolutionary
leadership, for the .ost part, was satisfied with their
officer corps. In many respects the officers selected
during the first several years of the war were men who met
the criteria established by the revolutionary leadership,
as was discussed earlier in this chapter. They were men
who reflected and shared their beliefs about society and
government, who desired neither anarchy or military tyranny
in any form.
America did not have a wealth of military leadership
talent available in 1775. Therefore, factors other than
military experience were considered in the selection of the
officers. Among the primary qualifications considered was
16„Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 31, 1777Butterfield, Letters of Beni amin_^sh
. 1:163; see 'alsoSame to same, October 1, 1777, ibid., 157.
17J^ames Lovell to Samuel Adams, December 20, 1777
Burnett, LMCC, 2:593-594.
the personal character of an individual
. The military
leaders certainly considered this an important considera-
tion. Washington believed that when past military service
was not a factor in the selection of an officer, the
criteria used should include the consideration of whether
the individual "has a just pretension to the Character of
a Gentleman, a proper sense of Honor and some reputation
to lose." General McDougall agreed, believing the officers
selected must be those "who have a Sense of Honor and whose
class in Life is respectable." General Jethro Sumner
desired officers "whose birth, family connections and
property bind them to the interests of their country."
"It is a matter of the utmost Importance," George Clinton
wrote the chief executive of New Jersey, "to have our army
officiered by young Gentlemen of Property, Sense & Spirit."'
A corollary to character was wealth, for it was believed
18
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Russell, Nor th Carolina in_the Revo l^utionary War (Charlotte:
Phillips Russell, 1965)
, p. 31 ;"George Clinton to William
Livingston, January 13, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of
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that men of property would give dignity to the officer
corps and they would be .ore likely to lay down their arms
when they were no longer needed by Congress and the
states.
Numerous men of property and standing did indeed
join the patriotic ranks. In Philadelphia, for instance,
John Adams reported in 1775 that the city's regiments were
"under Officers consisting of Gentlemen of the very first
Fortune and best Character in the Place.- The best known
of these regiments was even nicknamed the "Silk Stocking
Company" because of the gentility of its membership. Many
of its officers were later commissioned as Continental
off icers. Similar reports were made about the sons of
the southern gentry becoming officers. In Alexandria,
Virginia, when the local revolutionary committee met in
January 1776 to choose the officers for a new company,
twenty-one names were put forth, all from the first families
2 2of Fairfax County. Frequently young men of wealth and
20
The New York Provincial Congress to the New Yorkdelegates in the Continental Congress, June 7, 1775,
Berthold Fernow, ed
. ,
New York
_in_the_Revolut ion (Albany,
New York: Weed, Parsons and Company, Pr in ter s", TS 87 ) , pp . 7-8
21John Adams to Isaac Smith, Sr., June 7, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC, 1:212, Brunhouse, The Counter^Revolution
ij}_Pennsylvania
, p. 24.
22
Nicholas Cresswell, Jou rnal of Nicholas Cresswell,
1774-1777, p. 137.
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position who were not selected or did not choose to serve
early in the war, joined later as the war n.oved southward,
often serving at their own expense.
It was not just the wealthy young southern and
Philadelphia men of wealth and social standing that served
as officers, for many older northern men of wealth and
standing also served. One example was Elias Boudinot.
During the spring of 1777, Washington asked him to become
the Commissary General of Prisoners. When Boudinot said
no, Washington told him that "if Men of Character & Influ-
ence would not come forward & join him in his Exertions all
would be lost-[.]" Being thus influenced, Boudinot reported,
and realizing such a position would allow him to keep an eye
"on the Military Power & prevent its Incroachment
, on the
Civil Authority, I consented to accept the Commission ."
Many of the wealthy New York land-owning families, including
the Van Rensselaers and Livingstons, also supplied numerous
officers
.
Besides including men of wealth and social standing,
the revolutionary officer corps also included many of the
23
Evans, Thomas Nelson
, pp. 76-78; Henry P. Johnston,
The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender of Cornwallis 1781
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1881), p. 36n.2.
24
J. Thomas Scharf, History of Delaware 1609-1888,
1:239 . "
25
Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections
,
p. 9.
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educated and professional class. The officer corps counted
an,ong its number hundreds of college students, graduates,
and faculty. 26 professionals, such as doctors, also served
as line officers, not just in their professional capacity.
Among the doctors who held military command were John
Brooks, David Cobb, John Thomas, Arthur St. Clair, Edward
Hand, Hugh Mercer, Henry Dearborn, William Irvine, James
McHenry, James VJilkinson, John Beatty, John Hazlett, and
Theodorick Bland.
And just as the revolutionary leaders attempted to
procure the wealthy, educated, and socially acceptable as
officers, they also attempted to dissuade and prevent those
they considered socially inferior from receiving commissions
In North Carolina, for example, the Provincial Congress,
although allowing the soldiers to select their company grade
26
Henry P. Johnston, Yale and Her_Honor-Roll in the
^^^^_^?Y£lytion, pp. 3, 16, 3 6 V 3 8-39
,
84',"~341-34 2 /Anson Phelps Stokes, Memqri^al^_qf^_Eminent Yale Men: A
Biographical Study of Student Life_^nd7uHIv|FsItyVJnTluen ce
s
During the EighTeenth__and_J^jj-iet_eenth^ 2 vols'."
(New Haven: Yale University Press ,'"1914 ) , 2:29"0; William H.S,
Demarest, A_H_i story of Rutgers College_J/7_66_-192 4 (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers College, 1924]~r'pp. 101-138;
Samuel Davies Alexander, P£incetqn_ColJ^ge_Dur ing the
Eighteenth Century (New York': Anson D. FT^RandoIph^and
Company, 1872), pp. 149-193; Albert J. Beveridge, The Life
of John Marsha ll
, 4 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1916-1919), l:l55n.3.
27
J, M. Toner, The Medical Men of the Revolu;^ion,
p. 107n.l.; Louise C. Duncan, Med i cal Meir~in""the 'American
Revolution 1775-1783 (Carlisle Barracks, "Penn syTva rTi a
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Medical Field Service School, 1931), p. 36.
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Officers, retained to themselves the right of v. to. Durxn
1778, the Rhode Island General Assembly denied General
Sullivan's request that four non-commissioned officers be
cominissioned, because of the opposition of the Rhode Island
officers who believed the four men were their social
inferiors. The influential Van Cortlandt family, during
the fall of 1775, was able to dissuade one man from accept-
ing his election to a captaincy; and another New Yorker,
in a deferential manner, declined election to a captaincy
because he believed he had neither the education or
experience to hold such a position.
At his Roxbury, Massachusetts, camp early in August
1775, Connecticut militia colonel John Chester asked a
friend whether he should make the most advantage of his
current militia commission, being a judge, or having served
as a member of the assembly, with respect to obtaining a
commission in the regular Continental establishment.^^ A
specific answer to his question could not be located;
however, as a general rule, considerable regard was given
prior legislative experience or current political standing.
2 8William Greene to John Sullivan, October 30, 1778,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island
,
8:473; Otto Hufeland,
Westchester County during the American Revolution 1775-1783
,
p. 67; [John P. Becker], The Sexagenary, or Reminiscences
of the American Revolution (Albany: W. C. Little and
0. Steele, 1833)
, p. 22.
29John Chester to Samuel B. Webb, August 11, 1775,
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146
Many members of the colonial governments were
selected early in the war to serve as military leaders.
Washington, for example, had served for a long period in
the Virginia House of Burgess. Lord Stirling served on the
New Jersey Governor's Council prior to the war and Samuel H.
Parsons had served in the Connecticut General Assembly for
thirteen years before the war.^° Political leaders, such
as Patrick Henry, Lachlan Mcintosh, Samuel Elbert, and
Alexander McDougall, were often made senior military
officers over more qualified men, simply because of their
political standing. It is interesting to note that when
Lord Stirling was appointed a general in 1776 before him,
McDougall complained loudly until Philip Schuyler and John
Jay informed him that the promotion had been made for
political reasons and was not meant to be an improper
reflection upon his honor or his military ability. ^"^ Local
political leaders were also appointed to military positions,
for it seemed that such natural leaders would be more than
30 .Ditmas, Stirling
, p. 6; Hall, Samuel Holden
Parsons
, p . 1 8 ,
31Champagne, Alexander McDougall, pp. 35, 91, 107,
111, 238n.; Henry, Patrick Henry
, 1:312-313; Jenkins,
Button Gwinnett, p. 72.
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able in giving direction and exercising control over their
neighbors under arms.^^
Political considerations were observed throughout
the war. Washington frequently obtained promotions for
officers because of political necessity." Political
considerations were important factors for Congress, as well
as for the provincial congresses and early state legisla-
tures in the selection of the military officers. One person
complained during July 1776 that most of the inferior
officers in his colony selected during the first months of
the war were "the creatures and absolute dependents of the
34governing party." Similarly, Washington complained late
in 1776 that the states were appointing officers "not fit
to be Shoe Blacks from the local attachments of this or
that Member of Assembly. "^^ And when they did not select
previous political leaders, they selected themselves.
32
,
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It was only natural that many of the revolutionary
leaders, who served in their provincial revolutionary bodies
during 1775 and 1776 would become officers, often completely
leaving behind their positions in the civilian governments.
The New Hampshire Provincial Congress provided from
its membership numerous military commanders including John
3 6
stark. Similarly, many members of the revolutionary
organizations of Massachusetts during 1774 and 1775 went
on to distinguished military careers. These included
Generals William Heath, Artemas Ward, John Paterson, and
Benjamin Lincoln. ^"^ In Vermont, sixteen of the twenty-eight
men who served on the Council of Safety would serve in the
.
T
;
. 38
military
.
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Many members of New York's provincial conqrcsses
served as military leaders. Among them were Alexander
McDougall, Robert G. Livingston, Abraham Ten Broeck, Walter
Livingston, Richard Montgomery, and Nathaniel Woodhull.^^
In one listing of members of the provincial congress,
forty-two of the two hundred twenty-six had a military title
next to their name/° of the twenty-eight men of Rockland
County who served in the provincial congress and/or the
state legislature, nine served as militia officers and three
as Continental officers.'*"'"
Many members of the New Jersey Provincial Congress
played major roles in leading the colony's military forces
in the field as military cominanders. These included Willinm
Maxwell, William Winds, William DeHart, Nathaniel Heard,
Charles Stewart, Ephraim Martin, Philemon Dickinson, and
39
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Published for the author by Knickerbocker Pre"ss", 1910),
pp. 519-520, 531, 227, 535, 545-546; William H. S. Demarest,
History _of_Rutgers_l_766-l 924
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Washington, p. "409; Kirkland, Letters on the RevolutTon,
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Elijah ClarK.^^ Pennsylvania had .any officers who served
for varying periods of ti.e during the war in the Associa-
tion, the Flying Camp, and in the Continental ar.y, who
served during the first two years of the war in the legisla-
tive and constitutional bodies of the colony. A:.ong them
were John Nixon, Thomas Hartley, Henry Haller, John Bayard,
Anthony Wayne, William Irvine, Samuel Miles, and Daniel
Brodhead/3 Of the twenty-five members of the first
Committee of Safety nine later served as military officers,
including Anthony Wayne, William Thompson, and John
Cadwalader. Of the thirty-four men who served in the second
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Committee of Safety fourteen served as military officers.
Further south, Delaware and Virginia Provincial Congress
members John Haslet, William Woodford, and William Christian
also served as military officers/^
The deep South
' s experience was similar, as civilian
leaders in the provincial bodies became military officers.
Many of the early military leaders in North Carolina, both
Continental and militia, served initially in the provincial
congress and/or one of the several committees of safety.
Among them were Benjamin Williams, Griffith Rutherford,
Jethro Sumner, Isaac Gregory, Robert Howe, and Gideon Lamb.^^
Like their northern neighbor, many South Carolina military
leaders served in the early provincial and early state
44
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legislative bodies before becoming officers.^^ Many of
Georgia
-s leaders in its provincial congress and co^ittee
and councils of safety became military leaders. These
included Samuel Elbert, Joseph Habersham, John Martin and
Lachlan Mcintosh.
Early in the war. General Greene expressed his hope
NO popular prejudices nor family connexion will influence"
the elections of the offirPrQ -u^ ^ ,n rt ce s. He was to be disappointed
Often when a political leader did not hin^self serve in the
military he was able to obtain a cominission for a family
member or a protege. John Hancock, for example, got his
former clerk, William Palfrey, appointed paymaster of the
Eastern Department and his brother, Ebenezer Hancock,
appointed deputy. New Jersey Lieutenant Ebenezer Elmer
reported in his journal early in the war that he obtained
^
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Major John Habersham of Georgia," ibid., extra no. 2 (1886):
236-237, 239; Charles C. Jones, Biographical Sketches of
the Delegates from_Georgia_jto the Continental Congress
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1891), p. 114
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his commission from the New Jersoy Provincial Congress on
the recommendation of one of its members, his uncle,
Theophilus Elmer. 50 although Greene and some otherl
objected to such practices, most revolutionary leaders
believed that various forms of nepotism were a deterrent
to military tyranny.
In every state, by blood or by marriage, civilian
leaders had relatives and in-laws serving in the military.
In Georgia, Governor John Houston had a brother who served
as a continental surgeon; another who served in the state
legislature; a son-in-law, Lachlan Mcintosh, who served as
a continental general; and his father-in-law, Jonathan Bryan,
served in the Council and as vice-president. Bryan had two
sons who served in the state legislature and another who
served as a Continental officer.
George Walton, who served as chief executive of
Georgia, as a member of Congress, and as a Continental and
^Herbert S. Allan, John Hancock ; Patriot in Purple(New York: Macmillan Company, 194 8")\ ""p7"27r7~''5^rFar~Kipt^During an Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer ElmerLieutenant m the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in
the Continental Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias' Dayton
Printed from the Original Manuscript," PNJHS 2, no 3(1847) : 98.
^'"Edith Duncan Johnston, The Houstons of Georgia(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1950), pp. 209, 234,298-299, 319; [Isabella Remshart Redding], Life and Times
of Jon^_han_ Bryan^_1^08-i;^88 (Savannah: The MornXng New's"
Print, 1901), pp. 79-80."
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n^xlitia Officer, had a brother who served in both Congress
and in the state government. Another active Ceorgia fa.il,
was the Habersha.s. Joseph served as a .e.ber of the
executive council and speaker of the assembly, as well as
a continental officer. His brother, Ja.es, also served
as speaker of the assembly. Their brother, John, and
brother-in-law, Samuel Elbert, served as Continental
officers
.
South Carolina had several prominent families
supplying both civilian and military leaders. Charles
Pinckney, who served in various civilian positions including
stints in the privy council and senate, had a first cousin,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who served in the state legis-
lature and as a Continental officer. The latter 's father-
in-law was Henry Middleton and his brother-in-law was
Arthur Middleton, both civilian leaders. Another brother-
in-law was Continental and militia officer Daniel Horry.
Horry, who also served in the senate, had two brothers who
served as Continental officers and in the state legislature.
The Middletons, who both served in Congress and in the state
government, by marriage were real ted to Edward Rutledge, who
also served in Congress and in the state legislature. His
52
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two brothers, John and Hugh, both served in the state
government, the former as chief executive and the latter
as speaker of the House. Another active family were the
five Huger brothers. Isaac was a Continental general and
a member of the state legislature; Daniel was a member of
the House and council; John was a militia officer, a member
of the council of Safety, and Secretary of State; Francis
was Deputy Quartermaster General of the Southern Department;
and Benjamin was a Continental officer. The Gadsdens were
also active, with Christopher serving as a Continental
general, member of Congress, and as Lieutenant Governor.
His son, Thomas, was a Continental officer and his son-in-
law, Thomas Ferguson, was a member of the House and the
53privy council.
North Carolina had several families who were active
in both civilian and military affairs, particularly the
Ashes. John served as a member of the Committee of Safety,
Provincial Congress, State Treasurer, and militia general.
His sons, John, Jr., and Samuel, were Continental officers.
His brother, Samuel, who served in the military and as chief
judge, had three sons who served as Continental officers.
53Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,
Founding Father
, pp. 4 3-44 ; Reynolds, Biographical Dire^ry
of the Senate of Sou th Carolina
, pp. 23 9, 241-24 2 , 2 90, 3~037
BDC, p. 1156; [Rufus W. Griswold], Washington and the
Generals of the TVmerican Revolution, 2 :283; Walsh,
'
Christopher Gadsden
, pp. 121n3, 153n3.
John Ashe-s brother-in-law, aa„,es Moore, served in the
Provincial Congress and as a Continental general. Moore
•
s
brother, Maurice, who served in the Provincial Congress,
had two sons, and a brother-in-1 wT.^u n m law who served as Continental
officers. Maurice Moore's son-in-law was Continental
general Francis Nash, whose brother was Abner
.ash, who
served as governor, in the Provincial Congress, Council of
Safety, senate, assembly, and as a member of Congress.
Their father was a member of the Committee of Safety. other
active North Carolina families were the Hawkins, Joneses,
Sumners, Blounts, and Brevards. John Brevard, who was
active in state government, had six sons who served in the
military, and by marriage they were related to Generals
William Lee Davidson and Thomas Polk. William Blount, who
served in the Continental Army before serving in the state
legislature and Congress, had two brothers who served as
Continental officers. Continental General Jethro Sumner
had two brothers who served in the senate and two others
who were active in the military. Their brother-in-law,
Elisha Battle, also served in the senate. Willie and Allen
Jones both served in Congress. The latter 's sons-in-law
were Colonel William Richardson Davie and militia General
Thomas Easton. Benjamin Hawkins, who served in the House,
aide-de-camp to Governor Nash, and in Congress, had a
brother, Philemon, who was a militia colonel, who served
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in the Provincial Congress, the assembly, and on the
governor's council.
Many Virginia families also had family members
serving in military and civilian positions. This was
especially true of the Lees and Randolphs. Richard Henry
Lee had four brothers, Francis Lightfoot, Thomas Ludwell,
William Arthur, and a brother-in-law, William Shippen, Jr.,
who were active in civilian affairs. His second cousin and
nephew-in-law. Light Horse Harry Lee, was the cousin of
civil-military leader, Theodorick Bland. Bland and Thomas
Jefferson were fourth generation Randolphs. Also related
to the Randolphs were Light Horse Harry Lee, John Marshall,
State Treasurer Robert Carter Nicholas, and Speaker of the
Senate, Archibald Gary. The latter's sons-in-law included
militia Colonel Thomas Mann Randolph and Continental Captain
54
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pp. 29-45; Kemp P. Battle, "Career of Brigadier-General
Jethro Sumner. One of North Carolina's Revolutionary
Officers," MAH 26, no. 6 (December 1891): 423 ; Merritt B.
Pound, Benjamin H awk i n s - 1 nd i a n _Agen t (Athens: University
of Georgia Press, 1951), p. 3.
carter Page, son of state leader, John Page. The latter
•
s
brother, Mann Page, who served in Congress and the state
legislature, had as a son-in-law Continental Colonel George
Baylor. Joseph Jones, a state leader and meiriber of
congress, had as nephews James Monroe, John Marshall, and
Thomas Marshall, the latter a captain in the Virginia
state regiment, and by marriage was related to General
William Woodford. Governor Patrick Henry's brothers-in-law
included General William Campbell and Colonel William
Christian, and his son-in-law was Colonel Samuel Meredith.
Governor Thomas Nelson, who also served in the military,
had three cousins serving as Continental officers and a
brother who served in the state legislature. Member of
Congress and state leader, Edmund Pendleton had a nephew
and an adopted son serving as Continental officers. On the
Virginia-North Carolina frontier Evan Shelby, general of
the Virginia militia and a member of both North Carolina
and Virginia legislatures, had a son, Isaac, who served in
both state's militia and state legislatures.^^
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Maryland Governor Thomas Johnson, who served in
congress and as a general of the militia, had four brothers
serving in the militia. John Hanson, who served in Congress,
was related to Colonel Robert Hanson Harrison, Washington's
^
military secretary, and to members of Congress Daniel of
St. Thomas Jenifer and Thomas Stone. Hanson's three sons
served in the Continental Army, one of whom, Alexander Contee
Hanson, served as private secretary to Washington
.
Delaware and New Jersey had numerous families with
their members serving in military and civilian positions.
George Read, who served as chief executive of Delaware and
as a member of Congress, had two brothers who served in the
military and two brothers-in-law who were active: Gunning
Bedford as a Continental lieutenant colonel, and George Ross,
a member of Congress. Ephraim Martin, who served in the
Provincial Congress and a member of the council, had a son
Papers of John Marshall (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1974), p. 312n.4; Thomas Perkins Abernethy,
From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier
Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1932), p. 20; Evans, Thomas Nelson
, pp. 61, 127; Robert Leroy
Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund Pendleton (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), pp. 86, 150,
239; Draper, King's Mountain
, pp. 383, 412, 414; Scharf,
History of Maryland
,
1:450-451.
^^Ibid., 452-454; Jacob A. Nelson, John Hanson and
the Inseparable Union: An Authentic Biography of a Revolu-
tionary Leader, Patriot and Statesman (Boston: Meador
Publishing Company, 1939), pp. 113-114; J. Bruce Kremer,
John Hanson of Mulberry Grove (New York: Albert and Charles
Buni, 1938) , pp. 40-41.
160
Who served as a Continental officer. Many of .3„
.erseys
delegates to Congress had relatives who served in the
n,ilitary. Por example, John Witherspoon had three sons who
served as military officers; and Willia. Livingston, who
also served as the chief executive, was related by birth
and marriage to the New Yor. Livingstons, who provided nany
military officers. His son, Broc.holst, was a Continental
Officer, whose brothers-in-law were John Jay and Lieutenant
colonel William Smith Livingston. William Livingston's
nephew was Continental officer Matthew clarkson and his
brother-in-law was General Stirling, whose brother-in-law
was state leader John Stevens. Stirling's son-in-law was
William Duer, who served in Congress and in the New York
5 7legislature.
57
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:
A_Biography, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton Univer sity"Press
1925), l:193n27; 2:31, 31n.23, 49n.35; Alan Valentine, Lord
Stir l ing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 41,
44
,
241 ; Baxter, A Godchild of Washi ngton
, p. 392; Flexner,
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Pennsylvania's delegates to Congress also had
relatives serving in the military. Frederick Muhlenberg's
brother was General John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, and John
Armstrong, Sr .
' s son served as a Continental Officer. James
Wilson and George Ross had as their brother-in-law Mark
Bird, who was a militia lieutenant colonel and Deputy
Quartermaster General. John Dickinson's brother, Philemon,
was a militia general, as well as a member of Congress. The
Dickinsons were cousins to Colonel Lambert Cadwalader and
General John Cadwalader. The Dickinsons and Cadwaladers,
by marriage, were related to militia General Samuel Meredith,
as were members of Congress George Clymer and militia
Colonel Henry Hill. Another member of Congress, Edward
Biddle, had as brothers, Owen Biddle, who served as Deputy"
Commissary General of Forage and as a member of the Board
of War; and Charles Biddle, Vice President of the state;
and Clement Biddle, who served as Commissary General of
Forage and Quartermaster General of Pennsylvania. Their
brother-in-law was Peter Scull, who served as a Continental
officer and later, Secretary to the Board of War.^^
The Traitor and the Spy
, p. 161; Edward Brockholst Living-
ston, The L ivingston s of Livingston Manor, pp. 525-526.
58 , .James Haltigan, The Iri sh in th e America n Revo lu-
t^ion and their Early Influence in the _Colonies (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Patrick J. Haltigan", 1908)", pp.~2"d2
,
236-237;
Edward W. Hooker, The Fighting Par son of the American
Revolution: A Biography of General Peter Muhlenberg ;
One cannot discuss the civil-military family
relationship in New York without mentioning the Livingstons.
Philip Livingston, Second Lord of the Manor, had five
children: Robert, Peter, Philip, William, and Sarah, who
themselves, their spouses or their children were active
during the war. Robert's son, Peter, was a militia colonel
and member of the assembly; another son, John, was an aide-
de-camp to Governor Clinton; another son, Henry, who was
a militia lieutenant colonel; and his daughter married James
Duane, whose son-in-law was Major William North. Peter was
President of the Provincial Congress. Philip was a member
of the Provincial Congress, the senate, and the Continental
Congress. His son, Henry P. Livingston, was an officer in
Washington's Life Guards. William Livingston was a member
of Congress and Governor of New Jersey. His children were
mentioned earlier. Sarah Livingston was the wife of Lord
Lutheran Clergyman, Mili
t
ary Chiefta in and Pol it ical Leader
(Philadelphia: Edward W. Hocker, i936), p. 133; FirgiTson,"
Paper s of Robert Morris
, 1 : 261-262n . 9 ; Kirkland, Letters
on the American Revolution, l:91n.8; Wharton Dickinson,
"Philemon Dickinson: Ma jor-General , New Jersey Militia-
Revolutionary Service," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 420;
Charles Biddle, Autobiography of Charles Biddle, Vice^;;^
President of the Supreme Executive CounciT~of~Pennsy"lvania
1745-1821 (Philadelphia: E. Claxton~and Company, 18~83T, p. 74
David R. B. Nevin, Con tinental Sketches of Distinguished
Pennsylvanians
, pp. 169-170; Morton L. Montgomery 7~H istory
of Berks County, Pennsylvania , in the Revolution , from 1774
to 178 3, pp. 212, 268-269; James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished
vrarr ior: Ma j
o
r-Gene ral James VJil k inson (New York: Macmil Ian
Company , 19 3 8)", P • 59T
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Stirling and their son-in-law was Willia. Ouer. Then there
were the related cousins, Judge Robert R. Livingston of
Clermont, Robert G. Livingston, and Henry Livingston of
Dutchess county.
..dge Livingston had three sons and three
sons-in-law active in cxvil and military positions during
the war, including Colonel Henry Beek.an Lxvingston;
.ember
of Congress Robert R. Livingston; militia Major John R.
Livingston; Major General Richard Montgomery; Dr. Thomas
Tillotson, Physician Surgeon of the Northern Department; and
Morgan Lewis, aide to Gates, and Quartermaster General of
the Northern Army. The latter's father, Francis Lewis, was
a member of Congress. Robert G. Livingston had three sons
in the military: Robert G. Livingston, Jr., who was a
Continental colonel and member of the Provincial Congress;
Gilbert R. Livingston, a Continental officer; and Henry G.
Livingston, a brigade-major and aide-de-camp to Lord
Stirling. Henry Livingston of Dutchess County had two sons,
Henry, Jr., and Robert H., who were Continental officers.
Another New York family actively involved in civil-
ian and military affairs, who by marriage were related to
Philip Livingston ("The Signer"), were the Van Rensselaers.
59Edwin Brockholst Livinqston, The Livingstons of
TJ^vingston Manor
, pp. 515-535 , 545-556 , 22 7-229 ;^ BaxteF,"
A_ Godchild of Washington, p. 98.
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Their military involvc.ont is evidenced by the fact that
twelve of then, served in the northern campaign of 1777.
Pierre Van Cortlandt, who by marriage was related to the
Livingstons, served as chairman of the committee and council
Of safeties, member of the Provincial Congress, President
Pro Tern of the senate, and Lieutenant Governor. His son,
Pierre, and son-in-law, Abraham Van Wyck, were Continental
officers. Other active New York families were the Morrises,
McDougalls, Clintons, Schuylers, and Gansevoorts. Peter
Gansevoort, a Continental colonel and militia general, had
a brother, Leonard, who was a member of the Provincial
Congress; his brother-in-law, Jacob Cuyler, was also a
member of the Provincial Congress and Deputy Commissary
General of Purchases; his uncle, Volkert P. Duow, was Vice-
President of the Provincial Congress. Philip Schuyler, a
member of Congress and a major general, had as a son-in-law
Alexander Hamilton, and his brother-in-law was John Cochran,
Director of the Military Hospitals. Schuyler's mother was
a Van Cortlandt, his wife a Van Rensselaer, and he was
related to the Livingstons
.
60^^ . ^Ibid., pp. 68, 409, 451; Van Rensselaer, Annals
o^the Van Rensselaers, pp. 217-219, 548; Henry B. Di"^7i^,
Westchester-County, New York
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,
p. 105n.7; Koebling, Th^e Journal of the Reverend Silas"
'
Constant, p. 430; Alice"'P. Kenney, The Ga hsevoo3rj:T"oF~Albany:
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Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. 8 97~9"2
, 93, 119;
Tuckerman, Ph ij^ip
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, p. 104; Spaulding, George
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Governor and General George Clinton's brother was
General Jan.es Clinton, whose son, Alexander, was a
continental officer. George Clinton's brothers-in-law
included a .ilitia lieutenant colonel and Christopher
Tappan, a state leader and
.ilitia
.ajor. Tappan
• s son,
Peter, was a Continental officer. Clinton was also related
to .ilitia colonel Charles DeWitt, who also served in the
Provincial Congress, Council of Safety, and the Assembly.
Major General Alexander McDougall, who also served in
Congress, had two sons who were Continental officers. His
brother-in-law was Daniel Roberdeau of Pennsylvania, and
his son-in-law was the Judge Advocate of the an.y, John
Lawrence. General Lewis Morris, who also served in
Congress, had two sons who were Continental officers. His
half brother was Gouverneur Morris.
New England also had a large nuinber of families who
were involved in civil and military affairs, especially in
Connecticut. Silas Deane had as a father-in-law militia
General Gordon Saltonstall; his oldest step-son was Colonel
Samuel B. Webb, whose father-in-law was John Jay; and his
youngest step-son was John Webb, who served as an aide-de-
camp to Generals Greene and Howe, and whose father-in-law
6
1
Ibid., pp. 53, 161; Bliven, Under the Guns, p. 119;Champagne, Me^xander__McDougall, p. 1787 MorrTs',^ J^hn Jay,
l: 325n.5, 7; Baxter, A_Godchi_ld ofJVashingt^ pT^'ITT
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was colonel aohn Chester of the Connecticut State Hegi.ent
Roger Sherman had three sons who were Continental officers
and Ceorge Wyllys, Secretary of State, had two sons serving
as continental officers and another as a militia officer.
Militia Major General Jabez Huntington, who served in the
assembly, had four sons in military service, including
Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Huntington and General Jedediah
Huntington, whose father-in-law was Governor Jonathan
Trumbull. Jabez Huntington's brother-in-law was Colonel
Experience Storrs, who served both in the militia and the
Continental army. Governor Trumbull's three sons, Joseph,
Jonathan, and John, were Continental officers, the latter
two serving on Washington's staff. His son-in-law, William
Williams, was a member of Congress. ^2 m Massachusetts,
James Warren, Sr., President of the Provincial Congress and
later Speaker of the House, had a son who was a naval
officer. His father-in-law was James Otis, whose son-in-law
was Benjamin Lincoln, and whose sons, James Otis, Jr., was
a naval officer and Samuel Alleyne Otis was a member of the
state Board of War and Deputy Clothier General. The
Ford, Samuel Blachle^^_Webb
, l:xxvii-xxx, 178n,,212-213n.; 3:268; Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 62; Johnston,Yale and Her Honor--R^on_ij2^ the American Revolution
. pp. 8,
24, 265; Humphreys, L^fe ami _Times_of Davjjd_ Humphreys, 1:135;Seymour, A_^gres_sive_ Hi sjx)ry pp. 56',' 53, "177"^ '^tFc'"
Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 1, 2n., 166n.; Trumbull,
^ZHI^tll£D_T£]i^HH' PP- 17 0-176.
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President of the Massachusetts Board of War, Sa.uel Phillips
Savage, had two sons serving as Continental officers and
another who was a major of the South Carolina militia.
Massachusetts Board of War member Jonathan Glover, who was
also a mender of the legislature and colonel of the militia,
had as a brother General John Glover. Member of Congress
Robert Treat Paine 's brother-in-law was Lieutenant Colonel
David Cobb, who served as an aide-de-camp to Washington."
Governor Samuel Ward of Rhode Island, who also served in
Congress, had a brother, Henry, who was Secretary of State;
a son, Samuel, who was a Continental officer who served as
an aide-de-camp to Washington, and whose father-in-law was
Governor William Greene; and a son-in-law. Colonel William
Greene, whose cousin was Nathanael Greene. Governor
William Greene's cousins included Nathanael Greene and
Griffin Greene, Paymaster of the First Rhode Island Regiment.
General Greene's brother, Jacob, was a member of a county
Committee of Safety; his brother-in-law, William Littlefield,
was a Continental officer; and his cousin was Colonel
6 3
Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb
, 2:247n.; Francis S.
Drake, Memorials of the Society of the Cincinnati of
Massachusetts
, pp. 385, 497; Samuel Savage Shaw, [pri. ] ,
"Adams-Savage Correspondence, 1776-1785," PMHS 4 3 (October
1909-June 1910): 328-329, 328n.2; George AthiTT Billias,
General John Glover and His xMarblehoad Mariners (Now York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1960), p. 6 07~ Ral pF 3avo 1 , Two Men
of Taunton in the Cour se of Human Even ts 1731-1829 (Taunton,
Massachusetts: Davol Publishing Company, 1912), pp. 176-177.
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Christopher Greene, whose son-in-law was Continental Captain
Thomas Hughes. Governor Nicholas Cooke's sons-in-law were
Lieutenant Colonel Jere,„iah Olney and New York militia
Lieutenant Colonel Asa Waterman. Deputy Governor Bradford's
son. Major Willia. Bradford, was an aide-de-camp to General
Lee. state leader and militia Major General Joshua Babcock
had two sons who served as Continental officers. New
'
Hampshire chief Executive Meshech Weare had a son serving
as a Continental officer and Vermont's Chief Executive
Thomas Chittenden had a son-in-law, Matthew Lyon, who served
In the continental Army as Paymaster of the Vermont troops,
secretary to the Governor and Council, and Assistant State
Treasurer
.
o.
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Rebellion, in 1861: Comprising an account of the Stirring
Events Connected therewith: Biographical Notices of many
of the Officers Distinguished Therein: and Notes Expl ana"torv
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Although many of the officers were from the educated
and wealthy class of colonial society, for the most part,
the officers were men who were selected because of their
popularity with their neighbors who, in many cases, elected
them. This often meant men of simple and respectable means.
A Frenchinan observed that "by far the greatest part of the
American officers are farmers and farmers' sons of independ-
ent or easy fortunes . " ^
^ Another Frenchman observed the
American officers corps "is composed of deserving and pros-
perous artisans, well-known and respected merchants, and
farmers, beloved and revered by their neighbors . "^"^ These
observations were particularly true of the middle and New
England states, which produced most of the Continental
officers. Innkeepers and tavern owners, who were generally
66^ , . ,De Lisle to Count ?, November 28, 1777, "Notes
and Queries," PMHB 35, no. 3 (1911): 367.
Edward D. Seeber, trans.. On the Thre^shold of
Liberty : Journal of a Frenchman ' s Tour of "the'' Ami"Fican
Colonies in 1777
,
Indiana University PublicationsT^Sani-
ties Series, no. 43 (Blooming ton , Indiana University Press
1959)
, p. 105.
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, 5 th ser . , 1 : 936 ; for
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Edwin M. Stone, The Life and Recollections of John Howard,
Late President of the Rhode I s land Historical Society
(Providence: George H. Whitney, 1857), pp. 37-38, 387 43;
Mrs. [Catherine] Williams, Biography of Revolut ionary Heroes:
Con t^nijng_the_Ld^e_ofJ3ri_gadier^Geru_Wi 1^1 i am
_
B a rton 7^nd
also Cap tain Stephen Olney (Providence: 'Mrs. Williams, 1839),
p. 70; Oliver Ayer Roberts, History of the Military Company
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popular in their co„u.unities
, often became officers,
particularly as colonels and generals. A^onc, the™ were
George Weedon; Jethro Sumner; John Greaton; Henry Haller;
and Israel Putnam who, in addition to being a farmer, also
kept a tavern.
Because the American revolutionary military officers
were, for the most part, a reflection of civilian society,
it is understandable that they shared the same goals with
respect to their struggle with Great Britain. There were
some exceptions, of course. Some openly avowed Loyalists
joined the American military forces during 1775 and 1776
simply to prevent anarchy until the dispute with the mother
Artillery Company of Massachusetts 1638-1888 4 vols(Boston: Aitred Mudge and Son, 1895-1901) 2 -68-69 ro -yna
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, 1:335; Chastellux, Travels inNorth-America
, pp. 57, 57-58n.; [Mary Theresa Liit^F] "
Biographical Sketches of the Generals of the Continental
Army of the Revolution (Cambridge: John wn ^nn ^r.r^ g^n
^1889), p. 146; Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks
County, Pennsylvania, in the RevolutionT from 1774 to 1783
,
pp. 230-231; John Ferdinand Dalziel Smyth, A Tour in the
United States of America: Containing an Account of the
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ture. Commerce, Customs, and Manners of the Inhabitants;
"
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, 2 vols. (London: G. Robinson
,
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country could be resolved within the fra.eworK of the
.„pire
However, when the colonies declared themselves independent,
these officers left military service. Some so-called
•Sons of Liberty also became officers. Early in 1777, a
former Boston Sons of Liberty leader, Paul Revere, wrote
another colleague that he found but few of their former
friends in the army. Those that did join were generally of
the moderate disposition."^"^
What were the goals they shared? Why was the
American soldier fighting? Before setting out from
Philadelphia in July 1775 to the scene of battle in New
England, James McHenry made out his will, explaining he was
off to war "to defend the liberties of Americans and mankind,
against the enemies of both." McHenry was not the only
soldier to put his participation in the revolutionary war
in such moral terms, on such a high plane. During the
summer of 1777, General Parsons stated he was fighting to
maintain the right of humanity and to vindicate the liberties
of freemen. Timothy Pickering, later that year at Valley
Forge, told his wife that "the cause of America I consider
as the cause of humanity." Even Washington expressed his
'^^"Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia,
Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 186.
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belief that the A:.erican forces were fighting for the
essential rights and liberties of the present generation,
and for millions yet unborn. "Our cause," he told James
Warren, "is noble, it is the cause of Mankind. "^2
The soldiers were more likely to see the war in
terms of the Whig rhetoric of the day. Officers frequently
reminded themselves and their soldiers they were fighting
to protect American rights, liberties, properties and
lives
.
The officers also believed that whatever sacrifices
they made in terms of life and property was necessary to
ensure that the lives, properties and liberties of their
neighbors were safe against British tyranny. Early in the
James McHenry
' s will dated July 29, 1775 in TheJames_McHenry_Papers, 2 auction catalogs (New York! Park^Bernet Galleries, Inc., 1944), 2:56; Samuel H. Parsons toSamuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb,
p. 2 6 3; Timothy Pickering to Mrs. Timothy PickerTHg~
December 13
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, 1:196;George Washington to James Warren, March"~3l7~Ty79
, Fitz-patrick. Writings of Washington, 14:313, 312-313; 'see alsoGeorge Washington to the Ministers, Elders, Deacons and
Members of the Reformed German Congregation of New York City
Nov. 27, 1783, ibid., 27:249.
73General Orders, ibid., 5:424; Orders by Robert
Howe m Francis Marion's Orderly Book, June 28, 1777, Gibbes,
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, 2:61; Camp-
bell, Orderly Book, p. 2; "The Orderly Book of Colonel
William Henshaw, October 1, 1775, through October 3, 1776,"
PAAS 57 (April 16, 1947-October 15, 1947): 120; Philip
Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775, Gerlach, Philip
Schuyler, p. 284; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln,
September 28, 1779, [copy]
,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Micro-
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war,
.enc.
.n,...„
^^^^^^
realized "if we succeed tI am m no fp^r- r^-p i •^ear of making ample
amends for my lost time. If we fail-Lr , anything in thisCountry is not worth a thought " simii i'^t. S larly General Wayne
wrote Ms „i,e
.H.t
...e o. U.er., e.n„o.
.e
Co.cest an.
.est Spi.its o. tMs :ana is
..t a tri.Un,
Consideration for the Rir^h t • ian K c Inheritance-
f .] "''^
respite these expressions of they fou.ht, there
were those K.,i,s who often g.estionea the motives of the
^xlitary. ^o
.onths into the war Greene wrote that the
American soldiers desire, only to devote themselves ..0 ar.s
not for the invasion of other Countries but for the defence
Of our own; not for the gratification of our own private
interest, tut for the Publick security."
. ,ear and a half
later, Greene wrote the Governor of Rhode Island, "so.e
-ongst you, I am told are uncharitable enough to charge
the ar.y with a design of protracting the war for their own
private advantage." He said nothing could be further fro.
the truth. Nevertheless, in early 1781, Thornas Sumter
i;^f°™-^=-e^^ personal glory and private gain were
1 777 T.-i 1^
Tilghman to James Tilghman, February 22
y , uuiie /, LIU, stille, An_thony Wayne, pp. 66-67.
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th. goals Of .any of Ms fellow soldiers."
„ost soldiers
however, simply wanted to end the war as soon as possible
'
.nder honorable conditions, so that they could return to
their peaceful
.cans of profit. Few indeed envisioned
becoming professional soldiers. Most si.ply saw themselves
as temporary soldiers, citizens with a military duty to
perform.
William Blackstone, in his Commentar i_es_^n_th^ La^
oOBgland, wrote that in free states "a man puts not off
the citizen when he enters the camp, but it is because he
is a citizen and would wish to continue so that he makes
himself for a while a soldier. "^^ This was certainly true
of the American soldiers during their revolutionary war.
Washington certainly always considered himself a citizen
first. "When we assumed the Soldier," Washington told the
New York legislature in June 1775, "we did not lay aside
the Citizen." Three years later, he told a friend that the
Continental soldiers were "Citizens having all the ties,
and interests of Citizens," and that they should be
75
Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., July 141775, Showman, Paper s__of_GeneralJ^jUiana^ p 99.Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January~237T77 7Bartlett, Records of Rhode_Island
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considered, with Congress, as having "einbarked in one
Cause... and [with] the same End."^^ The French minister
reported to Vergennes early in 1779 that Washington was
constantly setting forth the principle that one must be a
citizen first and an officer and soldier afterwards . "^^ But
Washington was not the only one making such statements.
At a meeting held in a park in New York on August 10,
1814, Marinus Willett told a gathering that the favorite
toast of the revolution was "May every Citizen be a Soldier,
and every Soldier a Citizen "^^ This was indeed a popular
^ 80toast. This sentiment the military not only shared
amongst themselves but also reassured the civilian leaders
they were citizens first, and foremost. Knox early in 1778
during the so-called "Conway Cabal" wrote Elbridge Gerry
it was true that some persons who were and had been in the
army wished to have their power perpetuated at the expense
77George Washington to the New York Legislature,
June 26, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
3:305;
George Washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778, ibid.,
11:291.
7 8Conrad Alexandre Gerard to Comte de Vergennes,
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of the liberties of their fellow citizens, "but it is by
no means the sentiment or wish of the army in general, who
consider themselves only as citizens in arms, and who would
rejoice to return to private life were the independence of
America established." Almost five years later, General
St. Clair told the army's committee then at Philadelphia
they should "remind Congress that when they took up arms
it was not with a view to make a profession." He stated
that if most of the officers and soldiers had known the war
would have lasted so long they would have not engaged in
the armed forces. There was little exaggeration in this
statement, for most believed the war would be of only short
duration
.
The military, except for a few would-be professionals
and glory seekers, desired nothing more than to return to
their civilian status with no other reward than the appro-
bation of their fellow citizens for having done their duty.^^
"We are Soldiers ambitious only to restoring the violated
Rights of Citizens-and these secured," General Schuyler wrote
the first summer of the war, "We are to return instantly to
81
Henry Knox to Elbridge Gerry, January 4, 1778,
Austin, Elbridge Gerry, 1:239; Major General Arthur St. Clair
to Alexander McDougall, Colonels Matthias Oaden and John
Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The St.'ciair Papers,
1:574 .
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Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., May [ ],
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the Business & Employments of Civil Life."^^
Washington certainly desired, from the first week
of his command, to return to the peaceful banks of the
Potomac. On his way to Cambridge he addressed the New York
legislature on June 26, 1775. He told them he desired the
war to end as soon as possible, stating "we shall most
sincerely rejoice with you in that happy hour when the
establishment of Ainerican Liberty, upon the most firm and
solid foundations, shall enable us to return to our Private
stations in the bosom of a free, peaceful and happy
country." By the end of that summ^er, in hot and humid
New England, Washington told Congress "there is not a Man
in America, who more earnestly Wishes such a Termination
of the Campaign, as to make the Army no longer necessary."
As the war lengthened into years, and Washington remained
hundreds of miles from his beloved Mount Vernon, his desire
to return home increased. By the summer of 1779, he
confessed to Joseph Reed "the first wish of my Soul is to
return to that peaceful retirement, and domestick ease and •
happiness from whence I came." Two years later, he told
John Armstrong that he panted for retirement, "for those
domestic and rural enjoyments which in my estimation far
surpasses the highest pageantry of this v^orld." By the
83 ^ . , .Philip Schuyler to David Wooster, July 3, 1775,
Gerlach, Philip Schuyler
, pp. 284-285.
fall Of 1782, Washington ha. only been ho.e one ti.e in
There is not a Man in America," he to]d . m ^ ./ n l a New England
minister late in 1782 "^->. = +-that more Fervently wishes for
Peace, and a return to private life than I do."^^ other
officers shared these sentiments.
During the second month of the war, Greene told
his wife that he would rather be home than be a soldier
Greene's desire to return to his fa.rly and friends in Rhode
island increased the longer he remained away. He told a
cousin during the su^ner of 1780 that "No pleasure is equal
to domestic happiness" and his desire for the war to end
so he "might return to my dear fireside."
"i should be
extremely happy,
"
he told his wife the following spring, "if
the war had an honourable close, and I on a farm with my
little family about me." During the mid summer of 1781, he
told her his desire for the war's end and his retirement to
their home, "where love and softer pleasure are to be found."
When Gouverneur Morris suggested to Greene that he really
June 26
.^^^^e Washington to the New York Legislature,
rT^t A I '
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3-305-George Washington to the PreiidiKt-^FTh^C^tlHiFtalCongress, September 21, 1775, ibid., 3:511; GeorgeWashington to Joseph Reed, July 29, 1779, ibid 16-9-George Washington to John Armstrong, March 26, '1781; ibid
inli JT'''^^ Washington to William Gordon, October 23,
"
t : ""rioA' 25:288; see also Washington's Circular ofMay 4, 1782, ibid., 24:234-238.
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enjoyed the military life rrr^^^noy t , G eene responded by telling him
that he was "truely domestic."
-The more I am in an army
and the more I am acquainted with human nature," he wrote
Morris, "the less fond I am of political life.-^^
"I wish for nothing more," General Wayne wrote late
in 1778, "than an opportunity of returning to my 'Sabine
field,' with safety to my country and honor to myself."
Late on a cold December 1777 night Jedediah Huntington wrote
home that he hoped "God in his Great Mercy" would restore
peace to the land so "that I may return To the Duties and
Joys of Domestick Life." The following summer he wrote "I
most ardently hope for a speedy End to the War and I think
it seems to be the wish of almost everyone." it certainly
was the feeling of Timothy Pickering. During the summer
of 1777 he told his young bride that he hoped the war would
be brought to a speedy finish so he could "return to the
arms of my beloved." Later that summer, he told her that
85
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when he joined the A™y he thought the war would last one86 ^^^^
campaign.
Evidence of the desire to be citizens first was the
fact that so few officers and soldiers served the whole war.
Yet many believed they had an obligation to serve in a
civilian capacity if they did not serve in a military one.
Thus, numerous revolutionary leaders served in civilian
positions once having left military service. And frequently
officers served in a civilian capacity while serving in the
mil i tary
.
Many revolutionaries moved frequently between
civilian and military positions. Examples in the northern
states are numerous, including such leaders as Benjamin
Lincoln, John Sullivan, Thomas Mifflin, Joseph Reed, Philip
Schuyler, George Clinton, Alexander McDougall, Caesar Rodney,
John Dickinson, Philemon Dickinson, and Thomas McKean.^"^
^^Anthony Wayne to Joseph Reed, December 28, 1778Moore, Anthony Wayne, p. 75; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez'
Huntington, December 10, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC
20 (1923): 386; Same to same, June 10, 1781, ibid., 2 0:409;Timothy Pickering to Mrs. Rebecca Pickering, June 3, 1777,'Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1); and Same
to same, June 23, 1777, ibid.
87 ^Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the American
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The Life and Recollect ion^of
_John_Hwj-and
,
Late Pres ident
o f the Rhode^ Is^nd_Historical Society, p.' 5 4n,; Bowe'nT
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, pp. 221-228; Lawrence Shaw Mayo, John
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The southern states probably had
.ore individuals
.oving
back and forth between civilian and military positions,
primarily because of the lack of numerous leaders. Such
™ent not only strengthened the ties between the civilian
and the military, but reinforced civilian virtues and goals.
Besides desiring the officer corps be as .uch as
possible a reflection of the civilian revolutionary leader-
ship, it was the universal desire of the revolutionary
leaders that the military would subordinate themselves to
the^ivilian leadership, to the principle and practice of
Har?le; ""oTtt
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civil supremacy. The question of civilian control was
raised frequently in the years preceding the war and would
be constantly during the war itself.
When asked to remove the troops from the Boston
metropolis during 1769, Governor Bernard responded that he
had no authority over the King's troops. This brought a
response by the Massachusetts House of Representatives that
the civil power must have control over the military.
This response was to be expected, as if in a knee jerk
reaction, because the American colonists firmly believed
in Cicero's dictum "Cedant arma togae," i.e., let arms yield
to law. The colonists knew their classical history, as well
as the history of the preceding two centuries. They knew
that whenever the military was not checked by civilian
authority, military tyranny was instituted. A meeting of
delegates of New London and Windham Counties in Connecticut
rhetorically asked, "What subdued the Roman & Grecian
Republicks, An Army not under the Control of the civil
90Magaistratel" Most Americans had, to varying degrees
Francis Bernard to the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, May 31, 1769, Bradford, Speeches of theGovernor_o^Mas sachusetts 1765^:1775, p. 168T~Th^Miiii^u-
setts House of Representatives to Francis Bernard, June 13
1769, ibid., pp. 169-170.
90
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the delegates of New London and Windham Counties, September 8,
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after
.no„Xea,e o. t.e ae.a.es in
.„,,3na conce.ni.,
parliamentary control of t.e
.iUtary.
..en .ore ;.eri.ans
.new the story of .ow Cro.weU ana the Major Cenerais ruiea
England in a tyrannical fashion.^^ By the institution of
the coercive Acts,
.ost ;^ericans were, as discussed
earlier, aware that the military of the King co.ld very
easily duplicate what had happened in England a century
before. They, at least many Whigs, believed that the
Ministry was using the military xn the colonies as the sword
of their conspiracy to usurp them of their freedom and
liberty. Governor Bernard's lack of control over the
military was just another proof. it is not surprising then,
that during 1774-1775 the Whigs included among their charges
against the Ministry its attempt to render the colonial
governments subordinate to the military.
Jefferson, in his A^Su™^ri^view^f_t_he_^R^^
British-America during the summer of 1774, stated the British
imposed a standing army upon them of soldiers "not made up
of the people here, nor raised by the authority of our laws"
and that the King had "expressly made the civil subordinate
to the military." He wrote that "Every state must judge
for itself the number of armed men which they may safely
trust among them, of whom they are to consist, and under
91Schwoerer, ;;No_Jtandijig_Armie^ pp. 2, 3, 34, 71.
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What restrictions they are to be laia." similar views were
expressed by Virginia in declaring itself independent and
again in the Declaration of Independence . ^2
Once the war began, the revolutionary leaders
continued to express a concern about controlling the mili-
tary. In their declarations, constitutions and bills of
rights, they stated the necessity for keeping the military
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civilian
governments
.
It cannot be emphasized enough that the revolutionary
leaders truly believed that for their revolutionary war to
be successful, the military would have to be carefully
controlled by the civilian governments; that civil supremacy
would have to be genuinely accepted by the military. As
will be demonstrated later, the revolutionary leaders, being
realistic and by no means totally dogmatic about civil
supremacy, would, at times, compromise their beliefs regard-
ing civilian control. Civil supremacy would be a dynamic
concept. Nevertheless, they were adamant about such
431.
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co^p.cises being temporary in nature and punishing
unauthorized violations to the principle and accepted
practices of civil supremacy.
TO a large extent the American concept of civil
supremacy was an extension of their jealousy of pov.er As
was discussed earlier, the revolutionary leaders were a very
lealous people, very conscious of their rights and liberties
and very knowledgeable of how precarious their freedom was
When the military either assumed or was given too much power.
The military existed to win the war, but it was for the
civilian governments to assure the revolution itself was
successful
.
Just how jealous were the civilian leaders during
the warp The answer is: very jealous
. On the one hand
they did not desire the military to be raised too high in
the eyes of their fellow citizens as the true saviors of
the country and on the other hand they did not desire the
military to usurp any unauthorized power nor violate the
established tenets of civil supremacy.
With respect to the military being raised too high,
Abigail Adams informed her husband early in the war that
"every man who wears a cockade appears of double the
94Chevalier De La Luzerne to Comte de VergennesJanuary 28, 1781, Durand, New Materials for the History 'oftj2e_^meriican_Revolution
, pp. 234 , 235"^
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importance he used to, and I fp<:.i ^
>
a i eel a respect for the lowest
subaltern in the Ar.y.-^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^
war was long lasting, such attitudes would prevail and the
military would eventually be "sni- „iJ-y c apt to consider themselves
as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens." There-
fore, he warned Ja,.es Warren, the military "should be
watch [ejd with a jealous Eye." m the same vein, he
observed
:
I have a good Opinion of the principal officers of
I
^'^^^"^ ^^^"^ Patriots as well asSoldiers; But rf this War continues, as it inav foryears yet to come, we know not who r^ay succeedthem. Men who have been long governed by miUtarv
loL^'the sp?rlfa'd and^HablL i^Iyse S irit n Feeling of Citizens. And evenCitizens having been used to admire the HerSism
pWed and ?rr'v"' ^^-^^ have Sis-layed to look up to them as their Saviours
R?aht^ "° surrender to them thos^ig s for the Protection of which against anInvader, they had employ [e]d and paid them. 96
The military were indeed watched with a jealous eye, often
to an extreme degree.
One example of the extreme to which some civilian
leaders went in their jealousy of the military being shown
too much preference was in the matter of a toast. Throughout
95
Abigail Adams to John Adams, June [16'>1
. 1775Butterfield, AFC, 1:218-219. ^ J'
96^ -
^Samuel Adams to James Warren, January 7, 1776,
"Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 72 (1917)- 197-198
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the war, whenever toasts were offered in Whig gatherings
precedence was always given to the United States and the
continental Congress before General Washington and the Con-
tinental Ar.y.^^ But even in complying with this standard
priority, a difficulty arose in the course of one such
series of toasts. At a dinner party at Paneuil Hall during
the sunder of 1778, toasts were offered by the military and
civilian leaders in attendance. The first, given to the
UnUed States, and the second, given to the monarch and
kingdon of France, were both followed by thirteen-gun
salutes. The third toast was offered for Congress. The
officer in charge of the cannon looked to John Hancock for
approval before giving the salute. Hancock shook his head
^ Zjl^^aryland Gazette , July 11 , 1782 ; The Provi-l^^^^^^tteTI^n^^ lo/i^^h^^^
^|f|i^i^:^ip||l^^ 1776 ; The'New-YirF-Gazette :_an d the Weekly Mercury
. August 2 87T775"^~-ThF~
^^^^^^lIXll^^^ juW 8—1779 .55i:H|w^n5pnd:c^^ New-JerseyGazette, July 8 , 1778 , February 17, 1779
, J^JT^rTTTT^
WarLnVn^^ ^ II' November 7, 1781; May 29 , 1782 ; Ja^esrre to Samuel Adams, September 30, 1778, "Warren-AdamsLetters," MHSC, 73 (1925): 48-49; Benjamin Tallmadge toBarnabas Deane, July 6, 1778, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb,2:115-116; Frederick Cook, [ed.], Jo{rFHiTF~5rThi MilitaryExpedition o f Major General John S^Illi^TK^rA^ c^,^ M.^ q.-^'
Nations ofl^Tdians in 1779 (Auburn. NplT^TT^^MTT-lTn
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happened after the fourth toast was offered to the arr„y
and navy of Prance. But in^ediately after the fifth toast
to Washington and the American
.r.y
. Hancoo. waved his hand
eagerly in signal for the salute to be given. It was
Afterwards, Ja.es Warren as.ed Hancock why Congress was not
treated to the highest marks of respect and distinction that
a salute indicated. Hancock replied that Congress had been
included in the salute given the United states. Warren then
asked why were not Washington and the ;^erican Ar.y included
in the same salute to the United States. He told Hancock
he held Washington and his ar„,y in the greatest respect,
but if they were held up against Congress, they should be
disbanded. Warren informed Samuel Adams of the incident,
leaving it to him to "say whether this was oweing to no
principle, or to a wish to distinguish the Military above
the Civil, or to Contrast himself with Men he had represented
as Inimical to the General and Army.''^^ ^^^^ receiving
Warren's letter, Adams wrote him the incident was probably
not worthy of notice. However, "Things which detach [e)d
and by themselves are justly considerfe)d as Trifles[,J
light as Air, when they are connected with and made Parts
of a great Machine, become important and do good or Hurt."
James Warren to Samuel Adams, September 30, 1778,Warren-Adams Letters," MHSC 73 (1925): 48-49
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Ada.s believed it very wrong to show any partiality to the
military. Such preference, he believed, put Congress in
an awkward situation. He told Warren:
While they are exerting their utmost Influence on
of\reTelerlTllT ' '° Authorityth s veral States over the Military, there aresome Men, even in that State
. . . who'^^ould lessRespect shown to them than to the Creatures whichthey have made Tyrants have been the scourges andPlagues of Mankind; and Armies their Instruments!
. • •
^ne Time may come when the Sins of Americamay be punish [e]d by a standing Army; and that timewill surely come when the Body of the People, shallbe so lost to the Exercise of common Understanding
and Caution, as to suffer the Civil to stop theMilitary Power. 99 ^
This was just one example of the extreme to which some
civilian leaders expressed their concern about perceived
violations even to the spirit of civil supremacy.
Scholars now studying the American Revolution have
often remarked about the extreme degree to which concern
about civil supremacy was exhibited by the civilian leaders
and how this hampered the war-making efforts by the military
Almost one hundred fifty years ago, Jared Sparks stated
"The army suffered throughout the war from this trembling
timidity of the civil fathers, this fearful distrust of the
strength of purpose and self-control of the leading agent
Samuel Adams to James Warren, October 20, 1778,
ibid., 57, 58.
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Of their will...100
^^^^
inilitary expressed concern about the often extreme degree
to which the civilians were jealous of the military and
fearful of its power. John Laurens, for one, wrote his
father, at the time a member of Congress, that he wished
to see "all odious distinctions of jealousy laid aside, for
we are all citizens, and have no separate interests ^ 0^
Most Americans, however, believed that despite the diffi-
culties it created, jealousy was necessary in a republic,
for a power unchecked was tyranny. "The jealousy between
the army and the body politic," according to John Adams,
"is not to be dreaded; it only shows that the spirit of
liberty is still alive and active in the people. "^^^
At times, jealousy of the military was carried to
extremes. As a result, the military were often stifled in
their efforts by adherence to the accepted tenets of civil
supremacy. Nevertheless, the civilian leaders demanded
compliance with it, from the beginning of the war until the
end. Early in the war, Elbridge Gerry informed Joseph
Sparks, Gouverne£r_Morr^is^, 1:232-233; see also
Louis Smith, Ame£ican_Democracy_and_Mi^ A Study
of C ivil Control of tjie_Jj.jJ,tarv_Po\^_j.n_th^
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951)
, p. ITsT
101^ ,
,John Laurens to Henry Laurens, April 11, 1778,
Simms, The_Army Cor£esponden of Colonel John Laurens, p. 157
102^ ^John Adams to Baron Van Der Capellen, January 21,
1781, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:357.
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Trumbull "it is the fixed Determination of Congress to
preserve the civil above the military, and the authority
of that will not be surrendered, should it be necessary to
disband the army in preserving the same."^^^ Later, another
member of Congress wrote his state's assembly that Congress
was "careful to admit no Idea of Power in the Military
Order Repugnant to, or interefering with the Civil authority,
nor insolence to the Civil Magistrate of any State to pass
with impunity . ""'"^'^
Congress constantly reminded the military of their
desire for them always to subordinate themselves to the
civilian leaders. During the summer of 1777, Congress
resolved that it "will, on all occasions, discountenance
and punish any indecent behaviour of any officer or
officers in the Continental service, towards the civil
authority of the several states." The following year
Congress informed the chief executives that if any officer
acted badly towards them or the state governments to report
them to Washington or the commanding officer of the depart-
ment. During the spring of 1779, Congress resolved "that
103Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull, March 26, 1777,
Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL: see also Elbridge
Gerry to George Washington, January 13, 1778, Burnett, LMCC ,
3:34.
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any disrespectful and indecent behaviour of any officers
.
. . ,
under the appointment of Congress, to the civil
authority of any State in the Union, will be discountenanced
and discouraged. "lO^ These were not idle threats.
Despite some critical commentary by the military
with respect to civil supremacy, as a general rule, most
American soldiers accepted civilian control of the military
as necessary for a successful revolution. Washington
certainly accepted the necessity of civil supremacy. m
replying to an address by the city magistrates of Philadel-
phia late in 1781, he stated, "As I have ever considered a
due support of Civil Authority essential to the preservation
of that liberty for which we are contending, I have from
duty as well as from inclination endeavoured as far as
possible, to avoid the least violation of it.''^^"" According
to John C. Fitzpatrick, Washington, "By training, by
association and by custom was an earnest and honest believer
in the right and justice of constituted authority." A more
recent historian, Richard B. Morris, observed that "If any-
one doubted his devotion to republican institutions and his
105
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"'"^^George Washington to the Magistrates of the City
of Philadelphia, December 17, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington
, 23:394.
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frequent corru.ents on that score and his decisive actions
Morris stated that "In his handling of Congress and
his deference to their judgment, he [referring to Washington]
showed himself a master politician." A Washington biographer
of fifty years ago observed that Washington "held Congress
always and most scrupulously in reverence" and "Nothing in
Washington's life is more heroic than the deference with
which he treated this congress . "^^^ So was Washington
really a master politician, really heroic, in his dealings
with Congress? Not so much as he was a realist, understand-
ing the necessity of civil supremacy and a strong central
government if the American Revolution and war for
independence were to be successful. Therefore, in both
word and deed, Washington was ever deferential and
subordinate to Congress, from the day Congress commissioned
him till the day he resigned his commission.
It was expected by Congress, when they gave him his
instructions on June 25, 1775, that he would keep Congress
abreast of his activities and rely on them for all decisions
of a political nature. Congress, realizing however they
107 . .
,Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself
, p. 208;
see also p. 284; Richard B. Morris, Seven Who Shaped Our
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Ibid., p. 68; John Corbin, The Unknown Washing-
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Scribner's Sons, 1930), pp. 206, 205.
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could not foresee all possibilities, informed Washington
they were leaving .any things to his prudent judgment,
which they hoped would reflect the opinion of councils of109
These instructions were generally agreeable to
Washington. He saw the necessity of keeping Congress
informed. All one has to do is look at Washington's
correspondence to see how often he formally wrote Congress
and informally wrote its members. The same source also
demonstrates how frequently he corresponded with the chief
executives of the various civilian entities, informing them,
encouraging them, and asking their support. Even in picking
his aides throughout the war, Washington frequently selected
men who either by birth or politics were able to share his
views informally with the civilian leaders. With respect
to councils of war, Washington accepted the Congressional
instructions almost too literally. During the first year
of the war, Washington made few tactical or strategic
decisions without consulting his general officers and what-
ever civilian leaders who could be compelled upon to offer
advice. So much did he depend on them, Congress finally
told him he did not have to rely on such consultations if he
could more properly make a decision himsel f . -"""^^ Washington,
109
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however, preferred the advice of others. Throughout his
military, and subsequent political career, he disliked
making decisions without consultation, or without knowing
the exact limits of his authority. He told Joseph Reed
early in the war he was not fond of stretching his powers,
stating if Congress would say "'This far and no farther you
shall go,' I will promise not to offend whilst I continue
in their service." with respect to not making political
decisions Washington completely agreed with Congress's
instructions. As Washington told Philip Schuyler late in
the war, he had always made it a point "not to interfere
in the civil Concerns of the Continent or the Legislatures,
except where they are intimately connected with Military
Matters
.
"""""^-^ Washington was basically true to his word.
Washington constantly referred questions of a
political nature to the civilian authorities rather than
acting upon them in a unilateral manner. This was especially
true of his dealings with Tories and British emissaries , '"'''^
With respect to his contacts with British officials,
Washington was always careful to ascertain that the enemy
George Washington to Joseph Reed, March 3, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4:367; George
Washington to Philip Schuyler, February 6, 1782, ibid.,
23:488.
112Bradley Chapm, The American Law of Treason:
Revolu t ion ary and Early Nationa l Origin s (Seattle: Univer
sity of \vashington Press, 1964 ), pp. 55-56.
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understood that he was subordinate to Congress, for they
were the legitimate authority of the continent. Thus,
whenever the British contacted hi. to negotiate, he referred
them to Congress, notifying Congress of their approaches .
^
Additionally, when Jacob Duche attempted to have Washington
negotiate a settlement with the British, Washington did not
bother to respond. Instead, he simply forwarded Duche
'
s
letter to Congress for their consideration
. Washington
also referred questions of retaliation to Congress, believing
such questions were as much, if not more, political than
115
military. This was especially true of the Asgill affair.
Late in March 1782, New Jersey militia Captain
Joshua Huddy was captured and hanged by a "refugee partisan
force." Washington and his council of officers recommended
retaliation if the British did not turn over the guilty
113^
, .George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, March 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick Writings
of Washington, 6 : 427-42 8 ; Same to same, August 5, 17 82";;ibid., 24:466; Same to same, August 28, 1782, ibid., 25:71,
71-72; George Washington to Sir Henry Clinton, May 31, 1778,
ibid., 11:496-497.
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Sparks, Cor£espondenc_e_ o^f _the_Am 1:448-458 ;
George Washington to the "President 'of "the^Contlnental
Congress, October 16, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings_of
Wash ington, 9:382-383; [J. M. Butler], Washing ton^t_Vaney
Forge: Together wi tlljth^e_Duch^e_Correspond^ ( Phil ad e IphTa :
J. M. Butler, 1858)
,
ppl 45-77; Ford, JCC," 5:530; 6:886-887 ;
Graydon, Memoirs
, pp. 428-433.
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party. Congress agreed. On May 3, 1782, Washington ordered
Hazen to select by lot a captured British captain, who was
an unconditional prisoner. None being found, Washington had
Hazen pick any British captain prisoner. The choice fell on
twenty year old Charles Asgill, who had surrendered with
Cornwallis, thus covered by a prescribed treatment of
officers so captured. This bothered Washington, but he
decided to go ahead with the execution unless Congress could
be persuaded to stop it. Understanding Washington's dilen^a
and being persuaded by the French Minister to intercede on
Asgill
-s behalf. Congress ordered Washington to release
Asgill. Washington was relieved by Congress's decision,
especially since he firmly believed, as he told Congress,
Asgill
-s release was of such a political and international
nature that it was out of his purview "^^
Congress desired Washington to give strategic and
tactical direction to the Continental armies, always keeping
in mind the reasons why they had been raised. They did not
George Washington to the General and Field Offi-
cers of the Army, April 19, 1782, ibid., 24:136-137; George
Washington to Moses Hazen, May 3, 1782, ibid., 218; Same to
same. May 18, 1782, ibid., 263-264; Same to same, June 4,
1782, ibid., 305-306; George Washington to the Secretary at
War, June 5, 1782, ibid., 319-320; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress, April 20, 1782, ibid.,
144-145; Same to same, August 19, 1782, ibid., 25:40-41;
George Washington to James Duane, September 30, 1782, ibid.,
222-223; Ford, JCC, 22:217-218; 23:715, 718-719, 829n.,
845-847, 965n.
198
expect him to turn to themselves or the state governments
for military advice, and when they gave him extraordinary
grants of power they expected him to use it fully. On both
accounts they misjudged Washington, who was, as already
indicated, quite reluctant to act without advice or to
overstep the bounds of what he considered his proper rela-
tionship to private property, private citizens, and civilian
governments. Washington continually called on Congress for
strategical advice. During the late summer of 1776, for
instance, Washington queried Congress whether or not he
should burn New York City upon evacuation. Late in the war
he was still seeking advice, asking Congress where the main
western fortification should be located and whether or not
they wanted troops stationed in the Wyoming Valley."'""'"^ "Don't
forget to urge Congress to resume the power of appointing
all military Officers" Benjamin Rush reminded Richard Henry
Lee early in 1777, less than a month after Washington had
118been given dictatorial powers by Congress. Rush need
not have worried, for Washington disliked grants of
117George VJashmgton to the President of the Conti
nental Congress, September 2, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington
, 6:6; George Washington to William Irvine
,
December 18, 1781, ibid., 23:396; George Washington to
James Potter, October 26, 1782, ibid., 26:301-302.
118Benjamin Rush to Richard Henry Lee, January 6,
1776 [1777], L. H. Butterfield, ed
.
, "Further Letters of
Benjamin Rush," PMHB 78, no. 1 (January 1954): 17.
199
extraordinary power, and generally was quite eager to return
the powers granted him, believing the civilian bodies more
capable of mandating the desired means and ends. Even some
non-extraordinary powers Washington believed should be more
properly exercised by civilian bodies rather than himself.
Thus, we find early in the war, Washington hounding both .
the Massachusetts Provincial Congress and the Continental
Congress to assume the responsibility for the prizes taken
by his "navy." The Continental Congress did so in August
1776, assuming at that time control of all naval affairs.
Washington not only assured Congress and the state
governments of his willingness to subordinate himself to
them, but he was also quite adamant about insuring that his
army clearly understood the principles and practices of
civil supremacy, and acted upon them. Early in the war,
when precendents were being established regarding the mili-
tary's relationship to the civilian governments, Washington
was very diligent in assuring that his subordinates under-
stood the military was subject to the will of the civilian
119 .William Bell Clark, George Washington's Navy:
Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New England
Waters (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1961),
pp. 15-16, 17, 19-20, 135, 174, 185-186; Donald W. Beattie
and J. Richard Collins, Washington's Nev7 England Fleet:
Beverly's Role in its Origins, 1775-1777 (Salem, Massachu-
setts: Newcomb and Gauss Company, 1969), pp. 34-41; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
November 8, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington , 4:73;
Same to same, April 25, 1776, ibid., 517-518.
governn^ents, particularly the Continental Congress. During
the sunder of 1776, Washington told a congressional board
of war that he would "obey to the utn^ost of r.y power and
to the best of my Abilities, all orders of Congress with
a scrupulous exactness . 20 Washington expected no less
from his subordinates. ^21 He also expected them to keep
the best relations possible with the civilians, for he
considered harmony between the army and the civilians essen-
tial to winning the war.^22 ^^^^ ^^^.^^ ^^^^^ ^^There
is nothing I wish for more than harmony and a good under-
standing to prevail between the Country and the Army." Two
years earlier, when Washington had received complaints
against Lee's corps for illegal foraging, he told him "This
complaint I confess gives me extreme pain, as there is
nothing I wish so much as a perfect good understanding and
Harmony between the Inhabitants and every part of the
123Army." When Washington learned that Colonel Moylan had
120George Washington to the Board of War and
Ordnance, July 29, 1776, ibid., 5:347-348.
121George Washington to Philip Schuyler, June 25,
1775, ibid., 3:302-304; George Washington to Artemas Ward,
April 4, 1776, ibid., 4:467.
122George Washington to George Clinton, October 19,
1782, ibid., 25:277; George Washington to Samuel H. Parsons,
March 23, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 351.
12 3George Washington to Henry Lee, September 3, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing ton
,
19:493; Same to same,
November 29, 1778, ibid., 13:357.
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had a misunderstanding with Governor Trumbull, he wrote
Moylan that "You will upon the whole, find that many advan-
tages by cultivating a good understanding with Civil
Authority
.
"^^^
VThen Elias Boudinot went to Washington with an
informant's information about a traitor, Washington told
Boudinot not to take up the citizen and confine him without
letting him know his crime or his accuser. Boudinot, some-
what taken back by Washington's attention to civilian rights,
wrote, "My mortification was very great, to think, that I
who had entered the Army to v/atch the Military & preserve
the civil rights of my fellow citizens should be so reproved
by a Military man, who was so interested in having acted
otherwise [.] I reed [Sic] it as a severe lecture on my own
12 5imprudence .
"
Washington's officers shared his beliefs about civil
supremacy. They acknowledged that the state governments
and Congress were superior to themselves . "'"^^ Like
124George Washington to Stephen Moylan, February 3,
1780, "Selections from the Correspondence of Col. Stephen
Moylan, of the Continental Cavalry," PMHB 38, no. 3 (1913):
353.
125Boudinot, Journal or Historical Recollections,
pp . 6 6-67.
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John Haslet to ?, December 24, 1775, Delaware
Archives
,
3:1384; Statement signed by Georgia Continental
officers, February 10, 1776, White, His torical Collections
of Georgia, p. 94; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr.,
December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.
Washington, they realized the importance to the war effort
of their relationship to the civilian authorities, and the
necessity for harmony between the civilian governments and
the military.!" They also realized the civilians were
quite jealous of their power. As General Putnam told
another officer, "The civil power is exceeding jealous
lest the Military should make encroachments on its
1 T pJurisdiction." Therefore fho rr^^iA^in r , t e military were generally
careful not to offend the civilian authorities.
The military leaders throughout the war, continually
demonstrated to the civilian leaders their subordinate posi-
tion. This involved giving basic courtesies, following
orders, asking and receiving advice, avoiding political
involvements, and generally abiding by the basic tenets of
civil supremacy.
It was in their dealings with the British on
questions of a basic political nature where the American
127
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March 21, [1778], Idzerda, Lafayette in the Age of the
American Revolution, 1:373; Hugh F. Rankin, The North
Ca_rolirra Continentals
, p. 377.
12 8 Israel Putnam to Ebenezer Gray, December 2, 1778,
Hunt, L^:agnTents_of_Reyo_l_uti^ p. 133,. see also
Benedict Arnold to Lord George "Germa in , October 7 , 1780
,
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officers clearly dennons trated
, as Washington did, that
congress and the state governments set public policy, not
themselves. Even Charles Lee, who violated the spirit, if
not the letter, of almost every aspect of civil supremacy,
was quite proper in his relations with the British, at least
at the beginning of the war. When Burgoyne contacted him
during July 1775 about an interview, Lee asked the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress whether it was proper for
him to meet with the British general, and if they did, would
they appoint one of their members to accompany him. They
informed Lee that was a bad idea, but if he decided to meet
with Burgoyne to have Elbridge Gerry represent the govern-,
ment. Lee, deciding a meeting would cause jealousies and
suspicions, opted not to meet Burgoyne. Other generals were
even more adamant in their refusal to deal with the British.
Sullivan, for instance, during the spring of 1778, refused
one British general's attempt to have him circulate Lord
North's conciliatory bills to the people of Rhode Island.
In doing so, he informed General Pigot the people of Rhode
Island recognized no authority but the civil magistrates,
and therefore he would turn over all the copies to the Rhode
Island Assembly. Similarly, another British general
contacted Greene during 1782 in hopes of having him stop
South Carolina abuses of Tory property. Greene refused,
informing him that questions of Tory property were in the
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purview Of the civilian authorities and therefore he should
deal with them. He later gave the same advice to hi. when
the latter desired a temporary cessation of hostilities so
that he might purchase supplies . """^^
The military also demonstrated their subordinate
position by obeying instructions, even when the instructions
were militarily unsound. The classic example is Lincoln
defending Charleston when it was really not defensible.
He probably should have evacuated his troops from the city
early in its seige. Instead, at the instructions of Congress,
he defended it and was forced to surrender the largest
American force captured until that at Corregidor in 1942.
Other military decisions were also based upon political
considerations, such as Washington's decision in 1776 to
protect New York City and his 1777 decision to winter at
129Charles Lee to the Massachusetts Provincial
Congress, July 10, 1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
4 (1872) : 193; Charles Lee to John Burgoyne, July 11
, 1775
,ibid., 194-195; Lincoln, Journa]^__of_Each_Pro\n^
o^Jvla^sachusetts, p. 483 ; Robert Pigot to John SunTvarT;
April 24, 1778, Sparks, Correspondence of the American
Revolution, 2:114n.; John Sullivan to
.
Robert" Pi got "April 27,
1778, TBid., 114n.; John Sullivan to George Washington,
May 1, 1778, ibid., 114; Alexander Leslie to Nathanael
Greene, April 4, 1782, Edward McCrady, The History of South
Carolina in the Revolution 178 0-1783, pp. 632-633; Nathanael
Greene to Alexander Leslie, April I ], 1782, ibid., p. 633;
Alexander Leslie to John Mathews, April [ ], 1782, ibid.,
p. 633; John Mathews to Alexander Leslie, April 12, 1782,
ibid., pp. 633-635; Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion,
April 8, 1782, Gibbes, Documentary History of the American
Revolution, 2:155. '
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valley Forge. And when given power by the state governments
or Congress to aot in a forceful manner, the military,
realizing the necessity of not offending the civilian
leaders often did not exercise their power to its fullest,
we have already discussed how Washington frequently did not
use powers given him. similarly, Israel Putnam made every
effort to avoid a display of power or to appear placing the
military above the law, when he became military commander
of the city of Philadelphia on December 12, 1776, and placed
it under martial law."^"^^
Additionally, the military demonstrated their
subordinate status by turning over to civilian authorities
those soldiers and civilians they believed should be tried
by civilian law rather than military law.^^^ When four
130„ • •
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T^erican Revolution," MAH 1, no. 12 (December 1877): 714.
officers coi^plained to General Wayne they were going to be
turned over to civilian authorities to stand trial for an
offense conrn^itted against civilians, he reminded them they
"Certainly can't be Ignorant of the superior power of the
•Civil Law over the Mil i tary . " ^ ^2
^^^^ instances mili-
tary officers even threatened their soldiers with civilian
justice believing it would be more severe. "^^^
The military realized they needed the advice and
support of the civilian leaders to be successful. Therefore,
they frequently called upon state leaders for advice and to
issue instructions that could just as well be issued by
themselves, but would be more acceptable coming from civilian
authorities rather than from the military . "^^'^ Because of
vagueness in instructions and because of political ramifica-
tions, military leaders often consulted with civilian
leaders before taking action. This was especially true
early in the war when precedents were being established and
132Anthony Wayne to Jno
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and VJm. Bell and Peter Smith, October 10, 1778, Stille,
Anthony Wayne
, p. 172.
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divisions of authority were blurred. a major problem
throughout the war for the military leaders was what to do
with civilians and British subjects either caught in illegal
acts or suspected of some nefarious plans. The military
did not desire to inflict punishments unilaterally, thus
throughout the war we find them consulting with civilian
leaders as to what course of action they should take.^^^
Besides asking advice, the military leaders also
demonstrated their subordinate position by keeping the
civilian leaders informed of their activities and intentions,
often when it was requested but just as often when it was
not. They did so, believing the civilian leaders would be
better able to assist in the strategic decision-making
process. In New York during 1776 and 1777, George Clinton
was very diligent in keeping the New York Committee of
Safety and Convention informed of his activities. Also
135
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keeping the New York authorities informed were Tench
Tilghman and Alexander Hamilton. Between March and
September 1777, Hamilton wrote the Convention's Committee
of Correspondence over twenty letters. Earlier, during the
fall of 1776, Tilghman sent almost daily military situation
reports to a committee of the convention. New Hampshire's
John Stark, after the death of General Enoch Poor, assumed
the responsibility for keeping the government of his state
cognizant of the movement of their state's troops. Similarly,
Generals Putnam, Parsons and Huntington kept Governor
Trumbull apprised of how Connecticut's troops were perform-
137mg. In the middle states, early in the war, Lord
Stirling kept the New Jersey Assembly and Council of Safety
informed, as did Joseph Reed, President Wharton of Pennsyl-
13 8
vania. Further south, early in the war, Robert Howe
regularly reported his activities to the Virginia Convention.
Later in the war, George Rogers Clark kept the chief execu-
tive and the Board of War of Virginia apprised of the
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~ents Of his conunand in the west. Often both Lee and
Lafayette, despite their constant difficulties with state
executives, kept then, acquainted with their plans and
actions. Assisting Lafayette keep in touch with Maryland's
governor during the 1781 campaign was James McHenry, who
as a volunteer aide-de-camp, wrote Governor Lee nearly fifty
letters, generally about the state of the army.^^^
Probably the most important way the military
evidenced their subordinate position to the civilian
authorities was by their constant support of the civilian
governments. The military saw the necessity of stable
governments, for they would help in preventing anarchy and
military tyranny. Additionally they provided the best means
of supplying the army and harnessing the resources of the
state, i.e., monies and recruits.
139^S^tewart, lamJWood ford
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February 21, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette^n_Vi^ginj^, p. 3;For numerous letters from Lafayette to Governor Thomas Sim
Lee of Maryland, see J. Alexis Shriver, Lafayette in Harford
County 1781: An Account of the Events Attending the Passage
of the Marqui s_de^a^ayette_aj}d_Hi_s^_Troo Harford
County in 1781 and of Subsequent Events, to the Surrender
of Cornwalli s at Yorktown (Bel Air, M a"ryTand~rTr i va t eTy
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Where the governments were weak or virtually non-
existent, the military played an important role in
supporting and re-establishing the governments. This was
especially true in the South during the latter part of the
war. Both Greene and Lincoln when they commanded the southern
army stressed the necessity of the state governments existing
and being free of military interference. In May 1781, Greene
told the chief executive of South Carolina that the state
government should be re-established immediately, "as it is
of importance to have the minds of the people formed to the
habits of civil rather than military authority . "^^ ° That
summer he advised the Georgia state leaders to elect a
legislature, called on Colonel Clarke to have the people
elect a council, and directed Nathan Brownson, who he
recognized as governor, to repair to Augusta to organize
the government. During the summer and fall of 1779, Lincoln
encouraged both Mcintosh and Colonel Walton to assist the
Georgia civilian leaders with the re-establishment of the
state government and to encourage them to send delegates
141to Congress.
140Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, May 14, 1781,
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The military also protected the state governments
in the South. During the summer of 1780 the South Carolina
legislature shared the courthouse at Hillsboro, North
Carolina, with Gates, relying on him to have the southern
army protect their existence. Throughout the spring and
summer of 1781 Sumter, Marion, and Pickens helped keep the
civilian authority in existence in South Carolina. During
the fall of 1781, at the request of South Carolina's chief
executive, the brigadier generals of the South Carolina
troops conducted the assembly elections in their respective
militia districts. Once the legislature assembled at
Jacksonborough during January 1782, a Pennsylvania Regiment
was assigned to camp near the legislature in order to afford
142It protection.
In addition to upholding the governments, the mili-
tary also assisted them in preventing anarchical conditions
and fighting the domestic enemies. During 1779, 1780, and
1781, VJashington, at the request of Governors Trumbull and
Clinton, used the military to stop people from carrying on
George Walton, October 17, [17] 79, Benjamin Lincoln Letter-
book, 1:71, BPL.
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trade with or n,aking war on those living on Long Island,
as it was feared that such activity would cause retalia-
tion. 3 Washington and other Continental officers used
the army to assist the states in quelling the internal
enemies
.
Early in the war several states, to varying degrees,
authorized the Continental officers to use their soldiers
For
as well as the militia, to quell the disaf fected
.
example, New York had the Continental soldiers assist their
state forces in putting down the disaffected in Dutchess
County during 1777. Also that year General Smallwood and
Colonel Mordecai Gist, accompanied by Maryland political
commissioners, lead a small force of Continental troops and
militia against the disaffected in Maryland. The following
year, Rhode Island authorized General Sullivan to call out
and control their militia against the disaf fected . "^^^
14 3George Washington to Benjamin Tallmadge,
November 2
,
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The main force used against the disaffected were
the militia who were often authorized by the state govern-
ments to be led by Continental officers. The militia, for
the most part, were commanded by their own officers, often
under the immediate direction and control of the civil
authorities. This was especially true in New York, where
the militia and special ranger companies assisted state and
local committees in keeping the Tory element under control.
During 1777 in Dutchess County, where a large Tory element
expected the British to come to their aid, both the militia
and the Continental Army were used by New York's Commissioners
for Detecting Conspiracies to quell them into submission .
^
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The militia were also active in New England. For
example, during the summer of 1779, the Governor and Council
of safety of Connecticut authorized Brigadier General John
Tyler to use the militia to jail anybody in the New London-
Great Neck area who he suspected of being unfriendly to the
14 8
state. The middle states also relied upon the militia to
assist their cominittees in keeping control of the dis-
affected. New Jersey even used special units for that
purpose, in addition to regular militia units. During
the suimner of 1780 the Delaware militia was used to quell
Tories in the lower county who failed to pay taxes and bid
defiance by arms. James Allen, on January 25, 1777, wrote
in his diary that thus far during the winter Pennsylvania
had been governed by a council of safety who had "put the
execution of their decrees & the whole dispensation of
Justice into the hands of the field-officers of the several
battalions." Pennsylvania indeed relied heavily on their
148
Hoadly, Publ ic Records of the State of Connecti-
cut
, 2 : 370 . ' ' " " "
149,Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety
of the American Revolution, p. 79; Gerlach, P ro^l ogTieTo
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mlitia for maintaining order.l^l « various times both
Virginia and Maryland gave their militia officers great
latitude in using the militia against the disaffected in
their respective states. "2 ^^^^^ Carolina and South
Carolina were also active in using their militia, as well
as ranger and light horse units, to assist their committees
in controlling the disaf fected
.
The militia, as well as the Continentals, with a
few exceptions, used the authority given them without
abusing it. They did so in part because of their faith in
the civilian authorities and in civil supremacy, and because
the civilian and military leaders, as will be shown in the
next three chapters, kept a tight rein on them.
151
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CHAPTER IV
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL AND DIRECTION
OF THE MILITARY
^Vhen Congress met in Philadelphia on May 10, I775,
the war with Great Britain was a month old, the colonies
^
were calling upon Congress not only to give a unity to
addressing their common grievances, but also to take direc-
tion and control of the military. Both before and during
the war the Whigs expressed great concern about keeping the
n^ilitary under tight restraint, for to do otherwise would
be to allow the possibility of military tyranny and anarchy.
Peace was the first preference, a successful military war
the second, but more important was controlling and directing
the military.
The delegates to the second Continental Congress,
realizing the importance of their tasks, immediately set
about putting not only their political house in order, but
also their military establishment. Besides providing for
an army and selecting its military commanders, Congress
suggested military policies and began the process of
establishing the machinery for controlling and directing
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the military.
The question that was frequently raised during the
early summer of 1775, with respect to controlling and
directing the military, was where Congress should physically
locate themselves. Some members preferred removing to
Cambridge or Hartford, so as to be near the scene of battle.
Debate continued about a location into the fall, but by the
following spring when the war had spread to other parts of
the continent, it was decided to stay in the centrally
located Philadelphia. Debate regarding being nearer the
army was renewed during the summer of 1779, when several
delegates unsuccessfully attempted to have Congress join
the army and act "en Militaire."^ Although Congress as a
whole never sat near the army, they did actively involve
themselves in the control and direction of the army.
Until 1781, when executive departments were created.
Congress attempted to keep the direction and control of the
army in their own hands, though sharing some authority and
""John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 24
, 1775
, Butter-field, AFC, 1:255-256; Ford, JCC, 2:passim.
Titus Hosmer to Silas Deane, May 28, 1775, Burnett,
LMCC, l:94n.2; Joseph Hewes to Samuel Johnston, June 5, 1775,ibid., 113; Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, June 20,
1775, ibid., 138; Toger Sherman to Hoseph Trumbull, July 6,
1775, ibid., 154; Silas Deane to Mrs. Deane, September 22,
1775, ibid., 204 ; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, July 17,
1779, ibid., 4:328; Ford, JCC, 14:835-836.
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responsibility with the states and for lifted periods, with
the military themselves. During the first two years of the
war congress frequently involved itself in even the minutest
details of army policy and procedures. Relying on standing
committees, special committees, and grand committees.
Congress attempted to keep tight rein over all aspects of
the military. Special committees generally were appointed
to answer specific queries made by the military. Standing
committees were established to handle such matters as
procuring cannon, fire arms, saltpetre, clothing, beef and
salt. Standing committees were also established to provide
for prisoners of war, spies, cavalry, recruiting, improving
the militia, and the health and discipline of the army.
Hospital and medical standing committees were also established
the first year of the war.^ Generally the committees numbered
between three and five delegates, but often numbered thirteen
members, one from each colony. The latter were called grand
committees
.
Spending so much time on the minute military matters.
Congress frequently accomplished little else, even when
3
Ibid., 2:86, 106, 191, 203, 250; 3:419, 436, 459;
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184; 5:350, 442, 616, 810; 6:992; 7:193, 280-281; 8:413.
{219
relying on the con^ittees for guidance and recommendations
Part of the problem was absenteeism/ Also, the members
When present, were forced to spend a large amount of their
time among many con^ittees. Thomas McKean was chairman of
five corr^ittees and a member of thirty-three others at one
time during the first year of the war and Richard Henry Lee,
during his first five years in Congress, served on forty-
five military and naval committees. John Witherspoon served
on 120 committees during his six years in Congress; Roger
Sherman on 110 during his six years; and William Ellery on
seventy during his five years. John Adams, during his short
stay in Congress, chaired twenty-five committees and served
on sixty-five others.^
The committee system was as tedious, cumbersome,
and complex as it was slow and ineffective, as committees
often worked at cross-purposes.^ Responding to Washington
TTV. ^
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regarding a letter he had written Congress, President
Laurens reminded him that it was the rule of Congress to
commit letters to the consideration of co„™ittees and
boards that were dispersed in different parts of Philadelphia
and governed by rules of their own making for meeting and
responding to Congress, and therefore, "it is not always
or I should say, 'tis seldom in the power of the President
to answer with that dispatch which may seem necessary."'
Even when the committees met, they were not, for the most
part, given any more authority than to inquire and make
suggestions
.
Even as early as January 1776 it was obvious to most
members of Congress they could not continue regulating all
military matters by temporary committees and by the
committee of the whole, for although these seemed the safest
way, it also appeared that some form of a permanent military
oversight should be established. Therefore, on January 24,
1776, a committee was appointed to consider the propriety
of establishing a congressional war office. Their report,
calling for a Board of War and Ordnance, was made in April
and adopted on the twelfth of June. Its first members, John
Adams, Roger Sherman, Benjamin Harrison, James Wilson and
Edward Rutledge, with Richard Peters as secretary, were
7Henry Laurens to George Washington, November 13,
1777, ibid., 2:549.
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elected the next day. Charles Carroll of Carrollton,
because of the experience he had gained by visiting the ar.y
in Canada and his knowledge of French, was added a month
later .
^
Initially, the Board of War and Ordnance was
authorized to keep military records and accounts of arms
and supplies; forward congressional dispatches and money
to the army; provide for the prisoners of war; and superin-
tend the raising, fitting out and dispatching the army.
The Board met most mornings and every evening, at least
when its members were not sitting on other committees or
attending sessions of Congress. In Congress, much of their
time was spent explaining and justifying their proposals
and actions, for Congress remained a council of war, still
passing final judgment on any matter of the least substance.^
The demanding schedule of the members of the Board,
coupled with personnel changes in congressional membership,
resulted in frequent changes in membership on the Board.
During the first five months of its existence the Board had
nine different members."*"^
^Ford, JCC, 4:85, 215, 293, 293n.l; 5:434-435, 438,
575 .
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President Hancock, elated when the Board was
established, wrote Washington that it was a great event in
the history of America and would be attended with essential
advantages when properly conducted and inspected. ^1 This
did not happen for obvious reasons. instead of being given
broad powers, the Board of War and Ordnance was initially
granted only authority to consider and deliberate military
policies and procedures, and had no real decision-making
powers. occasionally, Congress would delegate just enough
authority to the Board to care for specific problems when
they arose, but in almost all instances the Board had to
report to Congress as a whole for a decision to be made.
Additionally, Congress continued to rely on the various
special, standing, and grand committees for military
recominendations. Despite the handicaps under which the
Board operated, they were able nonetheless to make several
useful recommendations.^^ If this method of conducting
military policy conformed to Whig beliefs regarding the
placement of authority in numerous hands, it certainly was
a dilatory and ineffective system. This was not very
"^'''John Hancock to George Washington, June 14, 1776
Burnett, LMCC
, 1:488.
Ford, JCC, 5:632, 729, 751, 753, 754, 757, 762,
768, 780, 781, 835, 838; 6:1041, 1043, 1047, 1053; 7:13,
108-109, 115-118, 154-155, 188-189, 340; 7:422, 491-492
494-495.
ii^portant the first year of the war, as .ost Whigs expected,
or at least hoped, for a peaceful accommodation with Great
Britain.
By the end of 1776, it appeared to most Whigs that
the Board of War and Ordnance was not significantly assist-
ing congress in handling military affairs, and in fact, due
to personnel changes and absenteeism, as well as lack of
military experience, might even be detracting from their
efforts. "If we expect to succeed in the present war,"
Samuel Chase wrote one general, "we must change our mode
of conduct. Distinct and precise departments ought to be
established. A gentleman of the military must be of the
Board of War . "-^^
Other members, agreeing with Chase, persuaded
Congress on December 26, 1776, to appoint a committee to
formulate a plan for better regulating the executive
business by non-members."^"^ The committee's report of
April 8, 1777, was tabled until mid July, at which time
Congress resolved to appoint a new Board of War. This new
body was to consist of three members not of Congress who
13 Samuel Chase to John Sullivan, December 24, 1776,
Burnett, LMCC
, 2:186.
14B^enjamin Harrison to Robert Morris, December 29,
1776, ibid., 196; William Hooper to Robert Morris,
December 28, 1776, ibid., 196; Richard Smith Diary, March 19,
1776, ibid., 1:398-399; Ford, JCC, 6:1041-1042.
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would, on a full time basis, conduct the business of the
Older board, under the direction and supervision of the
existing Board of War and Ordnance. However, on July 22,
1777, the date set for the election of the three non-.e.bers,
congress, having second thoughts, postponed making a selec-
tion and allowed the plan to lapse.
While Congress spent the first half of I777 in
deliberating the possibility of creating a new board, the
old one continued to function, with its members coming and
going with alacrity."^
Washington's defeats at Brandywine and Germantown,
coupled with his expressed desire for a knowledgeable board
of war to superintend all the war business, thereby reliev-
ing both him and Congress from the details of administration
that weighed them down, Congress during the fall of 1777,
began once again seriously to consider appointing a new
board with membership consisting of non-members. Most
members, by late fall, with the army in retreat, and finding
directing military affairs too complex for the limited amount
of time they had to devote to them, and believing that some
executive authority could safely be entrusted to non-members,
decided the time had come to appoint an effective board of
^^Ibid., 7:241-242, 259; 8:424
, 563
-""^Ibid., 9 :1080
.
war. so, on October 17, 1777, Congress provided for a new
Board Of war, to consist of three
.e.bers not of Congress.
Its duties were to keep a register of officers and^s.L±co
, accounts
Of ordnance and supplies; superintend the building of
arsenals and foundries; forward dispatches of Congress to
the States and ar.ies; superintend the raising, recruiting,
and dispatching of the land forces of the Continent; lay
before Congress estimates of the military stores needed;
and make entries of all business transacted. All of their
proceedings were to be inspected by Congress once a month,
or oftener, as Congress thought proper and convenient. The
board was required to sit where Congress did and no member
of it could absent himself without permission of Congress.
"Nothing is more essential than the proper
Establishment of this Board" James Duane informed General
Schuyler, referring to the new Board of War.^^ Most Whigs
completely agreed. Despite fears of giving military men
too much authority in either a civilian or military capacity,
it was generally believed that experienced military men should
17„. ^
^^^"""^ "^"""^
^° George Washington, October 20,1///, Ballagh, Lette£S_o^Rlcha^rd Jlen^ 1:338; GeorgeWashington to the President of the Conti^tal Congress,October 13, 1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
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226
be the non-congressional
.embers of the new board. Under
the watchful oversight by Congress, it was believed that
the military
.en could be trusted, for they had, to that
point in the war, demonstrated obedience to Congress and
the concept of civil supremacy. But which military men?
certainly those with demonstrated administrative abilities,
and most members did not want men who were sycophants to
Washington who, by late 17 77, was coming into greater
disfavor with a certain segment of Congress and the country.
Thomas Mifflin, Timothy Pickering, and Robert H.
Harrison were the military men selected to the board on
November 7
, 1777 . Mifflin nr>+--;i///. u rri , until that morning had been the
Quartermaster General, was allowed to retain his major
generalship although resigning his position. Pickering,
the Adjutant General of the Army, remained in that position
until mid January 1778, before assuming his place on the
board. Harrison, Washington's military secretary, refused
the position, primarily because he believed that Mifflin
and Pickering were not loyal to Washington, and were going
to use their position to undermine him."""^
With Pickering at camp, and Harrison refusing to
serve. Congress decided that the old Board of War and
19r.- u .Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Mifflin, November 2,
1777, Ballagh, Letters chard_ Henry _ Lee
,
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Ordnance would continue to function until the new one began
its operations. And to breathe so.e new life into the old
board, seven members of Congress were appointed board
..embers during the fall and winter. ^0 Also in an attempt
to give more direction and control to the board, particularly
with respect to better organizing and disciplining the army,
in December it was authorized to appoint an Inspector General
in every department, who, in Eliphalet Dyer's words, would
be the executors and assistant agents of the board.
By the end of November, when it appeared that only
Mifflin was readily available and willing to serve on the
board. Congress decided that additional members be selected.
Schuyler and Gates were favored by many members, in part
because both were qualified, and because by selecting them
various factions in Congress would be satisfied. Despite
the support for Schuyler, he was not selected. Gates was,
on November 27, 1777. He was to serve as President of the
Board, retaining his military rank and leave to take the
field whenever he desired. Richard Peters and Joseph
Trumbull were also selected, the former as secretary.
Peters assumed the new job, and retained his position as
secretary to the Board of War and Ordnance. Because of ill
20
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health, Trumbull never took his place on the new board,
resigning formally in April.
Two reasons have been preferred as to why the Board
of War was established, both in the context of the Conway
cabal, of which more will be said in a later chapter. The
first is that Washington, unable to discipline his army and
unable to win major battles, needed guidance from those who
understood the military realities of the war, supposedly
Gates, Pickering, Mifflin, and Conway. Thus, their appoint-
ments. Another reason is that Congress, needing the time
for other duties, had the board established as a helpmate
to both itself and Washington, and was not established to
undermine or thwart Washington
.
During 1778 the new board suffered a succession of
failures, beginning with their first project, an invasion
of Canada. In its wake came the resignations of Conway as
Inspector General and James Wilkinson, who had served as
secretary of the board for less than two months. Trumbull
22 S^ame to same, November 28, 1777, ibid., 575; James
Duane to Philip Schuyler, November 19, 1777, ibid., 559-
Ford, JCC, 9:960, 971, 971-972.
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had resigned in April, never having taken his seat; and that
™onth Gates left to take ™nd of the Northern Department.
Thus, by the summer of 1778 the board was criticized for
being just as ineffective as the old board and even more
caught up in small details. ^'^
TO improve the board's efficiency. Congress, on
October 29, 1778, changed its membership so that it would
consist of three non-congressional members and two members
of congress, with any three constituting a quorum. Colonel
Harrison, Pickering, and Richard Peters were the three non-
congressional members chosen; Francis Lightfoot Lee and
Jesse Root, the members of Congress appointed. Harrison
again declined and was replaced by Colonel William Grayson,
who had served during 1776 on Washington's staff. Major
Peter Scull was elected secretary. The congressional
membership frequently changed during 1779 and 1780, with
nine different members serving.
For long periods during 1779 and 1780 it appears
that Peters and Pickering managed the Board of War by them-
selves, and when Pickering left in the summer of 1780 to
24
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become Quartermaster General, Peters managed affairs until
that fall by himself. After November, he was ably assisted
by Ezekiel Cornell, who was appointed a congressional
member
.
TO make the Board of War more than just a super
adjutant general's office. Congress on November 25, 1119,
placed the board in charge of the Departments of Quarter-
master General and Commissary General of Purchases and
Issues, hoping it could untangle the difficulties in which
those departments found themselves
.
^'^
This responsibility
only bogged the board down in more detail, thereby prevent-
ing them from concentrating on often more pressing needs
of military administration. It should be noted, it was not
the Board of War alone which suffered from inefficiency,
overwork, and lack of real authority. Most of the other
major committees of Congress lacked any force or strength,
and as 1780 ended, with the army suffering and threatening
to either disband or turn on their civilian leaders.
Congress decided to create separate executive departments
26Jennings B. Sanders, Evoluti on of Executive Depart-
ment of
_ the Continental Congress, J/7 74-1 789 " ( Chape JThTIIIUniversity of North Carolina Press, 1935), p. 15; Harry M.
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27Jesse Root to Jeremiah Wadsworth, November 26,
1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:527; Ford, JCC , 17:511-512.
to handle their executive business. By doing this, it was
hoped that the army would understand that Congress had not
forgotten their responsibilities and obligations to thorn.
On January 10, 1781, the first executive department
was created, the Department of Foreign Affairs. A month
later, the Departments of Finance, Marine, and War were also
created. It was decided to appoint a Secretary at War who,
besides being a super Adjutant General, would provide a more
efficient liaison between the civil and military leaders.
Until one was selected, however. Congress decided the Board
of War would remain in operation.
Washington, pleased with Congress's decision to
create a Department of War, desired a member of his staff,
Hamilton, be appointed secretary. He also believed
Hamilton's father-in-law, Philip Schuyler, would make a
good choice. Schuyler, however, would not accept the post
without prior guarantees that he be reinstated as a Major
General, something that many in the army and Congress
objected to. John Sullivan, who like Schuyler had had
experience both in army and Congress, was also put forth
by some as a likely candidate, despite his lack of interest
in the post. Pickering believed the delegates might pick
2 8
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him, all the other candidates being undesirable for one
reason or another.
Indeed, there were reasons that some of the candi-
dates were undesirable, and as there was no clear choice,
congress, late in February 1781, postponed the selection
until the following October. The New England delegates
favored this because they feared Sullivan would be chosen,
something they did not desire for, as a member of Congress,
Sullivan frequently voted with the southern delegates, and
as a person with close ties to the army, it was feared he
might side too often with Washington against Congress.
Another group of delegates desiring the selection of Gates,
supported the postponement, hoping that by October Gates
would be cleared by a court of inquiry for the defeat at
Camden, and therefore be eligible if selected. The official
reason given for the delay was that it was imprudent to
hazard a change in congressional military administration
when the campaign was just beginning.
29George Washington to John Sullivan, February 4,
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writi^£S_of^ Washi^ 21:181; Philip
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During the first week of October 1781 Greene, Knox,
and Lincoln were nominated for the post of Secretary at War.
Debate respecting the three generals 's .erit lasted several
weeks. It was generally believed that Greene should remain
with the southern army and Knox with the artillery at the
seige at Yorktown, and then most probably at New York at a
later date. This left Lincoln, who had once obeyed
Congress's orders, even when it neant losing Charlestown
and the tarnishing of his own reputation. Thus he was
elected and, by the end of November 1781, he had accepted
and been confirmed by Congress. ^"^
The army was pleased with Lincoln's selection, as
he was well liked by them and Washington. This was
evidenced in part by Washington having allowed him to
receive the British surrender at Yorktown. Most civilians
were pleased as well. The Rhode Island delegates informed
their governor that "when we add his knowledge and experience
as an officer, his integrity and attention to business, we
cannot but flatter ourselves that the public will receive
George Washington, August 20, 1781, ibid., 191; Ford, JCC
19:205 . •'
31James Mitchell Varnmn to George Washington,
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essential benefits from his appointment
. The benefits
were not that essential, but certainly Lincoln was the best
choice at the time and did able and steady service as the
Secretary at War. Washington worked well with Lincoln,
sending his communications to Congress through him and
respecting him as a symbol of civil and congressional
authority. Similarly, Lincoln respected Washington and,
though his civilian superior, treated him with deference.
Thus, they worked well together, with Lincoln constantly
demonstrating great wisdom, tact, thrift, all with an amiable
33
manner
.
Observing Lincoln at work, a young French nobleman
wrote that the "work is not immense and all important points
are decided by Congress. "^^ For the most part, this is an
accurate observation. Lincoln's responsibilities were
mainly those held heretofore by the Board of War and by an
additional grant in April 1782 he was given many of the time
consuming administrative duties hitherto the responsibility
of Washington. Lincoln, although given some decision-making
authority, rarely exercised it, believing that Washington
32 .William Ellery and Ezekiel Cornell to William
Greene, December 6, 1781, Staples, Rhode Island in the
Continental Congress, p. 360. ~
"
33Harry M. Ward, The Department of War, 1781-1795,
p. 37.
34
E. VJ. Balch, trans., "Narrative of the Prince de
Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 4 (April 1877): 233.
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and Congress should be consulted on all matters of substance,
and to a degree Congress expected Lincoln to rely upon them
for guidance. 35 Lincoln, assisted by a secretary and two
clerks, was content simply to do what was expected of him,
no more, no less. During 1782 he found time to write
geographical descriptions in letters to family and friends
and to make philosophical notes for his own amusement.
However, during 1783, as the war came to a close, his duties
increased with the disbanding of the army, with most of
the army disbanded, Lincoln retired during the late fall
37
of 1783.
By giving some military control and direction to the
Board of War and Ordnance, the Board of War, and the office
of the Secretary at War, Congress and the military commanders
were relieved of many administrative details, but neither
were truly relieved of the policy-making aspects of military
control. Congress, because of their republican fears of
consolidation of authority and responsibility in a few
35
Ford, JCC, 20:36-37, 177-179; William Ellery and
Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, April 16, 1782, Staples,
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, p. 366;
Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of
the Continental Congress
, p. 102; Harry M. WardT The Depart-
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, pp. 13, 15, 17.
3 6Benjamin Lincoln Papers , MHS (Microfilm Reel tf 6 ) ,
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individuals, and fear of giving the mlitary too .uch
authority, kept most military policy-making in their own
hands. Despite the limitations on the three above-mentioned
offices, they did serve as a useful link between Congress
and the military, and were just another reminder to the
military of their subordinate position to the civilian
authorities, even when the membership on them became
progressively more militarily oriented.
Another form of controlling and directing the
military came in the form of the personal contact between
members of Congress and the military, as members of
committees and individually. As has been stressed in the
previous chapter, personal connections were very important
to understanding the mechanics of how civil control operated
and was maintained throughout the war.
The first members of Congress to visit the army were
Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, and Thomas Lynch, Sr.,
who, at Washington's request, came as a committee to confer
with the commander-in-chief at Cambridge on the organization
and operation of the army. Arriving in Massachusetts late
in October 1775
,
they met not only with Washington and his
officers, but also with the New England civilian leaders
then in camp. Their meetings, which lasted a week, resulted
in the conimittee successfully recon-imend ing to Congress that
they adopt Washington's suggestions for improving the
operation of the army.^^
Another congressional comn^ittee, consisting of
Robert R. Livingston, Robert Treat Paine, and John Langdon,
also took to the field that fall. m November they went
to Canada with instructions to visit Schuyler and the
northern army, which by the time they had arrived in New
York, had retreated out of Canada. The result of their
visit was an accurate report of the reasons for the failure
of the Canadian expedition. Rather than being resentful
of the committee overseeing his activities and reporting
on past failures, Schuyler welcomed congressional oversight
In fact, early in 1776 he requested Congress send another
committee, hoping it would help him supervise his unruly
army, composed to a large degree of New Englanders with
whom Schuyler did not work well. Before the arrival of
spring 1776, Congress selected Franklin, Charles Carroll
of Carrollton, and Samuel Chase as a committee to the
northern army, empowering them to sit and vote on military
3 8
Ibid., 2:265-267; George Washington to the Presi-dent of the Continental Congress, September 21, 1775,
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,
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Thomas Lynch, Sr., to George Washington, November 13, 1775,ibid., 253; [Jeremy Belknap], "Journal of My Tour to the
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councils, with any two having complete control over the
military; suspend officers and fill up vacancies; and to
authorize the raising of up to six independent companies.
Also early in 1776 Congress sent a committee,
consisting of Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Lynch, Sr., and
Andrew Allen, to New York City to calm the impetuous Charles
Lee, who had managed to embroil himself in a debate with
the New York authorities regarding their respective
responsibilities and authority
Sending committees to camp. Congress very quickly
learned, was a useful means of informing themselves of the
situation of the army, coordinating activities with military
and civilian leaders on a direct basis, and exerting
congressional supremacy on a personal basis. Therefore,
despite the introduction of a Board of War and Ordnance in
1776, Congress continued to send committees to camp frequently
during the next two years.
39„ ^ ^ ,Report of the Committee appointed to confer with
General Philip Schuyler, December 23, 1775, Force, American
Archives
,
4th ser., 4:442-446; Ford, JCC, 3:339-3411
4:151-152, 215-220, 233; Charles Carroll of Carrollton and
Samuel Chase to John Thomas, May 15, 1776, John Thomas
Papers, MHS (Microfilm); Robert R. Livingston to John Jay,
February 15, 1776, Morris, John Jay
, p. 228.
40
President John Hancock to George Washington,
January 29, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:332; Richard Smith Diary,
January 26, 1776, ibid., 329; James Duane, William Floyd,
and Henry Wisner to the New York Committee of Safety,
January 27, 1776, ibid., 330; Ford, JCC, 4:92-94.
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Late in the sunur,er of 1776
, they sent Elbridge Gerry,
Rober Sherman, and Francis Lewis to New York to inspect the
^
state of the army, and George Clymer and Richard Stockton to
the northern army for the same purpose. That fall they sent
William Paca, John Witherspoon, and George Ross to Washing-
ton's camp to discuss promotions and the appointments of
officers. The next summer they sent Elbridge Gerry, Philip
Livingston, and George Clymer to the main army to ascertain
its condition. To determine the condition of the army at
Fort Pitt, Congress appointed Joseph Reed, Gabriel Jones,
and Samuel Washington late in November 1777 as a committee
to travel to that western post, authorizing them to suspend
and appoint officers and to draw up offensive operational
plans in concert with General Hand. Because of other duties,
this committee was replaced by George Clymer, Sampson
Mathews, and Samuel McDowell, who did not reach Fort Pitt
until March 1778 .^"'"
Undoubtedly the most important committee appointed
the first half of the war was the one sent to Washington's
camp during the winter of 1777-1778. This was a time when
41
Ibid., 5:808; 6:973, 973n.l, 975; 7:546, 577;
9:942-945, 1018; 10:9, 38, 314; William Williams to Joseph
Trumbull, September 26, 1776, Burnett, LMCC
,
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Gerry to Horatio Gates, September 27, 1776, ibid., 105;
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Washington's popularity in Congress was at its lowest, and
the war effort desperate. Hoping to help Washington, and
at the sa.e ti.e to assert closer control over the military,
congress during the fall of 1777 established the Board of
war and the Inspector General's departxnent, and began send-
ing committees to VJashing ton ' s camp.
On November 28, 17 77, Congress appointed Elbridge
Gerry, Robert Morris, and Joseph Jones to repair to the main
army to discuss with Washington the possibility of a winter
campaign. They reached camp on the third of December and,
after several days of meetings with Washington and his
generals, realized the army was in no condition to mount a
winter offensive. Therefore, upon returning to Congress,
they had that body resolve that the army not take to the
offense until spring. They also suggested to Congress, as
did Washington, that since the army was in such bad shape,
the quartermaster general's department in shambles, they
send another committee to camp to help assist Washington in
correcting abuses and to make new arrangements for the
preservation of the officer corps and the army itself.
Congress responded on January 10, 1778, by appoint-
ing three members of Congress and a like number from the
42
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Board of War as a committee to meet with Washington at camp,
where they would reduce the regiments; make recommendation,
removals, appointments; and adopt such other measures "as
they shall judge necessary for introducing economy and
promoting discipline and good morals in the army."^^
Elected on the tenth were Joseph Reed, Francis Dana, and
Nathaniel Folsom, and Board of War members Gates, Mifflin,
and Pickering. John Harvie was added as a congressional
member on the twelfth.
Because of the embarrassing situation created for
Washington's critics in and out of Congress when the "Conway
Cabal" fell apart, it was decided in Congress that it would
be impolitic to have Washington directly controlled at camp
by Gates and the other Board of War members. Thus Gates,
Mifflin, and Pickering were excused from going to camp,
being replaced by Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Gouver-
neur Morris. Most of the members of the committee to camp
eventually made it to Valley Forge, and they, in conjunction
with Washington, were able to impress upon Congress the
necessity for the proper providing of the officers and
soldiers. During the first week of May 1778, several members
of Congress came to camp to help celebrate the French
'^^Ford, JCC, 10:40.
44 Ibid., 40, 41.
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alliance and, while there, discussed military policy.
Another committee was sent to camp that summer to help
arrange the organization of the army."^^
Although Washington was allowed more control over
the affairs of the army after the summer of 1778, Congress
nevertheless continued to send committees to camp to discuss
military policy. In December 1779, for example, Philip
Schuyler and Henry Marchant were selected to see Washington
about the arrangement of the Southern Department. On
January 10, 1780, when it appeared to many members that the
military needed help, Elbridge Gerry moved that Congress
send a committee to camp who would, with the commander-in-
chief, "be authorized to take such measures as they may
judge necessary, for obtaining immediate supplies for the
army." Although this motion v;as soundly defeated, Gerry,
Robert R. Livingston, and John Mathews were selected as a
committee to investigate the possibility of reducing the
4 6
size of the army and increasing its efficiency.
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March 16, 1778, ibid., 131; Francis Lewis to Pierre Van
Cortlandt, March [April], 10, 1778, ibid., 163-164; Joseph
Reed to Esther Reed, August 16, 1778, ibid., 375; The
Committee of Arrangement to Theodorick Bland, September 11,
1778, ibid., 407; The Committee of Arrangement to George
Washington, September 30, 1778, ibid., 431-432; Horatio
Gates to Thomas Conway, May 17 , 1778, Stark, John Stark , p. 143
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About a week and a half later, to supplement the
activities of the above-mentioned committee, Congress
decided to send two men, one of whom was to be a member of
Congress, as a committee to camp. Philip Schuyler and Board
of War member Pickering were selected, and later Thomas
Mifflin was added/'^ Schuyler, however, feeling Pickering
and Mifflin were enemies of Washington and that Mifflin had
failed as Quartermaster General and, therefore, was not
capable of making a contribution to the better provisioning
of the army, refused to serve. Thus, the committee collapsed
and never went to camp.
Washington, although appreciating Schuyler's loyalty,
nevertheless wanted a committee to be sent to camp to assist
him in provisioning his army and keeping them under control,
as well as helping him to get the states to supply his army.
Congress responded to Washington's April appeal by appoint-
ing a three-man committee which would go to camp to confer
with Washington about the reduction of the army and the
arrangement of the staff departments. This was in hopes that
a smaller army, efficiently supplied, would not only remain
in the field, but would not turn on their masters. Schuyler,
John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody were elected as the
^^Ibid., 75-77, 79.
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committee on April 13 1 7Rn =,r.^y X -LJ, 1780, and proceeded to camp shortly
thereafter .'^^
This committee, which was given additional
responsibilities and authority in May, was not that success-
ful, even when Congress in June called on the states to
cooperate with it. The military leaders, who had hoped the
committee would be able to assist them in better supplying
and controlling the military, became disillusioned. So did
Congress, which finally recalled them by an overwhelming
vote on the eleventh of August, believing the committee
wanted too much authority for themselves and the military
4 9commanders
.
So, upset and disappointed with this committee.
Congress did not send any members to camp the remainder of
the war. Individuals from, and representing Congress did,
however, go to camp. Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris
and Board of War member Richard Peters visited Washington's
camp at Dobb ' s Ferry during August 1780 to ascertain the
arrangement of the army for the ensuing campaign and to
48G^eorge Washington to the President of the Conti
nental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 18:207-211; Philip Schuyler to Alexander
Hamilton, April 8, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:110; Ford, JCC,
16:332-333, 354-356, 362.
49
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determine their financial needs. The Secretary at War,
Benjamin Lincoln, visited the camp also, during 1782 and
1783 for the same reasons.
Individual members of Congress also visited camp
throughout the war, for various reasons, but always with
the affect of reminding the military their actions were not
only being directed by Congress, but also monitored. Most
often, congressional visits came about as members traveled
to and from the meetings of Congress. Such congressional
visits began with John Adams visiting camp at Cambridge in
January 1776, where he consulted with the commander-in-chief
about sending General Lee to New York, and ended with James
Duane • s visit to Washington's headquarters at Newburgh during
52February 1783
. Some members of Congress went to camp to
50
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serve as military volunteers, such as Benjamin Rush during
the winter of 1776-1777, Thomas Burke during the Brandywine
campaign, and Elbridge Gerry and three others during the
1780 New Jersey campaign.
Another means by which members of Congress maintained
their personal contact with, and indirect control of the
military officers was by having their sons and other rela-
tives serve as aides-de-camp to the major military leaders.
For example, Silas Deane
'
s stepsons, Samuel B. Webb and John
Webb, served as aides-de-camp to Generals Washington, Putnam,
Howe, and Greene. Lewis Morris's sons, Lewis, Jr., and
Jacob, served as aides-de-camp to Generals Greene, Lee, and
Sullivan. Francis Lewis's son, Morgan, served as an aide-
de-camp to Gates. John Witherspoon
' s son, James, served as
an aide-de-camp to General Nash. James Duane ' s son-in-law,
Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 449; Burnett, LMCC, 5:134n.2,
206-207n.3; James Mitchell Varnum to William Greene,
April 21, 1781, ibid., 6:65; James Duane to Horatio Gates,
December 16, 1777, ibid., 2:590; James Duane to Philip
Schuyler, December 16, 1777, ibid., 590.
53Corner, AAitoba^graphy_of
_Ben2a pp. 124-
127; Griffith J. McRee, Lj^fe_ and Correspondince of James
Irdell, One o f the Assoc iate Justices of the""Supreme 'Court
of the Un ited States
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William North
, served -^r, ^
,
as an aide-de-camp to General Steuben.
Philip Livingston's son, Henry P., was captain of
Washington's guards. Henry Laurens's son, John, served as
an aide to Washington; and John Hanson's son, Alexander
Contee, served as private secretary to Washington. John
Armstrong, Sr.'s son, John, Jr., served as an aide-de-camp
to Generals Mercer and Gates. William Burnett's son,
Ichabod, served as an aide-de-camp to General Greene.
Edward Biddle's son-in-law, Peter Scull, served as an aide
to Washington. And James Mercer's half-brother, John
Francis Mercer, served as an aide-de-camp to General Lee.^^
Another indirect way the members of Congress were
able to strengthen their control over the military was by
having military leaders communicate with them. This not
only reminded the military that Congress was the supreme
decision-making body of the continent, but it also allowed
Congress to know better what was happening in the army.
Additionally, it strengthened the ties between the civilian
and military leaders.
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Throughout the war, members of Congress asked
military leaders to write them on a personal basis about
conditions at camp and about the qualifications and
abilities of their fellow officers.
Most officers welcomed the opportunity to express
themselves to members of Congress, and frequently did so.
Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, September 24 177fiButterfield, Lett_ers_o_f_ Benla_min Rush! 1 : 115 ; jShn Jay ' to
'
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Some even initiated the correspondence, not waiting for a
member of Congress to ask them to write. ^"^
Military men also visited Congress, thereby
reinforcing the supremacy of the civilians. These visits
were often prescribed by Congress, but just as frequently
military leaders took it upon themselves to come to Congress
to lay before that body a particular complaint or request,
generally relating to their own professional advancement,
which of course, they equated with the patriotic cause.
Washington, who preferred to stay at camp and deal
with Congress by letters and emissaries, as well as through
visits of committees, nevertheless was occasionally required
to come to Philadelphia to discuss strategy and the arrange-
ment and subsistence of the army. He, Gates, and Mifflin
were ordered to Philadelphia during the summer of 1776,
where they met with several committees to discuss plans for
a Canadian campaign, as well as plans for Washington's next
campaign. This two week stay was almost more than
Washington could bear, for he believed his time could be
57
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better spent in the field than in the cabinet. He avoided
conning to Congress for over a year, but return he did during
August 1777, when he spent several days with a comniittee
discussing the Northern Department
. Another whole year
would elapse before Washington again would be suirmoned to
Congress. This was late in December 1778. Despite being
wined and dined for a month and a half, and meeting with
various committees and members, Washington continually
expressed his desire to return to his army, and was allowed
to do so in February. Appreciating Washington's objections
to being called away from his army during a winter encampment
or a summer campaign. Congress refrained from calling him to
confer with them for over two years. Washington's next
visit occurred during Spetember 1781, as his army was march-
ing towards Virginia through Philadelphia. Washington used
the opportunity to meet with Morris and members of Congress,
primarily to discuss finances.^"'' After his successful
59
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Yorktown campaign, Washington returned to Philadelphia late
in November 1781 and remained there until March 1782, meet-
ing with committees of Congress, as well as with individual
members, to discuss the arrangement and future of the
62
army. The only other visit Washington made to Congress
before the peace treaty arrived the following spring, was
in July 1782, when he and Rochambeau met with several
members of Congress to discuss possible operations against
New York City.^"^
Although Washington did not enjoy visiting Congress--
not because he held any disrespect for that body, but because
he hated to be away from his army, particularly as they were
constantly on the verge of mutinying and/or disbanding--he
did not mind sending or having sent his representatives.
Congress, therefore, did not hesitate calling upon
Washington's subordinates to come to confer with them.
Because of the importance of logistics, members of
the army subsistence staffs were frequently called to
Congress. This was particularly true of Quartermaster
Generals Greene and Pickering, who spent much time discussing
62 , . .Robert Morris Diary, ibid., 3:316, 356, 399, 435;
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the support of the army with con^ittees of Congress and the
Board Of War.^^ other officers also visited Congress to
discuss the supply of army, including Thomas Mifflin in 1776;
colonel Daniel Brodhead in 1781; and General Greene's aides,
Lewis Morris, Jr., and Robert Burnet, during the latter
65years
.
Strategy and related activities also prompted
Congress to call upon military commanders to personally
discuss policy with them, particularly with newly appointed
theater commanders before taking command. Thus, most all
of the Southern Department commanders, beginning with Lee
in 1776 and ending with Greene in 1780, came to Philadelphia
before assuming command. Similarly, Northern Department
commander Gates and Schuyler also held discussions with
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Congress before taking command of their department.
Commanding officers often came to Congress on their own to
discuss strategy, particularly relating to plans that would
enhance their reputation or gain territory for their state. ^"^
Other officers also visited Congress uninvited to
plead their special interest, normally involving promotions
and command assignemnts. Although at times this was a
nuisance, it did serve to reinforce the belief that if the
military wanted something they had to obtain it through
legitimate means, by appealing to the civilian authorities.^^
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Despite the nuisance of some of the uninvited visits.
Congress, as has been stated earlier, appreciated the fact
that the military looked to them for guidance and direction.
Congress, we must remember, was the supreme civilian author-
ity, and therefore responsible for keeping the continent's
military forces from becoming tyrannous. Fear of a military
tyranny, a Cromwell, and the desire to uphold civilian
direction of the war effort and the military was ever present
in the thinking and actions of the members of Congress.
Although this authority would be shared with the state
governments and with the military itself, Congress from the
first days of their meeting in May 1775 attempted to get
and retain a firm grip on the control and direction of the
military forces of the continent.
As discussed earlier, the primary control exercised
by Congress was its authority to commission and promote
officers, especially the general officers. But there were
many other ways that Congress controlled and directed their
military forces; all of which tended to reinforce the concept
of civil supremacy.
Congress spent a considerable amount of time,
particularly early in the war, making personnel assignments
for even the lowest ranking officers, especially for the
69
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These personnel assignments were not just limited to the
lower ranking officers, for Congress even made personnel
assignments for general officers, such as sending De Woedtke
to Canada in 1776, keeping Mifflin in the Philadelphia area
late in 1776, and sending Steuben to Rhode Island in 1778.^°
These personnel assignments did not generally upset the
military as a whole or Washington, but congressional
*
involvement in troop movements, command decisions, investi-
gations, and strategy did, especially if they were made
without consultation with the military. Nevertheless, most
of the military accepted the authority of Congress to make
those decisions, and grudgingly accepted them, even when
they believed Congress did not have the expertise or the
best interest of the army in mind v/hen making ipilitary
decisions
.
Early in the war especially, but throughout it.
Congress made troop assignments, even at the company level.
Often these assignments came to Washington in the form of a
request, generally asking him to spare a regiment or two
71
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for a specific duty.^^
.ore fre.u.nUy, Wever, W,. i ..^.^
was simply ordered to make such assi.nn.ents
. T,,.,., ho was
ordered to reassign the Connecticut soldiers under Cru.r.l
Wooster during I he summer of 1775;
. h. German Battalion I he
followiny .summor; and I ho Pennsylvania and New Jersey Linos
dur.n, ,.ho o.
.,77G.^3 . ^,
^^^^^^^^
that each colony was more concornnd
.,houl Us own protection
than I hat of their neighbors, thus Lhoy dcsirod nporinl
consideration r,.,m Congress and Washjnylc;n wHli rcspocL to
sending troops to thoir defense. Early in the war. Congress
qonerally granted such requests for help. But as the war
progressed, and ronlix.ing Washington in I l,o fiold had a
betLcr idea ul how lo ulilix.o his forces, especially ,.rter
demonstral incj ablllLies at '(•.(Milon .uid Princeton,
Congress did not often burden him wilh requests fcir l,(<lpincf
out on(^ state at I Ix- expense ol .mother
.
'^'^
Tliis did not
mean Congress rol i n(]n ished control over tactical movements
of tli.>ir army as they frequently ordered Washing ion lo send
port if^nf, of I ho army I sp^oific locations, particularly
wiLh respect lo I li(> .•>nn I i ii n(>p,! i- 1 idch I I.clwrvMi 177') .md
751781.
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Besides making individual personnel and unit
assignments. Congress also mandated which units constituted
a particular command. Often this meant nothing more than
providing for a merging of units, such as the joining
together of Pulaski's Legion and Armand
' s Corps in 1780.
Congress frequently declared which units constituted a
particular field army, such as with the southern army. They
also mandated during 1775 that five thousand troops be kept
in the New York theater of operations,, and in 1777 they
informed Washington that he could not detail more than
twenty-five hundred men from the northern army without first
consulting with General Gates and Governor Clinton. When
making these organizational decisions, Washington was
generally consulted, particularly after Trenton and Prince-
ton, but there were exceptions, as the president of Congress
explained to him after ordering the Pennsylvania Line south
in 1781 without prior consultation, stating quick action
necessitated their decision.
Probably no other subject caused more debate within
the army and Congress than the appointment of commanding
generals of the various armies and expeditions. Although
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Washington was frequently asked his opinion or given
authority to :.ake such appointments, more often than not
Congress reserved to itself the right to make these
decisions, particularly with respect to the northern and
southern armies. At the beginning of the war, Washington
believed he commanded the main army subject to the will of
Congress, but the northern army was subject directly to
Congress. The result of Washington's acquiescence with
respect to the northern army resulted in many complications,
as evidenced by the Schuyler-Gates feud for command in the
Northern Department, and by the debate over the choice to
lead the expedition against Canada in 1778.^^ Congress also
kept a firm grip on control of the southern army, beginning
with the appointment of Charles Lee during the spring of
1776 until the appointment of Gates during the early summer
of 1780. Congress appointed successively Lee, Howe, Lincoln,
and Gates without consulting Washington; with Washington's
one appointment, DeKalb, being only temporary in nature. '^^
It was not until Gates faltered at Camden did Congress ask
Washington to name the southern commander. Ever deferential,
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Washington responded by reco™,ending Greene, who Congress
readily accepted.
Congress made other cominand appointments as well.
They included the creation of a position titled Commandant
of the Forts in the New York Highlands and filled it in the
spring of 1777 with George Clinton; the appointment of Gates
to command the army in the area around Fishkill, New York,
during the spring of 1778; and several of the commanders
at Fort Pitt and the Western Department, including Edward
Hand and William Irvine.
Just as Congress appointed commanding officers, they
also removed them, as well as investigated their actions,
beginning with the removal of General Wooster in June 1776,
and Washington being directed the following month to make
an inquiry into the conduct of the officers who had directed
the unsuccessful Canadian expedition. The following year,
Washington was able to ward off a congressional called-for
investigation of Sullivan's conduct at Staten Island and
Brandywine. Not so lucky v;ere St. Clark and Schuyler, who
were recalled after the loss of Forts Ticonderoga and
Independence, and required to repair to Washington's
^^Ford, JCC, 18:906, 994-995.
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headquarters to face an investigation. Also called to
account for their actions were the comn^anders of Forts
Clinton, Montgomery, and Mifflin, which also fell in I777.
Mcintosh and Howe were removed from their respective
commands in the south for their inability to get along with
the local civilian authorities. As Washington became more
trusted by Congress, he was allowed greater latitude in
calling for investigations and removing officers. Congress
even ignored the fact that Washington avoided having an
investigation of Gates's conduct at Camden, despite having
previously requested it; and eventually repealed their
8
1
request
.
By making personnel and troop assignments, investi-
gations, and command appointments. Congress kept a
relatively tight rein on the military. True, Washington,
as he demonstrated his ability and willingness to subordinate
himself to the will of Congress, was given more decision-
making responsibility. Nevertheless, when major strategical
decisions were to be made Congress, believing they were in
8
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a better position than the military leaders, including
Washington, to see the needs of the continent as a whole,
throughout the war mandated and recommended major campaigns,
expeditions, and other strategical movements.
Much of American strategy during the war was simply
a response to British movements. Nevertheless, Congress
was quite active giving military directions to their military
commanders, beginning soon after their meeting in May 1775.
At that time. Congress specifically advised New York not to
oppose British troop landings and to leave them in peace
unless they committed hostile acts or erected fortifications.
They also ordered the New York forces to abandon Forts
Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and withdraw all the troops,
cannon, and stores to the southern end of Lake George.
Later that month, and during June, Congress ordered that
New York and the Hudson River be protected; prohibited, and
then reversed themselves, regarding a Canadian expedition.
In September 1776, when it appeared that New York City would
be captured, many of Washington's generals suggested burning
the tovm to the ground before evacuating. Initially,
Congress ordered Washington to hold the town and do no
damage to it; but after Washington's queries to them.
Congress informed him he was under no obligation to hold
the tovm, but under no circumstances was he to burn it.
Earlier that year and again in 1778, before later suspending
their orders. Congress directed expeditions be taken against
Detroit. ^
Early in the war, particularly. Congress took an
interest in the Northern Department. During the winter of
1777-1778, for example, they twice ordered the securing of
the Hudson River, and authorized, then cancelled, a Canadian
expedition. During 1777 and 1778 they also took an active
interest in the western theater of operations, ordering
Gates in the latter year to mount an offensive in the Seneca
Country and during 1779 they ordered an expedition against
the western Indians. Additionally, during the fall of 1777,
they commissioned James Willing, a brother of member of
Congress, Thomas Willing, to lead an expedition down the
Mississippi, attacking the enemy wherever he found them.
With respect to the Southern Department, they ordered an
expedition against West Florida in 1777, and against East
Florida in 1778 .^'^
After 1779, Congress relied more on Washington to
make strategical decisions, in part because he had become
more trusted, and because he would have to coordinate his
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activities with the French. Nevertheless, Congress did not
relinquish their right to mandate strategy, for in August
1780 they ordered Washington to make plans with the French
to rid the south of the British forces. They also
continued, as they had throughout the war, making recommenda-
tions. Often Congress believed they knew what the best
strategy or military policy was, but realizing that military
in the field might have better judgment with respect to
practicability of carrying out their plans, they formed
their strategical requests as recommendations. Late in
November 1777, for example. Congress reconmended that
Washington undertake a winter campaign. Although they were
unsuccessful in this instance, as the army went into winter
encampment at Valley Forge, they were successful in their
recommendation during the late summer of 17 82 to have the
military undertake a western campaign against the Indians.
Congress, although possessing the authority over
the continent's military establishment, frequently shared
this authority with military leaders, particularly Washington.
This sharing of authority was progressive in nature, in that
it was increasingly shared as military commanders became
more trusted and as the war situation worsened.
84
Ibid., 17:699.
8 5
Ibid., 9:972; Edgar W. Hassler, Old Westmoreland
A History of Western Pennsylvania Duri ng the _Revo
1
ut ion
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1900), ppT'lSG, r86-187
264
Actually, the sharing of authority began with
Washington's appointment as co„er-in-chief on June 25,
1775. Realizing they could not foresee all eventualities!
congress told Washington they were leaving
.any things to
^
his prudent judgment, which they hoped would reflect the
opinion of councils of war. These councils, they desired,
would suggest the most advantageous means for the ends to
which the army had been raised. Gates had hoped Congress
had been more explicit in granting Washington specific
powers, but Washington was satisfied that Congress had been
proper in their instructions to him.^^ For the next year
and a half, Washington generally followed what he believed
to be Congress's desire; that is, calling councils of war
before making any important decisions. Additionally,
Washington, in his desire to remain completely under the
will of Congress, frequently did not take action until he
received the express authority from Congress.
By consulting Congress so frequently, Washington
had, by the summer of 1776, become a nuisance. Bluntly,
Congress told Washington they "have such an entire confidence
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m his 3Ud„. that they will ,ive no particular direction,
about the dispositions of the troops, but desire that he
will dispose those at New York, the Flying Ca^p and
Ticonderoga, as to hi™ shall see. the
.ost conducive to the
public good...«S With respect to hi„ calling councils of
war, congress that winter and again the following year
indicated that he did not have to rely completely upon
councils of war, preferring he acted as circumstances
R Qdictated.
Despite the discretionary authority granted
Washington early in the war, he was, for the most part,
still subject to the will of Congress, which constantly
involved themselves in overseeing and directing the military.
For example, early in the war they ordered Washington to
offer a pardon to all deserters; strongly recommended he
give Lafayette command of a division; and directed him in
the spring of 1778 to call a council of war to formulate
plans for the next campaign. ^° Such orders and recommenda-
tions continued throughout the war, as Congress acted on
the belief they must keep a firm grip on the military,
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otherwise the military might pot a fir™ grip on the. and
the country. Vet, as the military became more trusted, they
were given greater latitude in decision making, especially
Washington
.
Early in the war, during the height of the Schuyler-
Gates conflict, when Gates was reappointed by Congress to
coin^and the Northern Departraent, Congress informed Washington
that they "never intended by any commission hitherto granted
by them, or by the establishment of any department whatever,
to supersede or circumscribe the power of General Washington
as the commander in chief of all the Continental land forces
within the United States. "^1 Yet, as we have seen, the
powers granted the commander in chief were indeed circum-
scribed by Congress. It was a fine line that Washington
walked, as many decisions he faced often required asking
whether or not he was even entitled to make such decisions.
That, to a large degree, is why Washington frequently con-
sulted Congress and its members, as definition of his powers
changed with events. Hoping to clarify matters for
Washington and itself. Congress, early in 1779, directed
Washington to "superintend and direct the military operations
in all the departments in these States," subject to the
^"""Ibid., 8:668.
general orders of Congress. This .eant the Northern,
western, and Middle Departments, for Congress at that ti.e
reserved to themselves control over the Southern Department
Thus, Washington never had control, or at least complete
control, of all the forces of the continent, nor the grand
Strategy.
Washington was allowed after 1778 greater say in
what constituted that strategy. To a large degree this was
because of the arrival of the French forces. Thus, despite
ordering many of the forces under Washington's direct
control to the southern theater of operations during 1779
and 1780, Congress in the summer of 1779 authorized Washing-
ton to act with the French without applying to Congress for
9 3directions. Besides giving Washington more say-so over
strategy. Congress gave him more control over command and
personnel assignments.
Washington was frequently authorized to make major
appointments, beginning with commanding general and other
generals of the "Flying Camp" during the summer of 1776.
During 1778 and 1779, he was authorized to appoint the
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commanding officers of the Canadian expedition, a general
to replace Spencer in Rhode Island, the conu^anders at Fort
Pitt, and the commander-in-chief of the cavalry. After
congress's appointments of commanders of the Southern
Department faltered one after another, Washington was
directed in October 1780 to appoint a successor to Gates.
Not desiring to force his choice upon Congress, Washington
simply nominated Greene. Congress then appointed him
officially with instructions that he would be responsible
to Washington and not to themselves
.
After the reorganization of the army late in 1776,
and finding that the states were dilatory in appointing new
officers, and thus the inability to recruit the new army.
Congress directed Washington, in consultation with his
officers, to appoint the new officers. As discussed
earlier, this was an especially important grant of authority,
for appointment of officers was something Congress and the
states generally kept in their own hands. This statement
does not apply to staff officers for Congress frequently
authorized Washington to make such appointments.
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Beginning during the summer of 1775, Congress
authorized Washington to .ake staff appointments. ;.t that
time they authorized hi. to appoint the Co™.issary of Muster
the Quartermaster General, and the Wagon Master. The follow-
ing year he was authorized to appoint a Co^issary of
Clothing for the army under his i^ediate co™„and and a
Clothier-General of Supply for the army. At Valley Forge
early in 1778, Washington was authorized, in conjunction
with a congressional co™.ittee at camp, to appoint minor
positions in both the Quartermaster and Co,™issary depart-
ments, and the following year he was authorized to arrange
the western Commissary and Quartermaster departments, "any
resolutions of Congress notwithstanding."'^
Washington was also given discretionary authority
with respect to other military personnel matters. Realizing
he was in a better position than themselves to judge his
recruiting needs. Congress often allowed Washington, if he
judged necessary, authority to give bounties to augment
Continental bounties. Similarly, he was authorized to
offer rewards to British deserters, if he thought proper,
and in 1778, he and the commanders of the various departments
,
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were authorized to determine the hasic ration accor.in, to
circumstances.
Additionally, Washington was given authority to call
on certain states, for a fixed period of ti.e and for a fi.ed
number of .ilitia, to serve generally for a set a.ount of
time in a specific area for a specific purpose. ^8
ing this authority Congress reminded Washington that he,
like themselves, could only make such requests of the states,
not compel.
Probably the most surprising grants of authority
to Washington and the other generals during the war were
those of a dictatorial nature.
Disappointed with the state the American forces
found themselves during the fall of 1776, Charles Lee wrote
his friend, Benjamin Rush, that if Congress would give him
sufficient power for just a week, he could improve the
condition of the army and thus their ability to defeat the
British the next time the forces met. But he doubted
Congress would ever give any military man the necessary
power. "Did none of Congress," he queried Rush, "ever read
the Roman History?" Most had, and knew that the military
298-299;\'4
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in Rome had frequently been safely entrusted with dictatorial
grants of power. They knew also, however, that it was the
military that had undone the civilian leadership of the
Roman Empire. They also knew of the military tyranny and
despotism of the preceding century, and their own with the
British forces in America the decade before the war actually
began.
Nevertheless, by mid December 1776, there was talk
of giving the military dictatorial power, for it appeared
the war would be lost unless something drastic was done.
The army had been reduced to less than five thousand men,
and the British army was sweeping through New Jersey on its
way to Philadelphia. Drastic action was indeed needed, and
it was called for by many both in and out of the army.^°°
Washington's neighbor, George Mason, successfully had the
Virginia legislature on the twenty-sixth of December adopt
a resolution calling for Congress to "invest the Commander
m Chief
. . .
with more and ample extensive Powers for
conducting the Operation of the War."^°^ Even Benjamin Rush,
certainly not someone to trust the military with extensive
"'"'^^Nathanael Greene to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, December 21, 1776, Nathanael Greene Paoers,
vol. 1 (photostat), WLCL.
''"^"'"Resolution in Rutland, Papers of George Mason,
1 : 327 .
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powers, eanea for Washington to .e invested „Uh dictatorial
power for several months. "^^^
"Safety from external danger," Hamilton wrote in
the Exghth Federalist,
"is the most powerful director of
national conduct. Even the ardent lover of liberty will,
after a time, give way to its dxctates . " ^ ^3 This was true
during December 1776. Threatened with extinction if they
remained in Philadelphia, Congress, on the twelfth of
December, departed for the safety of Baltimore. Before
leaving, however, they conferred complete control of the
army in Washington's hands and placed Philadelphia under
the military command of General Putnam.
Washington was pleased to have complete responsibi-
lity and control of the Continental military forces, but he
needed the appropriate power to make his control meaningful
and effective. He therefore wrote Congress asking for the
power to procure men and supplies, explaining that he was
not lusting for power, but that desperate diseases required
desperate remedies. Congress, not wanting to set a
102„
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precedent for military dictatorship, but realizing that
extraordinary measures were required, decided that Washington
would have to be trusted with some for. of dictatorial power.
Thus, on the twenty-sixth of December they appointed a
comraittee, headed by Richard Henry Lee, to consider entrust-
ing Washington with extraordinary powers. Their report, the
next day, called for giving Washington the authority to
raise sixteen regiments, three thousand light cavalryn^en,
three regiznents of artillery and a corps of engineers; to
appoint, promote and discharge their officers; to call on
the states for militia; to impress supplies; to arrest and
confine persons who refused to accept Continental currency,
or were disaffected to the American cause; and to give
bounties, or otherwise prevail on the troops, whose terms
of enlistment were to expire on January 1, 1777, to stay
for a longer period. Their report was accepted and Washing-
ton was given these powers for a period of six months unless
sooner revoked by Congress . ^"^^
Explaining this decision to Robert Morris, William
Hooper stated Congress had given Washington "large and ample
powers, fully equal to the object if America means to
contend and support him." "Thus the Business of War will
106
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for six
.onths to co^e," he added, "^ove in the proper
channels and the Congress be no longer exercised about
matters of which it is supremely ignorant." Benjamin
Harrison told Morris that if these powers granted Washington
did not save Philadelphia, nothing else would, particularly
anything Congress could do.-^°^
Despite the belief they were doing the right thing
in granting Washington dictatorial power, n.any n.en.bers of
congress, realizing that many An^ericans would not understand
the dictatorial grant, called for an official explanation.
Therefore, on the twenty-eighth of December, a committee
was appointed to prepare a circular letter to the states
explaining the reasons which induced Congress to enlarge
Washington's powers and asking them to cooperate with him.
This circular was sent to the states two days later.
Additionally, several members of Congress wrote letters to
the leaders of their respective states explaining, as did
William Whipple, that "This measure was thought absolutely
necessary for the Salvation of America . ""^^^
107,,.
, ,
.William Hooper to Robert Morris, December 28
1776, Burnett, LMCC
, 2:196; Benjamin Harrison to Robert'Morris, December 29, 1776, ibid., 196.
108
Ford, JCC
, 6:1053; Lee, Memoir of the Life ofRichard Henry Lee
,
1:186-187.
William Whipple to Josiah Bartlett, December 31,
1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:198; see also William Ellery to
Nicholas Cooke, December 31, 1776, ibid., 199.
Notwithstanding these assurances
.any people believed
that Washington had been appointed
-Dictator;" at least
.any
people used^that term to describe Washington's status as
1777 began. m explaining Washington's grant of dicta-
torial power, John Adams was very careful to tell his wife
that "Congress never thought of making him Dictator, or
giving him a Sovereignty . "Ill congress was also careful to
make this clear to Washington. The resolve giving him
absolute powers was sent to him with an accompanying letter
from the committee of Congress then in Philadelphia,
expressing their trust in him. "Happy it is for this Coun-
try," they wrote, "that the General of their Forces can
safely be entrusted with the most unlimited Power and
neither personal security, liberty or property be in the
least degree endangered thereby. "H^ ^t least that was
their hope and desire; and they would not be disappointed.
Washington showed great restraint in exercising the
powers granted him, particularly as they did not have to be
fully used because of the victories at Princeton and Trenton
ll^Dr. William Shippen, Sr., to [ ] Shipoen,January 4, 1777, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 21, no. 4 (1897)-
4 98; Duane, Extracts from the Diary of Chfistopher Marshall,"
p. 111.
111. 1-John Adams to Abigail Adams, April 6, 1777
Butterfield, AFC
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112
,Robert Morris, George Clymer, and George Walton
to George Washington, December 31, 1776, Burnett LMCC
,
2:198.
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which eased the military crisis that had prompted the grant
of powers to meet the crisis. John Glover wrote: "I have
always been a Lover of Civil Law, & ever wish'd to see
America govern 'd by it. But I am fully of the Opinion that
it would be the Salvation of this Country was Martial Law
to take place, at least for 12 Months-^ that Genl
. Washington
was invested with power to call forth (any or) all the Male
inhabitants (if wanted) at 24 hours Notice. "^^^ To a degree
Congress agreed, but it was not until mid September, with
the British army approximately twenty miles from Philadelphia,
that they acted.
On September 17, 1777, two days before vacating
Philadelphia, Congress provided that for a period of sixty
days, anywhere within a seventy mile radius of Washington's
camp, the commander-in-chief be authorized to suspend
officers for misbehavior; fill up company grade and field
grade vacancies; seize provisions and other articles; and
remove goods from owners in areas subject to control by the
British army. These powers were augmented and extended by
Congress in October and November. Washington, however, ever
respecting the sanctity of private property, was somewhat
hesitant to seize property. This forbearance on Washington's
part caused Congress on December 10, 1777, to pass a
113John Glover to Jonathan Glover or Azor Orne,
June 17, 1777, "General John Glover's Letter Book." HCEI
112, no. 1 (January 1976): 14.
resolution stating that they understood his delicacy in
exerting military authority on the citizens of the states,
but reminding him that though it was highly laudable in
general, it may, "on critical exigencies, prove destructive
to the army and prejudicial to the general liberties of
America." They told him they expected him to draw his
supplies from exposed areas, and explicitly ordered him to
seize and pay for supplies anywhere within seventy miles
of his camp and, in general, to carry off or destroy every-
thing that might be useful to the British army, and not
absolutely necessary to the owners. Washington's powers
were extended to April 10, 1778, on December 30, 1777; and
to August 10
, 1778 , on April 23, 1778 . ""--^^
In April 1780, with his army in a terrible condition,
Washington asked Congress to help him provide for his army.
Congress responded by sending a committee, consisting of
Schuyler, Mathews, and Peabody, which was dicussed earlier
in this chapter. Schuyler hoped this committee would be
invested with the power necessary to adequately help
Washington. In fact, he hoped they and Washington v;ould be
invested co-jointly with a dictatorial power . "'""'"^ At first
Congress, though trusting Washington, restricted the powers
114
Ford, JCC, 8:752; 9:784, 905, 1013-1014, 1068;
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'^''"^Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton, April 8,
17 80
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granted the committee. Learning this, Washington wrote a
private letter to a member of Congress, that it was neces-
sary for the committee to be vested with a power sufficient
for cooperation with the French army, to draw out men and
supplies, and able to "give their sanction to any operation
which the Commander in chief may not think himself at
liberty to undertake without it as well beyond, as within
the limit of these States, "ll^ Mathews returned to Phila-
delphia almost immediately after arriving at camp, to lobby
Congress for increased authority for the committee
.
Somewhat responding to Mathews, as well as the news that
Lincoln and the southern army had been captured at Charleston,
and that there had been a mutiny by the Connecticut Line,
Congress twice, during May and June, called on the states
to cooperate with the committee at camp and Washington in
drawing out supplies and men.^^^ Washington and the committee
had hoped for more than this recommendation to the states.
They wanted the necessary authority to draw out the supplies
116George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 14, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Wr itings of Washington, 18:356-357; see also
George Washington to James'Duane, May 14, 1780, ibid., 358.
117 Robert R. Livingston to Philip Schuyler, May 21,
1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:158-159; James Duane to Philip
Schuyler, May 26, 1780, ibid., 170-171; Ford, JCC, 17:438-439.
118 President Samuel Huntington to the Several States,
May 19, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:155-156; Same to same,
June 21, 1780, ibid., 232.
and men on their own. But, as Duane told Schuyler, "it is
the fate of deliberate bodies to move with caution. "^^^
Many found the actions and explanations of Congress
unsatisfactory. Ezekiel Cornell, after visiting the army at
Morristown in May, wrote the governor of Rhode Island that
he despaired of "any vigorous exertions until there is a
power vested in some man or number of men, obligatory and
binding on all the states in the Union, as it will be
impossible to convince the several legislatures of the
necessity, until the happy mom.ent is past."^^^ Returning
to Philadelphia later that summer, Cornell reported others
shared his desire for more authority to be lodged in fewer
hands. In fact, some even spoke of making Washington a
dictator, under the belief that x^as "the only means, under
God, by which we can be saved from destruction . ""'"^'
Talk of a dictatorship frightened many members of
Congress, particularly as the committee at camp, Schuyler,
Mathews, and Peabody, appeared to fully support Washington
at the expense of civilian supremacy. Thus, the committee
was recalled by an overwhelming majority. Upon returning
119James Duane to Philip Schuyler, May 26, 1780,
ibid., 170.
120
Ezekiel Cornell to William Greene, May 20, 1780,
Staples, Rhode Isl and in the Continental Congress, p. 293.
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to congress, Mathews wrote Washington that "l suppose any
future propositions of .ine will be i^ediately exploded,
as too strongly tinctured with those 'Army principles,'
which I had imbibed, whilst with them."^^^
The recalling of the coi^ittee was a signal to those
concerned about Washington not having ample powers to save
the states that Congress was unwilling to give any dicta-
torial powers to Washington, Washington and the committee
jointly, or even to themselves. The reason Congress was
unwilling to do so had to do, to a large degree, with their
growing uncertainty of their own authority and their greater
reliance on the states to provide for the army. Thus, the
states would have to act to ward off the impending crisis
of the war effort completely collapsing.
A convention of New England civilian leaders meeting
at Boston early in August, 1780, after a lengthy debate on
the state of the army, recommended the New England states
and New York send comm.issioners to Hartford that November
to discuss how the army could be better provided for,
expecially with winter coming. The New York legislature
responded to the call by unanimously agreeing in October
to send delegates, with instructions to have the meeting
urge Congress be given the power to march the army into
122
Ford, JCC, 17:720; John Mathews to George
Washington, September 15, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:374.
281
delinquent states to force compliance with resolutions for
men and supplies. This the Hartford meeting did, as well
as urging Congress be given power of taxation in order to
pay the interest on the national debt.^^^
Several civilian leaders believed if the Hartford
Resolutions were adopted and implemented by Congress, and
the French gave their full cooperation, that a renewed army
could possibly win the war in 1781.124 everybody shared
their enthusiasm. There was great opposition to the resolu-
.
. 125tions. James Warren, for one, believed they had been
adopted "without recollecting political Maxims, without
attending to Historical Admonitions and warning or the
Principles on which our Opposition to Britain Rests." He
123
John Witherspoon to William Livingston, Decem-ber 16, 1780, ibid., 487-488; Franklin B. Hough, edProceedings of a Convention of Deleoatec, from Several ofthe New England States, Held at Bos ton ;~AU^iF"3^ TTso(Albany: J. Munsell, 1867), pp. 35-52 ; Res^TTJtT^^^of-th¥
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178 0, Syrett, Papers of Alexander_Hamj^lton , 2 : 425 ; Same to
same, September 16, 1780, ibid., 433.
124J^esse Root to Jonathan Trumbull, December 27,
1780, Burnett, LMCC
,
5:504; James Duane to George Clinton,
November 14, 1780, ibid., 445; Josiah Quincy to George
Washington, November 27, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of
the American Revolution
,
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125 .William Livingston to John VJither spoon
,
December 28, 1780, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Micro-
film Reel #1); Abigail Adams to John Adams, November 13,
1780, Butterfield, The Book of Abigail and John, p. 279.
believed Washington to be a
-Good- and a Great Man" but
"only a Man and therefore should not be vested with such
powers and besides," he added, "we do not know that his
successor will be either Great or Good." Additionally, he
worried about "what Influence this precedent," if adopted,
"may have half a Century Hence. "^26 He need not have
worried, for Congress was not about to give Washington or
anybody else dictatorial powers of the nature that was
suggested in the Hartford Resolutions
. with the French
army present in large numbers, it was believed it would be
dangerous to experiment with any form of unlimited power
placed in the hands of the military. Besides, French help
might end the war, thus making grants of power to make the
states comply with requisitions unnecessary. Nevertheless
Congress did make a concession to those that wanted a
stabler and stronger central government, by reducing the
value of the currency, establishing executive departments,
and adopting resolutions for an impost to pay the interest
on the national debt.
With the French assistance in defeating the British
at Yorktown and satisfied v^ith the actions taken by Congres
126
James Warren to Samuel Adams, December 4, 1780,
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mentioned above, Washington no longer felt the need to asK
for any special powers the remainder of the war; nor was
he granted any. Although Washington was no longer given
extraordinary powers, he was, as he was frequently through-
out the war, given information formally by Congress that
would not normally be given by a civilian body to a military
commander. He was also frequently given such information
informally by congressional members, including the
president.
Before discussing, in the next chapter, how the
states controlled and directed the military, and what powers
they Shared with them, it should be noted that Congress also
gave General Gates "dictatorial" powers. In fact, he
received his first grant before Washington. On June 16,
1776, Congress ordered Washington to send Gates to command
the Northern Department with authority to appoint officers,
fill vacancies, and suspend officers, as well as to settle
financial accounts, until October 1, 1776. John Adams
12 8
Elias Boudinot to George Washington, March 17,1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:81; James Lovell to George Washington,February 23, 1780, ibid., 5:48; John Sullivan to George
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Washington, May 5, 1778, Wharton, Revolutionary Diploma tic
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told Gates that Congress was sending north as
..nictator
.n Canada for Six Months, or at least untiU the first of
October... By later grants of power to Washington the
grant to Gates during the sunder of 1776 can hardly be
considered extensive, or dictatorial. But in .id 1776, this
grant was considered as such.
Gates, who became the darling of many members of
Congress during 1777 and 1778, was given great latitude by
congress with respect to calling on the states to supply him
with militia. He was also given authority, at times, to
n^ake personnel decisions generally made by Congress. During
the summer of 1777 he was empowered for a four month period
to suspend any officer and appoint replacements in the
Northern Department. During the summer of 1780, he was
authorized to appoint all staff officers for the southern
army. This latter grant of authority was also given to
Greene when he replaced Gates as commander of the southern
army. Greene, and Lincoln before him, were also authorized,
as commanders of the southern army, to call on the states
for militia assistance. These grants of authority were
limited in nature for, as John Adams told Gates, "We don't
John Adams to Horatio Gates, June 18, 1776
Burnett, L.MCC, 1 : 497 .
choose to trust you Generals, with too much Power, for too
long [a] Time . "
Although Congress did not grant the military
commanders too much power, for too long a time, as with
Washington, they did provide them with information that
normally a civilian body would not provide the military.
This was usually done in an informal manner, usually in the
form of correspondence between friends. "^^^
Congress, in summation, was generally able to
control and direct the military, primarily because the
military were willing to be controlled and directed by the
civilians. There were problems and difficulties, but for
the most part the military believed the best chance for
their revolution and war to succeed was to subordiante them-
selves to the civilian government, for to do otherwise was
to increase the opportunity for and the possibility of
military tyranny, something both the civilian and military
leaders feared and wanted to avoid.
131^ ^Ford, JCC, 8:614, 642, 644; 9:865; 10:354, 368-
15:240; 17:510; 18:995; John Hancock to Horatio Gates
August 14, 1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:452; John Adams to HoratioGates, June 18, 1776, ibid., 1:497.
132John Collins to Nathanael Greene, March 21, 1780,ibid., 5:90; see also same to same, ibid., passim; Samuel
Adams to William Heath, October 26, 1775, William Keath
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel fl) ; Elbridge Gerry to William
Heath, May 17
, 1776, ibid., William VJilliams to Joseph
Trumbull, 1775-1777, Joseph Trumbull Papers, oassin, vol 5
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CHAPTER V
STATE CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF THE MILITARY
Although Congress provided central control of
America's military efforts, the state governments also
played an important role in controlling and directing the
military forces, particularly their militia. The means
by which the states controlled and directed the military
varied from state to state, and from time to time. what
did not vary, was their desire to keep the American mili-
tary forces from becoming the enemy.
The states, fearing too strong an executive power,
placed most of the control and direction of the military
in their legislative bodies. Initially, however, quasi
legislative-executive bodies controlled and directed the
military forces in every colony. These bodies were commit-
tees and councils of safeties, which were first established
during the fall of 1774 and the subsequent winter, as has
been discussed earlier.
The early realization of the importance of control-
ling and directing the military in every colony prompted
Congress during July 1775 to recommend to those colonies
286
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without committees of q^-f^4-,, -i-sa ety to appoint them, suggesting
they be empowered to direct all military matters in the
recess of the respective colonial assemblies or provincial
congresses. At that time five colonies did not have
committees of safety, but by year's end they did.^
Generally, the early coromittees of safety functioned
only when the provincial congresses were in recess and were
often restricted to specified duties. But more often than
not, their authority, as well as tenure, was just as vague
and ill-defined as the authority upon which the provincial
congresses acted. Few of the committees existed after 1777,
with those of Vermont, New York, and New Jersey lasting until
1778; Rhode Island until 1781; and New Hampshire and
Connecticut to the end of the war. Nevertheless, they
served a useful and important function in the civilian con-
trol of the American military forces, particularly in those
colonies, later states, where the executive was weakened
by constitutional or self-imposed restrictions, and where
the provincial congress and later, state legislature,
infrequently assembled or did not adequately exercise their
constitutional responsibilities.
Early in the war the Nev; England committees and
councils of safety were frequently given extensive authority
"'"Ford, JCC, 2:189; Agnes Hunt, The^rovincia 1
Committees o f Sa fety of the_7lmer ican Revolution7~^Tnr71
.
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with respect to appointing and comi^issioning officers,
raising and discharging troops, and directing their i.ove-
ments. Later, when their states were threatened with or
actually invaded, such authority was again given. The
reason they were given such authority, and were successful
exercising it, was the fact that they were composed, for
the most part, of prominent leaders, including chief
executives and members of Congress.^
„
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««airs. particxarly anrin, ti.es of threatenea or actual
invasions
.
The conunittees of safety, though for the „ost part
Short lived, generally served as useful forces in giving
aireotion to their respective colony. s military policy and
providing for the control of the military itself.
.it.ough
their authority was often questioned and occasionally
Challenged, they nevertheless provided the legitimacy and
stability necessary until the governments under the state
governments were established. To a large degree their
success was due to thp fp>r--f- ^u^-^ 4-u •ne tact that their membership consisted
126; Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland-DlIHK^-fc-AEl?^ '
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of prominent leaders who, realizing the necessity of
preventing anything that would lead to anarchy or .ilxtary
tyranny, generally exercised their powers so that the .ob
and the military would not undermine the political and
social fabric. Once the constitutions were written and the
governments under them were formed, the responsibility for
the direction and control of the military within the states
passed to the state legislatures, who also realized the
importance of keeping tight control of the military.
By 1777, when the legislatures began fully exercis-
ing their powers, most legislators, because of their lack
of military experience and because the military situation
often necessitated broad-based policies, often deferred, in
military matters, to the Continental Congress and the
Continental generals. Yet this was only to the degree that
their own state's interests and safety were provided for.
The state legislatures nevertheless rarely relinquished
their responsibility for appointing and commissioning
officers, supplying the military, and giving some direction
to the military activities in their respective states.
Despite most of the responsibility for overseeing
the activities of the military rested with the committees
of safety early in the war, the provincial congresses and
conventions also directed and controlled military affairs.
The state legislatures did as well; particularly in
Massachusetts, wh.ch. untU IVSO. had no chief executive
Although occasionally delegating
.iiitary authority to thei.
council, their Board of War. and even to military officers
the Massachusetts legislature was active in giving military
directions and setting military policy. During the early
years of the war the New York Provincial Congress also gave
great attention to military affairs, especially with respect
to preparing the colony's defenses.^
Most legislatures, however, did not have the time
and experience, nor were they suited for giving their
undivided attention to military affairs. That is why, early
in the war, military responsibilities were frequently dele-
gated to the committees of safety. Because of the fear of
placing too much power in the executive and because they
were not always in session, some of the state legislatures
provided for other bodies to oversee various military
activities. These bodies included boards of war, extra-
ordinary councils, war offices, and county lieutenant
systems
.
Realizing it was too large to control efficiently
the military affairs of the state, the Massachusetts
legislature on October 26, 1776, created a board of war,
endowing it with authority to direct the operations of the
^Albert Bushnell Hart, ed.. Commonwealth His tory
of Massachusetts
, 3:121; Saunders, NCCR, 10 .-passim.
on
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land and sea forces of the state. The following spring
the supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania created a
board of war and navy board to assist the. in military
matters. The Board of War, composed of such prominent
.en
as Owen Biddle, Oavid Rittenhouse, Hichard Bache, and
.ohn
Bayard, was initially responsible for supplies and finance.
Later they were given responsibility for military appoint-
ments and given more authority over military policy. Their
tenure was rather short, as their existence ended
August 7, 1777. Vermont established a board of war
February 25, 1779, primarily to oversee the defenses of the
New Hampshire Grants. it remained in existence until 1783.^
The states that experimented most with boards of
war, extraordinary boards, and war offices were North
Carolina and Virginia, particularly when they became the
subject of British offensives during the middle years of
the war. Governor Jefferson, at times indecisive about
exercising executive leadership, took an active stance in
May 1779, by calling upon the Virginia legislature to create
a board of war, which was done later that month. It served
as an advisory body to the governor on military matters
6
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until its abolishment a year later. The Boara of War was
replaced during the su™,er of 1780 by a war office, headed
by a cor^issioner, appointed by the Governor with advice
Of the council. The con^issioner served as a military clerk
to the Governor and Council, thereby relieving the. of the
secretarial chores.^ Because North Carolina', r„L-dro m s Governor Nash
had trouble maintaining sufficient attendance of his
councillors to assist hi. and because he lacked sufficient
authority to control and direct his state's military forces,
the Assembly in September 1780 unconstitutionally put the
state's war power rn the Governor and a five man board of
war. The board of war, actually composed of three men, had
two major stumbling blocks to exercising their power. They
were considered too inexperienced by the military, and
Governor Nash, being upset that he had to share the authority
over the military with them, treated them as an advisory
body. In his message of January 28, 1781, to the state
legislature, Nash threatened to resign unless the Board of
7
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war was abolished. It was, bot „pon the suggestion of
ex-Governor Hichara CasweU, then a .e^er of the Senate,
a "council extraordinary" was est^hi.-.i. ay tablished on February 15
This council, consisting of Caswell, Alexander Martin, aid
Allen Jones, was responsible for advising the governor on
all matters, and any two of them wii-Ky u r n , th the governor, were
invested with full oower -t-^v^p
.o take measures for the defense
Of the state. Nash, not liking this arrangement, refused
to seek re-election. Because his successor, Thomas Burke,
also refused to work with the council, it was abolished.^
The extraordinary councils, boards of war, and war
offices were generally adopted when matters were desperate,
and therefore they were usually not very effective. Often
of extra-constitutional origin, they were disliked by the
executive, whose authority they generally shared. They were
also unpopular with the military, who saw them, for the most
part, as just another layer of civilian control. Rather
Clark, NCSR
, 18:707; 24:355-357, 378-380- 25-vii-225-229; William D. Cooke, compiler. Revolutionarygistory of North Carolina, in Thr^^^j^^^^^TT^^^r^ ^
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than Sharing the power of the state with the
.iutary a.ring
emergencies these bodies were created often to control the
military, as well as be a liaison between the civilian and
military leaders.
Another important layer of civilian control were the
county lieutenants. Virginia ^^n^q ^ .a d Pennsylvania appointed
civilian military commanders. Colonels of the militia, in
each county, and gave them command of the militia in their
county and some control of the military policy in the county.
This was particularly effective in the western counties
which were frequently the scene of military action.
^
Although most of the military control and direction
on the state level was exercised by multi-person bodies,
the executive branch of the revolutionary governments also,
to various degrees, exercised authority over the military
throughout the war. The prevalent distrust of executive
power, as well as that of concentrated power, and the haste
with which the new governments were instituted in each state,
affected almost every constitutional aspect of the executive
branch of the new state governments. Fear of concentrated
9
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p. 81; Edgar W. Hassler, 01dJVestiTOrelaiYdT~A~Hr^6?7~^f
Western Penn sylvan ia_p "Revol utT^n7"p7' 4 On~T^"""
Lewis S. Shimmell, Bor_de^ Warfare_in PenFivlvania During
Hl?__^Y£lyt-—
'
P- Thomas"Jeffer"son~t"6^LTi'ut'i'hiFti~of
Fayette, Lincoln, and Jefferson Counties, December 24, 1780Boyd
,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson ,4:237.
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power caused power to be divided everywhere, particularly
with respect to that to be exercised by the new chief
executives. An accompanying diffusion of power did not
alv.ays apply to the legislative branch, as they retained
most of the real authority over the military. Thus, the
revolutionary governments were not truly balanced. Where th,
legislatures, like the English parliament, exercised their
authority with few restraints, the chief executives were
restricted by the state constitutions, statutes, councils,
and the legislatures, as well as restraints they placed upon
themselves. For the most part, the chief executives, with
their councils, did not initiate legislation or make policy,
but simply carried out the desires of the legislatures, who
in most states, were the ones who elected the chief execu-
tives. Under peacetime conditions the weakened chief
executives would have not been so noticeable because of theii
lack of authority; however, as one governor told General
Greene, "I am left to the Constitution which may do in Peace
but is by no means adopted to war."''""'"
Margaret Burnham Macmillan, The VJa r Governor in
the TVmerican Revolution (New York: Columbia University PTess,
1943), pp. 57-73; James DeWitt Andrews, ed., The Works of
James Wilson : Being His Publi c Discourses upon Jurisprudence
and the Political Science Including Lectures as Professor
~~
of Law, 179 0-2, 2 vols. (Chicago: Callaahan and Company,
TS^'ey~ 1 : 357T~
'""'"Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Greene, March 4,
178 2, Mcllv.-aine , Offic i al Letters of the Governor s of
Virginia, 3:170.
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Most of the states severely lifted the authority
and power of their chief executives. They also limited their
tenure. in all but three states the chief executive was
limited to a one year term of office. Most of the states
imposed restrictions on successive terms of service, with
only Connecticut and New York allowing unlimited tenure.
None of the chief executives were given unlimited veto power,
and the few that did allow the veto, provided for it to be
overridden by the legislature. In addition, as a further
limitation on the chief executive, most states appended a
council to their executive branch, providing the council's
concurrence in many instances. In Pennsylvania, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, and Delaware the Council was the
executive body, its president generally just a first among
, 12
equals
.
The chief executives v;ere restrained in their
ability to make military policy or give direction to the
military forces of their states. "^"^ In most states the chief
executive could not call out the militia on his own authority.
12
Albert Berry Saye, A ConstitutionaJ_Historv_of
Georgia 1732- 1 968
,
rev. ed
. (Athens: University of "Georgia
Press, 1970), p. 115; Meshech Weare to Josiah Bartlett,
August 8, 1778, "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection,"
HM 4, no. 11 (November 1860): 332.
13
,John Jay to William Livingston, March 22, 1777,
Johnston, Correspondence and Publ ic Papers of John Jay,
1:123; Roche, Joseph Reed, pp. 150-151^!
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although some states did allow then, this authority in
special circumstances, such as during invasions.
It was not just constitutional, statutory, and
legislative restraints which hampered the chief executives
from giving direction to their state's military forces.
Often they limited themselves. Some chief executives were
simply indecisive leaders, such as Lowndes of South Carolina
and Jefferson of Virginia. The latter, because of his
strict constitutionalism, refrained from taking actions,
frequently believing major decisions needed the imprint and
sanction of the legislature.^^ Many chief executives,
rather than taking active roles in military affairs, expended
their energies in political matters. This was particularly
true in Georgia, Maryland, South Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and to a degree. New York, where the states were often
embroiled in debates between radical and moderate Whig
factions
.
Other problems confronted the chief executives.
Thomas Burke of North Carolina spent considerable time, after
14^ ^Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of
Edmund Pendleton
, pp. 210-211; David A Bernstein, '^VJilliam
Livingston
: The Role of the Executive in New Jersey's
Revolutionary War," William C. Wright, ed
.
, New Jersey in
the American Revol ution
,
2:21-2 2.
^Edward McCrady, The History of Sq^uth^_Carol ina__in_
the Revolution 177 5-1780, pp.' 24 3-24 4 ; ' Hamilton ^J
.
"Eckenfode
,
The Revolution in Virginia, pp. 210, 220.
escaping from the British, trying to re-establish his
legitimacy as many argued that he had broken his parole by
escaping. Burke was not the only chief executive captured
or forced to flee before the British ^r-^^r nciiti isririsn a my. Governor McKinly
of Delaware was captured, and Livingston, Rutledge, Reed
and Jefferson all spent considerable time avoiding capture.
The chief executives were also exhausted by time-consuming
duties of their office, as few had administrative staffs
to handle the day-to-day business. Despite these handi-
capping factors and influences, many chief executives took,
were given, and/or properly exercised their responsibility
over military affairs. Usually, however, this did not take
place until the state faced invasion or actually had been
invaded
.
Several chief executives, either by acquiescence
by the legislature or by the vigor of their personalities,
did become true heads of state during the war. These
included Jonathan Trumbull, Caesar Rodney, Thomas Johnson,
Thomas Sim Lee, Meshech VJeare, VJilliam Livingston, George
Clinton, Richard Caswell, Joseph Reed, William Greene, John
Rutledge, and for a few months, Thomas Nelson. For the most
16„Benjamin Harrison to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates, December 20
, 1782 , Mcllwaine, Of fici a 1_ Letters
o^ the Governors of Virginia, 3:409 ; Meshech Weaire to'
Josiah Bartlett, August^B^ 1778, "Stray Leaves from an
Autograph Collection," HM 4, no. 11 (November 1860): 332.
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part, the chief executives possessed varying degrees of
personal prestige and some were able to use their political
and personal standing to exercise an influence on their
respective councils and legislatures. This was particularly
true with respect to Trumbull, Livingston, Reed and Clinton.
The chief executives were by no means novices to the politi-
cal structure of their states. All the first state chief
executives had been prominent local leaders before the
revolution and eleven had been members of the provincial
assemblies. Weare
,
Trumbull, Caswell and Bulloch had served
as speakers; Wharton and McKinly had been presidents of
their councils of safety; and Caswell and Bulloch had pre-
sided over their respective provincial assemblies. Clinton,
Livingston, Johnson, Henry, Caswell, Rutledge and Bulloch,
were or would be members of the Second Continental Congress.
These were not radical men. They were among legal, social,
and political leaders of their respective states. Nor were
the later governors. Of the fifty-five wartime governors
(ten from Georgia)
,
nearly half were very prominent and
would have been, were they not already, leaders even v/ithout
the revolution."'"'^
17Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-
1783
, pp. 19 0-191; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War
Governors in the American Revolution, pp. 51-53.
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Given or taken power over military affairs, several
chief executives demonstrated they could use the limited
resources to best advantage. We must remember that besides
not being political novices, many of the wartime governors
were not military novices either. of the first thirteen
chief executives, four had served as militia generals:
Clinton, Livingston, McKinly, and Johnson; and three as
militia colonels: Weare, Henry, and Caswell. Clinton,
Reed, Trumbull, Nash, Nelson, Burke and Jefferson all
demonstrated at times an interest in and exercised vigor-
ously their authority over military affairs. Clinton was
active throughout his tenure in office suggesting military
policy. So was Jefferson. Both were quite interested in
western expeditions, especially since such expeditions would
undoubtedly result in the addition of territory for their
19
respective states. Other chief executives, such as Reed,
Rutledge, and Gwinnett, also involved themselves in military
1
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.
19George Clinton to George Washington, October 15,
1778, Hastings, Pub]^c_Paper s__of _George_Cl^in^ 4:163-164 ;
Same to same, October" 17
, 1778, ibid. I 167-169; George
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November 18, 1778, ibid., 294-295; Thomas Jefferson to George
Rogers Clark, January 29, 1780, James, "George Rogers Clark
Papers 1771-1781," pp. 144-149; Anthony Marc Lewis,
"Jefferson and Virginia's Pioneers, 1774-1781," MVHR 34,
no. 4 (March 1948): 551-588.
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planning. 20 Most chief executives, to varying degrees,
involved themselves in directing and controlling the mili-
tary by their participation in providing supplies,
countering Tory activities, and assisting in the selection
and promotion of officers.
The most direct control of the military by the chief
executive resulted when he was in the field with the mili-
tary, or meeting with military leaders who came on their
own or by direction to visit him. Normally the chief
executives became quite active in giving direction to
military affairs and exercising control over the military
when the British had entered their state. Clinton and
Rutledge are perhaps the best examples of chief executives
as commanders-in-chief. Clinton, even after being elected
Governor of New York, early in 1777, remained in the field
as a Continental Brigadier General, and even once inaugu-
rated, he returned to the field, rather than assuming his
civilian duties. During his first six months in office he
spent much time in the field, giving orders for the state's
20
Joseph Reed to Archibald Lochry, March 27, 1779,
"Original Documents," MH 5, no. 3 (March' 1907) : 175; Joseph
Reed to Robert Morris et al. [September 21, 1781], Ferguson,
Papers of Robert Morris, 2:328-329; Robert Morris Diary,
September 21," 1781," ibid., 316; Moultrie, Memoirs of the
American Revolution
, 1:479 ; Charles C. Jones , Jr ., The
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defense. since the Hudson Highlands were of such strategic
importance during i.ost of the war, Clinton found himself
frequently in the field in that area, giving directions,
offering suggestions, and receiving information as to the
needs and concerns of the military stationed in that area.
During 1779 he was persuaded by Washington from going on
an expedition against the western Indians, as his presence
was needed in the Highlands area in event of a British
offensive. The next year, however, Clinton often led the
militia into the western portions of his state against the
Indians
.
^'^
Rutledge, the President of South Carolina, similarly
took to the field, but unlike Clinton, he did so as a
civilian rather than as a military commander. He usually
took to the field to assist the military to procure supplies
and to inspire them, as v;ell as the citizens of his strife-
torn state, particularly after the fall of Charleston early
21George Clinton to George Washington, July 31, 1777,
Calendar of Hi storical Manuscripts, 2:262; George Clinton
to the New York Delegates to "the'^Continental Congress,
June 14
, 1780 , Hastings, Pub]J^_Paper^s_of_George_C]^
5 : 821-822 ; George Washington to Goose Van Schaick7~July~31,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washing ton, 19:287; George
VJashington to James Clinton, June 25, 1781, ibid., 22:262;
George Washington to Moses Hazen, November 18, 1782, ibid.,
25:349; John Palsgrave VJyllys to George Wyllys, October 11,
1777, "Wyllys Papers 1590-1796," CHSC 21 (1924): 458;
Proceedings of a Council of War, October 31, 1777, MHSC,
7th ser., 2:180-181; Spaulding, George Clinton, pp."T2¥-129,
133; Champagne, Alexander McDougall
, pp i 141.
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in the sunnier of 1780. Rutledge's ventures to the field
actually began the year before as he joined with Lincoln
to help direct the movements of the South Carolina militia.
During 1780 he left besieged Charleston to attach himself
to Sumter's command, later joining Gates in North Carolina.
The next year he ventured north to visit Congress and
Washington to discuss policy before returning to South
Carolina to re-establish civil government in his state.
Upon returning, he joined Greene's camp at the High Hills
of the Santee on August 1, 1781, re-established the civil
government, before continuing on to Camden to re-organize
the state's militia.
Clinton and Rutledge were somewhat unique in the
amount of time spent in the field, but they were not the
only chief executives who ventured into the field, either
to command the militia or to assist military commanders.
Governors Houston and Gwinnett of Georgia took part in
22George Washington Diary, June 5, 1781, John C.
Fitzpatrick, ed
. ,
The Diaries of George Washington 1748-1799,
4 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company "fof~tFe Mount
Vernon Ladies Association of the Union, 1925), 2:224; Edward
McCrady, The History o f South Carolina in the Revolution
1775 - 1780
, pp. 351, 764-765; Edward McCrady, The History
of South Carolina 1780-1783, pp. 510, 511; Anne King
Gregorie, Thomas Sumter (Columbia, South Carolina: R. L.
Bryan Company
,
"1931 ) , p. 182; Rev. Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin and Company, 1895), p. 76; Boweii, Benjamin_Lincoln
,
pp. 281, 283; Journals of Benjamin Lincoln, September~3-T7
1779, Benjamin Kennedy, ed . and trans.. Muskets, Cannon
Balls & Bombs: Nine Narratives of the Si ege o f Savannah in
17 79 (Savannah :~Beehive 'Press"7 19lT)'~~p~.~121 .
'
306
expeditions against Florida. North Carolina's chief
executives, Caswell, Burke and Nash, also ventured into the
field. so popular was Caswell as a mlitary commander
that while governor, the South Carolina delegates to Congress
early in 1779 invited him to accept a major generalship over
the North Carolina militia in their state, and to rank only
second to Lincoln. He declined, sending General Ashe to
command the militia. Alexander Martin, Speaker of the
North Carolina Senate and Acting Governor during Burke's
captivity, during the fall of 1781 joined General Rutherford's
camp to assist him in controlling the state's militia.
Chief executives of the upper south also took to the field
2 3Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History of Georgia
,1:59-61, 113-114; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American
Revolution
, pp. 23-25, 31-34; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, "
pp. 144-145.
24Abner Nash to George Washington, March 19, 1781,
Elizabeth G. McPherson, ed,
,
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Carolinians to Washington," NCHR 12, no. 2 (April 1935): 157;
Same to same, April 4, 1781, ibid., 157; Hugh F. Rankin, The'
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, pp. 200, 2 60; Ashe, Biographical
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,
2:29-30.
25 .William D. Cooke, compiler. Revolutionary History
of North Carolina, in Three Lectures, by Rev. Francis L.
Hawks, Hon. David L. Swain, and Hon. Wm. A. Graham
, p. 201
;
R. D. W. Connor, Revolutionary Leaders of North Carolina
,
North Carolina State Normal and Industrial College Histori-
cal Publications, no. 2 (n.p.: State of North Carolina,
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, p. 95
.
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to control military activities. Maryland's Governor Johnson,
a military veteran, commanded the militia in 1777, as did
Virginia Governor Nelson at the siege of York tovvn
. Few
northern chief executives took to the field, when compared
to their southern counterparts. Nevertheless, besides
Clinton, other chief executives in the northern states did
play active roles in the field with the military, as evi-
denced by the activities of Pennsylvania's Joseph Reed and
Massachusetts 's John Hancock. The former, during 1779 and
1780, frequently took to the field to give assistance and
encouragement wherever he could, and during the latter year
he commanded the militia in person. Hancock, who frequently
took to the field, primarily in Rhode Island, before becoming
governor in 1780, continued to do so once assuming his state's
top position, even leading the Massachusetts militia to Rhode
Island during 1781.^^
27Delaplaine, Thomas John son
, pp. 250, 256; Acomb,
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Although some chief executives took an active
interest in directing military activities and controlling
the military, most were not granted sufficient authority
and power to do either adequately. From the beginning of
the war, many Whigs believed a strong executive was needed
to prevent anarchy and military tyranny, as well as to
direct the energies of the state. This became m.ore
apparent as the war progressed and state after state was
invaded and occupied. Some chief executives were actually
urged to seize authority, especially during a crisis period.
Governor Lee of Maryland, for example, was told by James
McHenry during the summer crisis of 1781 to "Let the people
clamour, but save the State. Lee and most chief execu-
tives refused to act in an extra-legal or unconstitutional
manner, preferring to work within the established political
framework. Exceptions v/ere few, but they did occur. Gover-
nor Nelson of Virginia, although being granted extraordinary
authority during the summer of 1781, exceeded it by providing
for military impressment without the consent of his council.
Press, 1975), pp. 6-7; John Hancock to ?, March 6, 1781,
Collections of the Maine Historical Society
, 2d ser., 19:
177-178.
29Edward Rutledge to John Jay, November 24, 1776,
Johnston, Correspondence and Publi c Papers of John Jay, 1:94.
30James McHenry to Thomas Sim Lee, July 10, 17 81,
Kite, A Side Light on History, pp. 23-24.
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For this action he was later greatly condemned. ^1 And
Governor Burke, when asked by a .ilitia colonel for approval
of acting without for.al confirmation by the Assembly, told
him, "GO on and prosper in God's name [ , ] , do all the good
you can under any form or title you please. "^^
Most Whig leaders were realistic and practical men
who understood the mechanisms for directing and controlling
the military during periods of crisis were inadequate.
Therefore, the state legislatures often gave their chief
executives extensive powers while the legislature was in
recess and/or the state under invasion. For the most part,
granting of extensive powers to the chief executive to
harness the energies of the state took place in the southern
states, which were occupied by large British forces begin-
ning in 1778.
South Carolina, which perhaps suffered more than
any other state, placed great trust in their chief executive,
Rutledge, giving him more pov^er than any other civilian
leader during the war. Early in 1779, the Assembly, fore-
seeing a rather long legislative recess, voted him and his
council authority during the interim "to do everything that
31
Evans, Thomas Nel son, pp. 104, 114-115.
32 Thomas Burke to Robert Lutrell, September 4, 1781,
John S. Watterson, III, "The Ordeal of Governor Burke,"
NCHR 43, no. 2 (April 1971): 103.
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appeared to him and to them necessary for the public good."
on February 3, 1780, the South Carolina legislature again
conferred additional powers on Rutledge and the council,
stating that since it had always been the policy of republics
to concentrate powers of government in the hands of the
supreme magistracy during time of danger and invasion, they
were to do so, for a limited period. Until ten days after
their next session meeting the legislature authorized
Rutledge with such of council he could conveniently consult,
"to do all
. . .
things which may be judged expedient and
necessary to secure the liberty, safety and happiness of
this State except taking away the life of a citizen without
legal trial," and prohibited the subjecting the militia to
Continental articles of war."^"^ From this point early in
1780 until the Assembly met at Jacksonborough in January
1782, "it is not an exaggeration," according to one historian,
"to say that the government of South Carolina centered in the
person of John Rutledge, rather than in any group of persons
as the Privy Council, or in any place. "^^ These powers
33Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in
the Revolution 1775-1780
, pp. 319, 432; David Ramsay, The
History of the Revolution in South Carolina , 2 vols.
(Trenton: Isaac Collins, 1785), 2:47048; David Duncan
Wallace, The History of South Carolina
,
2:197-198; Robert W
Barnwell, Jr., "Rutledge, 'The Dictator,'" JSH 7, no. 2
(May 1941) : 216.
34Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina in the
Confederation
, p. 10; Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War
Governor in the American Revolution, p. 84.
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granted Rutledge, for a short period in 1782, wore extended
to his successor, John Mathews.
Other southern state legislatures authorized
extensive executive powers, for limited periods to their
chief executives, although not for the length of time nor
to the extent of that given Rutledge. With the Constitu-
tional Convention adjourned, most of the members of the
Council of Safety departed from the capitol, and facing a
threat of a British-launched invasion from Florida, six
members of the Council of Georgia signed a statement on
February 22, 1777, giving President Archibald Bulloch extra-
ordinary executive powers for a month's time, with the only
restriction that he be required to call on the assistance
of at least five persons of his own choosing to consult and
advise him on every occasion when a sufficient number of
councillors could not be convened. Within a few days of
adopting this measure, Bulloch died and, apparently, this
power was not extended or assumed by his successor, Button
3 GGwinnett. A year later, however, the Executive Council
of Georgia authorized the chief executive, John Houston, to
take full military control of the state without consulting
35George Smith McCov;en, Jr., The British Occupation
of Charleston, 17 8 0-8 2 , Tricentennial Studies, no. '5 (Colum
bia: University of South Carolina Press for the South
Carolina Tricentennial Commission
, 1972), p. 140.
3 6Jenkins , Button Gv;innett
, dp. 121-123.
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them, stating circumstances made it necessary and as well
as the fact the constitution was not clear on the matter.
Houston was hesitant at first to assume the power granted
him. But realizing that the Assembly would meet in the
near future and thus relieve him of his responsibility, and
that the full force of government was needed to supoort the
planned invasion of St. Augustine, he began to exercise the
authority given him. Another reason for taking a stronger
stance as chief executive was because the military leaders
were, for the most part, members of the opposition political
faction who would have had an excuse for assuming greater
control of the state's affairs had he not acted. ^"^ Extra-
ordinary powers were given to North Carolina's governor
during 1780 and 1781 and to Maryland's governor during
3 81778. Virginia was more hesitant than its neighbors in
granting extensive powers to its chief executives, even when
invaded
.
The question of giving the executive extensive
powers in Virginia first rose during the beginning of the
second winter of the war. At that time, several members
37Chandler, Revo lutionary Records of Georgia , 2:34-
35, 75-76; Stevens, A History of Georgia , 2:304-305.
3 8Abner Nash to Thomas Jefferson, February 2, 1781,
Boyd, The Papers of Thoma£_Jef fer son , 4:504 ; James Monroe
to ThomFs'yefre'rso'n7 JiTne^Je, '17 80 , ibid., 3:466 ; 2:344.
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Of the House of Delegates proposed that a dictatorship
created, invested with every civil and i^ilitary power.
Great opposition, especially by Archibald Gary, Speaker of
the Senate, greeted this proposal. So opposed to giving
dictatorial powers to Governor Patrick Henry, Gary supposedly
told colonel Si^ne
,
Henry's step-brother, that he would
personally kill Henry should be become dictator. Neverthe-
less, Gary and other opponents of any form of dictatorship,
did agree to giving Henry and the executive council addi-
tional powers for a limited period. Even in 1781, when
Virginia was invaded and the regular government disrupted,
necessary extraordinary power was not given the chief
executive until June when Thomas Nelson became governor.
Tarleton's raid on Charlottesville precluded the
scheduled June 4, 1781, election for governor and forced
the Virginia Assembly to move to Staunton, where, on the
seventh of June, a debate began on whether or not to
establish some form of dictatorship as a means of marshal-
ling the state's resources. George Nicholas moved that
Virginia appoint a dictator and that Washington be chosen
for that post. When Nicholas' motion was defeated, Richard
39Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia
!^-^_?-D_^PP^B^i^' Amer. ed
.
(Boston: David^CarTIsTeT
1801), p. 185; Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:505-509, 522-523;
Robert Leroy Hilldrup, The Life and Times of Edmund
Pendleton, p. 211; Brock, Ar chrbard^ CaTfy^PP . 101-104.
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Henry Lee called on James Lovell to have Congress assume
control of the state's affairs until a stable government
could be re-established or, at least, urge Washington into
accepting some form of dictatorial power to be used in their
state. Lee made a similar proposal to Virginia's
Congressional delegates, stating "Both ancient and modern
times furnish precedents to justify this procedure, but if
they did not, the present necessity not only justifies but
absolutely demands the measure." Lee also wrote Washington
of his desire that he come to his native state's defense,
as a dictator. Washington, already planning to come south
as the commander-in-chief of the combined armies, declined
Lee's offer without explaining his plans, which were still
secret
.
But Virginia did need a strong executive to guide
the state through its period of crisis. On June 12, 1781,
Thomas Nelson was elected governor and during the following
three months was given enough power to make a dictatorship
unnecessary. When he was elected governor. Nelson was
authorized by the Assembly, among other things, to call out
the state's military forces, impress for military purposes,
seize and confine loyalists, place the state q\iartormaster
department in the hands of Continental officers, and to
declare martial law in a LwcnLy-mile radius of British and
American camps. Nelson also extended tlie power granted him
315
beyond the breaking point. He was not, however, severely
chastised as it appeared the end justified the i.eans, a
view that the practical ^Vhigs were willing to accept at
40times
.
Granting of executive authority to chief executives
was more limited in the northern states. Nevertheless, when
circumstances warranted it, extraordinary powers, for
limited periods, were authorized. In Pennsylvania during
the summer of 1780, the Assembly authorized the President
or Vice President in Council during the recess of the legis-
lature to declare martial law. President Reed, at
Washington's insistence, used this power to impress needed
, • 41
supplies
.
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The legislatures also granted military leaders, both
Continental and militia, extraordinary and almost dictatorial
authority, particularly with respect to using their descre-
tion in distant theaters of operations, waging war against
internal enemies, and calling forth the militia and other
resources of the state In several instances, the states
also authorized Continental officers to command or direct
u 4 3their militia. The chief executives also delegated
authority to the military in their state Although most
42
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, p. 42; Saffell,
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John Todd, December 12, 1778, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia
State Papers
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1:312-313; Thomas Jefferson to Baron von
Steuben, April 21, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
,
5:525; Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island
, p. 179; John
Morris Scott, John Hobart, and William Duer to William Heath,
January [3?], 1776, William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1) ; John Penn to Officers Commanding North Carolina
Militia, General Butler or General Sumner, October 2, 1780,
Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chiefly to the Maryland
Line During the Revolution (Philadelphia : Printed for the
Seventy-Six Society, 1857)
, p. 58; Drayton, Memoirs of the
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Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in the
American Revolution
, p. 181; John Rutledge to Thomas Sumter,
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of these grants of authority to the i.ilitary took place in
the south beginning in 1779, such grants were r.ade in both
the north and south before that time. Generally, grants
to Continental officers frequently involved a legislature's
trust, or a governor's trust, in a person who, more often
than not, was a native of the state involved. it was
believed that a military man who had previously demonstrated
loyalty to the civilian government could be trusted, and
thus, could safely be given extraordinary authority.
Late in 1778, George Rogers Clark was given discre-
tionary authority by Governor Henry. During 1780 and 1781,
Jefferson also gave Clark great discretion in the western
theater of operations, generally as long as he furthered
Virginia's interests in that area and communicated to the
chief executive his plans and actions. Clinton of New
York frequently authorized military commanders discretionary
in_t]Te Revolution 1780-1783
, pp. 139-14 0; Hamilton J.
Eckenrode, The Revolution in Virginia, p. 256; Bartlett,
Records of Rhode Island, 8:238.
45Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December 15,
1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 62; Thomas Jefferson
to George Rogers Clark, April 19, 1780, Boyd, Papers of
Thomas Jefferson
, 3 : 354-355; Same to same, [April (19) ] ,
1780, ibid., 356-357; Same to same, December 25, 1780, ibid.,
4:237; Thomas Jefferson to James Innes, December 28, 1780,
ibid., 247.
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powers, including the allowing of Generals McDougall and
Parsons to obtain supplies/^
Probably the most often granted authority given the
Continental officers by the states was the permission to
call out the militia, as well as to command them. Early
in the war, the New York legislature, acutely aware of the
seriousness of the threat upon the existence of the revolu-
tionary government in their state, requested Washington
appoint a Continental general to command the militia along
the Hudson. Washington appointed George Clinton, but
suggested that the New York legislature give him commands
since the troops were not Continental. During December 1776,
the New York Provincial Convention authorized Clinton, as
well as Scott, Duer, Morris, and a Mr. Landon to direct all
military affairs, including calling out the militia of
Dutchess and West Chester counties. Two months later, in
February 1777, the convention gave Schuyler special authority
to call out the militia whenever he wished and early that
April, before he became governor, Clinton was given permis-
sion to call out the militia of four counties until the
first of August. As governor, Clinton turned over some
responsibility to controlling the militia to Continental
46George Clinton to Alexander McDougall, April 5,
1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 3:130-131;
Same to same, March 18, 1779, ibid., 4:646; George Clinton
to Samuel H. Parsons, March 17, 1778, ibid., 50-51.
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Generals Parsons and McDougall. and even offered to place
himself onder McDougall as a Continental brigadier general.
Another northern state which frequently faced
invasion and occupation was Rhode Island. They too
authorized Continental and
.ilitia officers authority to
call out the militia; generally, however, with the advice
and consent of the governor.
Early in the war. New Hampshire's legislature
authorized, in the absence of the council and Assembly, or
if the Committee of Safety was not sitting, the general
officer of the colony to call out the militia. Later in
the war. New Jersey militia Major General Philemon Dickinson
'
was given authority to call out his state's militia while
the Assembly was in recess Such granting of authority to
AuQust 8^^W?^^V-?^^^^^^°v Legislature,g 8, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5-399.Resolve of the New York ConveHtI5^^Dec^Ff'X9 r77 6
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48
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4 29; 9:38; The Providence Gazette and Country Journal'April 18
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Hampsh ire, 8:82; George Washington "t6~WiTriamTivingston
,
^^^^^^ ^' Fitzpatrick, Wri^ngs^f__Washington
, 21:325-
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call out the militia was primarily a southern phenomenon,
especially during the latter half of the war.
Throughout the war, Virginia, realizing that the
military officers frequently, in emergency situations, needed
this authority, first granted the right to assemble the
militia to Colonel William Woodford during the fall of 1775.
In 1777 and 1778, Continental Generals Hand and Mcintosh,
both operating in the western theater, were given power to
call out the militia. When Steuben assumed command of the
army in Virginia early in 1781, he received the authority
to command the Virginia militia once they were called out.
Other southern states also granted the military various
degrees of control over their militia. Maryland, during
the spring of 1776, authorized the military, because of an
impending invasion, to call out the militia and during 1779,
South Carolina's chief executive transferred responsibility
for controlling the militia from his hands to those of
General Moultrie. So concerned was the North Carolina
legislature about its inability to protect the state after
the defeat at Camden, that it gave Gates's second-in-command.
General William Smallwood of Maryland, authority over the
50North Carolina militia.
Virginia Committee of Safety to William Woodford,
[October 24?, 1775], Mays, Letter s and Pape rs of Edmund
Pendleton, 1:122; Patrick Henry to Edward Hand, July 3, 17 77,
Thwa 1 1c s , Frontier Defense o n the Upper Chi o, 1777-1778 ,
pp. 16-17; Same to same, July 27, 1777, ibid., p. 31;
Mcllvra ine , Journals of the Council of Virginia, 2:174; Thomas
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On the frontier, the need for quick response to an
enemy attack was quickly realized and therefore the military
leaders in the west were often authorized to call out the
militia upon any alarm. Such authorizations were granted
the military leaders in the Articles and Agreements or
Compact of Government of the Settlers of Cumberland River
on May 13, 1780
,
at Nashborough . ^"^
The military, although given extensive authority
and power during periods of crisis, were generally under
the firm control and direction of the civilian authorities,
both at the Continental and state levels. Control and
direction at the state level was exercised by several methods,
including the control over the selection and promotion of
officers; directly overseeing military affairs, by visits
to and from the military; and by making military policy.
In most states, the legislature, at various times,
selected and promoted the Continental and militia officers.
Although the company grade officers were usually selected
by the soldiers themselves, the field grade officers and
Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, January 4, 1781, Boyd, Papers
of Thomas Jefferson
,
4:308; Browne, Maryland Archives
,
11:262-263; Charles Cotesv;orth Pinckney, Life of General
Thomas Pinckney, pp. 54-55; William D. Cooke, compiler.
Revolutionary History of North Carolina in Three Lectures
,
by Rev . Franci s L. Hav/ks,"^ Hon. David "L. Swa in
, "and^Hoinr
Wm . A . Graham, p. 171. ~
'
^''Thomas Edwin Mathews, General James Robertson:
Father of Tennessee (Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1934) p. 188
some general officers were selected by the legislatures
thereby placing a dependence upon the., and thus a for. of
control. ^2 so dependent were the officers in one colony,
according to one observer, that they were "the creatures
and absolute dependents of the governing party.""
One method by which the state civilian leadership
maintained control of the military and assisted in the
direction of the military effort was by sending individuals,
such as the chief executives, previously discussed in this
chapter, and committees to the military camps. Such civilian
visits to Washington's camp began very early in the war,
beginning with the visit by Elbridge Gerry and two others
representing the Massachusetts Provincial Congress upon his
arrival at Cambridge. During the siege of Boston, many
1753-1 77^°^^?^?''''^^^ R22ts_ofJ^yland Democracy177^, p. 161; Kenneth Coleman, ThFAi^^FT^TiV^irninir^Georgia_r7_63-1789, p. 82; Charles~RK^^^^6^lA^^^^^
^:£5Il^t^P__H^_Virgini^^ to Commonwealth, pp ^2-145; George Mason to Martin CockHirHT^TiTT^TrTTTS RutlandPapers^o^^eorgejlason 1:241; Isaac S. Mulfo^d, History o?New_ Jersey. Civil and Political (Camden: P. Keen i^^dfE —
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Chandler, 1848), p. 422; Chfistopher Ward, The Delawaregontinen tals 1776-1783
, p. 6; William Gus ta^^IIi-lvhTtil^, Thegevolutionary_Soldiers of Del aware, p. 10; Hemphill, ExtriBtsfrom the Journa ls
_o£_jyie_Provinci a 1 Congresses of SouthCarolina 1775-1776
, p. 263; Albert BuihHilTllirt
,
ed^T"Commonwealth History of Massachusetts
, 3:72, 138; Lincoln,
Journals of Each Provincial Congre ss of_Ma s^acjiu^tts . p . ' 3 5 .
53 .Cited m Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the
Revolutiona ry War
, p. 31.
'
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Lincoln, Journals o f Each Provincial Congress of
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, p. 4 86 .
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civilian leaders visited Washington to discuss policy and
to oversee the activities of the soldiers and officers from
their colony, including the arrangement of the officer
corps. 55 During the winter of 1775-1776, Washington was
visited by Governor Cooke of Rhode Island; Connecticut
Lieutenant Governor Griswold; Oliver Ellsworth of the
Connecticut Council of Safety; Matthew Thornton, President
of the New Hampshire Provincial Congress and Chairman of its
Committee of Safety; and numerous members of the revolu-
tionary government of Massachusetts
. While in New York
during 1776, Washington was visited by various state leaders,
including Connecticut's Eliphalet Dyer and William Williams,
New York's John Jay, Robert R. Livingston, and Robert Yates,
and three members of the Rhode Island Assembly. Visits to
55
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,
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Samuel Cooper Diary, October 19, 1775, Frederick
Tuckerman, ed., "Diary of Samuel Cooper, 1776-1776," AHR 6,
no. 2 (January 1901): 322; Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of~My
Tour to the Camp, and the Observations I'made There," PMHS 4
(1858-1860): 82; William Garrott Brown, The Life o f Oliver
Ellsworth (New York: Macmillan Company, 19 05)
, p. 49;
Charles Thornton Adams, Matthew Thornton of New Hampshire:
A Patriot of the American Revolution ( Philadelphia
:
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Printing and Publishing Company, 1903)
, pp. 30, 34-34.
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Washington's ca.p continued throughout the war. For example.
New York sent John Jay and Gouverneur
.orris to see Washing-'
ton during the summer of 1777 to discuss the state of the
northern army and, early in 1781, Virginia sent Benjamin
Harrison to Philadelphia to make application to Congress
and Washington for assistance. Although Harrison met with
members of Congress, he was unable to meet Washington, since
the latter had returned to camp.^^ Generally, Washington's
dealings with state authorities were with the chief execu-
tives, either in person or in writing, as he did not have
the time, nor did he desire to visit or correspond with
individuals and committees representing the various govern-
ments. Early in 1777, Washington learned that Virginia had
sent John Walker to his camp to be the state's official
liaison. He then notified Governor Henry that this was
unacceptable, as it would set a precedent for the other
states, and besides, he argued, some things needed to be
Cooke to George Washington, September 6, 1776, Bartlett,
Records of Rhode Is land, 7:619; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas
Cooke, September 17, 1776, Showman, Papers of Nathanael
Greene
,
1:301. "
5 8John McKesson to George Clinton, July 29, [1777],
Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton
, 2:145; Benjamin
Harrison to George Washington, February 16, 1781, "Benjamin
Harrison's Mission to Philadelphia," TQHGM 3, no. 1 (July
1921) : 24-26 . ~"
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1 59kept secret. Walker remained in camp; Washington making
him an extra aide-de-camp.
Although the states did limit the sending of
committees and individuals to Washington's camp, they
continued sending them to other major encampments and
fortifications to investigate the needs and activities of
the military, as well as to discuss strategy and political
matters. These visits to military encampments began almost
as soon as the encampments were constructed, as the civilian
leaders believed their presence was needed to oversee the
activities of the military. This was particularly true in
New York, where the Provincial Congress in May 17 75 sent
George Clinton and Christopher Tappen as a committee to the
Highlands to inspect the defenses and later that year other
committees were appointed for the same purpose. During the
summer of 1776, the Provincial Congress sent a committee to
Gates's camp to investigate the officer corps and the
discipline of the soldiers. During the fall of 1776, the
New York Committee of Safety sent Robert R. Livingston,
James Duane, Robert Yates, and nine others as a committee
to cooperate with Schuyler at Albany in planning the
defenses of the state, and that December, Livingston,
James M. Scott, and William Duer were appointed as a
59George VJashmgton to Patrick Henry, February 24,
1777, Henry, Patrick Henry, 1:484.
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™ttee to cooperate with George Clinton. a .onth later,
the New York Con^ittee of Safety sent a co^ittee to Dutchlss
county to supervise the Mlitia and late in April, the New
York Convention sent a comniittee to investigate the diffi-
culties of mustering and controlling the militia. The New
York Committee of Safety sent a committee in February 1777
to cooperate with Wooster and Heath and, at Schuyler's
insistence during the early summer of 1777, the Council sent
Gouverneur Morris and Abraham Yates to inspect the state's
northern defenses. Late in December 1777, Putnam also
requested a committee be sent to cooperate and coordinate
the state's defenses with him. The legislature complied by
sending a committee to confer with him.^°
The other northern states similarly sent committees
to camp. Massachusetts in 1775, and Pennsylvania in 1776,
60., ^.Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton
, 1:129,130-132, 526-527, 731; Philip Schuyler to Pierre Van Cort-'
landt, June 30, 1777, ibid., 2:63n.; John McKesson to George
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,
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, p. 92; Berthold Fernow, ed.. New York in the
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sent con^ittees to Fort Ticonderoga to oversee and inspect
military activities. m the latter year, Pennsylvania also
appointed a committee to accompany Thomas Mifflin in his
attempt to influence the Association members to turn out
and stimulate them to action, and another co.^ittee to over-
see their navy. During 1777, New Hampshire's Committee of
Safety sent Josiah Bartlett and Nathaniel Peabody to
Bennington to cooperate with Stark and, during the same year,
the Pennsylvania State Navy Board was sent to the Red Bank
area to personally direct the movements of the state's mili-
tary forces. The following year. New Hampshire sent a
committee to Sullivan's camp to ascertain the condition of
the army and, during the summ.er of 1779, Massachusetts sent
Samuel Adams to Providence to petition Gates to spare
Jackson's regiment for the Penobscot expedition and, that
same summer, Connecticut sent a committee to New London and
Groton to inspect the fortifications and confer with the
commanding officers
•
6
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3 vols. (Boston: Richardson and Lord; VJells and Lilly7~ATd'en
Bradford, 1822-1829), 2:153; James Potter, William Clark,
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November 11, 1776, "Original Documents," MH 4 (1906): 292-
294; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, p. 23;
Ford, JCC
, 6 : 979 , 995; Instructions To Walter~Spooner
,
Jedediah Foster, and James Sullivan from the Massachusetts
Provincial Congress, June 14, 1775, Force, American Archives,
4th ser., 2 : 1407-1408; Pennsylvania Coloniar~Re cords';~T 0 :3 5 9 ;
"Records of the Committee of Safety,'' CNHHS7~7TirT7~Pennsyl-
vania State Navy Board to President Thomas VJharton,
October 30, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives , 1st ser..
The southern states also utilized comn^ittees to
inspect and oversee military activities, beginning in South
Carolina during the sunder of 1775. At that ti.e the South
Carolina Council of Safety sent William Henry Drayton and
the Reverend William Tennent to the back country with orders
'° "^^^^i^ protecting those that signed the
Association. ^2 Because of the distances involved on the
southern and western frontiers, as well as the nature of the
war there, military commanders were often given great lati-
tude. Nevertheless, civilian leaders were sent to the
frontier to oversee and cooperate with them. Virginia, for
example, sent a committee to Fort Pitt early in the war and,
during the winter of 1781-1782, sent a committee to advise
George Rogers Clark, as well as to settle the accounts of
his soldiers. Similarly, during 1782, Georgia sent a
committee to the St. Mary's River area to investigate and
5:723; Matthew Thornton to John Sullivan, September 28,
1778, Hammond, Let ters and Papers of John Sullivan, 1-92-95-
Samuel Adams to ?, August 14, 1779, Cushing7~W^TtTngs of
Samuel Adams, 4:161-162; James Wentv;orth et ar7rto'"j^¥than
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que
:
University of New 'Mexico Press, 1962), pp7~T01-104;
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supervise military activities
. Because the southern
states were frequently involved in ar.ed conflict through-
out .ost of the war, their state governments made use of
comi^ittees and individuals as liaisons with the military
with respect to strategy decisions. m June 1776 a member
of the Georgia Council of Safety went to Charleston to plead
with General Lee for Continental assistance in defending
Georgia by attacking Florida. Lee informed him he would
discuss the matter with only an official delegation from
Georgia. Such a delegation, consisting of Jonathan Bryan,
John Houston, and Lachlan Mcintosh, paid Lee a visit in
July. The result was the sending of a military force under
Howe and Moultrie to Georgia.
•
Besides the states sending committees to camp to
oversee military activities, they also sent individuals to
act as liaisons with the military leaders. During the
summer of 1776, William Sharpe, a member of the North
Carolina Council of Safety, accompanied General Rutherford
on his western expedition, acting as an aide. Similarly,
the New Hampshire Committee of Safety sent Samuel Folsom to
6 3 Hening, The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection
of al l the Laws of Virgin ia, 9:374; George Rogers ClaFk to
the Commissioners of Western Accounts, December 15, 1782,
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join Stark's camp during the summer of 1777 to act as a
liaison. During the summer of 1780, Jefferson of Virginia
sent one of his law students, the former Continental captain,
James Monroe, to the southern army armed with the title of
"Military Commissioner from Virginia to the Southern Army .
-
He was charged with collecting and co™icating information
about the state of the southern army to not only Jefferson,
but also Rutledge of South Carolina and Nash of North
Carolina. Early in 1781, Jefferson attempted to send another
individual to the southern army, to be attached to Greene's
headquarters as a liaison. However, the plan was dropped
when Greene assured Jefferson that it was unnecessary to send
anybody to camp, for he would make sure Jefferson was ade-
quately informed of events.
It was not just civilians visiting camp that provided
a means for civilian oversight over military affairs. The
military were often required to visit the civilian leaders.
Often the military simply came on their own. Just as the
^^Willie Jones to Patrick Henry, October 25, 1776,
Saunders, NCCR
,
10:860-861; Moore, John St ark, p. 271;
Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, June 10, 1780, Boyd,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 3:431; Same to same, June 16,
1780, ibid., 451-452; Thomas Jefferson to Abner Nash,
June 16, 1780, ibid., 452; M. F. Treacy, Prelude to Yorktown:
The Southern Campaign of Nathanae l Greene 178 0-1 781 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963) ,"^p. 211,
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military leaders often paid visits to Congress to discuss
supplies and strategies, as well as to ask for preference
of one kind or another, so did they, even more frequently,
visit the state governments for the same things. This was
especially true after 1779 when the states became more
responsible for the needs of the Continental army.^^
Another way the state civilian leaders kept a
personal contact, as well as an indirect control over the
military leaders was by having their sons and other relatives
serve as military aides to the major military leaders. For
example, Governor Trumbull's son, John, served as an aide-
de-cam.p to Spencer and Washington, adjutant to Gates, and
as a volunteer aide-de-camp to Sullivan. Governor William
Livingston's sons, William S. and Henry Brockholst, served
as aides-de-camp to Greene, Schuyler, Arnold and St. Clair.
His nephew, Matthew Clarkson, served as an aide-de-camp to
6 8Arnold and Lincoln.
State leaders also were able to watch the
activities of the military by serving with them as
6 7Margaret Burnham MacMillan, The War Governor in
the American Revolution
, p. 134.
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, pp . 14 5 , 14 5n . ; Flexner , The Traitor and the Spy ,
pp. 161, 463.
332
6 9
volunteers. For exaxnple, John Houston, after leaving the
governorship of Georgia in 1779, and before serving in Con-
gress, served as a volunteer aide to Mcintosh; John Archer,
a inember of the Maryland Assembly, served as a volunteer
aide to Wayne; and James Sullivan, judge on the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, served as a volunteer aide to his brother,
7 nJohn Sullivan
.
Another indirect control of the military was by
state leaders having the military write them. This not
only allowed the civilians to know what the military were
doing, but reminded the military that the civilians were
the supreme power. It also strengthened the ties between
the civilian and military leaders. Such requests for
correspondence were often formal, as chief executives and
executive and legislative bodies often asked military
commanders, including Washington, to inform them of their
69Wallace, William Bradford
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plans and activities
. Most requests for correspondence
were informal in nature, as it was believed it allowed the
military a greater degree of freedom in their expressions . ^2
The military leaders welcomed the opportunity to
communicate with the civilian leaders, and frequently did
so, both informally and formally. often they initiated
the correspondence with the state leaders, asking them to
^^Maryland Council to Marquis De la Favette, July 317 81, Browne, Mar^^^ 45 : 494 ; Virginia Committeeof Safety to William Woodford, [October 24"^, I7751 Mav^.Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton. 1:123; ComAittee'ofthe Executive Council of Georgia to Benjamin Lincoln
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reciprocate with information that would be useful to the
74
military
.
One of the most important contacts between the
military leaders and the state civilian leaders came about
in the form of meetings regarding the safety of a state.
Frequently commanding officers of departments and other
military commanders visited state leaders to discuss
strategy and other military matters. This was especially
true in the southern states. Charles Lee, in 1776, while
commanding the southern army, discussed military policy with
a wide variety of southern civilian leaders, primarily those
of Virginia and Georgia. Howe also consulted southern
civilian leaders, mainly as a result of the contemplated
expeditions against Florida in 1777 and 1778. Lincoln
frequently met with the chief executives of North Carolina
and South Carolina to discuss strategy and policy. Gates,
after taking command of the southern army, visited Jefferson
in Virginia, as did Lafayette the following year. Lafayette
also visited Maryland's Council upon arriving in the Southern
74William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney,
January 10, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the Amer ican Revolu-
tion, 1:258; Philip Schuyler to Jonathan Trumibull, June 5,
1777, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:54.
75Rawlins Lowndes to VJilliam Moultrie, November 29,
1778, Moultrie, Memoi rs of the American Revolution , 1:246;
William Moultrie to Charles Pinckney, April 16, 1778, ibid.,
3 70-371; Edward McCrady, The His tory of South Carolina in
the Revolution 1775-1780
,
p." 529 .
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Department. Similarly, Greene, after being appointed to
command the southern army, spent over a week in Philadelphia
discussing strategies with Congress before proceeding south
on November 2, 1780. Arriving in Maryland, he discussed
strategy and supplies with state leaders, leaving behind
General Gist to continue lobbying for support. From Anna-
polis, he proceeded to Richmond to see Jefferson and the
legislature of Virginia about his plans. There, he left
behind Steuben to act as a liaison with the state, joining
Gist in forwarding recruits and supplies.
Because of the distances involved in the Southern
Department, the commanding generals, desiring personal
contact with state leaders, often sent emissaries, military
necessity preventing them from leaving camp. Lincoln used
Moultrie and Colonel Pinckney as a link to Rutledge, as did
76 .Virginia Committee of Safety to Charles Lee,
April 10
,
1776
,
Sparks, Cor£es£onden^e_o_f_ the_^jrier ican Revo-
lution, 2:486-488; Hugh F. Rankin, The North_Caro"l ina
~
Continenta_ls, p. 67; Chandler, Revo]jj t^iqnary~Reco r"ds^o f
Georgia, 1:179, 190-191; Charles Lee to" ArcFibTlT~BulToch
,
August 23, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872):
238; Same to same, August 24, 1776, ibid,, 240-241; Button
Gwinnett to John Hancock, March 28, 1777, Jenkins, Button
Gwinnett
, pp. 218-221; Charles C. Jones, Jr., The History
of Georg ia , 1:113; Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln
, pp. 270, 'iTl;
Edward McCrady, The History of South Carol ina in the Revo-
lution 1775-1780
, p. 384; Patterson, Horatio Gates
, pp. 302-
303; Paul David Nelson, Gener a l Hora t io Gates: A Biography
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Universi ty~l9"7 6y7"p • 2 20T^
Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette and the Close of the American
Revolution
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Lafayette use James McHenry as a link to the government of
Maryland and George Augustine Washington to the government
7 7of Virginia.
Visits of commanding officers and their emissaries
to state leaders were not limited to the south. Schuyler,
for example, visited the New York Convention in 1777 to
discuss that state's defense and a year earlier Lord Stirling
visited the New Jersey Committee of Safety to discuss that
state's defense. Lafayette, on his way north to command the
Ill-fated Canadian expedition early in 1778, visited Clinton;
and on his way south late in 1780, he visited Thomas Mifflin
in Philadelphia to discuss Pennsylvania's recruiting poli-
cies. During 1779, Putnam, who commanded the Continental
troops on the east side of the Hudson, visited the Connecti-
cut General Assembly to discuss policy, particularly as it
related to raising additional troops. Not that successful
a field commander, Putnam was adept at dealing with civilian
officials, and was quite successful in coordinating the
defenses of New England and the Hudson Highlands with the
civilian leaders. During 1778 and 1779, General Maxwell,
77 . . .Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, February 12,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #3) ; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas
Nelson, August 7, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in Virginia ,
p. 44; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington, August 21,
1781, Louis Gottschalk, ed. , The Letters of Lafayette to
Washington 1777-1799
, p. 219; Same to same, August 24, 1781,
ibid
. , p . 221
.
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and Officers ho permitted, frequently visited the New Jersey
legislature, primarily to draw attention to the distresses
of the New Jersey Line.^^
It was not just the top field commanders who visited
the state civilian leaders. More often than not, it was a
company or regimental commanding officer who directly
appealed to his state to provide supplies, recruits, and
pay. Connecticut's government was frequently prevailed upon
by Parsons, Putnam, Tallmadge, and Humphreys; Vermont by
Stark; and New York by McDougall.^^ Southern field com-
manders were less likely, as the war progressed, to visit
7 8 Bush PhjJJ^_^chu^^ p. 78; Alan Valentine, LordStirl ing, p. 174; Louis Gottschalk, Lafayette Joins theAmerican Army
, p. 134; Marquis de Lafi^^¥FE¥~tF~Gi^?^^
Washington, December 5, 17 80, Louis Gottschalk, ed
.
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, pp. 146-147: ~ ~
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, p. 3 77 ; Jonathan
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MHSC, 7th ser., 2:118; Samuel H. Parsons to George VJashing-
ton, May 11, 1777, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p. 94; George
Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, May 17,' 1777, ibid., p. 96;
Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, June 24, 1780, ibid.,
p. 292; Same to same, July 4, 1780, ibid., p. 294; Samuel H.
Parsons to the Committee of Congress, June 24, 1780, ibid.,
pp. 292-293; Hall, Benjamin Tallmadge
, p. 41; Humphreys,
Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:205-207; Pennsylvania
Supreme Executive Council to George Washington, January 22,
1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives
,
1st ser., 6:200; Arthur
St. Clair to George Washington, April 15, 1781, Smith, The
St. Clair Papers
,
1:547-548; Same to same, June 16, ll^TT'
ibid
. ,
549-550; John Stark to George Washington, April 9,
17 82, Moore, John Sta rk, p. 4 59; Champagne, Alexander
McDougall, p. 166.
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their state gove™nts as they were either being pursued
or were pursuing the British. Generally, however, n^ost
commanders in the field during the southern campaigns sent
subordinate officers to visit the state civilian leaders.
Fortunately for the southern officers, state executives did
spend a lot of time at camp to coordinate their state's
defense. Therefore, it was possible for General Andrew
Pickens, early in 1781, to pay a special visit to Rutledge
p -I
at Greene's camp.
Although Washington rarely visited Congress to
discuss the concerns of the army, he frequently paid visits
to the leaders of the state governments, particularly those
of New York when the army was quartered at New Windsor and
Newburgh during 1781 and 1782. Because of the demands on
his time, Washington preferred dealing with state leaders
by mail. Whenever possible, he often had his letters hand
80
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,
2:1153-1154; Hugh P.
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, pp. 344, 381;
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40:177; Baron de Kalb to Thomas
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, "Revolution-
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1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 1 (March 1954): 16.
81
A. L. Pickens, Skyagunsta, The Border Wizard Owl:
Ma jor-General Andrew Pickens (1739-1807) (Greenville, South
Carolina: Observer Printing Company, 1934 ) , p . 89.
8 2 Spaulding, George Clinton
, p. 136; George
Washington to Horatio Gates, November 14, 1782, Fitzpatrick,
VJritings of Washington, 25:341.
carried by members of his staff or other officers who could
expound on his written communications. He also sent aides-
de-camp and generals to the state leaders to discuss
policies, particularly as they related to supplies and pay.
Washington began sending top assistants to the states for
help during the fall of 1776, when he sent Mifflin to
Pennsylvania, Reed to New Jersey, General Nixon to Massachu-
setts, and General Varnum to Rhode Island. Until 1782,
Washington frequently dispatched Knox and Heath to the New
England states to lobby for support. During 1778,
Washington sent Deputy Quartermaster General Lutterloh to
see the chief executive of Pennsylvania about supplies and
Philip Van Cortlandt to see the chief executive of New York
about troop dispositions. During 1781, Washington told
Stark that as long as he was in New Hampshire he should
impress upon the legislature the needs of the army. The
following year. Parsons, then in Connecticut, received a
George Washington to William Livingston,
November 23, 1776, ibid., 6:304-305; Thomas Mifflin to
George Washington, November 26, 1776, Reed, Joseph Reed
,
1:266; Samuel B. Webb to Jonathan Trumbull, November 24,
1776, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb
,
1:173; Wilkins Updike,
Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (Boston: Thomas H. VJebb and
Company, 1842), pp. 149-150.
84 George Washington to William Heath, June 2, 1781,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
18:468; Same to same.
May 9, 1781, ibid., 22:63-66; Circular to the New England
States, May 10, 1781, ibid., 68-69; George Washington to
Horatio Gates, November 14, 1782, ibid., 25:341; Abbatt,
Memoirs of Ma jor-General William Heath
, p. 249; Callaghan,
Henry Knox, pp. 99, 136-137.
340
similar letter from Washington
. Even as the war came to
a close, Washington was still sending lobbying parties to
the states. Early in 1782, he sent numerous officers to
the New England states to plead with the legislatures about
filling up their battalions
.
Besides appointing and selecting the officers, and
visiting them, and receiving visits from them, the civilian
leaders asserted themselves by directing, whenever possible,
the strategy the military followed. Often this simply meant
endorsing the plans the military brought to them, such as
George Rogers Clark's plans for the western frontier approved
by Virginia and Ethan Allen's plans for invading Canada
approved by the New York Provincial Congress. ^"^ But more
than often it meant adopting a strategy that would benefit
the state the most, often disregarding other states. Such
was the case with Massachusetts, who, without consulting
Congress, fitted out a military-naval force of nearly four
8 5George Washington to Thomas Wharton, March 7, 1778,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
11:45-4 8; Georqe
Washington to John Stark, May "6, 1781, ibid., 22:41; George
Washington to Samuel H. Parsons, January 3, 1782, ibid.,
23:433; George VJashington to Philip Van Cortlandt, October 17,
177 8, Judd, Correspondence of the Van Cortlandt Family
,
p. 269.
8 6George VJashington to the Superintendent of Finance,
January 25, 17 82, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
23:463-465.
8 7Edgar VJ. Hassler , Old Vfestmoreland : A History of
VJestern Pennsylvania During the Revolu tion , p. 131; Journal
of the New York Provincial Conqress , 1:65.
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thousand men during the summer of 1779 for the expedition
8 8against Penobscot. Besides directing the military in
grand strategy, the state governments also directed the
military in lesser matters, ever reminding them of their
O Q
subordinate role.
The state governments, like Congress, kept a
relatively tight grip on the military. Nevertheless, when
it appeared consistent with the safety of the body politic,
they allowed the military extraordinary power and authority.
For the most part, the military responded by not abusing
the trust reposed in them. Yet there is evidence that the
military often violated the trust placed in them. As will
be seen, the state governments, just like Congress, viewed
all such violations of civil supremacy with great concern
and acted accordingly.
8 8Albert Bushnell Hart, Commonwealth History of
Massachusetts, 3:36-38
; Henry I. Shaw,"Jr., ^eno"bicot~
Assault-1779
,
" MA 17, no. 2 (Summer 1953): 83-94
.
89Proceedings of the Convent ion of the Delaware
State, p. 20.
CHAPTER VI
THE ARflY CONTROLS ITSELF
Nicholas Cresswell, during July 1777, wrote in his
journal that the American army was composed of a "ragged
Banditti of undisciplined people, the scum and refuse of
all nations on earth." A Swedish Colonel in French service
described the American army in Savannah during 1779 as being
composed "almost wholly of deserters and vagabonds of all
nations."-^ These were somewhat exaggerated descriptions,
yet at times they seemed very true and therefore concerned
the revolutionary leaders. Their ideal was a disciplined
army composed of VThigs who had a stake in society. They
desired an army composed of men who shared the same cultural,
political, and social background and beliefs. But because
of the difficulty in recruiting such an army, and military
necessity, many who did not share a stake in American
society as they envisioned it, enlisted in the patriot
forces. These included Blacks, Indians, foreigners, British
"'"[Nicholas Cresswell], Journal of Nicholas Cresswell,
1774-1777
, pp. 251-252 ; Baron Curt von Stedingk to King
Gustavus III, January 18, 1780, Adolph B. Benson, Sweden and
the American Revolution, p. 165.
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and German deserters and prisoners of war, as well as
Tories
.
The first group that was taken into the Ai^erican
military forces, against the wishes of most Americans, were
the Blacks, a people many had always feared to arm.^
Despite Blacks demonstrating their skill and courage at
Lexington and Bunker Hill, Washington issued orders that
they were not to be recruited, although those already
enlisted could remain. Congress in September rejected a
motion to discharge all Blacks, but a council of officers
at Cambridge on October 8, 1775, unanimously agreed to
discharge all slaves. By a large majority, they agreed
that free Blacks in service not be re-enlisted when their
enlistments ended. Washington concurred."^
Late in 1775, however, because of difficulty in
recruiting, Washington allowed Blacks to re-enlist. Learn-
ing this. Congress informed Washington that he could
continue to re-enlist Blacks who had faithfully served at
the siege of Boston, but no others. This restriction was
lifted during the following years as enlistments slackened.
2Banjamin Quarles, "The Colonial Militia and Negro
Manpower," MVHR 45, no. 4 (March 1959): 648, 652.
3General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Wri ting s of Washington,
3:319; 4:57, 86; Details regarding the October 8th meeting
in Force, Amer ican Archives , 4th ser., 3:1040; Recruiting
Instructions
,
Tbid., 3 :1385; Diary of Richard Smith,
Burnett, LMCC , 1:207.
344
and Blacks were encouraged to join both the Continental
army and the state military forces. By the summer of 1778,
there were over 750 Blacks serving in the Continental army
and by 1780 both Rhode Island and Connecticut had all Black
companies, except for the officers/
This increasing use of Blacks did not take place
without protest. Six members of the Rhode Island Assembly
opposed the decision of their body to raise Black companies,
fearing the world would believe that the Americans were
attempting to win their rights and liberties with a band of
slaves. Heath was asked by Schuyler whether it was "consis-
tent with the Sons of Freedom to trust their all to be
defended by Slaves?" Heath agreed it was not.^
Opposition to the use of Blacks, as one would sur-
mise, was greater in the southern states, for as one
4
General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washington
,4:194; George VJashington to the President of the Continental
Congress, December 31, 1775, ibid., 195; Ford, JCC, 4:60;
Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961),
pp. viii, 16-18, 52, 55-56, 71-72, 80-82; Jack D. Foner,
Blacks and the Military in American History (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 10-11; David 0. V7hite,
Connecticut's Black Soldiers 1775-1783
, Connecticut Bicen-
tennial, ser
. 4 (Chester: Pequot Press, 1973)
,
passim;
James M. Varnum to George Washington, January 2, 1778,
"Revolutionary Correspondence," RIHSC 6 (1867): 209-210;
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Samuel Adams, August 27, 1777, ibid., 148.
345
southerner wrote, arming then, was "the child of a distempered
imagination." Nevertheless, from the beginning of the war,
Virginia allowed Blacks to join the militia and South
Carolina allowed them to be used as laborers. Additionally,
Maryland allowed (the only southern state to do so) Blacks
to be enlisted and even resorted to drafting them in 1781.^
Congress, during the British invasion of South
Carolina and Georgia in 1779, suggested the use of Blacks
under white commissioned and non-commissioned officers,
compensating slave owners for any loss they may suffer.
Alexander Hamilton, for one, thought the plan a good one,
believing the slaves would make good soldiers, having lived
a life of subordination. But he doubted the southerners
would readily accept such a plan, believing "Prejudice and
private interest will be antagonists too pov/erful for public
7
spirit and public good."
^E[dward] Giles to Otho H[olland] Williams, June 1,l^Sl, Calendar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers
in the Maryland Historical Society
, p. 46; Benjamin Ouarles.
The Negro in the /American Revolution
, pp. 56-58; Hemphill,
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7Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, [September 11,
1779], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
,
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Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, March 14, 1779, ibid., 17-19;
John Laurens to Henry Laurens, February 2, 1778, Simms, The
Army Correspondence of Colonel John Laurens
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Ellery and John Collins to William Greene, April 13, 1779,
Burnett, LMCC, 4:156; John Collins to William Greene,
March 30, 1779, ibid., 124; Ford, JCC, 13:387-388.
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Hamilton was correct in believing the plan would
not be adopted, for as one southerner wrote after learning
of it,
-we are much disgusted here at the Congress recom-
mending us to arm our Slaves, it was received with great
resentment, as a very dangerous and impolitic Step."
Despite the rejection of the plan, some Continental officers
and civilian leaders continued to lobby for the use of
Blacks, believing that the threat posed by a British army
outv>7eighed the danger of using slaves.^
John Laurens, once elected to the South Carolina
legislature in 1782, raised the possibility of the state
enlisting a Black regiment under his command. This recom-
mendation was not adopted, as "The prejudices against the
measure," according to Lewis Morris, Jr., "are so prevailing
that no consideration could induce them to adopt it." The
legislature did, however, agree to the limited use of Blacks
Q
for fatigue duty.
8 , .Christopher Gadsden to Samuel Adams, July 6 1779Walsh, Chri_sjtopher_Gadsden, p. 166; Benjamin Lincoln'to JohnRutledge, July 24, 17~79, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Benjamin
Lincoln Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Joseph Jones
to James Madison, December 8, 1780, Hutchinson, Papers ofJame s Madison
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November 28, 1780, ibid., 209.
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Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon.
Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence,"
SCHGM 26, no. 4 (October 1925): 194; Edward Rutledge to
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Although the use of Blacks in combat was sporadic
during the war, it has been estimated that some five thousand
did serve in various guises, primarily as sailors aboard
privateers." Another domestic source of manpower that was
avoided as much as possible was the Indian, who, like the
Black, was considered to possess the seeds of discord and
anarchy.
The first two years of the war, Congress and the
colonies, for the most part, attempted to keep the Indians
neutral, believing the cost of maintaining them as allies
outweighed any advantages which may be gained by their use.
Indians did, however, serve in American arms in the first
year of the war at the siege of Boston, in Canada, and on
the South Carolina frontier."'"''"
Arthur Middleton, February 8, 1782, ibid., 27, no 1(January 1926): 4 ; A. S. Salley, Jr., ed.
, Journals of theHouse of Representatives_^^oirbh_Carolina TColSbTa"^ '
Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1916), pp. 56-58;John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, [July 1782]
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•Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolu
tion, pp. ix, 83; Luther Porter Jackson, Virginia Negro
Sold iers and Seamen in the Revolutionary War (NorfolkT~GuideQuality Press, 1944), p. vi.
"^"''Ford, JCC, 2:123, 4:191; Lossing, Philip Schuyler
,2:106-113; 395-396; Philip Schuyler to George Washington,
August 6, 1776, Walter H. Mohr, Federal Indian Relations
1774-17 88 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1933), p. 39; Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the
Eastern Indians, May 14, 1-75, Frederic Kidder, Military
Operations in Ea s tern Maine and Nova Scot ia During the
Revolution, Chie f ly compiled from the Journals and Lette r
s
of Colonel John Allan, v/ith Notes and a Memoir of~Col. John
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Because of manpower shortages, the urging of Gates,
and after consulting Washington, Congress in May 1776
authorized Indian use during the northern campaign, allowing
bounties for Indians who would take prisoners at garrisons,
hoping this would prevent massacres. In June, Washington
was authorized to recruit up to two thousand Indians, and
later that summer was authorized to recruit additional
Indians from the St. Johns, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot
tribes . '^^
Despite the seemingly large numbers authorized during
1776 and 1777, Indians were rarely used in large bodies,
hardly ever incorporated with Continental units, and almost
always used on the frontier. This remained true during 1778
and 1779 as Congress, pressed for military manpower, author-
ized Indian use, even giving blank commissions to the Northern
Department's Indian Commissioners to pass along to warriors
of the Oneida and Tuscarora tribes, hoping this would bring
Allan (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867), pp. 51-52; Edward Miles
Riley, ed
. ,
The Journal of John Harrowe r: An Indentured
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, pp. 56 , 159^607 Isaac J. Green -
wood, "The Stockbridge Indians During the American
Revolution," NEHGR 54 (April 1900): 162-164; Ward, The War
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them into closer cooperation. During the spring of 1780,
Colonel Brodhead was given six blank commissions to bestow
upon Delaware Indians, and early in 1781 he was authorized
to use as many Delawares as volunteers as he desired. On
the southern frontier during 1780, Major William R. Davie
supplemented his command with thirty-five Catawba, whose
tribe also supplied warriors in 1781."*""^
In all, probably two or three thousand Indians
served in or with the American military forces during the
war. Rarely were a hundred used at the same time and place,
and always their conduct was carefully monitored. The
states generally restricted their use in populated areas
and frequently prohibited their serving in the militia . """"^
^^Ibid., 9:943, 1002 ; 10 :220-221; 12:411; 14:693;
16:373; 19:33; Allen D. Chandler, ed., "Minutes of the
Executive Council, May 7 through October 14, 1777," GHQ 34,
no. 1 (March 1950): 31; J. E. A. Smith, The History of~
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1734 to the year 1800 (Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1869), p. 296 ;
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Washington was generally against using them, believing their
services never compensated the expense. He felt the same
way about another category of manpower both Congress and the
states were forced to call upon-British and German deserters
and prisoners of v/ar
.
Initially, orders were issued both by the Massachu-
setts Committee of Safety and by the army forbidding the
enlistment of British deserters. Throughout the war similar
orders would be issued, as well as prohibitions against
enlisting British prisoners of war.^^ These prohibitions
did not, however, preclude Congress from frequently providing
incentives for British and German soldiers to renounce their
allegiances, with no obligation to serve in the American
17
military forces. It is estimated about thirty-thousand
"""^George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, May 3
, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
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German mercenaries served in Ainerica between 1776 and 1783,
about twenty thousand of them Hessians, who, for the most
part, neither demonstrated great love for the British nor
great hatred for the Americans. it is understandable,
therefore, why nearly half were captured, and some five
1 8thousand deserted.
With increasing manpower needs during the second
and third years of the war, many civil and military leaders
believed German mercenaries who had deserted or were taken
prisoner should be recruited, and some actually were.
Congress and Washington generally opposed their use, despite
the argument that German mercenaries were disciplined, and
therefore posed no threat to persons or property."*"^
Washington believed their limited use by the end of 1777 had
demonstrated that the Germans deserted the American forces
1
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just as easily as they had the British, taking with them
their bounty as well as their equipment.
Early in 1778, Congress agreed to the limited use
of Germans, primarily fighting as a separate corps on the
frontier, or as part of Pulaski's Partisan Corps of Armand
'
s
Legion. Later that year, at Washington's suggestion,
Congress gave Pulaski and Armand great latitude with respect
to the foreign deserters and prisoners of war they could
recruit for their respective corps. But just as quickly
as they and other commanders enlisted German and British
deserters and prisoners of war, they deserted. This was
also true of many foreigners who were recruited to serve
in the state forces, often against the wishes of the
20George Washington to George Baylor, June 19, 1777,
Fitzpatrick, Wri^i^gs_o^_Washi^gto^ 8 :264 ; see also John
Taylor to Edmund Pendleton, April 13, 1778, "Original Letters,"
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Continental Congress, April 9, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings
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legislatures and military commanders . ^
^
By 1780, Washington and other military comi.anders
were willing to admit the experiment of using foreigners
was not worth the expense and trouble. Yet deserters and
prisoners of war were continually recruited because of
military necessity.
Not much trust and faith was placed in the Tories
who frequently, when captured, quickly joined the patriot
forces rather than face summary punishment. They were never
systematically recruited during the war, as it became evident
very early in the war that Tories, forced into American arms,
deserted at the first opportunity, taking their bounty with
them. Yet many served, and proved to be as unruly as their
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George Clinton to Abraham Ten Broeck, March 9, 177 8, ibid.,
14; Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 20,"'
1777, "Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 387; The Maryland
Council to the Recruitings Officers of Anne Arundel County,
January 3, 1780, Browne, Maryland Archives, 43:48; Clark,
NCSR
, 25:335 .
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Whig brothers. 26 Also not systematically recruited were
criminals and vagabonds. But they were used, often given
the choice of serving or being jailed. Maryland, by mid
war, was giving pardons to criminals who agreed to serve
three years in the army, and South Carolina forced many
convicted of being idle, lewd, or disorderly persons into
27the military.
So concerned about recruiting those they believed
had no real stake in American society, the revolutionary
leaders, at times, prohibited, or at least limited, the use
of foreign born residents of America. Early in the war,
Massachusetts set the pattern by forbidding the enlistment
26,, ,Allen Bowman, The_rtoral£_of_the_ American Revolu-
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of foreigners, unless they were truly a settled resident
with a wife and fainily. Delaware, New York and Virginia,
in 1776, ordered their recruiting officers to only take i.en,
who by birth, or family connection, or property, were tied
to the country. 29 Washington wanted only natives for his
guard, and only natives, or foreigners of approved fidelity
for the light dragoons. Similarly, Greene imposed the same
standards for his dragoons. Despite these prohibitions,
many foreign born residents of America served in the
revolutionary military forces. "^"^
Thus, despite all the attempts at limiting the
"outside" influence in the army, the American military
forces were indeed a mixture of races and cultures. What
was desired-mature domestic yeomen--did make up the bulk of
the army surrounding Boston during the summer of 1775, but
by the end of the year many of those had left the service
when their enlistments terminated. Even those Americans
29 .Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress of
Massachusetts
, p. 593; Delaware Archives, 1:3T; CaTendar
of Histori cal Manuscripts, p. 11, Campbell, Orderly~Book, p. 33
30George Washington to Alexander Spotswood, April 30,
1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
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Freedom 1 7 75-1783 (Boston: Little, Brov;n and Company7~T94¥)
,
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that were recruited beginning in 1776 began to include the
young, the old, and the lame.^^ ^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^^
complained to Washington that among the eighty most recent
recruits arriving in the Highlands from Massachusetts were
many old men, boys, Negroes, as well as two French from a
French frigate. "^^ Captain Webb's company of the Fourth
Connecticut Regiment, in 1777, listed thirty-six of its
fifty-seven men, with ages given, as being twenty or
34younger. The militia, which was supposed to be the back-
bone of American society, also suffered from a lack of
stable, responsible, and respected membership, especially
in the southern states.
General Lee described the militia as being composed
of the most idle, vicious and dissolute members of society.
32
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Another officer called them a "dangerous part of society.""
Even Stark, who successfully led the militia, reported they
were "such a set of poltroons" as found no place else on
3 6
earth. The militia indeed suffered the same recruiting
problems as the army, often filling out their ranks with
small boys and old men.^"^
Because both the army and the militia were composed
of so many people who were either "outsiders" to American
society or were barely a part of it, the Whigs believed that
the officers would have to keep a close watch on the mili-
tary, to keep them from becoming a threat to life, liberty
and property. "Without a good set of officers," Greene
wrote the Governor of Rhode Island, "the troops will be
little better than a lawless Bandittie or an ungovernable
Mob." The success of their cause, Governor Cooke was told
by Greene, "depends upon establishing a good Core or Corps
3 8
of Officers," Cooke and the other civilian leaders
Charles Lee to James Bowdoin, November 30, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC
, 5 (1873): 323-324; Samuel
Shaw to [John] Eliot, November 18, 1776, Quincy, Samuel
Shaw
, p. 27.
3 6John Stark to the President of the New Hampshire
Congress, June 28, 1778, Stark, John Stark
, p. 172.
37John Cray ford, The Penobscot Expedition: being an
Account of the Largest American Naval Engagemen^~of the
Revolutionary War (Orrington, Maine: C. and H. Publishing
Company, 1976), p. 11.
3 8Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 11,
1776, Showman, Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 1:313.
realized this, but the officer corps, like the inen they
commanded, left much to be desired, especially at the
company grade level.
The company grade officers were, for the most part,
little different from the men they led. After all, in most
instances, these officers had been elected by the men they
commanded. From the first day Washington arrived at
Cambridge, he realized that most officers were not born
leaders. In fact, he reported, they were "generally
speaking
. . .
the most indifferent kind of People I ever
39
saw." It was not only of the New England officers he
complained, believing all the states were appointing offi-
cers "not fit to be Shoe Blacks," even his own Virginia/^
Knox agreed, believing the bulk of the officers '^a parcel
of ignorant, stupid, men, who might make tolerable soldiers,
41but bad officers." Similar complaints were voiced both
within and without the army during the first three years
42
of the war. If the quality and character of the
39George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20,
1775
,
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Continental officer was complained of, then that of the
militia officer was condemned. Washington described the
militia officers, with few exceptions, "not worth the bread
they eat. "^^
Like their men, the officers frequently came and
went, as personal needs and desires dictated. It was the
rare officer who always remained in camp to oversee the
activities of his men. Many officers, besides furloughing
themselves or resigning when things got rough, simply
deserted. In one study of seven New York regiments it was
found that during the war at least 15 percent of the offi-
4 4
cers deserted. Officers were also constantly in trouble,
just like their men. A study of some fifteen hundred
offenses committed which were penalized by court martials
reveals that 30 percent were committed by officers and
4 5
non-commissioned officers. They frequently demonstrated
in the Age of the American Revolution, 1:71, 72; Samuel
Patterson to George Read, September 19, 1776, William
Gustavus Whiteley, The Revolutionary Soldiers of Delaware,
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Ibid., 116n.21.
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insubordination, and were often unruly/^
Often such conduct was the result of drink, which
was not limited to just the company grade officers/^ Lord
Stirling, William Maxv/ell, Henry Babcock and Adam Stephen
had drinking problems, the latter being dismissed from
4 Rservice as a result. Officers were also frequently
involved, because of drink, or greed, or low pay, in plun-
dering, taking financial advantage of their men, or
involving themselves in questionable and fraudulent
4 9
schemes
.
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The soldiers they cominanded certainly were more
unruly and undisciplined, especially early in the war. A
surgeon aboard a British warship anchored in Boston harbor
wrote late in May 1775 that the An^erican army was a "Rabble,
without order, subjection, discipline, or cleanliness," and
predicted in three months' time they would dissolve as a
unified fighting force. Similarly, Benjamin Thompson
observed in Boston on November 4, 1775, about the lack of
discipline in the American army, observing "the doctrines
of independence and levellism have been so effectually sown
throughout the country, and so universally imbibed by all
ranks of men, that I apprehend it will be with the greatest
difficulty that the inferior officers and soldiers will be
ever brought to any tolerable degree of subjection to the
51commands of their superiors." American officers agreed
with these observations. General Montgomery believed "The
New-England troops are the v/orst stuff imaginable, for
soldiers." "There is such an equality among them," he
lamented, "that the officers have no authority ." Schuyler,
during July 1775, informed VJashington that with respect to
50Letter dated May 26, 1775, in Farley
'
s Bristol
Journal of July 8, 1775, cited in Margaret Wheeler Willard,
Letters on the American Revolution 1774-1776, p. 120.
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the New England troops, "it is extremely difficult to
introduce a proper subordination amongest a people where
so little distinction is kept up." So frustrated did
Schuyler become that by November he wanted to retire from
service, believing he v/ould never be able to discipline the
5 3soldiers under his command. These problems were not only
encountered by the New York generals already cited. Many
officers expressed contempt for the New Englanders,
generally believing them too radical and independent in their
thoughts, beliefs, and actions, and certainly too excessive
54m their equality. As Joseph Reed told his wife, it was
impossible to introduce discipline where the principles of
democracy so universal ly prevail , "where so great an
53Philip Schuyler to George Washington, July 15,
1775
,
Sparks
,
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equality and so thorough a levelling spirit predominates ^5
In many respects the New England soldiers at the
beginning of the war were indeed an ungovernable mob, doing
pretty much as they pleased, causing displeasure to the
officers that commanded them, particularly those of the
middle colonies, but also to the soldiers of the other
colonies that served with them. At the beginning of the
war Benjamin Thompson predicted the American forces would
never be united due to the fact that there existed great
jealousies between the troops of the different colonies and
would only get worse the more they came in contact with one
another. These sectional differences did exist, and
frequently manifested themselves in fighting between the
troops of the different sections. ^"^ Fights also took place
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between Continental soldiers and the militia.
The southern troops were oftentimes as guilty, if
not more so as the war progressed, of being unruly and
undisciplined. One company of Virginia backwoodsmen under
the command of Captain George Gibson were so rowdy they were
satirically called "Gibson's Lambs. "^^ Several months after
taking command of the southern army, Greene reported that
his army was "so addicted to plundering that they v;ere a
terror to the Country. "^^ Indeed they were, as will be
discussed later in this chapter. But if the Continental
soldiers V7ere unruly, undisciplined, and at times a terror
to the country, as well as to each other, then the militia
were even more so.
Late in the war, a young Pennsylvania officer
serving in North Carolina complained that the militia in
Christopher Marshall, p. 213.
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that state were under no control. This complaint was not
unique to the south. Referring to the militia at White-
marsh late in 1777, one observer noted "There is no more
regulation among what I have seen of them, than a flock of
Bullocks." From the falls of the Ohio, another reported
the militia was under no subordination, where "every man
61E^nos Reeves to ?, March 13, 1782, John B. ReevesExtracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves
'
of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 3 (1897): 386.
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seems to do that which he thinks best." The militia indeed
did what they thought best, often against the desires of
their officers. "with the militia," Greene wrote, "every-
body is a general." when called on to explain his accounts,
Richard Peters who commanded a company of Philadelphia
Associators, was asked how many men he commanded, stated
"Not one." The paymaster immediately queried him as to his
large expense account if he commanded no m,en
. Peters
explained that he indeed commanded not one, "but I am com-
manded by ninety."
The militia constantly demonstrated that they would
only be commanded by those that they selected, and would
only obey such orders as they thought proper to their best
64interests. Both the Pennsylvania and Maryland militia
made it perfectly clear they did not desire to be commanded
by anybody they had not chosen and would not follow any that
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their legislative bodies selected for them.^^ So frustrating
was it for one Maryland militia officer to command a company,
that he resigned, preferring to stand in the ranks as a
common soldier. The thing about the militia that most
upset military commanders v;as that they came and went as
they pleased, including the officers. Washington complained,
"they come, you scarce tell how, they go, you hardly know
6 7
when." In all, not counting drafts who never joined the
army, one scholar has estimated that at least half of the
militia enrolled during the war deserted.
With such military forces as these it is easy to
understand why America had few successes the first three
years of the war. Most of the failures were attributed to
the lack of discipline both in the field and in camp. This
lack of discipline greatly concerned both the civilian and
military leaders for without it, not only would military
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6 8Allen Bo\\Tnan, The Morale o f the American
Revolutionary Army, p. 70.
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success be impossible, but it was necessary to prevent
domestic anarchy and military tyranny. This concern about
discipline was a carry-over belief from the pre-war days,
when the colonists were urged to moderate their protest by
using legitimate, constitutional, and peaceful methods.
Thus, during the first months of the war, discipline was
called for in the army by individuals, colonial legislative
6 9bodies and Congress. So important was discipline
considered by Congress that they informed the army they
would "consider activity and success, in introducing disci-
pline into the army, among the best recommendations for
promotion." That was an idea that Congress thought might
improve discipline in 1776. During 1777, Congress continu-
ally attempted to come up with other ideas that would
promote discipline, some of which will be discussed later
in this chapter. "^^
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Individual members of Congress constantly urged the
necessity of discipline. We "will stand or fall," John
Adams told Heath, according to how the army "adheres to or
deviates from the same discipline," referring to that of
the Roman legions and British regulars. So concerned about
discipline, he wrote the Judge Advocate of the Army that
"Every officer ought to be hanged, who does not discipline
his Men every day.""^^ Thomas Lynch told Washington during
the fall of 1775
,
shortly after the articles of war had been
adopted, that he should enforce them with vigor, with the
full support of his friends in Congress.
Washington, from his previous plantation and
military experience, was a devout believer in the necessity
of discipline. During the Seven Years War, he wrote
"Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers
formidable; procures success to the weak, and esteem to
all." Twenty years later, in approving a court martial
sentence at Valley Forge, he stated , "exact discipline and
71John Adams to William Heath, August 3, 1776, MHSC,
7th ser .
, 4:14; John Adams to William Tudor, March 11 , 1777 ,
William Tudor Papers, MHS; see also John Adams to Henry
Knox, August 25, 1776, Burnett, LMCC, 2:61; John Adams to
Abigail Adams, April 13, 1777
,
Butterfield, AFC
,
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to same, July 18, 1777, ibid., 2 84 ; Same to same, August 8,
1777, ibid., 304; Same to same, August 24, 1777, ibid., 328.
7 2Thomas Lynch to George Washington, November 13,
1775, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution,
1:84; see also Elbridge Gerry to Horatio Gates, June 25,
1776, Burnett, LMCC, 1:506.
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the strictest obedience to orders is the Soul of an Army."^^
Upon taking comi^and of the army in July 1775, he emphasized
the need for exact discipline being adhered to, stating
without discipline the army would become the scene of dis-
order and confusion. Again on January 1, 1776, in the first
general orders of the new Continental Army he warned "an
Army without Order, Regularity, and Discipline, is no better
than a Commission'd mob." "it is Subordination and Disci-
pline (the Life and Soul of an Army) which next under
providence," he stressed, "is to make us formidable to our
enemies, honorable in ourselves, and respected in the
74
world." These themes he constantly reminded the officers
7 5
and soldiers. His subordinates reminded their men as well.
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Washington knew that simply encouraging discipline
would not prevent the army from becoming a terror to the
people they were meant to protect. "A people unused to
restraint must be led," he wrote Lord Stirling, for "they
will not be drove, even those who are ingaged for the War,
must be disciplined by degrees. "^^ Part of the process of
leading them, it was generally agreed, was improving the
officer corps and extending the terms of enlistments, which
will be discussed later in this chapter, but even more
importantly Washington and most other Whig leaders believed
that religion and discipline went hand in hand, with one
contributing to the other.
Although the fervor of the Great Awakening had
played itself out by 1775, still the American Revolution,
the mental process, was partly a movement permeated with a
Present State of the ARMY: addressed to the military " by
"A LIEUTENANT COLONEL," The New-Jersey Gazette, December 24,
1777; Henry Knox to [Henry] Jackson, April 277 1777, Revolu-
tionary War Letter Collection, no. 9, BPL; George Clinton
to Major [Abraham?] Cuyler, August 2, 1776, Hastings, Public
Papers of George_Clinton
,
1:289-290; Samuel H. Parsons~F6
Samuel B. Webb, August 21, 1777, Webb, Samuel B. Webb, p. 623;
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A. S. Salley, Jr~.
, "An Order Book of the 1st. Regt., S. C.
Line, Continental Establishment," SCHGM 7, no. 3 (July 1906):
133-315; Robert Howe to [Robert] Rae, December 1, 1778,
"Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-May 1780),"
ibid., 13, no. 4 (October 1912) :212; Alexander McDougall to
Aaron Burr, January 15, 1779, Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of
Aaron Bur r , 1:145.
77George Washington to Lord Stirling, January 19,
1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of V^ash inqton, 7:33.
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religious conviction that God was actively involved in the
welfare of America. As was discussed earlier, Americans
believed that God would only protect them so long as they
were virtuous and .oral. This was constantly stressed by
the revolutionary leaders. "The importance of religion and
morality and a devout acknowledgement of the government of
the heaven, to the support of order and government among
men, and the liberty, safety and happiness of society,"
was, according to Jonas Clark in a 1781 election sermon,
"what reason teaches, and what common sense, as well as
universal practice of mankind, in all ages and nations,
concurs to confirm." "m a word," according to Clark,
"religion among a people, in its power, purity and governing
influence, is the guardian of liberty, the strength of
government, the energy of laws, the band of society, and
both glory and defence of the state," Similarly, John Adams
wrote that "Statesmen
. . . may plan and speculate for
liberty, but it is Religion and Morality alone, which can
establish the Principles upon which Freedom can securly
79
stand.
"
7 8William G. McLoughlin, "'Enthusiasm for Liberty":
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& Politicians: Two Essays on the Orig ins of the American
Revo lution (Worcester: American An tiauar ian""SocTe ty~~'r9T7 ) ,
pp. 4 8, 51.
79
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General Washington certainly shared these beliefs.
Throughout his public career he regarded organized religion
as an important stabilizing force and saw the church as the
bulwark of American social and political order. These
beliefs, acquired early in his life, were greatly reinforced
as he grew older, particularly after his marriage to a devout
church woman . ^ ^
Thus, from the beginning of the war, Washington
stressed the need for religion in the army, and the necessity
that his army be virtuous and moral. "tVhile we are zealously
performing the duties of good Citizens & Soldiers," he told
the army at Valley Forge, "we certainly ought not to be
inattentive to the higher duties of Religion. To the
distinguish ' d Character of Patriot, it Should be our highest
Glory, to add the more distinguish ' d Character of Christians."
Earlier he had told the army of his hopes "that every officer
and man, will endeavour so to live, and act, as becomes a
Zabdiel Adams, June 21, 1776, Butterfield, AFC , 2:21.
8 0Paul F. Boiler, Jr., Georg e VJashington & Religion
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 19631, pp. vii,
3-2 3, 29, 44-46; W. E. Woodward, George Washington: The
Image and the Man (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1926) ,
p. 14 2; VJilliam J. Johnson, George Wa shington the Christian
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1919), passim; John C. Fitzpatrick,
"Washington as a Religious Man," Pamphlet no. 5 in Albert
Bushneli Hart, ed . , Honor to George Washington and Reading
About George Washing toil (Washington, D.C.: United States
George^Washing ton Bicentennial Commission, 1932), p. 46.
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Christian Soldier defending the dearest Rights and Liberties
of his country.
It is not surprising then to find Washington order-
ing that Congressional days of fasting, prayer, and
humiliation be strictly observed by the army. Nor is it
surprising to find him constantly ordering soldiers to attend
8 2divine services. He also was concerned about the role of
the chaplains of his army, hoping by their conduct and their
exhaltations they would guide the soldiers in morality and
lead them to discipline.
Chaplains, however, were never plentiful. It has
been estimated that less than half the regiments had
chaplains during 1775, and by January 1776, there were only
nine in Continental service. During 1778, the army employed
twenty-tv;o chaplains, and probably that same number were
with the army during the latter stages of the war.^^ Despite
8
1
General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly
Book, p. 303 ; Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington ", 5:245.
8 2 General Orders, ibid., 3:403; 4:369; 9:275; 11:252;
Circular to the Brigadier Generals, May 26, 1777, ibid.,
8:127; Journal of Ammi R. Robbins, Theron Wilmot Crissey,
History of Norfolk Litchfield County, Connect icut 1744-1900
(Everett, Massachusetts : Massachusetts Publishing Company,
1900), pp. 98, 100, 112; William B. Weeden, ed., "Diary of
Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army.
With a Memoir," RIHSP new ser
.
, 7 (1899, 1900): 182, 192,
207-208, 210, 212.
8 3
J. T. Headley, The Chaplains and Clergy of the
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, pp. 62-63; Dexter, Literary Diary o f Ezra Stil es,
2:319. '
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their small number, these ministers who served as chaplains,
as well as officers of the Line, did have some success in
encouraging discipline and moral conduct.
iMany ministers, such as Enoch Poor, James Hall, John
Peter Muhlenberg, and David Avery, served in the army in a
military capacity. Others, such as James Caldwell, shoul-
dered weapons as common soldiers, or like Thomas Allen and
Caldwell, exhorted men on, or on to, the battlefield.^^
It was not, however, in their military capacity
that Washington and the other Whig leaders hoped the clergy
would have great influence. It was in their ability to
exert a moral influence over the army that was greatly
desired and considered essential, for as Philips Payson of
Chelsea, Massachusetts, stated in a May 1778 election sermon,
"The fear and reverence of God, and the terrors of eternity,
are the most powerful restraints upon the minds of men."^^
84 Ellis Ames, "Death of General Poor in the American
Revolution," PMHS 18 (1880-1881): 435-436; J. T. Headley,
The Chaplains and Clergy of the Revolution, pp. 68-69, 72-73,
149-150, 212, 222, 227, 234-236, 246-248, 298-299; Nicholas
Murray, "A Memoir of the Rev. James Caldwell, of Elizabeth-
town," PNJHS 3, no. 2 (1848): 82; Johnston, Yale and Her
Honor-Roll in the TVmerican Revolution
, pp. 222-22 3, 241;
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Congress, Washington, and others hoped the ministers
would help remind the soldiers of the goodness of the
revolutionary cause, the necessity for discipline despite
hardships, and the desirability for morality at all times.
Many ministers complied with these desires, frequently
preaching sermons reminding the men of their patriotic and
moral duties and obligations. As John Hart told the Virginia
soldiers in 1777, that in order to "enjoy our property in
security, we must stand firm to the cause of liberty and
8 7public virtue .
"
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Washington also involved himself and the other
officers in encouraging the soldiers to discourage vice in
every shape. "Purity of Morals," Washington told the army
in his general orders, was "the only sure foundation of
publick happiness in any Country and highly conducive to
order, subordination and success in an Army." Orders of a
similar nature were constantly issued by Washington and
88
other officers.
Despite these encouragements to maintain a high
moral character, the conduct of the army was generally less
than desired during the first several years of the war.
The soldiers frequently spent their days, including Sundays,
gaining, drinking, cursing, and generally being unruly and
rowdy. James Warren described the American army occupying
Boston during April 1776 as "the most undisciplined, profli-
gate Crew that ever were Collected." Similar descriptions
of the army in Canada, in the Southern Department, on the
frontier and in New York City and State were made.
^^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, \^tings_o_f WasM^
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of having an undisciplined army was numerous military
defeats, and very few victories. ^1 An additional and
unwelcomed result was the destruction of property and the
specter of domestic anarchy. Edmund Burke told Parliament
in a speech during 1790 that "An armed, disciplined body is,
in its essence, dangerous to liberty; undisciplined, it is
9 ?ruinous to society." American Whigs during the mid 1770s
shared this opinion. They did not want their revolutionary
war to be lost on the battlefield, nor did they want it to
become the source for domestic turmoil and tyranny.
By the end of 1777, many Whigs were therefore
expressing their concern about the direction the war was
taking. The Philadelphia campaign had resulted in the loss
of that city; the army was foraging for itself, seemingly
under no control; and though victories had been achieved in
the north, still no word had come from Europe regarding a
Paul David Nelson, General Koratio Gates: A Biography
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French alliance. Many Whigs, including members of the
military establishment and Congress, placed a large share
of the blame for the sad state of the army on Washington,
believing his Fabian strategy was not working nor that he
sufficiently disciplined his army.^"^ Many Whigs, however,
believed the lack of discipline in the army and the numerous
military setbacks were not completely Washington's fault;
the blame should rather be placed on the whole officer
94
corps
.
The officer corps, for the most part, possessed
little real military experience nor the professional back-
ground to make them good military disciplinarians. During
the summer of 1775, one Connecticut officer complained that
many officers, who passed for agreeable, clever men in
civilian life, made indifferent figures in the military,
having "no Idea of the Discipline and Government which are
absolutely necessary among military Men." Another officer
Benjamin Rush to John Adams, October 21, 17 77,
Butterfield, Lette rs o f Benjamin Rush , 1:159-160.
9 4Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775,
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phy. Reminiscences and Letters of John Trumbull, from 1756
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complained to Washington that year the officers, for the
most part, "totally ignorant in military affairs. "^^
Washington found this to be true during the siege of Boston,
learning that his New England officers were not used to
handling large bodies of men, being primarily farmers with
little or no leadership experience. He learned very quickly
that besides being unable to give orders, few of his offi-
cers were willing to obey them. A month after arriving at
Cambridge, he wrote Lund Washington that the "Men would
fight very v^ell (if properly Officered) although they are
an exceeding dirty and nasty people. "^^ But the army was,
as we have seen, not properly officered. During the fall
of 1776, William Ellery told the Governor of Rhode Island
that "the officers of the army in general are not equal to
their appointments, and from hence it is that our soldiery
is disorderly and undisciplined."^"^ The generals also came
9 8
under such criticism. So did the militia officers, who
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Washington stated, with few exceptions, were not "worth the
bread they eat.""
^^^^^ ^^^^^^
time disciplining their men, and were, as discussed earlier,
under little discipline themselves, coming and ooing as they
pleased
.
Washington and other commanding officers, realizing
that much depended upon the officers disciplining themselves
and their men, began very early in the war to suggest and
implement methods by which the officers would become more
disciplined, and therefore better leaders. From the begin-
ning of the war it was obvious to Washington and others that
many company grade officers, in part because they had been
selected by the men they commanded, were not strict disci-
plinarians, often showing great familiarity with their men,
as well as giving in to their every indulgence
.
9 9George Washington to Lund Washington, September 30,
1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings_of Washington ,' 6 : 138-139
.
100,,. T T .William Duer to George Clinton, January 29, 1777,
Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 1:565; George
Slaughter to Thomas Jefferson, January 19, 1781, Boyd,
Papers of Thomas Jefferson
, 4:410; Samuel Hay to William
Irvine, November 14, 1777, "Replies," HM 3 , no. 9 (September
1859): 284; Samuel H. Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, Febru-
ary 27, 1779, Hall, Samue l Holden Parsons
, p. 219; Robert
Levers to Joseph Reed, August 23, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania
Archives
,
2d ser
.
, 3:523.
'"^'"Joseph Glover to the President of the South
Carolina Council of Safety, Henry Laurens, September 22,
1775, A. S. Salley, Jr., ed
. ,
"Papers of the First Council
of Safety of the Revolutionary Party in South Carolina,
June-November, 1775," SCHGM 2, no. 1 (January 1901): 4;
Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, June 18, 1777, Butterfield,
Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:150; Elbridge Gerry to James
Washington, most southern officers, and many New York
officers, early in the war expressed their disapproval of
the levelling influences existing in the army, believing
they greatly accounted for the lack of discipline in the
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army. Although attempts were made to change the officer
selection process, they met with little success. Thus, it
was realized that if qualified officers could not be imme-
diately had, at least the unqualified ones could be gotten
rid of as quickly as their actions warranted.
Within two weeks of his arrival at Cambridge,
Washington began arresting and discharging officers for
improper conduct. During the next several years numerous
officers were cashiered for many offenses, primarily for
conduct unbecoming a gentleman and for being absent without
leave
.
"'"'^"^ While the army was encamped at Valley Forge,
VJarren, October 6, 177 7, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Correspond-
ence, p. 8 6; John Adams to Joseph Hawley, August 25, 1776
,
Adams, Works of John Adams
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9:434-435; Nathanael Greene to
Jacob Greene, June 28, 1775, Showman, Papers of General
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American Revolution
, pp. 68-69; Edward Hand to George
Washington, August [ ], 1776, Linn, Pennsylvania in the
War of the Revolution, 1:305; George Washington to Richard
Henry Lee, August 2 97 1775, Fitzpatrick, VJritings of Washing
ton, 3:450-451; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 21, 1775, ibid., 508.
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John Adams to Elbridge Gerry, June 18, 1775,
Adams, Works of John Adams , 9:358; Graydon, Memoirs , p. 149.
10 3George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20,
1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:433, General
Orders, ibid., 5:343-344, 141; "Orderly Book of Gen. John
Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB
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Washington used the lull to cashier many officers, being
told by Hamilton that without putting a stop to the numerous
abuses by the officers to the military constitution, it
would "be impossible to establish any order or discipline
among the troops. "^^^ Cashiering of officers did not cease
after the Valley Forge campaign, as many officers were dis-
charged throughout the remainder of the war."^*^^
Washington and the other commanding officers
realized that discipline in the officer corps v;ould only
be achieved with time; time for the officers to learn their
trade. To ensure this happened, Washington and his generals
set about to stop officers from being constantly furloughed
or from furloughing themselves. Early in the war, many good
officers spent as much time at home as they did in the field.
To put a stop to this, Washington, by mid war, was requiring
34, no. 3 (1910): 347; Ford, General Orders Issued by Israel
Putnam
, pp. 49-50, 66-67.
104Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [prior
to January 29, 1778], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
,
1:414; General Orders in Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly
Book
, pp. 22 3-224 , 235 ; Whiting, Revolutiona r-y Orders of
Gene ral Wa shing ton, pp. 30, 84, 86; "Revolutionary ~Army
Orders for the Main Army Under Washinqton [1778-1779]," VMHB
14, no. 2 (October 1906): 186, 312; 13, no. 4 (April 1906):
348; 14, no. 1 (July 1906): 35-36, 45, 48-49; 17, no. 2
(April 1909) : 179
.
105General Orders, the First Pennsylvania Regiment
Orderly Book in Linn, Pennsylvania in the V7a r of the Revolu-
tion, 2:359, 382; Regimental Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books,
pp. 2 69, 301, 630-631; [Feltman] , Journal of Willi am Feltman ,
p. 19; Bray, Diary of a Commton Soldier, p. 169.
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each regiment to have a certain number of officers present
at all times, particularly during each winter encampment . "^^^
Just keeping the good officers in the army v;as not
enough. Training and attention to personal character were
considered necessary for the American officer corps to be
truly effective. With respect to personal character,
Washington attempted to instill in the officer corps the
necessity of appearing and acting as officers and gentlemen,
appreciating their commissions, and realizing their leader-
ship responsibility.
From the beginning of the war, Washington attempted
to make the officers more conscious of their character and
appearance. With respect to the former, besides encouraging
observance of religious duties and discouraging vices,
Washington encouraged the creation of and participation in,
Masonic lodges, believing they were character building insti-
tutions, as well as being stabilizing and socializing forces.
General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington , 13:196-197; George Washington to Israel Putnam,
November 27
, 1778, ibid., 342 ; George VJashington to VJilliam
Heath, November 16, 1779, ibid., 17:113; George Washington
to the Major Generals and Officers Commanding Brigades,
January 22, 1780, ibid., 426; Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of
Aaron Burr_^ With Miscellaneous Selections from Hi s
Correspondence, 1:112; "Memoir by the Chevalier Dubuysson,"
crted~TrrTdzerda
,
La^aygtte _in_ the Age of the Amer ican
Revolution, 1:81; Baron von Steuben to Nathanael Greene,
May~r57TT81, Kapp, Steuben, p. 4 29; Anthony Wayne to [James]
Bowdoin and Council of Massachusetts, March 25, 1777, Smith,
The St. Clair Papers, 1:388-389.
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The first military lodge, St. John's Regimental Lodge, was
established during July 1775 by the New York officers. By
war's end, ten traveling lodges were established. Washing-
ton, who had joined the Masons in 1752, actively participated
in their meetings, setting an example many officers
followed. As for personal appearance, Washington attempted
to make the officers' appearance distinct from their soldiers,
first by having them wear different colored ribbons and cock-
ades, and later by distinctive uniforms. And to ensure they
had the necessary funds for their personal upkeep, as well as
to make their commissions more desirable, Washington got
Congress early in the war to raise their wages significantly
higher than had originally been authorized . """^^
Training was seen as an absolute necessity to bring
about discipline in the officer corps. Many military and
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Washington to^he"President of the Continental Congress,
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civilian leaders during the sumi^er of 1776 began lobbying
for a formal military academy, believing it would give the
necessary training needed if the war was long lasting. That
fall. Congress debated the possibility of establishing an
academy, but no formal plans were made, most likely because
Washington's victories at Princeton and Trenton convinced
many that Great Britain would peacefully end the war, and
probably because of the fear of establishing a professional
military class. "'"'^^
Although an academy was not established, a training
regiment was, which Congress authorized during 1777. This
regiment, the Invalid Regiment, was primarily assigned
garrison duties. But until it was disbanded during the
spring of 1783, it also served as an officer training
school ^ Two other units, though not formally established
for that purpose, also provided effective training and
produced many disciplined officers. The first was the
Delaware Regiment, which was well-trained by Thomas Holland,
a former British army captain, who served as its adjutant.
The second v\'as the Kentish Guards, formed during the winter
109
Ibid., 5:83 8; 6:860; Henry Knox to William Knox,
September 23, 1776, Drake, Henry Knox, p. 32; John Adams to
Henry Knox, June 2, 1776, Adams, Works of John Adams, 9:384;
Same to same, September 29, 1776, Butter fieldV^DAJAV 3:442.
''"'''^Lewis Nicola to Anthony Wayne, March 19
,
1779
,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives , 1st ser., 7:255; Ford, JCC
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of 1774-1775 in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, and comi.anded
by James Mitchell Varnum. it was well-schooled in the
military arts by William Johnson, a British deserter. This
unit provided over thirty Continental officers, including
Nathanael Greene."'""'""^
Although the American forces did not have a v/ealth
of military talent to call upon when the war began, and
although many qualified officers, such as Montgomery, Thomas,
Mercer, Hitchcock, and Haslet, were killed or died the first
years of the war, America did have a sufficient number to
provide adequate leadership and discipline. Eleven of the
first thirteen Continental generals appointed had prior
military experience, and of seventy-three brigadier generals
commissioned during the war, sixteen had held European com-
missions, and all but twenty-one had prior military
experience
.
It was not just the generals who were experienced
in the field of Mars. All but tv/o of the first Virginia
regimental commanders had prior military experience, mainly
gained during the Seven Years War. Many field grade offi-
cers had served in European armies, including Colonels
"'""'""'"Christopher L. Ward, The Delaware Continentals
1776-1783, pp. 7, 240; Fletcher PratF7'~FrGvern3enefars
:
Studies in American Command_ (New York: William Sloane
Associate s","r9 4 9')"7"p • ~4 7 ^Thaye r , Nathanael Greene, pp . 4 4,
49.
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Lutterloh, Febiger, and Beauman.l^^
^^^^^ ^^^^.^^ officers
also joined the arr.y, including Lafayette, DeKalb, DuCoudray,
Conway, Steuben, Duportail, DeBorre, DeFermoy, Pulaski,
Armand, Fleury, L'Enfant, and Kosciuszko.
It was hoped early in the war that, with time,
America's citizen soldiers would become adequate military
commanders, able to give the military the discipline
necessary to keep it under control. Washington and the
other generals constantly urged attention be given to disci-
pline, encouraging officers to spare the time necessary to
make themselves better disciplinarians . "^^^ And many
112
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States Army in War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
19371, pp. 2, 20; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration
of the American Revolutionary Army, p. 3. ~
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E.g., General Orders, Orderly Book of the Eighth
Pennsylvania Regiment, Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the
Upper Ohio 1779-1781," p. 434.
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An^ericans did in fact become exacting discipl inarians .
^
Besides attempting to improve discipline in the
army by improving the the quality and adequacy of the
officers, Washington and Congress also adopted other
measures, including the introduction of inspector-
generalships and provost units, and the infliction of
punishments
.
During the summer of 1777, to placate the aspira-
tions of two French officers. Congress made Colonel Mottin
de la Balme Inspector General of Cavalry and Major General
du Coudray Inspector General of Ordnance and Military
Stores. -^-"-^ By doing this. Congress found a method of not
only fulfilling commissioning obligations, but set the
precedent for establishing an army-wide Inspector General
system
.
Thomas Conway, who came to America during the winter
of 1776-1777 from France with almost thirty years military
experience to his credit, gained many admirers, not only for
the skill he demonstrated during the Brandywine-Germantown
115
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operations, but also for the discipline his troops exhibited.
Thus, when by late 1777, it appeared that Washington was
having problems disciplining the army, Conway was promoted
to Major General and made Inspector General of the Army."'""'"^
Before he could actually begin functioning in that capacity,
he became involved in what has been called "The Conway
Cabal," and lost whatever influence he might have had in
the army. Realizing he would be ineffective as Inspector
General, Conway did not attempt to exercise his authority
and resigned during 1778. His replacement, Steuben, was
well-received in camp and by the time Conway resigned, had
instilled much discipline in the army at Valley Forge.
Steuben must have made an early impression at Valley
Forge when he first appeared early in 1778, wearing foreign
decorations and accompanied by an Italian greyhound which
he had brought with him from Europe. Washington, learning
of his ability as a drill instructor, immediately put him
to work as an Inspector General, and Congress accepted his
services as a paid volunteer. Steuben would have preferred
a line command, but realizing the increasing prejudice
against foreign officers assuming leadership positions,
118
decided to prove his worth by becoming a good drill master.
-^^^Ibid., 9:1023-1026
^^^James L. VJhitehead, ed . , "The Autobiography of
Peter Stephen DuPonceau," PMHB, 63, no. 2 (April 1939):
201-202; Ford, JCC , 10:50; John Laurens to Henry Laurens,
February 28, 17787 Simms, TnT^rmy_Corresponden^^^
He bagan his task by drafting one hundred twenty
men from the various lines, forming them into the guard
for the commander-in-chief.
"i made this guard," Steuben
wrote, "my military school. i drilled them myself twice
a day; and to remove that English prejudice which some
officers entertained, that to drill a recruit was a ser-
geant's duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often
took the musket myself to show the men the manual of which
I wished to .introduce
.
""^-'-^ Assisted primarily by French
volunteers, DuPonceau and Ternaut, and by Captain Benjamin
Walker, and to a lesser degree by Colonels Francis Barber,
John Brooks, William Davies and a field officer from each
brigade, Steuben diligently worked at drilling squads of
two to twelve men. For emphasis he frequently swore at the
men in German and French, and v/hen exhausted of his foreign
expletives, he would call to his aides, "'My dear Walker
and my dear Duponceau, come and swear for me in English,
these fellows won't do what I bid them.'" "A good natured
smile then went through the ranks," reported DuPonceau,
"and at least the manoeuvre of the movement was properly
John Laurens
, pp. 131-132; Same to same, March 9, 1778,
ibid., pp. 137-138.
119Cited in Kapp, Steuben
, p. 126; General Orders,
Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General VJashington, p. 35
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12 0performed." His program of drill instruction began on
March 24
, 1778 , and by June there were reports of a notice-
able difference in the drill and discipline of the v/hole
army, particularly as after one small group of men learned
their lessons they were returned to their respective units
to set an example. Part of the reason he was so successful
was, according to one witness, because he was "much Respected
and Esteem "d" and "beloved by the soldiers who themselves
seem to be convinced of the Propriety & Necessity of his
121Regulations .
"
Washington, quick to recognize Steuben's value, on
March 28, 1778, appointed him Inspector General and
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Philip Cortlandt to George Clinton, May 9, 1778,
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From Its Settlement in 1630 to 184 2 (Boston: James Munroe
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Huntington, June 10, 1778, "Huntington Papers," CHS^, 20
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Gardiner, VJarren-Gerry Corre spondency, p. 120; Kapp, Steuben ,
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Lieutenant Colonels Davies, Brooks, Barber, and John Ternant
as sub-inspectors, until the pleasure of Congress was known.
Additionally, he appointed brigade inspectors and Steuben's
sub-inspectors, in April, were made division inspectors,
along with Lieutenant Floury. Congress, learning of the
improvements in the army and attributing them to Steuben,
on the fifth of May commissioned him a Major General and
formally made him the Inspector General. In September, they
commissioned John Ternant a Lieutenant Colonel and appointed
him Inspector General of the southern army. Congress
continued throughout the war to make changes in the Inspector
General's department, hoping that it would give greater
uniformity and discipline to the army. Once commissioned,
Steuben hoped to be given a field command. He did not,
however, forsake his interest in drill and discipline for,
with the help of Walker, Fleury, DuPonceau, L'Enfant, John
Laurens, Hamilton, and Greene, during the winter of 1778-
1779 he wrote a manual of discipline for the army, which was
adopted by Congress during March 1779 and used until the War
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It is difficult to weigh the ii^portance of Steuben
to the army. Certainly his contemporaries believed he
deserved great credit for the army's successes at Monmouth
and Yorktown, but probably more importantly he was most
praised for the contribution he made in attempting to give
order and regularity to the army, which it lacked before
12 3his arrival. But it was not Steuben alone that gave the
army the discipline it acquired after the winter encampment
at Valley Forge. Other methods and means were employed,
such as the creation of a provost corps and the increased
severity of punishments inflicted upon the soldiery.
Although men had been assigned to provost duties as
early as 1775, it was not until May 1778 that Congress
authorized a Provost Corps, consisting of five officers and
fifty-eight soldiers, including four executioners. Its
primary functions included apprehending deserters, marauders,
rioters, stragglers; inspecting departed camps; and during
battle, to keep troops from fleeing the scene of action. """^^
123Otho Holland Williams to Baron von Steuben,
November 28, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society
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Balch, Journal of Claude Blanchard
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Strict punishments wore also utilized as a means
by which the army was kept under control. Rules of
soldierly conduct and punishment were originally adopted
by Congress on June 30, 1775, and issued as sixty-nine
articles of war. They were modeled on those adopted in
April by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, These rules,
which Washington believed not comprehensive or severe enough,
were amended by Congress in November 1775, during the summer
of 1776
,
and again during April 1777 ."'"^^
Congress ordered the Articles of War be read and
published once every two months at the head of every regi-
ment. Washington, by early 1776, was requiring their reading
to every company at least once a week. Other commanding
officers also had the Articles of War read more often than
was required by Congress.
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Despite all the administrative, personal, ideologi-
cal and moral efforts to keep the military disciplined and
under control, soldiers continually demonstrated insubordi-
nation to both civilian and military authority. Therefore,
corporal and capital punishments were used as a last resort
to correct and punish such behavior.
Early in the war, for disobedience to orders,
absences without leave, disrespect to officers, theft, and
other minor offenses, punishment generally consisted of
riding the wooden horse, being reprimanded, drummed out of
the service, paying a minimal fine and/or receiving from ten
12 7to thirty-nine lashes. The latter figure, which had been
the most common punishment during the English Civil War and
the maximum figure allowed by Mosaica Lav;, was the maximum
Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books
, p. 445; Orders of Daniel
Brodhead, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio
1778-1779," p. 459.
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number authorized by Congress, and was perhaps the nost
common punishment administered during the first year of the
12 8
Most soldiers considering thirty-nine lashes more
sport than punishment, Washington and the Judge Advocate
suggested the number be increased to one hundred. This was
done in September 1776 when Congress amended the Articles
129
of War. ^
Despite getting approval for administering one
hundred lashes, Washington desired some form of punishment
between one hundred lashes and the death penalty. Early
in 1781, after the January mutinies, he recommended to
Congress that he be authorized to administer such punishments
as labor at public works, assignment to sea duty, and five
hundred lashes. A cominittee of Congress recommended five
hundred lashes be authorized, but Congress rejected it as
too harsh a corporal punishment
. Nevertheless, some
128
C. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army: A H is tory of the
English Soldier During the Civil Wars, The Commonwealth and
the Protectorate being the Ford Lectures delievered in the
University of Oxford 1900-1
, 3rd ed., [1921], with a~7^ew
intro. by P. H. Hardacre (London: Methuen and Company, 1961),
pp. 286, 287; Ford, JCC, 2:122.
129
Ibid., 5:806; Memorial of the Judge Advocate
[William Tudor], [October 1775], Force, American Archives
,
4th ser., 3:1164; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
V7ritings of Washington, 7:114.
Same to same, February 3, 1781, ibid., 21:178-179;
John Sullivan to George Washington, July 2, 1781, Burnett,
LMCC, 6:133.
399
officers did indeed adi^inister inore than one hundred-lash
punishments, usually administering that number to an indi-
vidual daily for several days.^^l g^^^ officers did not
attempt to disguise their exceeding the maximum, number of
lashes. Other forms of harsh corporal punishment were used,
such as being lashed on the "bare buttocks" and running or
walking through a gauntlet where hundreds of soldiers would
use switches to inflict punishment .
^ Although harsh
corporal punishments were inflicted throughout the war, mild
punisliinents such as thirty-nine lashes, reduction in ranks,
and reprimands, continued to be the rule, rather than the
exception throughout the war."*"-^^
131Maurer Maurer, "Military Justice under General
Washington," MA 28, no. 1 (Spring 1964): 12.
132General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
25:368-369; "Orderly Book of~Gen. John Peter
Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB 35,
no. 2 (1911) : 165; "Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main
Army under Washington [1778-
. 779] , " VMHB 14, no. 1 (July
1906): 42, Lauber, Orderly Books
, pp. 273, 706; Boynton,
General Orders of Geo. Washington
, p. 65: General Mcintosh's
Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-
1779," p. 441; Court Martial at Fort Mcintosh, ibid.,
pp. 460, 461-462, 462; Orderly Book of the Eighth Pennsyl-
vania Regiment, Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the Upper
Ohio 1779-1781," pp. 437, 450; John Smith Hanna, A History
of the Life and Services of Captain Samue 1 Dewe s , A Native
of Pennsylvania, and Soldier of the Revolutionary and Last
Wars. Also, Reminiscences (Baltimore: Robert Neilson, 1844),
pp. 202-203, 236-2 38, 260; Bray, Diary of A Common Soldier
,
pp. 141, 183.
133 Ibid., pp. 72-73, 242, 244; Fort Montgomery
Garrison Court Martial, Hastings, Public Papers of George
Clinton
,
2:20; General Orders, "Orderly Book of~the Regim'ent
of Artillery Raised for the Defence of the Town of Boston in
1776," HCEI 13, nos. 2, 4 (April 1875, October 1876):
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The offenses Congress and the ari.y were most con-
cerned with were desertion and plundering. The former
because of the harmful effect it had on the ability of the
army to field sufficient nmnbers to defeat the British and
the latter because of the harmful effect it had with respect
to the sanctity of private property.
To stop desertion, besides utilizing pickets around
the perimeter of the camp and the Provost Corps in the camp,
Washington and the other comnianding officers had roll calls
taken three or four times a day, and infrequently at night.
Threats of punishment were also made.^^^ Congress also
involved themselves in the desertion problem, making provi-
sions for rewards for those that apprehended deserters
.
115-135, 237-252, passim; ibid., 14, nos. 1-3 (January,
April, July 1877): 60-76, 110-128, 188-211, passim; General
Mcintosh's Orders, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the UpperOhio 1778-1779," p. 441.
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Daniel Brodhead
' s Orders, ibid., pp. 430, 434-Greene's Orders, Greene, Nathanae l Greene
, 3:337; Charles C.
Pinckney's Regimental Orders, A. S. Salley, Jr., ed
.
, "An
Order Book of the 1st Regt., S. C. Line, Continental Estab-
lishment," SCHGM 7, no. 3 (July 1906): 135; Division Orders,
"Revolutionary Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington[1778-1779]," VMHB 20, no. 3 (July 1912): 254; 21, no. 1
(January 1913): 30, 21, no. 4 (October 1913): 379; General
Orders, "Elisha Williams' Diary of 1776," PMH3 48, no. 4
(1924): 338, 341; 49, no. 1 (1925): 55, 607~General Orders,
Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington
, 9:243; 12:221, 22:270;
25:343, 354.
135Alexander Scammell's Regimental Orders, "Orderly
Book of Captain Daniel Livermore
' s Company, Continental
Army, 17 8 0," CNHHS
, 9:236.
''"^^Ford, JCC, 3:325; 7:154-155; 8:594; 9:813-814.
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Nevertheless, it has been estimated that nearly 20 percent
of the army deserted during the war."^-^"^
Because of the large number of desertions. Congress
instructed Washington, as early as the latter half of 1776,
"lop
to punish desertion. Washington and his subordinates,
wishing to set an example, began early in 1777, increasing
the severity of punishment for desertion, raising the
punishment to one hundred lashes, occasionally administering
as many as five hundred to an individual . "^-^^ Death penalties
137
Thad W. Tate, Jr., "Desertions From the American
Revolutionary Army," (M.A. Thesis, University of North
Carolina, 1948), pp. 9-11, cited in Hugh F. Rankin, The
North Carolina Continentals
, p. 393; see also Arthur~j7
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During the American Revolution," VMHB 55, no. 2 (April 1947):
137, 138; John H. Stutesman, Jr., "Colonel Armand and
Washington's Cavalry," NYHSQ 45, no. 1 (January 1961): 24;
Allen Bowman, The Morale of The American Revolutionary Army,
p. 71.
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139George Washington to Joseph Spencer, April 3,
1777, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
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Orders, ibid., 17:344-347; 22:442-443; 23:320-322; 25:118-
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212-213
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252-253
,
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Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26-December 20, 1777," PMHB 33,
no. 3 (1909): 267, 274; 33, no. 4 (1909): 459; 3471To. 1
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July 14th, 1778," ibid., 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 206, Bray,
Diary of a Common Soldier
, p. 181; Thomas Proctor to the
Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 31, 1777, Hazard,
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were also increasingly administered, particularly during
1779 and 1780 .^''° There were at Ipastle 225 soldiers sentenced
to death for desertion during the war, but approximately
only forty were actually executed, for it often took a man
several times to desert before his sentence was actually
carried out. One soldier even deserted seven times before
Pennsylvania Archives
, 1st ser,, 5:207.
„ ,
. ,
General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings ofWashington, 17 : 343-347 ; 20:442 ; 2 3 : 320-322r-^^R^lirtionarvfor the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779^ "VMHB 13, no. 4 April 1906): 340-341; General Orders of ti;Southern Army, "Order Book of John Faucherand Grimke (August1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 14, no. 2 (April 1913): 107; 17 no 1(January 1916): 29; 17, no. 3 (July 1916): 118; Co^rtMartial at Fort Pitt, Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on theUpper Ohio 1778-1779," p. 417; Brown, Revolutionary WarJournals of Henry Dearborn, pp. 162, 19¥7-lmrriir^T-W^eden
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John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782,"
PMHB 19, no. 2 (1895): 222; Thomas R. Bard, "Journal of
Lieutenant Robert Parker, of the Second Continental
Artillery, 1779," ibid., 27, no. 4 (1903): 406; "The
Journal of Ebenezer Wild (177601781) Who Served as Corporal,
Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the T^erican Army of
the Revolution," PMHS 26 (1890-1891): 119; Diary of David
Farnum, p. 22, MHS
.
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, 141he was executed. Plunderers and marauders were also
harshly punished, as destruction of private property was
considered a very serious offense.^^^ General Orders were
frequently issued by Washington and his subordinates
threatening instant punishment for plundering, marauding,
or leaving ranks during a march with the intention of doing
14 3
either. At least one hundred soldiers were sentenced
to death for plundering and marauding during the war, of
whom as many as thirty v/ere executed . '''^'^
141Marvin Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History
2lJlilAtary_r^b^izati^n_i Arnnr~1775-1945
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County During the American Revolution 1775-1783
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General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge 6Fderly~Book, p.72;
George Washington to the President of the ContInental~~
Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
6:114.
144 General Orders, Orderly Books in Linn, Pennsyl-
vania in the VJar of the Revolution
,
1:632; 2:375; [Feltman]
,
Journal of William~Feltman , T7 8r-T7 82 , p. 41; John Bell
Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the Journal of Lieutenant John
Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-1782," PMHB 19,
no. 2 (1895): 222; "The Journal of Captain VJilliam Beatty,
of the Maryland Line, 1776-1780," HM 2d ser., 1, no. 2
(February 1867): 84 ; William B. VJeeden, ed . , "Diary of Enos
Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With
a Memoir," RIHSP new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 221.
Early in the war, capital punishment was not
generally inflicted upon soldiers as a punishment, in part
because of questions of the legality of doing so and because
many believed that the soldiers, until properly disciplined,
were not responsible for the misbehavior. So, despite many
soldiers being sentenced to death during the first three
years of the war, only three or four were actually executed.
As Washington told Clinton early in 1777, "By making
Executions too common, they lose their intended force and
rather bear the Appearance of cruelty than Justice . ""''^^
But with the increase of plundering and desertion during
1779 and 1780, when the army was suffering for lack of
supplies, approximately fifty soldiers were executed.
During the next two years, about tv^7enty-f ive men were
executed. None were during the last year of the war. In
all, approximately seventy-five soldiers were executed.
Soldiers were frequently forced to watch the executions,
in hopes it would be a good object lesson for them. They
V7ere often required to march around the dangling body, and
in one instance, a deserter of the Maryland Line, after
having been executed, had his head brought to the camp of
14 5George Washington to George Clinton, May 5,
1777, Fitzpatrick, Wri tings of Wa shington , 8:18-19; see
also George Clinton to the President of the New York
Convention, February 25, 1777, Hastings. Public Papers of
George Clinton, 1:632.
Fitzpatrick, Spirit of the Revolution, pp. 186-
187.
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the Virginia Line and placed atop of a gallows as a
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warning. Also used as a warning were planned executions
which were commuted, generally to corporal punishment, at
the last possible moment. The tempering of capital
punishment was also implemented in the form of proclamations
G^^eral Wayne's Light Infantry Orders, "Revolu-
^tS^p'^T.^o^^n^^^^^^ ^^i^ A^^y ^"der Washington[1778-1779]," VMHB 18, no. 4 (October 1910): 428; WhitinqRevolutionary Order s_of_
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Cornelius Ten Broeck, July 9, 1779, "News from Camp: Letters
Received by Cornelius Ten Broeck of Rocky Hill, New Jersey,
from his Sons Cornelius and Peter Serving in the Continental
Army 1779-1780," MAH 2, no. 3 (March 1878): 169; R. W. G.
Vail, ed., "The Western Campaign of 1779: The Diary of
Quartermaster Sergeant Moses Sproule of the Third New Jersey
Regiment in the Sullivan Expedition of the Revolutionary War,
May 17-October 17, 1779," NYHSQ 41, no. 1 (January 1957): 48.
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Ibid., 48, 49; John Smith Hanna , A History of the
Life and Services of Captain Samuel Dewes, A Native of
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Also, Reminiscences
, pp. 228-231 , 261-263; Bray, Diary of "a
Common Soldier
, p. 172; Journal of Ammi R. Robbins", Theron
Wilmer Crissey, compiler. History of Norfolk, Litchfield
County Connecticut 1744-1900
, p. 97; Brown, Revolutionary
War Journals of Henry Dearborn
, pp. 162, 163; William B.
Weeden, ed., "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in
the Revolutionary Army. VJith a Memoir," RIHSP new ser,, 7
(1899, 1900): 111, 211, 212, 221; "Journal of Capt. William
Beatty, 1776-1781," MHM 3, no. 2 (June 1908): 107; "The
Journal of Ebenezer Wild (1776-1781), Who Served as Corporal,
Sergeant, Ensign, and Lieutenant in the American Army of the
Revolution," PMKS, 26 (1890-1891): 119, 120-121; General
Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of V7ashington , 11:356.
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issued by Congress and Washington pardoning all soldiers
awaiting punishment, and by proclamations giving deserters
a set amount of time for returning to camp without having
to face punishment. "^'^^
Despite the punishments and pardons; the improve-
ments in discipline made through the efforts of Steuben and
the inspectors; the increasing the effectiveness of the
officer corps; and obtaining longer enlistments, the army
remained barely controllable during 1779 and 1780, attested
by numerous mutinies, destruction of property, and violation
of personal rights. "''^^ This was especially true in the
south, where Greene reported his army was "so addicted to
plundering that they were a terror to the Coun try . " "'"^'^ This
situation little changed during the remainder of the war."*"^^
During the summer of 1782, the Governor of South Carolina
reported the army was so licentious that they were "extremely
14 9General Orders and Proclamations, ibid., 4:204;
7:364; 9:426, 496; 11:362; 14:222-223, 429-430; 18:451;
19:471-472; 23:469.
'"^^George Washington to Lord Stirling, March 5,
1780
,
ibid., 18:73; George Washington to James Bov^doin,
September 12, 1780, ibid., 20:36.
"'"^''Nathanael Greene to Alexander Hamilton,
January 10, 17 81, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:531
15 2Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, December 6,
17 80, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:183; Nathanael
Greene to BarorT^von Steuben, December 7, 1780, Greene,
Nathanael Greene, 3:541; Colonel [ ] Henderson to John
Rutledge, August 14, 1781, ibid., 377.
detrimental to the inhabitants who are unfortunate enough
to be within their vortex. "^^3 Nevertheless, Greene was
able to maintain a semblance of discipline by being severe
in administering punishment, particularly during 1782 and
1783 .-^^^ Discipline, which had been lax on the frontier
in the Fort Pitt area, was improved beginning in the spring
of 1782 when General Irvine quelled mutinous troops by
numerous court martials. So effective was Irvine that by •
the next summer the inhabitants of Pittsburgh thanked him
for maintaining his troops in such good conduct. Disci-
pline came sooner to the main army under Washington.
Although the main army occasionally mutinied and
were unruly during 1779 and 1780, for the most part
Washington kept them under tight rein, by increasing the
severity of punishments; by keeping the army busy (such as
having unnecessary earthworks constructed) ; and by keeping
153John Mathews to Arthur Middleton, August 25, 1782,
Joseph W. Barnwell, annotator, "Correspondence of Hon. Arthur
Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence," SCHGM
27, no. 2 (April 1926): 70.
154Nathanael Greene to [Otho Holland Williams]
,
June 6, 1782, Calendar of the Genera l Otho Holland VJi lli ams
Papers in the Maryland His torical Society
, p. 66.
155
C. W. Butterfield, An Account of the Expedition
Against Sandusky under Col . V7i lliam Crawford in 178 2 ,
pp. 42-43; Address of the Inhabitants of Pittsburg to
William Irvine, September 13, 1783, ibid., p. 303.
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his army away from populated areas. By the summer of
1781, after the mutinies of that January had been severely
quelled, discipline was rigorously enforced, as evidenced
by the success by which Washington was able to march his
army to and establish the siege at Yorktown . ^^^^ Despite
some lapses, discipline continued in a high state throughout
1782 ."^^^
Discipline in the militia increased during the
latter stages of the war, due in large part to the influx
156„Benjamin Rush to John Adams, April 28, 1780Wharton, Revo]AJti^nari^ip]x^^ 3:639 ;Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, 'Decembef~T27~r7 79
,
MorrisJohn Jay, p. 670; General Greene's Orders, September 26 1780Lauber, Orderly Books
, p. 142; Earl Schenck Miers, Crossroads'
of Freedom: The Amer ican_Revolution^nd_t^hP_pi of^New
Nation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press7~r9Try7~p
. 2 06 .
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,Robert Morris to John Jay, July 5, 1781, Johnston,
Correspondence and Public Papers^_of^ohn__Jay
. 2:45; Marquis
de Lafayette to Comte de Vergennes, January 30, 1781,
Charles H. Sherrill, French__Memorie£_o^Ej^
America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1 ^TsTr^PpT" 32T-
322; Journal of Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de Verger, Rice, The
American Campaigns of RochambeauV_s_^rmv
, 1:152; Robin, New
Travels Through North-America, p. 36.
"
15 8George VJashington to Benjamin Harrison, Novem-
ber 13, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:336;
George Washington to Elias Dayton, May 7, r7827~rbid.,
24:230; Robert R. Livingston to John Jay, April 28, 1782,
Wharton, Revolu t ionary Diplomatic Correspondence, 5:377;
Journal of Jean-Baptiste-Antoine de VergerT Rice, The Ameri-
can Campaigns of Rochambeau ' s Army , 1:16 6; Acomb, The
Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Closen, p~. 242;
Balch, Journa l of Claude Blanchard, p. 17 5 ; Baron von Steuben
to George Clinton, April 10, 17 82, Spaulding, George Cli nton
,
p. 137; General Orders at West Point and Nev/burgh, Whiting,
Revolutionary Orders of General Washington, pp. 215, 216.
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of supernumerary Continental officers talcing „nd of
militia units. Additionally, Continental officers co^ed
the militia, often at the insistence of the state govern-
159
ments
.
Although the military commanders attempted to and
were relatively successful in maintaining discipline within
their forces, believing to do otherwise would create oppor-
tunities for and the possibilities of attacks on the lives,
liberties, and properties of their fellow Americans, the
military, nonetheless, as will be seen in later chapters,
often were threats to the very things they were charged with
protecting. And as will be seen, the civilian leaders
rarely tolerated such threats.
159 ^Robert Morris to John Jay, July 4, 1781, Johnston,
Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay
,
2:45;
Robert R. Livingston to" John Jay, April 28, 1782, ibid.,
2:210; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals,''
pp. 188, 247; George Plater, William Carmichael, John Henry
and Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Thomas Johnson, Jr.,
June 1, 1779, Burnett, LMCC, 4:244; The Maryland Council to
the Maryland Delegates in the Continental Congress, May 20,
1779, Browne, Maryland Archives
,
21:405; George Washington
to the Maryland Council, May 25, 1779, ibid., 419-420.
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CHAPTER VII
AN ARMY CRITICAL OF CONGRESS, THE STATE
GOVERNMENTS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
With the existence of ideological controls and the
extablishment of organizational controls as discussed in
the first six chapters, one would assume the American
military forces would remain subordinate to the civilian
governments during the vjar. For the most part, they did,
complying with the desires of the civilian governments and
posing little threat to them. Nevertheless, the military
were frequently critical of the civilian governments and
the civilian control.
This critical attitude, as will be shown, resulted
in the military interjecting themselves, both politically
and militarily, in civilian affairs. It also resulted in
creating a mutinous and rebellious spirit in the military.
As a result, conditions were present, particularly during
1780 and 1783, for the two things the Americans feared most
anarchy and military tyranny.
Throughout the war the military, for a variety of
reasons, were quite critical of Congress, its
policies,
procedures, and personnel. Most criticisms of
Congress by
410
the military related to congressional decisions involving
military appointments, promotions, rewards, and punishments.
Because Congress seemed inconsistent and indecisive
in its command and staff appointments the first five years
of the war, the military were often quite vocal in their
criticism of Congress. The most notable example of Congress
antagonizing the military early in the war with respect to
appointments came about as a result of Congress not clearly
establishing the authority of General Gates when he was
appointed to command the American forces in Canada. By the
time Gates arrived in the northern theater of operations,
the army he was to command had retreated out of Canada and
was generally considered under the jurisdiction of the
Northern Department's commanding general, Philip Schuyler.
Gates and his supporters assumed he was the commanding
general of the Canadian-bound army, wherever it was located,
and therefore, acted as such. The result was a year-long
debate as to the command authority of the two generals.
During that time. Congress removed and reappointed both men,
trying to please the supporters of both. Compounding
the
problem was the fact that John Sullivan, who also
served
in the Northern Department, believed he had
been slighted
by congress when Gates was placed in command
of the Canadian
bound army instead of himself. When Congress
attempted to
have Washington appoint the supreme commander
in the North-
ern Department he referred the problem
back to them. He
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did this for two reasons. First, he believed it was their
responsibility. And second, he did not want the unselected
general to be critical of him. Thus, during 1776 and 1777,
the Northern Department was in turmoil, and Congress was
held responsible."^
Congress was also criticized by the military for
being inconsistent and somewhat capricious in appointing
commanding officers of the staff departments. This was
particularly true with respect to the medical department,
where professional and personal jealousies among the surgeons
caused the offended party to become quite critical of
Congress. Whenever Congress made a command appointment,
upheld one, or tampered with the organizational structure of
the hospital and medical departments, it was inevitable that
some surgeon would be offended. This was especially true
early in the war, since such strong-willed medical
officers
as Benjamin Rush, William Shippen, Jr., John Morgan, and
Samuel Stringer, were constantly at odds with the
decisions
^FnrH JCC 5-488-451; 6:526; 7:180-181, 202, 216,
179-280 336!'3^' 8 364 , 375-376 , 391 , 540, 596 , 600-601
604- Geirge Washington to the President of the
Contrnental
congress August 3, 1777, Fitzpatrick,
Writir^_s_of Wa|hing^
ton! 9:8-9; Philip Schuyler to George
Washington, July 1,
mi^^^s ^-^^^^^ • is!
=
^^
l^^^^^lan' 1 280-281; Jonathan GreglJfy-Rossie,
The Politics
i^i^Hnd in the ;™eri«n_Revolut ion (Syracuse: Syracuse
ijn ivers ityTr'ess'; 1975), pp. 107-173 .
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of Congress, as well as with one another.
The Commissary Department also had its critics of
congressional decisions respecting their command appoint-
ments and organizational changes. The first Commissary
General, Joseph Trumbull, had numerous difficulties with
Congress regarding his authority, as did VJalter Livingston,
Deputy Commissary General of Stores and Provisions for the
Northern Department. As a result, both left the military
3
very early in the war. Jeremiah Wadsv;orth, who became the
Commissary General in April 1778, was ready to resign by
that summer as he had become dissatisfied with congressional
policies respecting his department. The following summer
he wrote Congress, "I must part with my peace of mind and
good Name, or my Office!" Therefore, he requested to resign
^Louis C. Duncan, I^dical_Men__in_ the American
Revolution 1775-1782/ PP . 84 , "103-I04n . 2 ,'"117-129 , 140 ,
276-30r; J. M. Toner, The Medical Men of the Revolution,
p 32; Harvey E. Brown, The_Me23^ca_l Depar^
States Army from 1775-1_783_ (Washington, D.C.: Surgeon
GiHi?iI"^OffT^e7"l873) ; pp. 16-19 , 21-23 , 29-31 , 34-38 ,
46-47 ; James E. Gibson, Dr^_Bodo_Ott^and__the_Med ical Back-
ground of the^mer ican_Revolution (Springfield, Illinois;
BaTtTmore", "Maryland: Charles C. Thomas, 1937), pp. 104-114,
185-194 , 203-302 ; Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., JohnJ^organj_
Continental Doctor, pp. 178-239.
^Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The_Poli^ics_of_Com^^
in the American Revolution, pp. 118-134; Don R. Gerlach,
-^^PhiTTFsHhuPiF"iHd -The Road to Glory,' A Question of
Loyalty and Competence," NYHSQ 49, no. 4 (October 1965):
p. 361.
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Congress granted this request, allowing him to resign the
first day of 1780.^
Nathanael Greene, who became the Quartermaster
General during the Valley Forge winter, became completely
disillusioned with Congress's handling of his department
and, by 1779, was ready to resign.^ When Congress attempted,
early in 1780, to change the Quartermaster system, based on
the suggestions of Thomas Mifflin and Timothy Pickering,
two men Greene cared nothing for, and realizing this change
would make his job more difficult, Greene became very ada-
mant in expressing his disapproval, even taking his views
personally to Congress.^ Getting no satisfaction from
Congress, he wrote Wadsworth that Congress "are as great a
^Jeremiah Wadsworth to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, June 5, 1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers,
Box 128, CHS; Ford, JCC, 15:1326.
^Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 6,
1779, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; John Fell Diary,
Burnkt, LMCC, 4 : 292-293 ; Roger Sherman to Jonathan Trumbull
December 2^1779 , ibid., 542; Robert R. Livingston to Philipu o zu, ^
'
y'
'
'
^.^^ Nathanael Greene to
Schuyler, December 20 , 1779, iDia., d^^, ucn-ii i
the President of the Continental Congress, December 17,
1779,
Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:259-263; Same to same,
January 13, 1780, ibid., 263-264.
Sathanael Greene to President Joseph
^^f '
February 9, 1780, ibid., 264-265 ; Same to
'
1780 ibid 271-273; Same to same, April 25,
^^SO, ibid ,
1 'Natha;;el Green; to George ^^-^^^^3^°-,^-^% 1^
ibid., 275; same to
--^g^^^^^^.^^i.^^Sccf 5:io8n'l-
Same to same, April 8, 1/bU, i urnuLu, — ,
N^hanael Greene to Jonathan Trumbull, May 7 , 1780 ,
MHSC,
7th ser . , 3 : 36-37 .
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set of [rascals] as ever got together." When he received
the newly adopted plan on July 26
,
1780, and seeing that
it provided too small a staff, lower pay, no provision for
his two deputies, and obligated him for the acts of his
subordinates, Greene immediately wrote Congress, asking to
g
resign and questioning their competency. Greene's letter
was not well received. Congress, in fact, was so upset with
it that not only did they accept his resignation as Quarter-
master General, but even considered removing him from the
army altogether. These actions regarding the Quartermaster
system and Greene were very upsetting to Washington and
others, who were already critical of the congressional
9
system of specific supplies. Greene's and VJadsworth's
successors, Timothy Pickering and Ephraim Blaine, also had
difficulty with the congressional decisions, and lack of
decisions, respecting their departments. Blaine complained
"^Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11,
1780, Nathanael Greene Papers [code book provided], CHS.
^Nathanael Greene to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 19, 1780, Greene, Nathanael
Greene, 2:288-292; Same to same, July 26, 1780, ibid.,
314-316 • Nathanael Greene to the Committee of Congress at
camp, jily 14, 1780, ibid., 304-308; Ezekiel Cornell to
Nathanael Greene, July 29, 1780, ibid., 322; Ford, JCC,
17:615-635, 690-691.
^George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental congress, March 26, 1780, ^itzpatrick,
Writin^s_of^^
Washington, 18:152-155; Same to same, August ^ 0 , 1? 8 0 ,
ibid
.
,
19^03^404 ; George Washington to Joseph Jones, August 13,
1780 , ibid., 366-369 ; Jeremiah Wadsv^'orth to
Nathanael
Greene, July 15, 1780, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers,
CSL.
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to Congress late in 1780 that he was at a loss as how to
run his department, as Congress had set down no government
for it."^^ The following spring, Pickering wrote Congress
that he did not "mean to be continually hounding the ears
of Congress with tales of public poverty and distress," but
he needed Congress to act, "If any other man can, v/ithout
money, carry on the extensive business of this department,
I wish most sincerely he would take my place. I confess
myself incapable of doing it.""^"^
If the command appointments and departmental control
caused the military to be critical of Congress, then
congressional promotions caused many of them to almost hate
Congress, as they believed their honor was involved. One
historian of the Revolution wrote in 1822 that "Military
reputation is even a more delicate commodity than female
chastity. It is often acquired without merit, and as often
lost without justice. "-^^ With respect to the promotion
-•-^Ephraim Blaine to the President of the Continental
Congress, October 17 , 1780 [copy], Hastings, PuMic_Papers
ofGeorge__Cld£rton, 6:301.
-^-'"Timothy Pickering to the President of the
continental Congress, April 21, 1781, Pickering, Tim^
Pickering, 1:289.
^^Paul Allen, A HijtooryjDf_the Amer d^an_ Re^^^
romorehending all the P7incipal Even ts_^oth^in_ the
FieM
li^olTs- of-Thi-^nU^ta^Conar^^
M5^-lH^?taRtlL^te^ of_Gener a 1 Washington , 2 vols.
TBiTtTSBr'^: Franklin Betts, 1822), 2:i2b.
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problem during the American Revolution, he was accurate
in his observation. Although most officers were not mili-
tary professionals, the act of putting on uniforms had the
effect of making them highly conscious of their honor and
reputation, as well as grieved when someone was promoted
ahead or over them. Because of the sensitivities involved
in promotions, Washington was eager that Congress be regular
in their promotions. Congress was not, however, consistent
in their promotion policies, thereby causing Washington to
13
frequently complain to them.
Officers frequently resigned during the war because
Congress had not promoted them. William Woodford left the
military service in the summer of 1776 when Adam Stephen
was made a general before him. The following year, John
Stark resigned when Enoch Poor was made a general instead
of himself. During 1779, Colonel Thomas Price
resigned when
Mordecai Gist was promoted before him, and Colonel Harry
Livingston resigned when he was not promoted. During
1777,
Generals John Armstrong, Jr., and Andrew Lewis
left the army
when they were not promoted, and Benedict
Arnold went home
13ceorge Washington to the Commr^
with the Army January 2 9 177 8],^^ ' ,H^-p?^diHt
l^^^iine^tl^Con^ July 7 , 1778 , ^^-^^]^^
George Washington to James Duane,
December 26, 1780, ibid..
21:15.
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to sulk when he was not made a major general. Not only
were those that resigned unhappy with the promotions made
by Congress, but so were many of their peers who believed
Congress had not made the proper selection. Often this
involved wide-spread criticism of Congress. Probably the
most criticism was generated as a result of Congress
promoting James Wilkinson and Thomas Conway late in 1777.
Conway, who had been commissioned a general in May
1777, was promoted to major general and Inspector General
of the Army on December 13, 1777. Despite Washington's
warning to Congress that the promotion of Conway v/ould be
highly disagreeable to the twenty-three men who were his
senior. Congress went ahead when Conway threatened to resign
if they did not promote him. This news v/as met at the main
army encampment with great disgust. General Huntington
reported the promotion was "an Insult to the Understanding
and Sensibility of the general Officers of the Army." Early
E. Hocker, The_ Fj^gh±ing_^r son
Revolution: A Biography "of General Peter Muhl enberg , p. 96:
Stewar t7" WiHiam^'ood ford , 1:721; David R. B. Nevin,
Continental Sketches_of_^i£t2Jigui^shed p. 147;
Stark, John~Stark, pp. 42-43; [Rufus W. Griswold] , Washington
and the~Generals of the Americ an Revolution , 2:334; Wallace,
TraTEorous HeFo
,
pp. TT?-1 35 ; 'Ethel Armes, ed . , Nancy
Shippen: Her Journal Book^^Zjlg-^^^g^"^^^""-^- J^o"^ance_of_a
Young Lady oFTashTon of Co lonTaT Philadelphia with^etters
t^TT^^and about Her (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company,
19 35) p 7Tr~0thon^Holland Williams] to Elie Williams,
February 24, 1779, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. H.
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in January 1778, Generals Knox, Huntington, Mcintosh,
Paterson, Poor, Maxwell, Varnum, Scott, Weedon, and Sullivan
sent a memorial to Congress criticizing them for promoting
Conway. "^^ About the same time as the generals learned of
Conway's promotion, and began expressing their ire, the
colonels of the army learned that Congress had promoted
Wilkinson because he had brought them news of the victory
at Saratoga. John Laurens wrote his father that Wilkinson's
promotion had given "universal disgust" to the officer corps,
and suggested that instead of having promoted him, Congress
should have rev;arded him with a good horse (as Wilkinson
had dallied on his way to Philadelphia) . Hoping Congress
would rescind the promotion, at least thirty colonels were
threatening resignation by year's end."*"^ Congress was not
Nathanael Greene to President of the Continental
Congress, January 12, 1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 2,
V7LCL; Jedediah Huntington to Joseph Trumbull, January 21,
1778, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 2, CSL; Nathanael
Greene to Jacob Greene, Greene, Nathanael Greene , 1:543-544;
Thomas Conway to Charles Carroll of Carrollton, November 14,
177 7 , Rowland, Charles Carrol l_of_C_arrol_l ton , 1:225-230 ;
Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington, December 29, 1777,
"Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 390; George Washington
to Richard Henry Lee, October 17, 1777, Fit zpatrick , Writing^
of Washington, 9:387-389; Ford, JCC, 8:349; 9:1023-1026;
Callahan, ^^enry Knox, p. 133; John Laurens to Henry Laurens,
January 1, 1778, Simms, The Army Correspondence _o£_Colone^
John Lauren s, p. 100.
-^^John Laurens to Henry Laurens, November 26 , 1777 ,
ibid P 83; Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene, January 3,
1778*'Greene, Nathanael Greene, 1:543-544; Nathanael Greene
to the President of the Continental Congress, January 12,
1778, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 2, WLCL; John
Sullivan
to Henry Laurens, January 20, 1778, Hammond,
Letters_and
Papers of John Sullivan, 2:14, 14-15.
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pleased with the officers questioning their promotions of
Wilkinson and Conway. Nevertheless, Congress, realizing
how adamant the officer corps was in opposition to the two
off icers and their promotions
,
reassigned Conway to the
Northern Department and made Wilkinson Secretary to the
17Board of VJar
.
The military were also very upset with Congress for
commissioning and promoting so many foreign officers.
"Congress in the beginning , " Hamilton observed , "v:ent upon
a very injudicious plan with respect to Frenchmen. To every
adventurer that came, without even the shadow of credentials,
they gave the rank of field officers." Hamilton believed
that it would be wise to acquire the services of several
qualified foreigners, even gratifying them "beyond what they
can reasonably pretend to." These comments v;ere made in the
late spring of 1777. A little less than a year later, after
Congress had continued to commission foreigners in large
numbers, as well as to promote them ahead of deserving
Americans, Hamilton complained that Congress had not been
able to "summon resolution enough to withstand the impudent
importunity and vain boasting of foreign pretenders," and
were thus bullied "by every petty rascal, who comes armed
-^''Abraham Clark to Lord Stirling, January 15, 1778 ,
Burnett, LMCC , 3:40; Henry Laurens to John Rutledge,
January 30, 1778, ibid., 63-64.
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with ostentatious pretensions of military merit and
experience." "These things," he informed Clinton, "v;ound
1
8
my feelings as a republican more than I can express."
During the summer of 1778, Washington wrote one member of
Congress that he wished Congress had employed no foreigners
other than Lafayette, as he considered them little more than
19
adventurers. Most American officers shared these opinions
20
of Hamilton and Washington. Most irritating to the
American officers was the commissioning of Philip de Coudray
by Congress during the spring of 1777. Du Coudray arrived
in America from France with an agreement signed with Silas
Deane promising him a Major-Generalship of the artillery
Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 1:246, 247; Alexander
Hamilton to^George Clinton, February 13, 1778, ibid., 426.
"^George VJashington to Gouverneur Morris, July 24,
1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of ^'Jashj-ng_ton , 12:226-228 ;
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, May 17, 1777, ibid.,
7:75; George Washington to Silas Deane, August 13, 1777,
ibid'., 9:61, 63: George V/ashington to Benjamin Franklin,
August 17, 1777, ibid., 85-87.
^"^George Washington to Henry Laurens, July 24 , 1778 ,
ibid., 12:224; William Smallwood to George Washington,
December 30, 1778, "Some Revolutionary Letters," MHM 2,
no 2 (December 1907): 340; John Laurens to Henry Laurens,
Julv 16, 177 8, Simms, The Army Correspondence o f Colonel^
John Laurens, p. 203; PT^t^it"^ the General Officers of
thFArmy to'the Continental Congress, December 31, 177/,
Hammond, Letter^and Papers_^f^oJm_Sullivan 1:^
John SulliVi^rto Henry "Laurens, January 25 , 1779 ,
i^id
,
2:501; Arthur St. Clair to James Wilson, February 10,
1777,
Smith', lli^_Sjt^_Clair_ Papers, 1:382 .
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and a half -pay pension for life. VThen news of this reached
camp, many officers formally and forcefully voiced their
objection to Congress complying with Deane ' s agreement.
As we will see in the next chapter, Congress v/as displeased
with the protest, believing the military should not inter-
ject themselves into the civil sphere of commissioning and
promoting. Nevertheless, Congress was wise enough to work
out a compromise whereby du Coudray was made an inspector
21general with command of no troops.
Not only did the American officers have problems
with Congress commissioning and promoting foreigners, but
so did the foreign officers themselves. They often quibbled
about the propriety of being subordinate to an officer to
whom they would normally be the superior were they in
22
Europe
.
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1
Alexander Hamilton to William Duer, May 6, 1777,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246-247; Nathanael
Greene to John~Adams , May 7 , 17 77 /"Bernhard Knollenberg, "The
Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John
Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 52; Same to same. May 28,
1777, ibid., no. 3 (July 1942): 74; Nathanael Greene to ?,
June 4, 1777, Johnson, Nathanael Greene , 1:97; James Lovell
to Joseph Trumbull, [June], 6, [1777], Burnett, LMCC, 2:379;
Henry Knox to George VJashington, June 5 , 1777 , Sparks,
Correspondence o f the American Revolution , 1 : 378-380
.
^^Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, June 26, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:389; James Lovell to William Whipple, _
June 30 , 1777 , ibid., 394 ; Same to same, July 7, 1777, ij^i^-'
403; James Lovell to George Washington, July 24, 1777, ibid.,
417-419 .
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Seniority problems also plagued Congress from the
beginning of the war almost till the end, as many officers
believed Congress often acted improperly in assigning
seniority. Seeing the list of the first nine brigadier
generals selected, Artemas Ward wrote John Hancock he hoped
they would "not have a tendency to create uneasiness among
us." They did, however, as four of the selected, Seth
Pomeroy, David Wooster, Joseph Spencer, and John Thomas,
believed they had been slighted with respect to their
seniority. All four threatened to resign unless their
seniority was adjusted upward. Eventually Wooster and
Pomeroy resigned when Congress did not act. Thomas was
placated when he was made the senior brigadier general and
Spencer, who went home temporarily, was coaxed back and
2 3
later promoted. Numerous other generals, including Arnold,
^"^Artemas Ward to the President of the Continental
Congress, June 30, 1775, Force, American Archives, 4th ser .
,
2:1140; Cotton Tufts to John Adams, July 3-4, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC , 1 : 237; Charles Lee to John Thomas, July 23,
1775, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 197-198;
George Washington to the President of the Continental Con-
gress, July 10 , 1775 , Fitpzatrick, \^it2£igs_o£J2a_shdj}
3:325-326; George Washington to John Thomas, July 23, 1775,
ibid., 358-361; Samuel B. Webb to Silas Deane, [July], 11,
1775, Ford, SajTmel_^la^]^yJ^eb^ 1:79-81; Ford, JCC, 2:103,
191; North Callahan, Connecticut ' s Revo_lutj^onaj^^_War _l£ad^
A Publication of the TVmerican Revolutionary Bicentennial
Commission of Connecticut, Connecticut Bicentennial Series 3
(Chester, Connecticut: Pequot Press, 1973), pp. 25-26;
Christopher Collier, Connecticut_in the^ontinental_^Con^^^
Series 2 of the above (Chester, Connecticut: Pequot Press,
1973)
, pp. 26-28
.
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Weedon, and Muhlenberg, as well as many company and field
grade officers, resigned or threatened to resign as a result
of Congress not giving them the seniority they expected.
Needless to say, such seniority disputes did not endear
Congress to the offended officer.
Also not endearing Congress to offended officers
involved those instances where officers believed that
Congress had not properly rewarded or punished them. Wash-
ington, for example, was disturbed with Congress for not
giving credit to the role played by Major Lee's partisan
unit at Stony Point. Samuel Smith was similarly upset with
Congress for giving Pennsylvania's Commodore Hazlewood a
sword for his role in the defense of the Delaware River when
Smith believed he did not deserve it, and Simeon Thayer v;as
upset he was not given one at all, since he believed his
25
efforts v;arranted one. More officers were upset by the
2 4Nathanael Greene to Francis Marion, January 17,
1782 , Nathanael Greene Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1) ;
Philip Van Cortlandt and Peter Gansevoort to the President
of the Continental Congress, April 9, 1779, Judd, Correspond
ence of the Van Cortlandt Family, pp. 295-298; Philip Van
Cortlandt to John Jay, April 14, 1779, Judd, "Memoir" and
Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt , p. 12 8;
Wallace, Traitorous Hero , pp. 134-135; Paul A. W. Wallace,
The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1950), pp. 170-171; Stewart, William
Woodford
,
1:72, 722; 2:878-879, 898-916.
^^Noel B. Gerson, Light-Horse Harry: A Biography of
Washington's Great Cavalrym"an, General Ilenry Lee (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966) , pp. 68-69;
John Armstrong, Sr., to Thomas uniarton, November 23, 1777,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives , 1st ser., 6:32; Ford, JCC,
9:862; John W. Jackson, Th e Pennsylvania Navy 1775- 1781: The
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way in which Congress punished or censured them. During
the summer of 1777, Sullivan and several other officers v;ere
upset with Congress for having condemned Sullivan's action
at Staten Island without giving him a chance to explain him-
self. St. Clair and Schuyler were reprimanded by Congress
for their role in surrendering Fort Ticonderoga and Putnam,
similarly, for abandoning Forts Montgomery and Clinton.
All three generals complained so much about not getting a
public hearing to explain their actions, that Congress
eventually cleared them of responsibility for the military
setbacks. Schuyler was also upset with Congress for being
so dilatory in investigating and clearing him of charges
of misusing public funds. Gates, who was removed from
command of the southern army after his defeat at Camden,
was upset with Congress for not urging Washington to hold
a court of inquiry into his conduct and then for repealing
their original resolution calling for such an inquiry,
2 6
thereby not allowing him to formally clear himself.
Defenses of the Delaware (Mew Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press, 1974), p. 218.
^^Adam Stephen to John Sullivan, September 20, 1777,
Hammond, Letters and Paper s_of_jJohn_SijaijA^ 1 :455 ; John
Sullivan to John Hancock, September 27, 1777, ibid., 460-470;
Arthur St. Clair to Horatio Gates, November 21, 1777, Smith,
The St. Clair Papers, 1:446; Gouverneur Morris to Philip
Schuyler ,~Awr^'^ 77 17 77, Sparks, Go^uverneur Morris , 1:141-
142- Philip Schuyler to Gouverneur Morris, September 7, 1777,
ibid 143; Philip Schuyler to the President of the Continen-
tal Congress, September 8, 1776 , Force, Ameri^can ^rchiA/_e^
5th ser., 2:245-247; Same to same, September 14, 1776, ibid.,
263; Philip Schuyler to George V:ashington, September 11,
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The military were also critical of Congress for the
way they believed it often mistreated Washington. During
the spring of 178 3, Washington wrote Alexander Hamilton that
he "often thought . . . that the public interest might be
benefitted, if the Commander in Chief of the Army was more
into the political and Pecuniary state of affairs than he
is." This was an observation Washington made frequently
27
throughout the war. Not only did Congress not keep
Washington adequately informed, often intentionally, but
they often sent information to his subordinates without
informing him. Learning of an instance of this, John Laurens
wrote his father that "The conduct of Congress in giving
orders to officers on detached commands, without communica-
ting them to the General, is not only a deficiency of
politeness, considered as an omission of a compliment which
2 8
is due to him, but likewise a breach of military propriety."
1776, ibid., 293-294; Ford, JCC, 5:841; 7:326-327, 349-350;
10:601-602; 11:803-804; 12:1186; 23:465-466; Bush, Philip
Schuyler, pp. 134-138; Patterson, Horatio Gates , pp. 319,
324-3257 332.
^"^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 4,
1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 3:277; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
July 21, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington , 22:404-
405; George Washington to Edmund Randolph, August 1, 1779,
ibid., 16:28; Henry Laurens to John Laurens, May 11, 1778,
Burnett, LMCC, 3:228.
^^John Laurens to Henry Laurens, April 5, 1778, Simms,
The Army Correspondence_o£_ColoneWohn^^ p. 154.
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These transgressions were considered relatively slight when
compared to the treatment Washington received during the
winter of 1777-1778, the period of the Conway Cabal. It
was during this time that many in the military believed
Congress was not adequately supporting Washington, and were
in fact, adopting policies which undermined his authority.
The military were often critical of Congress for
its handling of military policy. Throughout the war,
Congress involved themselves in strategical, tactical, and
other matters that the military believed came under their
30purview. "'Inter nos,'" General Lee wrote Benjamin Rush
during the fall of 1776
,
'"all the resolves of Congress
relating to Military affairs are absurd, ridiculous, and
ruinous." Two weeks earlier, he had written Gates that
Washington should threaten to resign unless Congress stopped
interfering with military policies. About the same time, in
Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington,
December 29, 1777, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC , 20 (1923):
390-391; Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, Decem-
ber 14, 1777, Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull, p. 215; Elbridge
Gerry to Henry Knox, February 7, 1778, Austin, Elbridge
Gerry, 1:242; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington,
December 30, 17 77 , Idzerda, La^aye t te_j-£_the _Age_of_^
American Revolution, 1:204; Same to same, February 23, 1778,
Louis Gootschalk, ed . , The Letters of La faye tte to Washing-
ton 1777-1799, p. 30, Nathanael Greene to Jacob Greene,
March 17, 1778, Greene, Nathanael Greene , 2:35; Rossman,
Thomas Mifflin , p. 132; Champagne, Ale^cander _McDougal^,
pp. 135-136.
^"^Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, March 12,
1778, Syrett, Pape rs of Alexander Hami lton, 1:439.
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a more charitable mood, Greene wrote "The Congress in the
infancy of Politicks could not be brought to believe many
serious truths; by attempting speculative principles rather
than real life their maxims in War have been founded in
folly. However, experience ripens Judgment and ... I dont
doubt the Congress in time will be as able Politicians in
military matters as they are in civ[i]l Governm [e] nt . "
With the creation of the Board of War late in 17 77,
many in the military hoped that Congress would become less
of a nuisance in military affairs. These hopes were quickly
dashed, as it appeared that the Board of War was just as
inept as Congress. Their first project, an invasion of
Canada early in 1778, was described by Washington as "the
32
child of folly." Not only did the planned Canadian
expedition upset Washington and most military leaders, but
it caused much bickering among the generals who were to have
a prominent part in its implementation. Wisely, Congress
cancelled it in March, leaving several generals feeling they
had been mistreated by both the Board of War and Congress.
3
1
Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 2, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 263; Charles Lee
to Horatio Gates, October TT, ri776] , ibid., 261-262;
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, December 21, 1776,
Showman, Papers of Nathanael Greene , 1:375.
"^^George Washington to Thomas Nelson, Jr.,
February 8, 177 8, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
10:432-433
.
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Lafayette was so upset that he wrote Washington that he had
been "shamefully deceived by the board of war.""^"^
There were other military related activities that
Congress made policy and decisions about that upset the
34
military. They were generally minor in substance, but
compounded, they had the result of malcing Congress appear
insensitive to the pride and dignity of the officer corps.
One such example related to the status of the staff depart-
ment officers. Most line officers v;ere upset v;ith Congress
for giving the staff department officers, including those
in the wagon masters' department, regular commissions.
They believed this lowered the value of their own commis-
35
sions. Another example related to congressional decisions
regarding prisoners of war. Sullivan wrote Washington early
in 1778 that the conduct of Congress with respect to those
prisoners captured earlier in the war would disgrace a
3 3
Marquis de Lafayette to George Washington,
March 11, 1778, Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafay-
ette to Washington 1777-1799, p. 27; Marquis de Lafayette to
Henry Laurens, January [26J, 1778, Idzerda, Lafayette in the
Age of the American Revolution, 1:253-6; Same to same,
January 27, 1778, ibid., 258-61; Same to same, January 31,
1778, ibid., 271-272; Henry Laurens to John Rutledge,
January 30, 1778, Burnett, LMCC , 3:64.
^^Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March, 5, 1779 ,
Smith, The St. Clair Papers , p. 462.
^^George Washington to the Committee of Congress at
Camp, [January 29, 1778], Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing-
ton 10-377; A LIEUTENANT COLONEL writing "THOUGHTS on the
fTi'sent State of the ARiMY : Addressed to the Military," The
New-Jersey Gazette, December 24, 1777.
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"Senate of Barbarians." Many officers shared this belief,
believing Congress was very inconsistent in whom they
desired to be exchanged. Congress frequently gave orders
as to who would be exchanged and when, often not consulting
Washington in the process. This was most upsetting to
VJashington when Congress involved itself in attempts to get
General Lee exchanged. Lee himself, and others, were upset
with Congress for attempting to include civilians in their
prisoner of war exchange formula, and attempting to have
Washington give preference to officers taken at Long Island
and New York, rather than to those taken earlier in Canada. "^^
Especially upsetting to the military was what they
considered Congress's lack of ability and will to direct a
successful war effort. Many officers, particularly early
in the war, believed Congress v;as not energetic in pursuing
37policies that would allow for a military victory. "Are we
3 6John Sullivan to George Washington, March 2, 1778,
Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan
,
2:28; Ford,
JCC, 6 : 862'^ Jared Sparks et al .
,
"Report on Exchange of
Prisoners during the American Revolution," PMHS 5 (1860-1862)
325-347; John Richard Alden, General Charle s Lee: Traitor or
Patriot?
, pp. 171-173, 191-192 ; Max Mrntz," Gouverne'ur Morris
and the American Revolut ion (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Prei¥^^ r97 0) , ~~pp7~ 9 7^9 9";" William Irvine to the Pennsylvania
Council, January 7, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives ,
1st ser
.
, 5:172.
^"^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 18, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, 1, WLCL; Same to same, January 4,
177 6 , Sho\sTnan, Papers_ofJ^athajT_ae]^ G^e^ne , 1:178; Charles
Lee to George WashFngton, July 1, 17 76, "The Charles Lee
Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 103.
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at war or are we not?" General Lee rhetorically asked early
3 8in 1776. During the last week of June 1776, the Quarter-
master General pleaded with one member of Congress, "For
Gods Sake Mr [
. ] Gerry, give a little more velocity to
Congress-you do not know the situation of your Country, or
your conduct would be more Decisive." A week later,
Congress did give a little more velocity by declaring
independence, and in September by providing for what they
believed was sufficient force and means to achieve a mili-
tary victory. Nevertheless, many in the military believed
Congress was too timid in asserting their powers to assure
adequate support of the military. This was particularly
true of General Lee , who
,
early in the war , wrote that it
was not just a few members of Congress who were timid, but
40 ...
"the whole Stable." Complaints of congressional inertia
increased as the war progressed, so that by the summer of
1780 most military leaders agreed with Joseph Reed that
o o
Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 23, 1776,
ibid
.
, 255
.
^^Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 29, 1776,
Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell W. Knight Collection, MHS
.
^^Charles Lee to Horatio Gates, October 14, [1776],
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 261; see Charles
Lee to Benjamin Franklin, November 6, 1776, ibid., 266-267;
Charles Lee to the President of the Massachusetts Council,
November 22, 1776, ibid., 303; Charles Lee to George
Washington, February 26, 1777, ibid., 4 (1872): 335; see
also Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, September 5, 1776, Drake,
Henry Knox, p. 30.
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every measure by Congress for the general good "has been
timid, feeble, and languid. "^"^ This complaint continued
the next year, but became less frequently voiced after it
appeared that Congress was making itself more efficient in
directing the war effort and more effective in supporting
the army.
Besides the inertia, also upsetting to the military
was the fact that Congress relied on expedients . ^ "V7e have
lived upon expedients,'" VJashington complained during the
fall of 1780, "till we can no longer, and it may truly be
41Joseph Reed to George Washington, June 5, 1780,
Reed, Joseph Reed
,
2:211; see also Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene,
2:273; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, February 13,
1778, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 1:425; Arthur
St. Clair to Horatio Gates, November 21, 1777, Smith, The
St. Clair Papers^, 1:446 ; John Laurens to Henry Laurens,
March 9 , 1778 , Simms , Army Correspondence of Colonel John
Laurens, p. 137; Alexander Scammell to John Sullivan
,
April 8, 1778, "Colonel Alexander Scammell and His Letters,
from 1768 to 1781, Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss
Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser . , 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 143;
Anthony Wayne to VJilliam Irvine, March 10, 1780, "Letters
of General Wayne to General Irvine, 1778-1784," ibid.,
6, no. 10 (October 1862): 323.
"^^Same to same, March 25 , 1781, ibid., no. 11
(November 1862): 339; Horatio Gates to Thomas Johnson,
February 26, 1781, Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates:
A Biography, p. 254; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering,
March 9, 1781, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1) .
^^Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continen-
tal Congress, March 11, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1); George Washington to William Greene,
October 18 , 17 80 , Bartlett, Records of Rhod_e_Island^, 9:250;
George VJashington to the President of the Continental
Congress, August 20 , 1780 , Fitzpatrick, V7riting s of
V^ashington, 19:407 .
said that, the history of this VJar' is a history of false
4 4hopes, and temporary devices." Si^nilarly, St. Clair
complained that Congress was continually "patching rather
than adopting some uniform system in regards to the nili-
45tary." Relying on short enlistrxents and atte^nptinc to
meet the material needs of the 6r:iy through a sjstem of
specific supplies were just two e>:pedients that upset the
mil itary
.
The military viewed the problems of congressicnal
inertia and reliance on expedients as a result of the /;ay
Congress was organized and functi€»ned. To a large extent
the military believed Congress was not capable of befjag
effective because it had almost no executive control of
affairs, and what little executive control existed, v:3S in
committees and boards, whose membership were constantly
fluctuating as was that of Congress itself. "If Congress
suppose, that Boards composed of their ov;ri body, and always
fluctuating, are competent to the great business of ¥ar
(which requires not only close application, but a cor.stant
and uniform train of thinking and actinglr'^^^ashingtori
^^George Vlashington to Gearge Maso-n, October 22,
1780 , ibid., 20:242; see also George Washingtor. to Jchn
Cadwalader! October 5 , 1780, ibid., 122; Gecrce Wash i^ng ton
to James Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 218.
^Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reco, April 8, liSO,
Hazard, Pennsy lvania_A£chiA^, 1st ser., 8:168.
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informed James Duane late in 1780, "they will most assuredly
deceive themselves . "^^ Congress also upset the military by
attempting to handle too many matters, including minor
decisions, as a committee of the whole, thereby rendering
4 7It a less efficient body. "By their grasping to do every
thing themselves," complained one general, "very little is
48done." Adding to the opinion of the military that Congress
operated inefficiently and was not competent to the
exigencies of the war was the belief that the members of
Congress spent too much time in idle debate or were too
4 9involved in personal and political disputes. But it was
46George Washington to James Duane, December 26,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wa s hington, 21:14.
47 Benjamin Tallmadge to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 20,
1779, Jeremiah VJadsworth Papers, Box 127, CHS.
4 8Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25,
1779, [Rufus W. Griswold] , Washing ton and the Genera ls of
the American Revolution , 1:298.
4 9Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, February 5,
1779, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5);
Benjamin Tallmadge to Jeremiah Wadsworth, March 20, 1779,
Jeremiah VJadsworth Papers, Box 127, CHS; Alexander McDougall
to Joseph Reed, March 25, 1779, [Rufus W. Griswold], Washing-
ton and the General s of the American Revolution , 1:298;
George Washington to Joseph Reed, November 27, 1778, Fitz-
patrick, Writings of VJashington, 13:348; George Washington
to George Mason, March 27, 1779, ibid., 14:301; George
Washington to John Armstrong, May 18, 1779, ibid., 15:99;
George Weedon to Nathanael Greene, September 29, 1779,
Stewart, Wi 1 1 iam Wood ford , 2 : 1087 ; Marquis de Lafayette to
George Washington, December 30, 1777, Idzerda, Lafayett^
in the Age of the Ameri can Revolution, 1:204; Marquis de
Laf aye tte"to" Henry Laurens, [ca." January 5, 1778], ibid.,
213-215; Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, June 1, 1778,
Sparks, 'Gouverneur Morris^, 1:182; Nathanael Greene to
AlexandeFTTcDougall, r-.pril 1 5, 1780, Douglas Southall
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v;ith respect to their political foundation that the military
were the most seriously critical of Congress.
"The fundamental defect," of America's war effort,
Hamilton observed during the summer of 1780
, "is a want of
power in Congress ." Probably the greatest complaint about
Congress was that it lacked any real power, that it could
really only recommend, and that under the Articles of
Confederation one state could counteract the will of the
rest of the states. ^"^ During the first winter of the war,
Rhode Island's governor expressed a desire for "a supreme,
superintending power, to exert and direct the force of the
52
whole, for the safety and defence of all." Washington
certainly shared this opinion, as he believed there should
Freeman, George Washington: A Biography
,
5:150; Nathanael
Greene to John Sullivan, December 3, 1779
,
Hammond, Li f
e
and Papers of John Sullivan , 3:171; Nathanael Greene to
Nicholas Cooke, January 23, 1777, Bartlett, Records of
Rhode Island , 8:116.
5 0Alexander Hamilton to James Duane , [September 3,
1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:402.
5
1
Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw , p. 100; Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris,
February 21, 1783, Francis S. Drake, Memorials of the Society
of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 161; Lewis Morris, Jr.,
to Lewis Morris, Sr., June 7, 1781, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876): 495; Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael
Greene, December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.
^^Nicholas Cooke to Charles Lee, January 21, 1776,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:448-449; see also
Nicholas Cooke to George Washington, January 21, 1776,
ibid., 450.
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be one supreme director of the country's wartime affairs.
He did not want to become that supreme director, but wished
that it would be Congress. He informed Congress during the
spring of 1780 that he hoped "a plan could be adopted by
which every thing relating to the Army could be conducted
on a general principle under the direction of Congress."
"This alone," he maintained, "can give harmony and consist-
ency to our military establishment, and I am persuaded will
be infinitely conducive to Public economy. "^^ The fact that
a fev7 members of Congress, or one state, could take av/ay
from the pov;er of Congress to direct the war effort v;as most
upsetting to the military. "The confederation gives the
states individually too much influence in the affairs of
the army," Hamilton complained during the summer of 1780.
He wished the states had no voice in Continental military
matters. "The entire formation and disposal of our military
54forces," he told James Duane, "ought to belong to Congress."
"I cannot well form an Idea of national polity," Greene
complained the following year, "where the Constituent parts
5 3George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington , 18:210; George Washington to William Fitz-
hugh, August~8, 1781, ibid., 22:481.
^^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3,
1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 2:402.
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claim absolute and independent sovereignty."^^ VJashington
told James Duane late in 1780 that it would be madness to
continue the war if "individual states conceive themselves
at liberty to reject, or alter any act of Congress" and
early the next year he told William Fitzhugh that "unless
the powers of Congress are made competent to all the pur-
poses of War we are doing no more than wasting our time,
and spending our treasury to very little purpose."
Washington, like his fellow officers, could not believe
Congress operated under a system that allowed the states
to comply or not comply with requisitions made by Congress
upon them
.
Just as maddening to Washington and the military
was the fact that Congress frequently relinquished to the
states what little pov/er they had, especially with respect
55Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris , November 21
,
1781
,
Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris, 3:229; see also
ibid., 228 ; see also Charles Lee to George Washington,
January 24, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872):
259 .
George Washington to James Duane, December 26,
17 80, Fitzpatrick, VJritings of VJashington, 21:14; George
Washington to William Fitzhugh, March 25, 1781, ibid.,
20:375; see also George Washington to John Armstrong,
March 26, 1781, ibid., 379; George Washington to Joseph
Jones, May 31, 1780, ibid., 18:453.
^"^Same to same. May 31 , 1780 , ibid., 18:453 ; George
Washington to Fielding Lewis, May 5 [-July 6], 1780, ibid.,
19:131-132; George Washington to John Parke Custis,
February 28, 1781, ibid., 21:320; George Washington to
John Armstrong, March 26, 1781, ibid., 379.
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5 8to military affairs. By doing so, Washington and others
frequently complained they were forced to look to thirteen
states for support, instead of to just one body--Congress
;
and, instead of having one unified Continental Army, they
5 9had thirteen separate armies. And by doing so, one
consequence Hamilton observed, was that "some of the lines
•of the army would obey their states in opposition to Congress
notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity
of the army[.]"^^ There were other consequences because of
Congress giving up their powers, but there were even more
problems as a result of the not always clear line of
authority between Congress and the respective states.
Although most Continental officers came to view
Congress as the supreme civilian authority, this view was
not shared by the majority of their countrymen. In fact,
most Americans believed their state governments were the
supreme civilian authority; after all, they were fighting a
5 8Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, August 18, 1781,
Ferguson
,
Paper s o f Robert Morris, 2:70.
5 9 ^George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washington , 18:453; George
VJashington to Fielding Lewis, May [-July 6], 1780, ibid.,
19:131; George Washington to the President of the Continen-
tal Congress, August 20, 1780, ibid., 413; Nathanael Greene
to Robert Morris, August 18, 17 81, Greene, Nathanael Greene ,
3:372.
^^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3,
1780], Syrett, Papers_of Alexander Hamilton, 2:402.
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war to defend the life, liberty, and property of their
fellow citizens, their neighbors, not to establish and/or
support a national government, of a unified country. Thus,
throughout the war. Continental officers often found
theraselves caught between the authority of Congress and the
state governments. The resulting friction caused the mili-
tary to become more critical of the ability of Conqress to
control and direct the war effort, and more upset with the
narrow, and often selfish, interests and attitudes of the
state governments.^"'"
Two problems that arose out of the Continental-state
relationship that were particularly upsetting to the military
involved their relations with state officials with respect
to military policy and command, and to a lesser degree,
their vulnerability to state authorities with respect to
civil matters. With respect to the latter. Continental
officers often found themselves confronting state authori-
ties over judicial matters, generally as a result of civil
suits brought against them. These civil suits were generally
the result of legal impressing done by the military or
attempts to hold the military responsible for the Continen-
tal public debt. Quartermaster and commissary officials,
such as Greene, Blaine, and Pickering complained constantly
^"""Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan Mcintosh, August 14,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 1:13, 14-15, BPL.
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that they and their subordinates were being sued for public
debts, being taxed, and in Pickering's instance being
6 2
arrested. Pickering also v;as harrassed by state authori-
ties at Yorktown when they would not allow him to receive
official mail at their post office unless he paid the
postage. The military and state officials also disputed
and then debated their respective authority in other matters,
such as to when Continental enlistments were completed, who
was responsible for transacting prisoner exchanges, letting
people travel to New York City, authorizing private warfare.
^^Ephraim Blaine to the President of the Continental
Congress, July 20, 1782, Ephraim Blaine Papers, Letterbook,
LC (Microfilm Reel #2) ; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca
Pickering, January 12 [-19], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #1); Donald Whisenhunt, [ed.]. Delegate
from New jerseyj_'nie_Jo^u£n^l_of_^ pp. 107-108 ;
Timothy Pickering to George Washington, January 18, 1783,
Saprks, Correspondence_of_the_Amer2^an^ 3 : 544 ;
Timothy PickeriH^to Udny Hay, July 26 , 1781 , Pickering,
Timothy Pickering, 1:317-319; Timothy Pickering to the
President ot the Continental Congress, August 12, 1781,
ibid 332; Timothy Pickering to George Clinton, August 26,
178l',
' ibid. , 335-339; Nathanael Greene to the President of
the Continental Congress, December 12, 1779, Charles
Caldwell, Memoirs of the J^e_and_Cam_pajLgns _o^^
Nathanael gF^n^7^135r_General_An_th^_A^
Strt^7^n"d~c5iS^^er of the Southern_Department^i^
W^S^f^n^i^i^l^W'lPhTridilphia: Robert Desilyer and
Th5HiF-Diiil^7T:8l9 ) , p. 4 30; Nathanael Greene to John
Jay, June 24, 1779, Morris, John Jay , pp.
607-608.
^^Timothy Pickering to the President of the _
continental Congress, October 11, 1781, Pickering,
T^thy
Pickering, 1:306-307.
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and who should pay troops raised by special levies.
The most serious conflict between the Continental
officers and the state govornnionts took place when they
disagreed about their respective areas of authority. Such
disagreements were frequent, especially in the south, where
some civilian leaders maintained that once Continental troops
entered their state they should be totally subordinate to the
control and direction of the state government. The first
major disagreement took place in South Carolina during the
suimner of 1776 as General Lee and the state government
issued conflicting orders and disagreed about who was respon-
sible for directing the state's defensive efforts. South
Carolina experienced similar problems throughout the war,
particularly during the 1779 and 1780 sieges of Charleston,
Douglas Southall Freeman, George VJashinq tonj A
Biography, 5:243-244; George Washington to Comte do
Rochambeau
,
January 20, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 21:120; George Washington to V>/illTam Livingston,
February'T9 , 1780 , ibid., 18:28-31; George Washington to
John Cleves Symmes, February 22, 1780, ibid., 43-44; George
Washington to the New York Legislature, August 11, 1776,
ibid., 5:413-414; Allen D. Chandler, ed . , "Minutes of the
Executive Council, May 7 through October 14, 1777," GHQ 34,
no. 1 (March 1950): 35; George Clinton to the New York
Convention, March 23, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of
George Clinton, 1:676, 677; Samuel H. Parsons to George
Washington, May 15, 1779, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons ,
pp. 242-243.
^
^Thomas Burke io the North Carolina General
Assembly, December [ ], 1777, Clark, NCSR, 11:701-703;
William Henry Drayton's speech before the South Carolina
General Assembly, January 20, 1778 , Niles, Prj^ncieles__and
Acts of the Revolution in /unerica, p. 112.
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as Lincoln and Moultrie frequently quarreled with the state
leaders as how best to defend the city, and whether or not
to surrender.
Continental officers also experienced similar
difficulties with Georgia's civilian leaders, particularly
Governors Gwinnett and Houston. During the spring of 1777,
Gwinnett organized an expedition to Florida consisting of
two regiments of Continentals under Lachlan Mcintosh and a
large body of Georgia militia. Once underway, Mcintosh
refused to subordinate himself to the governor, who had
taken to the field to lead the expedition. Learning of
this difficulty, the Council of Safety requested Gv/innett
and Mcintosh return to Savannah to discuss the command
problem. Colonel Samuel Elbert, who then assumed command
of the expedition, had problems as well, as he received
orders from both Mcintosh and the civilian authorities.
Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 5 , 1776 , "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC , 5 (1873): 123; Same to same,
July 22, 1776, ibid., 156; Same to same, July 23, 1776,
ibid., 157-160; Same to same, July 24, 1776, ibid., 163;
Same to same, July 27 , 1776 , ibid., 173-174 ; Same to same,
August 3, 1776, ibid., 199; Charles Lee to Patrick Henry,
July 29, 1776, ibid., 179; Charles Lee to the Continental
Board of V7ar and Ordnance, August 7, 1776, ibid., 203, 204;
Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution , 1:424-426,
428-429, 43T1 2:79-8 0; William Moultrie to John Rutledge,
April 6, 1779, ibid., 1:368-369; William Moultrie to
Charles C. Pinckney, April 16, 1779, ibid., 370-371; Edward
McCrady, The History of South Ca^rolina_ in_ the Revolutioj^
17 7 5-17 80^7^^^F0-y61, 37 5 , 4'66;' 472-476 , 478 , 485 , 512 ;
Johnson, Trad itions and Remini scences , pp. 219, 260-261;
Marvin R.~Zahnizer, Cha£les_Cotesv^rtl^Pi^^
Father, p. 63.
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Because of the confusion of authority, the expedition was
abandoned, and eventually recriminations resulted in
Mcintosh killing Gwinnett in a duel.
Similar problems arose during the summer of 1778,
as General Howe and Governor Houston debated command
authority while leading an expedition against Florida.
Because of their dispute and subsequent bickering, the
expedition failed. The command problem between Howe and
Houston continued during the v/inter of 1778-1779 when
6 8Savannah and Augusta were surrendered.
During the summer of 1780, Congress attempted to
rectify the problem of state chief executives in the field
demanding control of Continental troops, by adopting a
resolution that provided that when a chief executive acted
in conjunction with Continentals they would be considered
Jenkins, Button Gwinnett, pp. 144-145; Lyman Hall
to Roger Sherman, May 16 [-June 1], 1776, ibid., pp. 228-229;
Charles C. Jones, Jr., "The Life and Service of the Honorable
Major Gen. Samuel Elbert of Georgia," MH extra no. 13 (1887):
12; Burton Barrs, East Florida in the American Revolution,
pp. 23-25.
^^Ibid., pp. 31-34; Moultrie, Me^moi£5Jgf_the American
Revolution, 1:230-231; Minutes of a Council of War, ibid.,
236; William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, July 26, 1778, ibid.,
239; Thomas Pinckney to [Harriott Horry], July 11, 1778,
Jack L. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas Pinckney, 1775-1780,"
SCHM 58, no. 3 (July 1957): 159; John Fauchereau Grimke,
"Journal of the Campaign to the Southward. May 9th to
July 14th, 1778," SCHGM 12, no. 4 (October 1911): 196, 200-
206 ; Hugh F. Rankin, 'HieJ^r th_Caro]j£ia_Con^^
pp. 190-191; Ford, JCC, 11:55.
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6 9Continental major generals. What Congress was not able
to resolve clearly was the problem of state chief executives
and state legislatures not allowing their state troops and
militia to be subject to the control and direction of the
Continental officers v/hen the need arose.
Samuel Adams, at the beginning of the war, was very
adamant about not wanting the militia placed under the
direction of Continental generals, at least not until such
time as a truly Continental government was established. He
wrote Elbridge Gerry that "it is always dangerous to the
liberties of the people to have an army stationed among them,
over which they have no control." "There is," he added, "at
present a necessity for it; the continental army is kept up
within our colony, most evidently for our immediate security.
But it should be remembered that history affords abundant
instances of established armies making themselves the
masters of those countries, which they were designed to
protect. There may be no danger of this at present, but it
should be a caution not to trust the whole military strength
of a colony in the hands of commanders independent of its
established legislative." Gerry agreed in part with his
mentor, believing, however, they must be practical about
letting the militia serve under Continental officers. He
believed this could be safely done only if the military
^^Ibid., 17:777
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establishment was kept entirely subordinate to the civil
authorities in every part of the continent . "^^
Although there were many instances of the militia
and state troops being ordered by the state governments to
cooperate with and subordinate themselves to Continental
officers, there were just as many examples of a lack of
cooperation, and confusion when they served together. There
were even problems regarding the question whether some troops
were raised as Continental or as state troops, as was the
case in New York, Rhode Island, and South Carolina.^''" An
additional problem was David VJooster (a Continental briga-
dier general and a Connecticut militia major general), who,
during 1775 and 1776 used the confusion resulting from his
dual commissions to subordinate himself to civilian and
. . . . 72Continental authorities as it suited his own desires. The
real problem with respect to Continental control of militia
70 Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, October 29, 1775,
Austin, Elbridge Gerry
,
1:120, 119-120; Elbridge Gerry to
Samuel Adams, October 9, 1775, Force, Amer i can Archives ,
4th ser., 3:994; Same to same, December 13, 1775, Gerry-
Knight Papers 1713-1825, MHS
.
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and the American Revolution , p. 70; Journals of the
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r775-177"6 -177 7 , 1 : 422;" Cowe 11,' Spirit of '76"""in Rhode^
Island7~ppT~lT6 , 130-13 3; Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion:
The Swamp Fox, p. 23.
Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command
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and state troops related to large extent to the degree to
which these troops would be subject to the Continental
Articles of War.
During the first two years of the war, Congress
attempted to establish the fact that when the militia served
in conjunction with Continental soldiers they would be
73
subject to the Continental Articles of War • Some states
74
readily accepted this policy, but most did not. One
southern leader , Thomas Burke
,
totally opposed allowing any
state or militia troops to be subject to Continental Arti-
cles of War
,
believing citizen soldiers should be subject
75
to civilian authority, not to military court martials.
During the summer of 1776, South Carolina's chief executive
would not allow his state's militia serving with General Lee
to be subject to Continental Articles of War. This so upset
Lee that he wished that Congress would not suffer the
militia to exist, unless they were brought under some uni-
7 6
form system that allowed for Continental control. That
-^^Ford, JCC, 3 : 352; 5:805
Minute s of^the Provincial Cong r£ss_and___the_Council
of Safety of the~State~of New Jersey, pp. 2 61-2 62.
"^^Thomas Burke's Abstracts of Debates, Burnett, LMCC,
2:277; Thomas Burke's Remarks concerning the Confederation
[November 15, 1777], ibid., 557.
^^Charles Lee to John Rutledge, August 6, 1776,
(three letters of that same date), "The Charles Lee Papers,
NYHSC, 5 (1873): 200, 200, 200-202; Same to same, July 22,
rmT ibid., 156; Charles Lee to Richard Peters, August 2
1776 ; ibid., 190; Hemphill, Journal s^of the
noneraLAs_sem_bly
and House of Representatives, 1776-1780, p. 215.
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summer, Washington complained to Congress about the militia
not following the Articles of War, and expressed his opinion
7 7the militia would be the ruin of their cause. The problem
resurfaced in South Carolina again in 1779, as Lincoln
constantly lobbied to have the militia subject to the
Continental Articles of War. He was unsuccessful in his
attempt, as the legislature ruled that under no circumstances
would they allov; their militia to be subject to Continental
Articles of war. This policy was even endorsed by numerous
South Carolina Continental officers, including General
7 8
Moultrie. Continental officers had difficulty in other
southern states, as well, as it was difficult to convince
the state leaders that the militia would be more useful if
7 7
George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Wa shington , 6:111, 112.
"^^Benjamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 26,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to Andrew Williamson, August 28,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook #33, 1:31, BPL: Benjamin
Lincoln to George Washington, November 7, 1779, Sparks,
Correspondence_^f_the_AiT^rican_Re\^^ 2 : 345; Benjamin
Lincoln to Francis Marion, November"^5, 1779, Gibbes,
Documentary_lU£tory_of_the_^^
.
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they were more disciplined and subject to Continental court
79
martials
.
Just as problems resulted from the militia and state
troops not being subject to Continental Articles of War, so
did problems result as a lack of clear understanding regard-
ing command authority when Continental and state forces
served together. During the first year of the war, Congress
established a precedence of rank for Continental, state, and
militia soldiers when they acted in conjunction with each
other. Although precedence was established for officers of
equal rank. Congress did not clearly establish the prece-
dence among the officers of different grades of the various
categories of soldiers. Some states did, thereby causing
8 0
confusion and disputes. But beyond the question of
precedence of rank, was the more basic question of who would
indeed command when Continental and state forces acted in
conjunction. This question was raised many times during the
war, and generally not resolved to everyone's satisfaction,
particularly not to that of the Continental officers.
Almost from the first days of the war, there existed
a problem for the Continental officers with respect to their
authority to command state troops and militia. During the
^^Georeg Weedon to Baron von Steuben, April 1, 1781,
Boyd, Pape rs of Thomas Jgffg££gll/ 5:276n.l.
^^Ford, JCC, 3:326; Hemphill, Extracts from__the
Journ
a
ls of the Provinc i al_Congre sses of South Carolina 1 77 5
l7767~p. 14 2; Clark, NCSR, 10':199; l6:vi-vii; 24:2'.
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summer of 1777, when General Schuyler ordered a Vermont
regiment of rangers to Saratoga, the Vermont Council of
Safety instructed them to remain in Vermont to guard their
own frontier. Also that summer, the Schoharie and
Schenectady Committees of Safety often countermanded the
orders Continental Colonel Goose Van Schaick gave their
militia. New Hampshire state troops under General Stark
refused to be subject to the command of Continental generals
during the summer and fall of 1777
,
and the New Hampshire
8
1
lesgilature would not force them.
About the same time. Commodore Hazelwood of
Pennsylvania's navy, who commanded a small flotilla on the
Delaware River, refused to cooperate with or subordinate his
forces to Samuel Smith, who commanded Fort Mifflin, the main
fort the British had to take in order to capture Philadel-
phia. Hazelwood ignored pleas from both Greene and
Washington, believing he was a better judge of the best
8 2
defenses necessary to protect the forts on the Delaware.
Agnes Hunt, The Provincia l Committees of Sa fety
of the American Revolution, pp. 37-38; Goose Van Schaick to
Philip Schuyler, August 4, 1777, Hastings, Public Papers of
George Clinton , 2:169; Benjamin Lincoln to Philip Schuyler,
August 8 , 1777 , Burnett, LMCC , 2 : 456-457n . 2
.
^^George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, November 17, 1777, Fitzpatrick,
Writinas of Washington, 10:73-76; George Washington to
I^ii^rw'^ir^t^HT^October 25 , 1777 , ibid., 9 : 427-428 ; John
Hazelwood to George Washington, October 26, 1777, Sparks,
Correspondence of the_Amer ican_Re\^ut ion , 2:18-21; The
P^sylvania St^'e Navy Board to Thomas Wharton, October 30,
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During the spring of 17 79, Colonel Brodhead began what was
to be an ongoing debate with the county lieutenant of
VJestmoreland County, Pennsylvania, on the question of how
8 3
best to utilize the county's rangers. Most debates
between the Continental officers and the state civil and
militia leaders with respect to command authority took
84
place in the south, particularly after 1780.
Problems in the south began during the summer of
1776 in South Carolina, when that state's chief executive
and General Lee frequently debated whether Lee would be
allowed to command the state's militia which fought with
his Continentals.^^ Lincoln expended much energy arguing
1777, Hazard, Penn sylvan i_a_A£chlves, 1st ser., 5 :723 ; James
Mitchell Varnum to George Washington, November 19, 1777,
John F. Reed, Campaign to Vallei^Forge_Jul^l^^^77^
December 19, 1777"(PhTladelphia : University of Pennsylvania
Press 19651 pT~32 5; Ebenezer David to Nicholas Brown,
November 11, 1777, Black, AJRhode^Island_Ch^ p. 64;
Same to same, November 23, 1777, ibid., p. 68; John W.
Jackson , The Pennsylvar^_I^vylL75^Z^
Delaware, 'TT^437'^WiUace, WilT^m_Bradford , pp. 428-440 .
^^Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, June 5, 1779,
Ha7ard Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:466-467;
Lewis S.
shi^e i 1T^ifioi^i^^
tion, pp. 109-110.
^^Rankin, FrancisJ^arionj^^ PP • 105-106
^^Charles Lee to John Rutledge, July 5, 1776,
"The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 123,-
^ame to same,
; 1 on I77fi ibid "TSOT Same to same, July 22, 17/b,
''k X I'si D;avton"Memolrs of the American Revolution,
2^280 ; Ed!4rfM^SadyTWlT^^^
Revolution I^TS^ITSO' pp. 140-141.
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with the South Carolina civilian authorities over the same
question during 1779 , as did General Howe the previous year
with South Carolina's and Georgia's leaders with respect to
8 6
commanding their militia, who served with his Continentals.
During 1781, Greene constantly had problems in the south
regarding what control he had over the disorganized state
lines , state troops , militia , and partisan units . Greene
spent much of 1781 debating with South Carolina's military
leaders the necessity of them cooperating with him, rather
than carrying on a partisan war. He also spent a consider-
able amount of time attempting to get the southern state
governments to allow him to use their troops as he desired.
In the instance of South Carolina he v/as not that successful,
8 7
as the government itself was barely functioning.
A major reason the Continental officers were unable
to have state forces cooperate with them was because the
governments of the states frequently put their own safety
ahead of that of their neighbors or the country as a whole.
^^Beniamin Lincoln to Rawlins Lowndes, January 26,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS, (Microfilm
Reel #3), Benjamin Lincoln to John Rutledge, February 19,
1779 ibid , John Fauchereau Grimke, "Journals of the
Cam-
paigA to ti;; southward. May 9th to July 14th, 1778 ,"
SCHGM.
12, no. 4 (October 1911): 194-195, 202-203.
^^Robert D. Bass, Gamecock^ Lile_and_CajTipaJ^n^^
Thomas Sumter, pp. 120-212; Anne King Gregorie,
W^I^S^^^^TSS'; S^thanael Greene to William Henderson,
A^^^riTrrySl, Greene, Na thanael _Greene , 3:380, M t.
Treacy, Prelude to Yorkto^The_Soutl^^
Nathanae]rG^eene,__ll80;^7^, p. 77.
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Years after the war, James Robertson was quoted as saying
"Whether we were Virginians or Carolinians we asked and
cared not; for we were all for the general Congress and for
8 8
VJashiny ton . " Robertson's inomory must have failed him,
for this was not tlie case, cjither at tlie end, and certainly
not at the beginning of the war. Fifteen years before the
war, an English traveller expressed his doubts of the
colonies ever uniting in a common cause, for like "fire and
water are not more heterogeneous than the different colonies
in North T^erica." DoKalb, after visiting the colonies in
1768, reported it would be difficult for the colonies to
89
unite, althoucjli he believed it would happen eventually.
The reasons for tliese beliefs was the fact that, despite
some commonly held beliefs, values, forms of government, as
well as language and religion, the colonies envisioned
themselves as separate nations, within the British empire.
If any unification was to take place, the states generally
90
looked no further than to their section. Thus, because
^^James R. Gilmore (Edmund Kirke) , The_Rear Guard of
the Revolution (New York: D. Appleton Company, 1889) , p. 143
^
^Andrew Burnaby, Travels Through the Middle Settle-
ment in North-America in the Years 1759 and 1760. With
Observations Upon the State of the Colonie s, 2d^d . (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, T960), p. 113; Jc^hn DoKalb to nuc
de Choiscul, February 25, 1768, Kapp, Kalb, p. 63.
^°John Adams to Joseph Hawley, November 25, 17 75,
Adams, works of John Adams , 9:366-367; Merrill Jensen, The
Artie les of Confederation:' An Interpre t a t ^ on_o^ the Soc^
a 1
-
Constitution al History of the American Revolution 1774-im
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), p. j6.
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each state considered itself a sovereign body, with its own
interests and destiny, it was not surprising then, that
state governments would look to their own safety than that
of the colonies as a whole.
Very early in the v;ar the military came to realize
the need for united action by all the colonies, and began
urging the colonial governments to put aside their self-
91interest and sectional concerns. Washington certainly
believed that only united action would allow for a military
victory. Responding to Rhode Island establishing its own
military forces for defensive purposes, Washington told
Governor Cooke that "If each state was to prepare for its
own defence, independent of the others, they would all be
92
conquered in a short time, one by one." Greene was
perhaps the most outspoken about the necessity for doing
Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington, March 11,
1778 [draft], Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel
#2); Samuel H. Parsons to [?] , February 10 , 1777 , Hall,
Samuel Holden Par_sons, p. 89; John Sullivan to the New
Hampshire Cominittee of Safety, August 5, 1775, Hammond,
Letters and Paper s__o£_John_^l^ljA7gj]_, 1:73.
^^George Washington to Nicholas Cooke, January 20,
1777
,
Bartlett, Records_of Rhode_ Inland, 8:114; see also
George Washington to"Joseph Reed, April 15, 1776, Fitz-
Patrick, Writing s of Wash ington, 4:483; George Washington
to the President of the Continental Congress, December 20,
1776 , ibid . , 6:405.
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9 3
away with colonial and sectional distinctions. "For my
own part," he wrote from the siege of Boston during the fall
of 1775, "I feel the cause and not the place. I would as
soon go to Virginia as stay here." Two months later, he
wrote, "The Interest of one Colony is no way incompattible
with that of another. VJe have all one common interest and
one common wish; to be free from parliamentary Jurisdiction
94
and Taxation .
"
Late in 1777, Greene expressed the opinion that "it
cannot be expected from the local prejudices of mankind that
the several legislative bodies will be willing to strip
themselves of their inhabitants, & lessen their own internal
safety unless they are well persuaded the measure is essen-
95
tial to their own happiness and security." At times the
states were persuaded of the necessity of cooperating with
one another, and there were many instances of cooperation
among and between the states as desired and requested by the
^^Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, July 22, 1776,
Showman, Papers of General Nathanael_Greene , 1:260; Same to
samr s4pt¥fnb^~237T7757~Rirscr6 (1867): 126; Nathanael
SeeAe to Thomas j4f fersonT^^e 27 , 1781, Greene, Nathanael
Greene , 3:556.
^^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 16, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, 1, WLCL; Same to same,
December 31,
1775, ibid.
^^Opinion of Nathanael Greene [December 1, 1777],
Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed . , Defences_^,Phila^^
1777, p. 221.
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military. But there were just as many instances of a lack
of cooperation, and in fact, some states took actions which
harmed their neighbors and the military. These actions
included prohibitions on recruiting by officers of other
states; establishment of embargoes on food stuffs, and
refusals to supply weapons to soldiers of another state,
except under great pressure, and not at all in one
• ^ 96instance
.
The states, concerned about self-preservation,
sacrificed the good of the whole by undertaking various
offensive operations; raising their own infantry, horse,
and artillery units for self-defense; and by relying on the
militia, at the expense of endorsing Continental enlist-
9 7
ments. These actions were upsetting to the Continental
officers. With respect to the states relying on their
militia and short Continental enlistments, Washington
^^Henry J. Yeager, "The French Fleet at Nev/port,
1780-1781," [memoirs of the Chevalier de Lillebresme] , RIH
30, no. 3 (August 1971): 90; Mcllwaine, Journals of the
Council of Virginia , 1:122, 271, 332; Chandler, Revolutionary
Ri^rds of Georgia , 1:223 , 2:54 ; Hemphill, Journa l s o f the
GiHefalTAssembly and House of Repre sentatives 1776-1780 ,
pp. 166. 1 68; Clark, NCSR , 10T795-796, 880; 11:357; Philip
Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, January 23, 1777, MHSC, 7th
ser., 2:15; Same to same, March 16, 1777, ibid., 33-34;
Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals , pp. 188-
189, 380.
^"^Upton, RevoUat^^nary^^w^H^ pp. 80-81;
Foster, James Jackson, pp. 16-17; Fred Anderson Berg, Ency_2
clopcdj R^^ZIZ^^^j^l^^^l^^L-^^-^j^^^ Regiments
and Independent Corps", pp. 116-120
.
complained during 1780 that this was "a reflection on the
judgment of a nation so enlightened as we are, as well as
a strong proof of the empire of prejudice over reason. "'"^^
State self-interest led t lie states to be very chary
ahc^iit allowinq I lieir i roops \o 1)0 1 akon frcMii 1 h(M r state to
assist anollicvr wIkmi their own tiLalo was tlnci I (mkhI . Siieh
instances usually upsi^t the Cont i lu n I .il officers, as was
the case when Virginia prevented troops from leaviiuj the
state in 1781 to assist Greene and when Soutli Carolina pre-
vented troops in 1776 from going to Georgia to assist that
state
.
Coinpoimd i nc| 1 he prohltMiis of mi 1 i t ,u y willi
r(^s])Oct to the si atc-Conl i iioiil a] rela l.i onsliip was the
sectional concerns oi the stales. 'I'lu.' cxmsequences of
these concerns were that the New Emjl-iiul :;t<it(^s were loathe
to allow llu^ir soldiers to serve under r,(MUMal Schuyler; and
were even loathe to have their i rofM'^- commanded by offioc-rs
^^George Wasliincjton to VJi 1 1 i am Greene, October 18,
1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode ir.l.uul, 9 :250.
^^Nathanaol Greene to 'I'hoin.i ;•. .UM fcM-son, June 27,
1781, Greene, Nat l ianael Greene , 3:'.^'>'.> ')56; Nallianacl Greene
to Gouverneur Morris, November 21, 1781, Ferguson, Papers
of Robert Morris, 3:229; Charles Lee to John Rutledge,
July ^S, 1776, " The Charles Lee Papers," NYIISC, 5 (1 873):
156; Same to same, July 23 , 1 776 , ibid., 157-160; Same to
same, July 2A , 1776, ibid., U. 3
.
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of any colony other than their own.-^°° Additionally, many
southerners feared early in the war that once the British
were driven from New England, the army, composed chiefly
of New Englanders, would unleash themselves upon them. It
took the election of Washington as commander-in-chief and
assurances by the northern civilian and military leaders
to dispel such fears .
Besides state and sectional concerns causing the
military hardships and hard feelings towards the states and
sections, the military also developed a disliking for those
states which engaged in disputes over territory
,
especially
when such disputes had the effect of undermining Continental
efforts. Duty in and around Fort Pitt brought much grief
Philip Schuyler to Gouverneur Morris
,
September 7
,
1777, Commager, Spirit of 'Seventy-Six , p. 569; Philip
Schuyler to Jonathan Trumbull, July 27, 1111, MHSC , 7th ser.,
2:92; John Jay to Philip Schuyler , September 12 , 1111
,
Lossing, Phil ip Schuyler , 2:306; George Washington to Joseph
Reed , November 8, 1111 , Fitzpatrick. Writings of Washington,
4:11; John Adams to John Winthrop, October"^, 1775 , MHSC ,
5th ser. , 4 :295.
"'"'^"'"John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 11, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC, 1:216; Butterfield, DAJA, 3:321; John
Adams to James Warren, July 6, 1775, "Warren-Adams Letters,"
MHSC, 72 (1917): 76; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr.,
October 16, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL;
Same to same, December 31, 1775, ibid.; Eliphalet Dyer to
Joseph Trumbull, June 17, 1775, Joseph Trumbull Collection,
vol. 1, CSL; Samuel Ward to Henry Ward, November 2 , 1775,
Knollenberg , Corresponden_ce_of_GQvernor Samue l V7ard , p . 116
;
Same to same, December 27, 17 75, ibid., p. 150.
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to the Continental officers stationed there, for the area
was contested for by both Pennsylvania and Virginia. The
military were constantly complaining about the problem of
the Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute, as not only did they have
to expend energies to keep the citizens from both states
from making war upon one another, but found that thoir
ability to mount offensive operations were hampered as a
result. General Hand, in 1777, blamed his inability to
mount an attack on the west on the lack of cooperation
between the Pennsylvania and Virginia governments and
settlers. Hand's successor, Lachlan Mcintosh, also had
difficulty mounting an offensive operation in 1778, and he
became so discouraged that the following year he asked to
be relieved from command . Mcintosh ' s successor, Daniel
Brodhead, a Pennsylvanian , Vs7as cautioned by Washington to
avoid becoming embroiled in the dispute between the two
states; nevertheless he found himself constantly at odds
with the governments, settlers, and soldiers of both states.
He especially had trouble with Virginian, George Rogers
Clark, believing his energies were only being expended to
grab more land for Virginia. Brodhead ' s successor, William
Irvine, throughout 1781 and 1782 expressed his displeasure
about being unable to mount an offense in the west because
of the difficulties still existing between Pennsylvania and
459
Virginia, and because of difficulties surrounding those
that wanted to create a nev; state. ''"^^
The military were also upset about having to become
involved in the difficulties between Connecticut and
Pennsylvania relating to control of the VJyoming Valley.
Congress placed Continental soldiers there not only to
protect the settlers from the enemy, but from each other.
Their instructions were not to get involved in the terri-
torial dispute, but they could not help but become
103involved. Needless to say, the military did not like
102 .Lewis S. Shimmell, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania
During the Revolution
, pp. 74, 125-126, 129; Lachlan
Mcintosh to George Bryan, December 29, 1778, Kellogg,
"Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779," pp. 189-190;
Daniel Brodhead to George VJashington, January 16, 1779,
ibid., p. 200; John Dodge to the President of the Continental
Congress, January 25, 1779, ibid., pp. 206-210; William
Croghan to William Davies, August 18, 1781, Palmer, Calendar
of Virginia State Papers
, 2:346; William Irvine to George
'
Washington, December 2, 1781, Butterfield, Washing
t
on- Irvine
Correspondence
, p. 80; Same to same, April 20, 17 82, ibid
.
,
p. 108; William Irvine to William Moore, December 3, 1781,
ibid., appendix G, p. 232; Same to same, July 5, 1782, ibid.,
appendix G, pp. 247-248; William Irvine to Benjamin Harrison,
April 20, 1782, ibid., appendix H, p. 267; James Marshall to
Joseph Reed, June 5, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives,
1st ser., 9:193; Same to same, June 27, 1781, ibid., 233-234;
Same to same, August 8, 1781, ibid., 343-345; Thomas Scott
to Joseph Reed, October 19, 1781, ibid., 438; Ephraim
Douglass to [?], August 29, 1781, "Notes and Queries," PMHB
4, no. 2 (1880): 247; Herbert Laub, "The Problem of Armed
Invasion of the Northwest During the American Revolution,"
VMHB 42, no. 2 (April 1934): 142.
'''^^George Washington to Zobulon Butler, December 29,
1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington , 21:32; Samuel H.
Parsons to George Washington, January 10, 1781, Hall, Samuel
Holden Parsons, pp. 326-327.
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having to expend their energies on domestic problems,
relating to the Continental-state and state-state conflicts.
Neither did they like the way the states frequently operated,
particularly when it adversely affected their own operations.
Just as the military were critical of Congress for
the way it functioned, so did they frequently express a
similar displeasure with the state governments. Two years
into the war, John Adams wrote that "every nev; government
is as feeble as water, and as brittle as glass," and a year
later, John Jay observed "The wheels of Gov[ernment] like
104
those of a new Carriage do not yet go easy." The mili-
tary certainly believed the state governments were as
brittle as glass and slow as the new wheels of a carriage.
And they complained about it incessantly . "''^^ "The vile
John Adams to James Warren, February 12, 1777,
Adams, Works of John Adams , 9:453; John Jay to Philip
Schuyler, February 6, 1778, Morris, John Jay, p. 465.
"""^^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6,
1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm
Reel #1); Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, April 4,
1779, Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL; Benjamin Lincoln to
George Washington, November 7, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence
of the American Revolution, 2:346; Henry Lee to George
Washingt6n, February 21, 1778, ibid., 2:77; Marquis de
Lafayette to George Washington, May 24, 1781, ibid., 3:322;
Baron von Steuben to George Washington, February 18, 1781,
Boyd, Papers of Thomas_Jefferson , 4:652n.; Robert Howe to
William Moultrie, December 8 , 1778 , Moultrie, f_lemoir s c^
the American Revolution, 1:247; William Moultrie to Charles
pi7^a^?^i77TiKiriFy^l6, 1779, ibid., 265; Anthony Wayne to
Philip Schuyler, March 23 , 1777 , Smith, lli^St Clair Pape_rs,
1.387- Alexander McDougall to [ ], December 22, i//b,
F^rce', American Archives, 5th ser., 3:1364-1365 ; Timothy_
PickeriF^^-T^^R^b^^-pirkering, October 13 , 1777, Pickering,
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water-gruel governments which have taken place in most of
the States are totally disproportioned to the exigencies of
the war, and are productive of sentiments unworthy of an ener-
getic republic," Knox complained during the summer of 1781. -"-^^
What was really upsetting to the military was the inability
of these weak governments to provide them with pay, supplies,
and recruits.''"^'^ Almost as upsetting was the timidity with
which the state governments waged war against the foreign
Timothy Pickering
, 1:175; James Craik to William Smallwood,
April 14, 1782, Thomas Balch, ed., Papers Relating Chie fly
to the Maryland Line During the Revolution
, p. 17 3;
Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 2 3, 1777,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island
,
8:116; Alexander
Lawrence, [ed.], "Journal of Major Raymond Demere," GHQ 52,
no. 3 (September 1968) : 341; Anthony Wayne to V7illiam Irvine,
March 25, 1781, "Letters of General Wayne to General Irvine,
1778-1784," HM 6, no. 11 (November 1862): 339; David Forman
to George Washington, November 7, 1777, Worthington Chauncey
Ford, ed. , Defences of Philadelphia in 1777
, pp. 92-93.
106 Henry Knox to William Knox, July 20, 1781, Drake,
Henry Knox
, p. 66.
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Dan[iel] Morgan to Otho [Holland] Williams,
March 10, 1780, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society
, p. 19;
William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 10, 1779
[extract], Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution ,
1:260; Walter Stewart to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1779,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC , 6 (1874): 304; Tench
Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780, ibid., 11
(1878): 455; Benjamin Lincoln to George Washington,
December 19, 1778, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, Letterbook, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #3); Benjamin Lincoln to Richard Caswell,
March 3, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, 2:12-13, BPL.
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^ ^ a.- 108and domestic enemy.
Part of the reason the states were not energetic
enough, as far as the military was concerned, was because
of the lack of power vested in the chief executives. The
military frequently expressed their criticism of this defect
109m the state governments. They also expressed their
dissatisfaction with the chief executives, often because
of political differences, but also for other reasons, such
as Burke violating his parole and Jefferson insisting he
was not a military man."'"'''^ Not only were the military upset
108 Samuel Patterson to Caesar Rodney, June 22, 1780,
Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney
, pp. 24 7-24 8;
Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, December 12, 1775, "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC , 4 (1872): 226-228; Charles Lee
to Richard Henry Lee, December 12, 1775, ibid., 228; Same
to same, April 5, 1776, ibid., 379; Charles Lee to Edward
Rutledge, April 3, [1776], ibid., 372; Charles Lee to
George Washington, April 5, 1776, ibid., 377; Same to same,
February 29, 1776, ibid., 335; John Stark to the Tryon
County Committee of Safety, June 16, 1778, Stark, John
Stark, p. 163; John Stark to William Heath, September 11,
1781 , ibid., pp. 248-249; Nathanael Greene to Samuel
Ward, Sr., December 31, 1775, Nathanael Greene Papers,
vol. 1, WLCL.
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Baron von Steuben to George Washington,
February 18, 17 81, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson , 4:652n;
Nathanael Greene to [?], June 4, 1777, Johnson, Nathanael
Greene, 1:97; Marquis Francis de Malmedy to Charles Lee,
December 20, 1776, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island , 8:163-
164 .
^'"^ [William Feltman] , The Journal of Lieut. Wil liam
Feltman, of the Fj_ rs^t Pennsv ]A;arn^a_ Reg imen t , 17 81-82 , p. 37;
oTThoT^HToTTand] [Williams] to [James] Mc[Henry], January 23,
17 81, Calendar of the Genera l Otho Hollan_d_Wi^Iliams_Papcrs
in the Maryl^n^jtorica^l_s5crety, p. 3 7; Benjamin Lincoln
to'^^rrmTETedgeT March 2 , 1780 , Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook,
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with the lack of executive power and the executives them-
selves, but they also criticized many state legislators,
believing many of them to be men of small minds, large
prejudices, and self-seeking natures."'""'""'"
There were numerous other reasons which caused the
military to become dissatisfied with the state government,
including various personnel matters. The matter of promo-
tions was a source of constant irritation for the military.
Just as they were frequently upset with Congress for its
appointments and promotions, so too were they upset V7ith
112
the state governments for theirs. And just as they were
Henry Knox to Henry Jackson, June 7, 1777, Revo-
lutionary War Collection, BPL; Nathanael Greene to John
Adams, April 5, 1777, Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The
Revolutionary Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John
Adams," RIH 1, no. 2 (April 1942): 49; [Edward] Giles to
Otho H[olland] Williams, November 15, 1781, Calendar o f the
General Otho Holl and Wil liams Papers in the Maryland
Historrcal Soc iety
, p. 56; Daniel Morgan to Otho H[olland]
Williams7"~MaFch 10 , 17 80, ibid., p. 19.
11?
Officers of the Maryland Line to Nathanael Greene,
December 13, 1780, "Grievances of the Maryland Line," MHM 4,
no. 4 (December 1909): 326-363; Henry Knox to George
Washington, March 27, 1781, [draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #5); Journal of the House of De legates of
the Commonwealth of Vi rginia'; Begun and Held at the_CaDito]^
in the City of Williamsburg." On Monday, jtlie_fifth_day _of_
October. In the year of our Lord One Thousand Seve^_Hundred
and Seventy-Eiglvt (Richmond: Thomas W. White, 1827'), p. 25;
Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina, 3:75; Robert D.
Bass, Gamecockj^TfiTand^
p. 77 ;"Anni"King Gregorie, Thomas Sumter, p. 109; William P.
McMichael, [ed.], "Diary of Lieutenant James McMichael, of
the Pennsylvania Line, 1776-1778," PMHB 16, no._ 2 (1892):
143-144; Josiah Harmer to Anthony Wayne, March 8, 1779,
Charles J. Stille, Ajt tho_ny_Wayne , pp. 176-177 ; Anthony Wayne
to the Conmiittee of^Fleld Officers of the Pennsylvania Line,
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critical of Congress for how it utilized them, so also were
they critical of the state governments, believing they did
not properly utilize their talents. This was especially
true of the southern officers, who were often quite sensi-
tive in matters where they believed their honor was at
stake
.
Commanding generals and other officers who state
governments requested not be allowed to serve in their
states or cominand their troops, were, in most instances,
happy to be removed from the personal and political quarrels
in which they found themselves. Nevertheless, they were
almost always upset with the state governments for making
it known to Congress, Washington, their commanding general,
and the general public they lacked the necessary character
or ability to get along with the civilian authorities.
Among the generals so upset were Howe, Putnam, Arnold, Gates,
March 14, 1779, ibid., p. 175; James Craik to Jeremiah
Wadsworth, August 17, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on the
American Revolution
,
1:67; George Washington to Anthony
Wayne and William Irvine, August 11, 1780, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington , 19:353-358; Arthur St. Clair to
Joseph Reed, February 21, 1779, Smith, The St . Clair Papers,
1:460-461; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, January 23,
1777, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island , 8:116-117.
"''"^Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to William Smallwood,
August 24
,
1776, Thomas Balch, ed., Paper s_Re]^ti^ng_Ch3^^
to the Maryland Line During the Revolution, p. 64;
Hamilton J. Eckenrode", The Revolut"ion~~in Virginia_, pp. 74-76;
Stewart, William Woodfor d," 1:403; Thomas Perkins Abernethy,
Western Lands and the American Revolution , p. 255.
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Sullivan and Mcintosh.
Besides being critical of Congress and the state
governments, the military were critical of the American
people; the people whose lives, liberties, and properties
they were defending. The military were aware, as v;ere most
civilian leaders, of the necessity of the American people
being virtuous for their cause to be successful. If we fail,
one officer wrote his wife, "the Americans can blame only
their own negligence, avarice, and want of almost every
James Lovell to William Whipple, September 17,
1777, Burnett, LMCC , 2:496; Hugh F. Rankin, The North Caro-
lina Continentals
, p. 173; Edward McCrady, The H istory of
South Carolina in the Revolution 1775 - 1780 , p. 330; William S.
Livingston to George Clinton, March 28, 1778, Hastings, Public
Papers of George Clinton, 3:90; George Clinton to Alexander
McDougall
,
April 29 , 1778
,
ibid., 232-233; George Clinton to
Gouverneur Morris, May 14, 1778, ibid., 310; Robert Howe to
Henry Laurens, October 9, 1778, Clark, NCSR , 15:766-767;
William Cutter, The Life o f Israel Putnam, Ma jor-General in
the Army of the American Revolution , pp. 332-33 3; George
VJashington to Horatio Gates, September 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington , 12:505; Joseph Reed to George
Washington, April 24, 1779, Sparks, Correspondence of the
American Revolution , 2:275-278; Scharf, History of Maryland ,
2 : 312n
.
, 321, 329; Button Gwinnett to John Hancock, March 28,
1777, Jenkins, Button Gwinnett , pp. 218-220; see also, ibid.,
pp. 138-140; Alexander A. Lawrence, "General Lachlan Mcintosh
and his Suspension from Continental Command During the
Revolution," GHQ 38, no. 2 (June 1954): 101-141; William
Glascock to the President of the Continental Congress,
May 12, 1780, Lilla M. Hawes, ed . , "The Papers of Lachlan
Mcintosh, 1774-1779," ibid., 39, no. 3 (September 1955)
:
263-264; Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:185-
189; 3:248; Ford, JCC, 8:591, 597, 616; 14:570, 585-606,
670-671, 673; 16:156, 169-170; 20:752-753; Benjamin Lincoln
to Lachlan Mcintosh, May 22, 1780, Benjamin Lincoln Letter-
book, 2:37, BPL.
115public virtue." General Greene, early in the war,
desired that America would open her ports to the world, but
realized, as he warned one member of Congress, "it will be
necessary to keep a check upon commerce, lest it take the
lead of military pursuits." It was not the time, he main-
tained, to get rich, but to secure v;hat they had."'""''^ Yet,
Greene knew, as did most military leaders, most Americans
were exceedingly avaricious, commerce being their genius."'""'-'^
Greene's fears were realized as, by the second year of the
war, it was apparent to the military that many civilians
had lost whatever virtue they may have had, and were expend-
ing their energies in making profits at the expense of the
needs of the war effort, and therefore, the military."''"'"^
115Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 6,
1778, Pickering, Timothy Pickering
, 1:211.
'"^^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 23,
1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Same to same,
December 31, 1775, ibid.
117Same to same, December 18, 1775, ibid.
118Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering,
August 10, 1777, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., August 6,
1777, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8 (1876):
449-450; Marinus Willett to John Jay, December 17, 1777,
Morris, John Jay
, p. 456; John Glover to Jonather Glover
or Azor Orne , June 17, 1777, Russell W. Knight, ed .
,
"General John Glover's Letter Book," HCEI 112, no. 1
(January 1976) : 13
.
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During 1778 and 1779, the military becaine more dis-
illusioned with the American people. While the army at
Valley Forge suffered, Greene was convinced that the
American people were only interested in making money,
regardless of what happened to the army and the war itself.
He complained that "Money becomes more and more the
T^ericans' object." About the same time, John Laurens
observed "it is no less a fact that in every town on the
continent, luxury flourishes as it would among a people who
12 0had conquered the world." "Where," the Adjutant General
asked the last week of 1778
,
"is that boasted patriotism so
119Tench Tilghman to James McHenry, January 25, 1779,
Steiner, James McHenry
, p. 25; Nathanael Greene to Samuel B.
Webb, December 21, 17 79, Webb, Samuel B. Webb
, p. 193;
Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, March 22, 1779, Quincy, Samuel
Shaw
, p. 54; Alexander McDougall to Egbert Benson,
February 9, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall
, p. 146;
Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25^ 1119, [Rufus W.
Griswold]
,
Washington and the Generals of the American
Revolution
,
1:298-299; Rufus Putnam to Deacon Davis
,
January [ ], 1779, Miscellaneous Revolutionary Correspond-
ence 1779-1780, WLCL; Nathanael Greene to George Washington,
September 16, 177 8, Greene, Nathana el Greene , pp. 11, 14 3;
Nathanael Greene to Charles Pettit , November 23, 1778, ibid.,
p. 445; Otho [Holland Williams] to [Philip] Thomas,
September 21, 1779, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 15;
jeremiah~Wadsworth~~to Nathanael Greene, August 7, 1779,
Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers, CSL.
12 0
Nathanael Greene to [ ? ], February 7, 1778,
Johnson, Nathanael Greene , 1:16 3; John Laurens to Henry
Laurens, April 11, 177 8, Simms, The Army Correspondence of
Colonel John Laurens, p. 157; see also Samuel Smith to James
McHenry, February lO" , 17 7 8 , The James Mc HeiTry_P ape_rs
,
(Auction Catalogs) Parke-Bernet Galleries , Inc., 2 vols.
(Nev7 York: Parke-Bernet Galleries Inc., 1944), 2:100.
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much talked of at the Beginning? I absolutely begin to
doubt whether the Americans in general deserve the Blessings
of Freedom, & Independence. They are such Slaves to sordid
Avarice." "The people of America," one officer wrote his
parents during the summer of 1779, "seem to have lost sight
entirely of the noble principle which animated them at the
commencement of it." Ke complained the "patriotic ardor"
had given way to "avarice." Earlier that year, Tench
Tilghman complained that America had advanced as far in
luxury in the third year of their independency as "the old
musty Republics of Greece and Rome did in twice as many
121hundred." Washington shared these sentiments.
Throughout 1778 and 1779, Washington expressed his
concern about and displeasure with the American people's
avarice, extravagance, and speculation; their lack of
122
virtue. "Speculation, peculation, and insatiable thirst
121Alexander Scammell to [ ] Scammell, December 30,
1778, Miscellaneous Revolutionary Collection, West Point
Library; Samuel Shaw to Mr. and Mrs. Shaw, June 28, 1779,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw
, p. 58; Tench Tilghman to James McHenry,
January 2 5 , TT7'9 , Steiner, James McHenry, p. 25.
12 2George Washington to George Mason, March 27, 1779,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington , 14:300; George Washing-
ton to John Augustine Washington, November 26, 1778, ibid.,
13:335; Same to same. May 12, 1779, ibid., 15:60; George
Washington to Lund Washington, May 29, 1779, ibid., 180;
George V7ashington to Gouverneur Morris, May 8, 1779, ibid.,
25; George Washington to William Fitzhugh, April 10, 1779,
ibid., 14:365; George Washington to Burwell Bassett, April 22,
1779, ibid., 432; George Washington to James Warren, March 31,
1779, ibid., 312; George Washington to Robert Howe, Novem-
ber 29, 1779, ibid., 17:144.
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for riches seems to have got the better of every other
consideration and almost of every order of Men" he complained
to Benjamin Harrison during December 1778. A year later, he
told Henry Laurens that virtue and patriotism were almost
gone, as "Stock jobbing, speculating, engrossing,
. . . seems
to be the great business of the day.""'"^^
During the winter of 1779-1780, the military's poor
opinion of the American people increased, as it appeared to
many soldiers that their existence was getting worse while
that of the citizens was getting better, at the expense of
not only the soldier in the field, but also of his family
at home. This opinion hardened during the spring and summer
of 1780, and created a situation where the Continentals were
ready to give up the war effort and/or turn against the
124
civilians. One officer, in camp near Morristown early in
12 3George Washington to Benjamin Harrison
,
December 18 [030], 1778, ibid., 13:467; George Washington
to Henry Laurens, November 5, 1779, ibid., 17:73.
124 Philip Van Cortlandt to Pierre Van Cortlandt,
March 23, 17 80, Judd, Memoir and Selected Correspondence of
Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 152; Baron De Kalb to Baron Holt-
zendorff. May 28 , 17 80 , Kapp, Kalb , p . 18 4 ; Jeremiah
Wadsv;orth to Nathanael Greene, July 15 , 1780 , Jeremiah
Wadsworth Papers, CSL; Same to same, August 17, 1780, ibid.,
Udny Hay to George Clinton, Septem.ber 13, 1780 , Hastings,
Public Papers of George Clinton , 6:226; James Duncan to
John Clark, July 28, 1780, "Original Documents," xMH 2
(1905) : 67
.
470
17 80, wrote that when he entered the army he had expected
hardships and sufferings, but not because the army would
be sacrificed "to Aggrandize a few D-d dirty Rascals." He
believed that "by their Conduct," the American people,
"deserve to be Slaves to British Master s ." "'•^^ "It really
gives me pain," General Paterson wrote during March 1780,
"to think of our public affairs; where is the public spirit
of the year 1775? ^^There are those flaming 'patriots' who
were ready to sacrifise their lives, their fortunes, their
all, for the public?" "I once thought America had virtue
to encounter the greatest difficulties firm and unshaken,"
he wrote two months later, "but her conduct shows how weak
my Supposition was; indeed, I am fully persuaded the Doctrine
of total Depravity (which we have so long denied) is true,
12 6
and that there is no virtue in man." Later that summer,
Ebenezer Huntington expressed the view held by many officers,
when he wrote "I despise My Countrymen. I wish I could say
I was not born in America. I once gloried in it but am now
127
ashamed of it- [ . ]
"
125Ebenezer Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
January 8, 1780, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923):
"""^^John Paterson to William Heath, March 31 , 1780 ,
MHSC, 7th ser., 5:45; Same to same, May 7, 1780, Egleston,
John Paterson
, p . 115.
12 7
Eb[enezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
July 7, 1780, Blanchfield, Letters Writ ten by Ebenezer
Huntington, p. 87.
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During 1781, the military continued to express their
dissatisfaction with their countrymen . "'"^^ The chief
geographer of the army, in May wrote a friend at Rutgers
College, "Justice [,] patriotism and charity are fled
America [.] sordid Avarice has swallowed us up [
. ] Instead
of gratitude and rewards the Army the benefactors of the
129Country Meet with neglect- [.]
"
Expressions of dissatisfaction with the Amierican
people subsided somewhat during the last two years of the
war. Nevertheless, many soldiers believed, as will be
discussed in chapter nine, as did an artillery officer v;ho
wrote late in 1782 that he had "sacrificed my all in the
service of an inconsiderate . . . people . "'""^'^ Washington
certainly believed the American people were controlled by
12 8William McCraw to William Davies, August 10, 1781,
Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers , 2:311; Jeremiah
Wadsworth to Samuel H. Parsons, February 12, 1781, Hall,
Samuel Holden Parsons , p. 322; Arthur St. Clair to George
Washington, April 15, 17 81, Smith, The St. Clair Papers ,
1:547; Thomas Sumter to Nathanael Greene, January 29, 1781,
"Letters to General Greene and Others," SCHGM 16, no. 3
(July 1915) : 98.
"""^^Simeon De Witt to John Bogart, May 8, 1781, [John
Bogart] , John Bogart Letters: Forty-Two Letters Written to
John Bogart of Queen's College Now Rutgers College and Five
Letters Written By Him, 1776-1782, Rutgers College Publica-
tions, 2d ser . (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers College,
1914)
,
p. 30.
"'"^'^Sebastian Bauman to Henry Knox, November 7, 1782 ,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10).
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"every selfish passion" and had replaced public interest
with private interest, and in the process ignored the plight
of the army.
One result of the military's constant criticism of
Congress, the state governments, the Continental-state
relationship, and the American people, was the weakening of
the civil-military relationship. And out of this weakened
relationship grew the conditions by which the military
became a threat not only to civilian control, but to the
lives, liberties, and properties of the American people.
The next chapter will demonstrate the degree to which the
American military violated the principles of civil supremacy,
and in the process made war on the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people they were fighting to defend.
131George Washington to John Laurens, June 10, 1782,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
24:421; see also George
Washington to James McHenry, October 17, 1782, ibid., 25:269.
CHAPTER VIII
THE MILITARY MAKES WAR ON LIFE
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
The military, frequently displeased with the
policies and actions of Congress, the state governments,
and the American people, often ignored the desires of the
civilian governments and the will of the people, giving
primacy to their own. In doing so they took actions, with
respect to life, liberty, and property, which constituted
challenges to the principles of civil supremacy and the
concept of civilian control. This chapter will discuss
these actions and challenges, as well as the responses of
the civilian and military leaders. The next chapter will
discuss the serious threats to the established civilian
governments; those instances where the plans and actions
by the military were not only a threat to life, liberty,
and property, but to the revolution itself.
For the most part, the military not only shared with
the civilians the belief in civil supremacy, but generally
acted upon it. However, lack of confidence in the civilians,
and military necessity, at times prompted the military to
take actions which challenged civil supremacy and civilian
473
474
control. These actions, which took place throughout the
war, were often preceded by ultimatums or very strongly
worded suggestions, generally in the form of letters to the
civilian leaders, stating that if the civil government would
not act to satisfy the needs of the military, the latter
would act."'"
Such ultimatums and suggestions were rare during
the first two years of the war. But by 1777, when it
appeared to the military that the civilian governments were
not adequately supporting them, the military did not hesi-
tate threatening the civilian authorities. John Cadwalader
informed the Pennsylvania Council of Safety during January
1777 that "We wish to see the Civil authority regulate and
direct all our public measures, and should greatly lament
the Necessity which may compel the Military power to take
the direction into their hands in order to save this Country
from absolute ruin," however, he continued, "you may depend
that the Military will exert its authority whenever the
weakness, languor, or timidity of your Councils shall render
it their duty so to do, and all the World will justify them
Philip Schuyler to James Duane, June 5, 1779,
Miscellaneous Manuscripts, 1779-1780, WLCL; Samuel H.
Parsons to Jonathan Trumbull, November 2, 1777, MHSC, 7th
ser
.
, 2:183.
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2in It." More specifically, John White, during the fall
of 1777, while inarching his Georgia regiment through North
Carolina, informed the chief executive of that state that
if he was not loaned money to feed his troops he would turn
them loose on the land and its inhabitants. Early in 1779,
John Sullivan twice informed the Rhode Island chief execu-
tive that despite being a zealous advocate of civil authority
he would either dismiss his troops or turn them loose on
the state's inhabitants unless the legislature acted to
supply his troops. The following winter, John Rogers, the
military commander at Kaskaskia in Illinois, constantly
threatened the local and Virginia civilian authorities with
the alternative of either supplying his command or having
3them seize what they needed
.
During the last year of the war, upon learning the
South Carolina legislature was unable to supply his army
with forage by means of impressment, Greene wrote Governor
2Address from John Cadv/alader et al., from Morns-
town to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, January 15, 1777,
"Selections from the Military Papers of General John
Cadwalader," PMHB 32, no. 2 (1808): 161.
Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals ,
p. 131; John Sullivan to William Greene, January 5, 1779,
Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:482-485;
Same to same, January 16, 1779, ibid., 493; John Rogers to
the Magistrates of Kaskaskia, November 10, 1780, Alvord,
"Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," pp. 206-207; Same to same,
January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 211; Petition of the Inhabitants
of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, ibid.,
p. 234.
Guerard a threatening letter. "Due respect shall ever be
paid to the Laws of the State when it is possible," Greene
maintained, but his horses were starving. "it has always
been my wish, and it shall ever be my study, to act conform-
able to the Laws of every State where it is possible, but
there are cases where it is not." This was one of those
instances, Greene stated, threatening to impress on his own
authority unless the state acted. ^ Although most of the
threatening letters related to their physical needs, many
involved state conduct towards the Tories. During March
1779, McDougall informed Clinton that if the New York
civilian authorities did not assist him in handling the
Tories, he would do so on his own, despite looking like a
tyrant. Earlier in the war. General Lee informed the
Virginia comjnittee of Safety that if they did not act to
remove peacefully the Tories from the Norfolk and Princess
5
Ann areas he would do so at the point of a bayonet. Fre-
quently such threats were carried out, both with respect
to the Tories and supplies.
"^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 9 , 1783 ,
Letters By and To General Nathanael Greene with some to his
Wife (William A. Read Collection), 1 : 28 , WLCL.
^Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, March 14,
1779 , Hastings, Public Papers of Georg_e_C]J-ntqn , 4:632 ;
Charles Lee to the President of' the Virginia Committee of
Safety, April 8, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4
(1872): 393-394; see also Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge,
April 3, [1776] , ibid. , 372.
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For the most part, as will be discussed, civilian
leaders were upset with the military for taking unauthorized
military action against the Tories, but they did not expend
much energy in attempting to stop the military, nor in
punishing them. As a rule, the civilian leaders only
responded to unauthorized military action against the Tories
when that action involved oaths, court martials, or in some
way appeared to be a threat to civilian control. With
respect to Tory property, the civilian leaders preferred
the military not seize anybody's property, no matter what
pretext. Property, after all, was a basic right for which
the revolutionaries were fighting to protect.
Most Americans acknowledged the sacredness of private
property, in part because of the wide ownership of land and
property in America and in part because of their English
Whig intellectual heritage. The economic context of the
American Revolution is evident, as most of the ideological
and political slogans were couched in an economic rhetoric
that all Americans could understand, if not all agree upon.
Property, with life and liberty, was what the American VJhig
V7as fighting to protect. That was what the Declaration of
Independence declared during July 1776. A month later in
northern New York, a flag with "Liberty" written on one side
and "Property" on the other was raised over the newly
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constructed Fort Dayton.^
From the beginning of the war, civilian leaders
called for the protection of property, not only from British
arms, but also from American military forces. Most
American military leaders realized the necessity of protect-
ing property, for a variety of reasons, including the belief
that they were fighting to protect the sanctity of property
and the belief that unauthorized seizure of property might
force those that had their property violated into the
British camp. Nobody realized this more than VJashington,
himself a large owner of land and property.
"I never saw any Man so strictly observant of the
preservation of private property," Tench Tilghman wrote of
William B. Scott, In Pursuit of Happiness: American
Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth
Century (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1977)
,
pp. 1-52; Elisha P. Douglass, Rebels and Democrats: The
Struggle for Equal Political Rights and Majority Rule During
the American Revolution (Chapel Hill : University of North
Carolina Press, 1955), p. 146; "Journal Kept During an
Expedition to Canada in 1776. By Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant
in the Third Regiment of New Jersey Troops in the Continental
Service, Commanded by Colonel Elias Dayton. Printed from the
Original Manuscript," PHNHS 2, no. 4 (1847): 183.
-7
Hints for the Consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such
others of the Honble Congress as he Shall judge proper to
advise with thereon [January 1776] , by Joseph Hawley in Paul
Fullman and George M. Elsey, into., "More Hints from Joseph
Hawley January 1776," Publications of the Colonial Society
of Massachusetts , Transactions 34 (1937-1942) : 402;
Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph Reed, February 21, 1778,
Burnett, LMCC , 3:94.
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Washington early in the war. An example of Washington's
concern for private property is evidenced by his stay at
the Ford Mansion during 1779 and 1780. Upon moving in, he
had all the house's articles appropriated for his use inven-
toried. Upon departing, and learning that one silver
tablespoon was unaccounted for, he had one with his initials
on it sent to Mrs. Ford from Mount Vernon. He also had the
Q
house replastered and thoroughly cleaned upon leaving. Not
only did he practice protecting private property, but he
constantly urged others to do so. In one of his earliest
general orders, he reminded the army they were fighting for
"Rights, Liberty and Property." "VJhy did we assemh)le in
arms?" he asked the army in his general orders of Septem-
ber 4, 1777. "Was it not, in one capital point, to protect
the property of our country?""'"'^ He constantly reminded the
army it was not only a disgrace to the name of an American
soldier, but repugnant to the principles of the cause in
which they were engaged, to violate private property."'"''"
^Tench Tilghman to [ ], September 9, 1776,
Tilghman, Tench Tilghman , p. 136.
^Mabel Lorenz Ives, Washington's Headquarters (Upper
Montclair, New Jersey: Lucy Fortune, 1932), p. 207.
"•^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington ,
3:312; ibid., 9:178.
"^"'"General Orders, ibid., 19:348 ; Lauber, Orderly
Books, p. 491.
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Additionally, he frequently reminded the officers of their
obligation to impress upon their soldiers the necessity of
12protecting private property.
Washington's officers complied with his orders with
respect to protecting private property, for the orderly
books are full of reminders to the soldiers to protect their
13fellow citizens' property. Charles C. Pinckney told his
soldiers late in 1775 they should look upon themselves as
the "guardians of the property" of the inhabitants of South
Carolina and "deem it an infamous breach of the trust
reposed in them to destroy, or take av;ay what they are bound
to protect." The following year, Greene informed his
soldiers that "we came here to protect the inhabitants &
12 General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing-
ton, 4:514; Orderly Book of the Seventh Pennsylvania
Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the VJar of the Revolution
,
2:400.
13General Greene's Brigade Orders, "The Orderly Book
of Colonel William Henshaw October 1, 1775, through
October 3, 1776," PAAS 57 (April 16, 1947-October 15, 1947):
120; General Orders, "Orderly Book of the Company of Captain
George Stubblef ield , Fifth Virginia Regiment, From March 3,
1776, to July 10, 1776, Inclusive," VHSC , new ser., 6:146;
"Orderly Book of Gen. John Peter Gabriel Muhlenberg, March 26
December 20, 1777," PMHB 34, no. 2 (1910): 186-187; "Orderly
Book of Capt. Simeon Brov/n, Colonel Wade's Regiment, Rhode
Island Campaign, 1778," HCEI 58, no. 3 (July 1922): 249;
Regimental after orders, "Revolutionary Orderly Book of Capt.
Jeremiah Putnam of Danvers, Mass. in the Rhode Island Cam-
paign. July 10, 1779-December 19, 1779," ibid., 46, no. 4
(October 1910): 344; General Parson's Orders, Ford, Samuel
Blachley Webb, 1:309; Light Infantry Orders, "Revolutionary^^
Army orders for the Main Army under VJashington [17 78-1779],"
VMHB 19, no. 1 (January 1911): 43.
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their property from the ravages of the enemy, but if instead
of support & Protection, they meet with nothing but insult
& outrage, we shall be considered as banditti & treated as
oppressors & enemies." A wing of the army during the summer
of 1780 was reminded "it is true we are Fighting for Liberty
but it is with a View to the free Enjoyment of our Property
and if we dont give Security to the People how can we Expect
they can give Support to the Army, we are called to the
Field not only to Oppose the Enemy but to give protection
to the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants, and if we
fail in the Latter we perform but half our Duty.""'"'^
During 1775, Heath, upon hearing complaints about
the soldiers destroying private property, told Colonel
Prescott that private property should ever be held most
15
sacred. It can be safe to assume that Prescott 's soldiers
continued to violate the sacredness of private property
despite what actions Prescott may have taken after receiving
Heath's admonition. Throughout the war, many soldiers and
officers plundered their fellow citizens' property. Most of
Extract from the Orderly Book of Charles Lining,
Gibbe s , Documentary History of the American Revolution ,
1:244-245; General Greene's orders in Colonel Moses Little's
Orderly Book, Henry P. Johnston, The_ Campaign of 1 776 arounj.
New York and Brooklyn, pt. 2, pp. 6-7; Lauber, OrderlyJBooks
,
pTTSO .
"'"^William Heath to William Prescott, October 8,
1775 , William Heath Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel U) .
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military far from their home area, where
)roperty, particularly if the stranger
.dered less wrong in their eyes, as well
This was especially true early in the
antly New England-manned army plundered
New York, and even in the New York City
summer of 1776, Washington wrote Congress
stop the plundering, "but under the
.'lunder, and want of Laws to punish
Imost as well attempt to remove Mount
.|)n had good cause to complain, for even
D somebody stealing and damaging his
pistols. Other generals suffered as well. Charles Lee had
ITHEAST LIBRARY BINDING CO., INC.
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four of his horses taken by Greene's soldiers; Schuyler had
his property damaged and burned by Major Dearborn's soldiers;
and General Lewis Morris had his Westchester County estate
1
6
Isaac J. Greenwood, ed.. The Revolutionary Services
of John Greenwood of Boston and New York 1775-1783~idited
from the Original Manuscript (New York: De Vinne Press for
Joseph R. Greenwood, 1922), p. 35; The Autobiography of Levi
Hutchins: With a Preface, Notes, and Addenda, By h is Youngest
Son
,
private ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press,
1865)
, p. 28; Ward, The War of the Revolution , 1:69; Edward
Tilghman to William Heath, September 5, 1776, William Heath
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #2)
.
1 n
George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, September 24, 1776, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 6:114.
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plundered by soldiers of Hand's regiment
^
Early in the war the military plundered both Whig
and Tory alike, often simply to obtain booty or because they
were too lazy to cut their own firewood or properly requisi-
tion foodstuffs, but just as often because they needed
19
supplies to survive. This was true during the winters of
201777-1778 and 1779-1780. It was especially true during
the summer of 1780 as the army suffered, starved, and
1
8
Charles Lee to Nathanael Greene, September 12,
1782, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 7 (1875): 35; Richard
Varick to Horatio Gates, October 28, 1777, Howard Sv;iggett,
War Out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers .
Empire State Publication 20 (Port V7ashington, New York:
Ira J. Friedman, 1963), p. 56; Lewis Morris, Sr., to Lewis
Morris, Jr., September 6, 1776, "Letters to General Lewis
Morris," NYHSC , 8 (1876): 442.
19 . .Citizens of Montgomery County to President Thomas
Wharton, August 15, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives
,
2d ser., 3:118-119; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler,
August 27, 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:428; St. Mary's [County]
Committee to the Maryland Council, August 7, 1776, Browne,
Maryland Archives , 12:184; Division Orders, "Revolutionary
Army Orders for the Main Army under Washington [1778-1779],"
VMHB 21, no. 1 (January 1913): 30; George Washington to
Henry Lee, November 29, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
13:357; George Washington to John Sullivan,
July 25, 1777, ibid., 8:469; Joseph Reed to the Continental
Congress Board of War, March 8, 1779, Martin I. J. Griffin,
Catholics and the American Revolution , 3 vols. (Ridley Park
and Philadelphia: Martin I. J. Griffin, 1907-1911), 3:90.
^"^General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly
Book, pp. 297-298; Lord Stirling to George Washington,
January 16, 1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American
Revolution , 2:381; Royal Flint to Jonathan Trumbull,
January 6, 1780, Johnston, Yale and Her Honor-Roll in the
American Revolution, p. 116.
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eventually a portion mutinied.^-'- Late in August 1780,
Greene reported the plundering done by the Pennsylvania Line
was "equal to anything corrmiitted by the Hessians." Two
weeks later, a member of Congress reported that "The army
now lives principally by plunder,
. . . ; and will, if they
keep together I fear, soon become free-booter s . And I think
every man must feel for the inhabitants where the army
marches." In a circular letter to the chief executives of
the northern states in August, Washington reported the army
had assumed "the odious character of the plunderers instead
22
of the protectors of the people." Fortunately for the
northern states, the war, and thus the army, moved southward
during 1780 and 1781, and with them, the plundering.
After learning that soldiers had burned some of his
property in Annapolis, Charles Carroll of Carrollton
complained the "soldiers are very troublesome" and "a great
2
1
General Orders, West Point, "Orderly Book of
Captain Daniel Livermore ' s Company , Continental Army, 1780,"
CNHHS , 9:215; Ebenezer Huntington to Samuel B. Webb,
August 30, 17 80, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 2:282.
2 2Nathanael Greene to George VJashington , August 26,
1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene , 2:207; Ezekiel Cornell to
William Greene, September 10, 1780, Staples, Rhode Island
in the Continental Congress , p. 312; Circular to the
Governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Maryland, August 27, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 19:450.
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nuisance, & I heartily wish they were gone."^^ This was a
wish shared by many southerners, as the soldiers and their
officers increased their plundering in the south after
241779 . ^
Most of the plundering in the south, and much of it
in the north, was practiced by the irregular state forces
and militia, who frequently did not discriminate between
2 5friend and foe. One New Jersey resident reported early in
2 3Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Charles Carroll
of Annapolis, April 5, 1781, Ellen Hart Smith, Charles
Carroll of Carrollton (New York: Russell and Russell, 1942)
,
p. 208.
24 . . .Benjamin Lincoln to Charles C. Pinckney, July 24,
1779, Benjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #3) ; William Henderson to John Rutledge,
August 14, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene
,
3:377; Nathanael
Greene to Alexander Hamilton, January 10, 1781, Syrett,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton
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2:531; Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, January 9, 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed
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2:344;
Nathanael Greene to John Rutledge, July 28, 1781 , William
Johnson, Nathanael Greene
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2:211; William Smallwood to
Horatio Gates, October 21, 1780, Clark, NCSR
,
14:720; John
Jameson to George Washington, September 27, 1780, Sparks,
Correspondence of the American Revolution
,
3:102; John
Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780, Helen Lee
Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim
Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954):
126 .
25Petition of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the
Governor of Virginia, May 4, 1781, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records
1778-1790," 5:234; Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd,
May 21, 1779, ibid., 88-89; Wade Hampton to Nathanael Greene,
July 29, 1781, Greene, Nathanael Greene , 3:342-343; William
Smallwood to Horatio Gates, October 31 , 1780 , Clark, NCSJR,
14:720; William Livingston to the Pennsylvania Council of
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1st ser. , 5 : 238-239 ; Aaron Burr to Alexander McDougall,
January 13, 1779, Matthew L. Davis, Memoirs of Aaron Burr.
With Miscellaneous Selections from his Correspondence ,
1:142-14 3; Alexander McDougall to Georoe Clinton, Janua ry 20,
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the war that "We have not had the enemy among us, but
Staten-Island hath not suffered from the British troops
scarcely the tenth part of the damage this town hath from
2 gthe militia." Greene complained that the militia in the
south were "more allured from the hopes of plunder than from
a desire to serve the public. "^'^ Sumter's irregular force
plundered on a regular basis, in part because their booty
was their compensation for military service. Sumter's
soldiers, as well as other irregular and Continental
soldiers, took much of their plunder from Tories, or those
living in so-called neutral areas, justifying it on the
grounds that if they did not take the property it would be
taken by the British or Tories and used against them.^^
1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton, 4:502;
Philip Schuyler to John Jay, February 1, 17[78T, Morris,
John Jay
, p. 4 64; Lund in. Cockpit of the Revolution
,
pp. 130-131; "Diary of James Allen, Esq., of Philadelphia,
Counsellor-at-Law, 1770-1778," PMHB 9, no. 2 (1885): 196.
2 SAbraham Clark to [ ] Dayton, October 26, 1776,
Force , American Archives , 5th ser., 2:1249.
27Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, May 4 , 17 81
,
Reed, Joseph Reed
,
2:352; see also Nathanael Greene to the
President of the Continental Congress, December 7, 1780,
Greene, Nathanael Greene , 3:546.
2 8Robert D. Bass , Gamecock: Life and Campaigns of
General Thomas Sumter , pp. 202-204; M. F. Treacy , Prelude
to Yorktown : The Southern Campaign of Nathanael Greene 1780-
17 81
,
p~4T:
29John M. Beeckman et al., to George Clinton,
September 10, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George
Clinton, 4:20; James Millen to Robert Howe, .March 9, 1780,
ibIdT7~552-553; VJilliam Heath to George Clinton, October 19,
1781, ibid., 7:418; Victor Hugo Paltsits, Minutes of th e
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Civilian leaders constantly complained about
plundering and frequently asked that it be stopped. So
concerned about the plundering in their state, the Maryland
Council declared "every Act of Violence or Invasion of pri-
vate Property, by the Military, ought to be enquired into,
redressed and, in future, prevented The states provided
Commissioners for Detecting and Defeatincr Conspiracies in
the State of New York: Albany County Sess"Tons~i:7 7 8 -17 8r^"~1:300-301; [Ebenezer Fox]
, The~ Revolutionary Adventures
' ofEbenezer Fox, of Roxbury, Massachusetts^fBostnn r r4nT^;^7^^~7^^
Francis, 1838), pp. 48-49, 51; General Orders, Pennypacker,
Va lley Forge Orderly Book
, p. 131; Colonel William Campbell's
General Orders, Draper, King's Mountain
,
Appendix, p. 532;
Nathanael Greene to Thomas Sumter, April 15, 1781, Edward'
McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution
1780-17837 p. 142.
'
30Henry Laurens to William Thomson, July 13, 1775,
A. S. Sal ley, Jr., The History of Orangeburg County, South
Carolina from Its First Settlement to the Close of the
Revolutionary War
, p. 394; Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Nelson,
Jr., January 12, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
,
4:344; Thomas Nelson, Jr., to Marquis de Lafayette,
August 3, 1781, Mcllwaine, Official Letters of the Governors
of Virginia
, 3:20; Proclamation by John Rutledge, August~l,
1781, Anne King Gregorie, Thomas Sumte r, p. 182; Minutes of
the Executive Council, Chandler, Revolutionary Records of
Georgia, 2:14 8-14 9; Providence Town Council to Horatio Gates,
August 3, 1779, Stone, Our French Allies
, pp. 140-141;
Joseph Reed to the Continental Board of War, March 8, 1779,
Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives , 1st ser., 7:230; Continental
Board of War to Casimer Pulaski, March 9, 1779, ibid., 233,
234; The Maryland Council of Safety to Nathaniel Smith,
January 18, 1777, Browne, Maryland Archives , 16:58; The
Maryland Council to William Smallwood, March 29, 1782, ibid.,
48:117; Jonathan Trumbull to John Tyler, August 27, 1779,
MHSC , 7th ser., 2:428; Ford, JCC, 11:571; Proclamation of
Governor William Livingston, The Pennsylvan i a Packet, or
General Advertiser
,
February 11, 1777.
31The Maryland Council to David Poe, November 25,
17 81, Browne, Maryland Archives, 48:6.
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in their articles of War and in resolutions prohibitions
against plundering by the military. They also adopted
policies they hoped would discourage plundering. New Jersey,
for example, in 1777, ordered that no more than six militia
were to go about without an officer. Colonels of regiments
were expected to enforce this rule. Officers in Rhode
Island were held responsible for the damage done by their
soldiers. Connecticut soldiers, who went on expeditions
to Long Island to capture prisoners, were required to give
bonds not to plunder. To ensure soldiers did not plunder
in a so-called neutral ground in South Carolina, they were
32
removed by order of the government from that area.
Realizing the importance of private property, and
being chastised by the civilian governments because soldiers
had violated private property, many officers took an active
interest in the plundering problem. Washington and other
commanding officers constantly reminded their subordinates
of the necessity of keeping a careful v;atch over their
33
soldiers so as to prevent plundering.
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Greene, for example, told one young officer that
"You cannot treat the inhabitants with too much delicacy,"
. . .
"nor should the least encouragement be given to the
soldiers, either to invade the property of the people, or
offer them any personal insults . -This conduct it is which
has made the British so very odious. "^"^ The officers
constantly issued orders prohibiting plundering, frequently
accompanying such orders with the threat of swift and sure
35punishment. The officers also issued orders prohibiting
General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary Orders of General
Washington
, pp. 27-28; General Orders, Lauber, Orderly
Books, p. 402; General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge
Orderly Book
, p. 54; Division Orders, Orderly Book of the
First Pennsylvania Regiment, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War
of the Revolution , 2:390; Ford, General Orders Issued by
Ma jor-General Israel Putnam
, p. 37; Samuel H. Parson's
Orders, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons
, p. 89; Henry Haller's
Orders, Morton L. Montgomery, History of Berks County ,
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Lachlan Mcintosh's Orders, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., ^he Papers
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297-298 , 300-301; General Orders, Campbell, Orderly Book ,
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The officers also issued orders prohibiting the taking of
property from Tories or property found in so-called neutral
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areas, suggesting that if such property were to be seized
it should be done by or with the approval of the civilian
^ 36governments
.
The officers also took special precautions and other
actions to curb plundering. When Stark took command of the
garrison at Newport, Rhode Island, late in 1779, he had
guards placed in the streets to prevent plundering. At West
Point, because soldiers picked apples and fruit in nearby
orchards, a guard was placed in the orchards to prevent such
practices
.
^"^ Besides having soldiers assigned to stop
plundering, commanding officers often required junior offi-
cers to be quartered with the soldiers, believing their
3 8presence would be a deterrent. As was discussed in chapter
p. 425; General Greene's Orders, Henry P. Johnston, The
Campaign around New York and Brooklyn, pt
. 2, p. 24; General
Sullivan's Orders, ibid., p. 28'.
3 6Benjamin Lincoln to Lachlan Mcintosh, July 15,
1779, Banjamin Lincoln Letterbook, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #3) ; General Orders Issued by General
Lincoln, September 2 , 1777 , ibid. , (Microfilm Reel #2) ;
Tench Tilghman to [ ? ] , March 17, 1777, Tilghman, Tench
Tilghman
, p, 155; General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Wri ting s of
Washington
,
6:8-9, 104-105; 7:109-200; 22:327-328
,
444"^
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(August 1778-May 1780)," SCHGM 16, no. 1 (January 1915): 42;
ibid,, 17, no. 1 (January 1916): 30,
37 Stark, John Stark
, p. 81; General Orders, Lauber,
Orderly Books
, p. 4 02
.
3 R
Division Orders, Orderly Book of the First Penn-
sylvania Regiment , Linn
,
Pennsylvania in the War of the
Revolution, 2:390; Bliven7~Under the Guns, p. 225.
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six, frequent roll calls were employed as a means of keeping
soldiers near camp where they had less chance to plunder.
Additionally, soldiers were often restricted to the distance
39they could be from camp. And besides punishing those
found guilty of plundering, those indirectly involved were
oftentimes punished. For instance, during the summer of
1780, Washington ordered that anybody found around fires
of burning fences would be considered of plundering, whether
40
or not they cut them down. McDougall attempted to limit
plundering by threatening those caught in the act with being
turned over to civilian authorities for trial and punishment
"The consequence," he wrote Clinton, "had been that not a
single panel of fence has been burned" as the soldiers v/ere
more fearful of civil punishment than military punishment
,
especially as the former would have the tendency to lessen
41
their reputation at home.
Plundering was the taking of an individual's pro-
perty by force by individual or small groups of soldiers;
impressing was the seizing of one or more person's property,
often systematically, by a body of soldiers, with or without
^^General Orders, Pennypacker, Valley Forge Orderly
Book
, pp. 166, 168; Lauber, Orderly Books , p. 98.
^^General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
V7ashington , 20 :75 .
^"^Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, November 5,
1778, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, p, 200.
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civilian government approval. Most civilian leaders opposed
impressing, authorized or not, and attempted to have their
governments avoid it whenever possible. Even the word
"impressing," the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council
told Sullivan, was "repugnant." Washington and most offi-
cers also preferred not to impress, unless it was absolutely
necessary. They did not desire to impress as to do so meant
the soldiers were more likely to violate private property in
the process. And more importantly, because taking property,
even with civilian government approval, alienated from the
revolutionary cause those from whom the property v/as
44impressed. St. Clair believed that impressing had not
only the disadvantages just mentioned, but as he told Robert
42William Livingston to George V7ashington, February 16,
1778, Sedgwick, William Livingston , p. 261; Corner, Autobio-
graphy of Benjamin Rush , p. 14 7; Hoadly, Public Records of
the State of Connecticut , 3:288; Duane , Extracts f rom the
Diary of ChrTstopher Marshall , p. 255; A Petition and Remon-
strance from the Freeholders of Prince VJilliam County,
December 10, 1781, by George Mason, Rutland, Papers of
George Mason, 2:706-711; Jonathan Bayard Smith to Joseph
Reed, February 21, 1778, Burnett, LMCC, 3:94.
^^The Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council to John
Sullivan, May 21, 1779, Hammond, Letters and Paper s of John
Sullivan , 3:28-31.
"^"^William Heath to John Sullivan, July 29 , 1778,
ibid., 2:146; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Sim Lee,
April 17, 1781, Browne, Maryland Archives, 47:197; Robert
Lawson to Thomas Jefferson, January 28, 1781, Boyd, Papers
of Thomas Jefferson , 4:460; Richard McCarty to John Todd,
October 14 , 1780 , Palmer, Calendar of Vi rgini a State P ape_rs,
1 : 380; George VJashington to~Wi"lliam Greene, August 27 , 1780,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 9:217.
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Morris, after learning the Board of War had authorized
impressing, "The people are already not a little jealous
of the army, and such an exertion of what will appear to
them military power, can not but produce mischievous
45
effects .
"
The military often went to great lengths to avoid
impressing. During the summer of 1781, Washington drew
nine thousand dollars of the sum of monies sent by Massachu-
setts to pay their troops, and placed it in the hands of
the Quartermaster General with orders to pay for the trans-
portation of the army's supplies. Washington wanted to
avoid impressing teams. Earlier that year, Lafayette to
lessen the impressing burden, whenever possible, impressed
oxen rather than horses. And later that year, to avoid
imposing additional burdens on the citizens of Riclimond,
St. Clair seized some sixty horses being sent from Annapolis
46
to Greene's army m the Carolmas.
Despite their dislike of impressing and attempts to
avoid it, the military were frequently forced into situations
"^^Arthur St. Clair to Robert Morris, November 13,
1777, Smith, The St. Clair Papers , 1:459; see also 458-459.
"^^John C. Fitzpatrick, ed . , The Diaries of George
Washington 1748-1799 , 2:208; Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas
j^ferson, March 17, 1781, Gilbert Chinard, [ed.]. The
Letter s of Lafayette and_ Jef fer so^n , The Johns Hopkins
Studies irTTnternatlonal Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hop-
kins Press, 1929), p. 26; Same to same, April 17, 1781, ibid.,
p. 37; Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, November 14,
1781, Smith, The S t. Clai r Papers^, 1:563-564 .
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where they requested permission from civilian authorities
to impress. Such requests were often accompanied by a
threat to impress, even if authority was not granted. Some
officers, however, did not even request permission or even
threaten before they impressed, as the exigencies of the
war, particularly the lack of supplies, forced them to
impress on their own authority.
In the south, especially after 1780, many commanding
officers, including Armand, Gist, and V7ayne, resorted to
unauthorized impressing when the necessity arose.
Lafayette was perhaps the commanding officer in the Southern
Department who impressed the most without authority. Almost
imniediately after arriving in Virginia, he sent word to
Jefferson that circumstances would oblige him to requisition
goods however unpopular it was. He made a similar declara-
tion to Jefferson's successor, Thomas Nelson, informing him
47 . .Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in
the Continental Congress, January 11, 1782, Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madison
,
4:25; Benjamin Harrison to Charles
Armand-Tuf f in , December 6 , 17 81 , Mcllwaine , Official Letters
of the Governors of Virginia , 3:107; Same to same,
January 3, 1782
,
, ibid
.
, 120 ; Same to same
,
January 1 2
,
1782, ibid., 127-128; Same to same, September 2, 1782, ibid.,
315 ; Mordecai Gist to Thomas Sim Lee , March 3 , 17 81
,
J . Alexis Shriver , Lafayette in Harford County 1781 : An
Account of the Events Attending the Passage of the Marquis
de La Fayett^ and his Troops through Harford County in 17 81
and of Subsequent'^Events , to the Surrender of CornwaTlis
TBelair
,
Maryland : Privately Printed, 1931), pp. 53 -54;
Evans, Thomas Nelson, p. 108.
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that Virginia's governnicnt must understand that often in
sight of the enemy he had been forced to impress without
their approval.
Earlier in the war there was much unauthorized
impressing in the northern theater of operations, particu-
larly in the so-called neutral areas, such as VJestchester
County, New York. A considerable amount of unauthorized
impressing also took place on the frontier, especially at
4 9Kaskaskia and Fort Pitt.
Civilian authorities frequently reprimanded or
punished those officers who impressed without their approval,
especially when mechanisms to obtain needed supplies existed.
48Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 20,
1781, Boyd, Papers of Thoma s Jefferson, 5:189; Marquis de
Lafayette to Thomas Nelson, October 31, 1781, Idzerda,
Lafayette in the Age of the Ame r ican Revolution
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4:434; see
also MarquTs de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, April 17,
17 81, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jeffe r son , 5:477; Same to same,
April 21, 17 8T~rbi:d77 523 .
4 9Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, January 29,
1779, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clin ton , 4:504;
Alexander McDougall to wTlliam Hull, March 28, 1779, Camp-
bell, Willi am Hull
, pp. 278, 279; Solomon Sherwood to
William Hull, April 28, 1779, ibid., p. 281; Lachlan Mcintosh
to the Magistrates of Westmoreland County, October 21, 1778,
Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"
p. 147.
^^Lincoln, Jojurnals of Each Provincial Congre_ss__of
Massachuse tts
, pp. 260-261; John Rutledge to Francis Marion,
OcTober 10, 17 81, Gibbes, Documentary ^J:_s torY.^9.L.J:h%J^I^^^^j-——
Revolution, 3:1 86, 187; John" Mathews "to Francis Ma'rion,
ApriT~rd',~17 82 , ibid., 2:157; Same to same, April 1 8 , 1782 ,
ibid., 167-168; Bernard C. Steiner, We_sjtern_J^arylan_d^ in
Revolution, John Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and^PoTitTcal Science, vol. 20, no. 1 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1902), p. '.0.
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Realizing they would probably be chastised or punished for
impressing without civilian authorization, some officers
attempted to soften the blow by apologizing immediately
before or after they had done so.^"^ They also gave explana-
tions, or justified their actions on the basis of military
necessity, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
Just as protecting property from being ravaged by
the American military forces was of great concern to the
civilians, so too was their concern of keeping their homes
protected from quartering by the military. Quartering was
an important aspect of the Whig revolutionary rhetoric, so
much so that many Whigs maintained that British quartering
was one of the reasons for the break with the mother
52
country. So concerned were the Whigs about quartering
that most state constitutions contained prohibitions against
quartering of troops in times of peace in any house without
the consent of the owner, and generally during war only with
53
the consent of the legislature.
Mordecai Gist to Thomas Simm Lee, April 17, 1781,
Browne, Maryland Archives , 47:197; Marquis de Lafayette to
Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781, Chinard, Lafayette in
Virginia
, p. 7.
^^William Hooper to Robert Morris, February 1, 1777,
NYHSC, 11 (1878): 418; Patrick Henry's Speech before the
Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 16, 1788, Jonathan
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3:411.
^^"Hints for the Consideration of Mr. Gerry and Such
others of the Honble Congress as he Shall judge proper to
advise with thereon," by Joseph Hawley, [January 1776], Paul
Fullman and George M. Elsey, [eds.], "More Hints from JoGoph
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For the most part, the military shared the commonly
held aversion to quartering and therefore went out of their
way to avoid it, by building barracks, using public build-
ings, paying rent, and avoiding towns altogether
.
Despite their efforts to avoid the necessity of
quartering troops among civilians there were instances of
illegal quartering. Generally this was early in the war
when the legislatures had not yet made provisions for other
forms of housing arrangements. Such actions were condemned
by the civilian authorities, as they had little tolerance
for violations against the sanctity of the home.^^
Hawley January 1776," Publications of the Colonial Society
of Massachusetts
,
Transactions 34 (1937-1942): 402; Joseph
Hawley to Elbridge Gerry, February 18, 1776, Austin, Elbridge
Gerry
,
1:162-163; Bouton, Documents and Records Relating to
New Hampshire
, 9:857; Proceedings of the Convention of the
Delaware State
, p. 20; Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, feds.],
The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
, p. 447; Boyd, Papers of
Thomas Jefferson
, 1:378 , 431; William Clarence WebsteF^,^
"Comparative Study of the State Constitutions of the American
Revolution," AAAPSS 9 (January-June 1897): 387.
54Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 2:86;
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island
,
7:532; 9:469; Hoadly,
Public Records of the State of Connecticut
,
1:471-472; Scharf,
History of Maryland^ 2:296; Duane , Extracts from the Diary
of Christopher Marshall
, pp. 115, 116; Balch, Journal of
Claude Blanchard
, p. 75; George Clinton to John Greaton,
January 24, 1776, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton ,
1:218; The Pennsylvania Evening Post , January 25, 1777.
55Nicholas Cooke to William Richmond, March 30, 1776,
Matt. B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of
Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781 ," P_AAS new ser., 36
(April 14-October 20, 1926): 313; Nicholas Cooke to Henry
Babcock, March 30, 1776, ibid., 313; Nicholas Cooke to
George Washington, April 23, 1776, ibid., 320-321; Robert
Just as plundering, impressing, and quartering were
seen as challenges to civilian authority, so were the seiz-
ing of Tories and administering oaths by the military.
Early in the war, fearing the military might take the Tory
problem into their own hands, Congress recommended the
states adopt measures to render the Tories harmless.
Although most states did adopt measures to control the
Tories, the military usually found such measures were inef-
fective. Therefore, it is not surprising to find the
military threatening to take matters into their own hands
unless the civilian governments gave more force to their
measures. General Lee often threatened to act if the
civilian government did not. When the Virginia government
refused to relocate Tories from an area of military opera-
tions, he forced many Tories to leave their homes, and even
burned out one Tory family who refused. Mostly, the
military did not even threaten before they took Tory matters
into their hands. They simply acted. This was certainly
the way Lee operated.
Morris to Horatio Gates, April 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee
Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 388; Hamilton J. Eckenrode, The
Revolution in Virginia
, pp. 90-91.
^^Ford, JCC, 3:280; 4:18-20, 205.
57 Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 467-469.
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At the invitation of Rhode Island's chief executive,
Lee went to that colony late in 1775 to assist them v^ith
their coastal defenses. Reaching Nev/port on Christmas day,
he was appalled to find the town teeming with an active Tory
element. Therefore, on his own authority, he arrested eight
of the most prominent Tories and tendered to them "a most
solemn oath of allegiance to the Continental Congress." The
three who refused to accept it were jailed. Both Washington
and the Rhode Island legislature congratulated him for his
5 8
spirited efforts. For Lee, this was license to continue
seizing Tories without consulting civilian authorities. At
least this is what Lee believed as he headed south to New
York to assist in the fortification of New York City.
Once in New York, and seeing that the provincial
government was taking no action against the Tories, Lee
decided he would act against the Tories when an opportunity
presented itself. Early in March, receiving news that
he was to be reassinged to the Southern Department,
he implemented his program against the Tories,
Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776,
ibid 233; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, January 22, 1776, ibid., 248; Charles Lee to
Nicholas Cooke, January 6, 1776, Matt B. Jones, [ed.],
"Revolutionary Correspondence of Governor Nicholas Cooke
1775-1781," PAAS new ser. 36 (April 14, 1926-October 20,
1926) : 300-301; George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, December 31, 1775, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 4:197.
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leaving the consequences to his successors if the civilian
authorities objected. After notifying the Provincial
Congress and Congress of his plan, but not waiting for their
approval, Lee, on the fifth of March, ordered Isaac Sears
to offer a test to every suspected Tory in Queens. Those
that refused to take the oath were to be arrested and sent
5 9to Connecticut for confinement. There was great opposi-
tion to Lee's oath. "To impose a Test," John Jay wrote,
"is a sovereign act of Legislation and when the army becomes
our Legislators, the People that Moment become Slaves. "^°
In Congress, the New York delegates questioned Lee's actions
As they explained to the New York government:
We took up the Subject on general Principles. There
can be no Liberty where the military is not subordi-
nate to the civil power, in every thing not immediately
connected with their Operations. Your House, the
natural and proper Tribunal for all civil matters
within the Circle of your Jurisdiction, was assembled,
and Congress itself within the General's reach, ready
to enforce every reasonable Proposition for the
publick safety. To one or other he ought to have
applied . A Similar Effort in Rhode-Island had passed
over unnoticed ; reiterated Precedents must become
dangerous; we therefore conceive it to be our
unquestionable Duty to assert the Independence and
59Charles Lee to Joseph Reed
,
February 28 , 177 6
,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC , 4 (1872): 333-334; Charles
Lee to the President of the New York Provincial Congress,
March 4, 1776, ibid., 345; Charles Lee to Isaac Sears,
March 5, 1776, ibid., 346; Charles Lee to the President of
the Continental Congress, March 5, 1776, ibid., 348.
John Jay to Alexander McDougall, March 13, 1776,
Richard B . Morris , Seven _Wh^ Shaped Our Destiny: The Founding
Fathers as Revolutionaries , p . 18 5
.
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of^i^i^^i^j; to this unwarrantable Invasiont Its Rights by one of their Officers. 61
"However salutary such a measure might be, when governed on
a legal and constitutional basis," they told Congress, "we
were much alarmed that it should owe its authority to any
military officer, however distinguished for his zeal, his
rank, his accomplisliments
, and services." "There can be
no liberty where the military is not subordinate to the
civil power in everything not immediately concerned with
their operations." Therefore, they requested Congress to
"assert the independence and superiority of the civil power"
with respect to Lee's action. Although most members of
Congress saw the necessity of the oath in New York, they
were opposed to the military imposing it, and therefore on
the ninth of March they adopted a resolution prohibiting
the military from imposing upon, exacting, or requiring of
any inhabitant of the colonies, any oath. Three days
earlier, the New York Provincial Congress inforined Lee that
a Long Island resident had been apprehended in Nev; York City
by a military guard and forcibly taken to Connecticut with-
out them being informed of such action. They wanted Lee to
James Duane, John Jay, Lewis Morris, and John
Alsop to the New York Convention, March 15, 1776 , Burnett,
LMCC, 1:389.
6 2Richard Henry Lee to Charles Lee, March 25, 1776,
ibid., 408; Ford, JCC, 4:203-204, 195.
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inform them of the charges so the prisoner could either be
punished or released, and reminded Lee the right of appre-
hending, trying, and punishing citizens belonged to the
civilian authorities. "This right we think it our duty to
insist upon, as essential to the security of our constitu-
ents." They told Lee they hoped to be able to cooperate
with him, but reminded him that "it becomes us, as faithful
guardians of the people, to protect the liberty and property
of our constituents as much as possible in our present
unhappy situation." The same day, Lee, in a letter to the
President of the Provincial Congress acknowledged their
authority, explained why he had taken such hasty action,
and expressed regret, but also stated he would continue to
seize professed Tories who constituted a threat, as it was
his duty to Congress, New York, and his own conscience
.
Before the Provincial Congress could respond to Lee's letter,
the general left town on the seventh of March to take command
of the Southern Department.
Shortly after arriving in Virginia, Lee took action
against the Tories in Princess Anne and Norfolk counties.
To Virginia's Committee of Safety he explained his actions
had been predicated upon military necessity and assured them
6 3The New York Provincial Congress to Charles Lee,
March 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872):
349-350; Charles Lee to the President of the New York
Provincial Congress, March 6, 1776, ibid., 351-352.
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that if they found him too much in the province of the civil
power it would be entirely by mistake, not design. The
Committee of Safety accepted his explanation and assurances,
believing his action was "one of the inevitable consequences
of this kind of war" and agreeing that "what the public
safety seems to require, should be immediately done, even
tho' some injury may arise to innocent individuals." They
only asked they be kept informed, as they were the repre-
sentatives of the people. Lee complied, even asking twice
that specific actions be taken against the Tories without
first taking the action on his own authority. His dealings
with Maryland, with respect to actions against the Tories,
was not so amicable.
Early in April 1776, Lee, then at Williamsburg,
Virginia, obtained a packet of letters containing correspond-
ence between Maryland ' s royal Governor Eden and British
officials, wherein Eden recommended that a British regiment
be sent to Maryland to insure that colony's allegiance to the
crown • Instead of sending the letters to Maryland ' s Council
of Safety, which was chaired by moderate Daniel St. Thomas
Jenifer, Lee forwarded them to Samuel Purviance , the radical
chairman of the Baltimore County Committee of Observation.
Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776, ibid.,
467-469; Same to same, May 11, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 23;
Charles Lee and Robert Hov;e to Edmund Pendleton, May 10 , 1776 ,
ibid., 21; Edmund Pendleton to Charles Lee, May 5, 1776, ibid.,
4 (1872) : 470, 471.
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In doing so, Lee claimed ignorance of who should properly
receive the letters, and suggested Purviance, using Lee's
name as his authority, order the arrest of Eden. In charac-
teristic style, Lee told Purviance "The sin & blame be on my
head. I will answer for all to ye' Congress. "^^ Receiving
the letters from Lee on the fourteenth of April, Purviance
ordered Samuel Smith to seize the Governor in Annapolis.
Smith, upon arriving in Annapolis and reporting to the
Maryland Council of Safety, was severely reprimanded by the
civilian authorities. By evening he was sent back to
Baltimore without attempting to arrest the governor. The
following day, William Paca and several other Maryland
revolutionary leaders called on Eden, confronting him with
the letters. Eden was able to assure them he did not
intend to inflame the ministry. To a large extent, they
wanted to be assured, for the Maryland Council of Safety
desired to keep from having to seize the governor and thereby,
they beleived, create a situation that could produce anarchy
6 SCharles Lee to Samuel Purviance, April 6, 1776,
ibid., 381; The Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), April 25, 1776;
Esther Mohr Dole, Maryland During the American Revolution,
p. 98.
6 6Frank A. Cassell, Merchant Congressman in the
Young Republic: Samuel Smi th~Q"f"Tiary land , 1 752-1839 , pp , 14-
15; John Silas Pancake , Samuel Smith and the Politics of
Bu siness 1752-1839 (University, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 1972) , p. 7.
506
in the colony. ^7 Learning that the Council of Safety had
not acted, Purviance sent copies of the Eden letters to the
President of Congress, attaching an unsigned letter of his
own, severely condeinning the Council of Safety and taking
responsibility for sending Smith to Annapolis. President
Hancock read Purviance
' s letter aloud to Congress and,
despite attempts by Maryland's delegates to stop them.
Congress approved Maryland's seizure of the royal governor.
The Council of Safety, upset with both the Baltimore
civilian leaders and the military, ordered Purviance, Smith,
and several others to appear before them to defend their
presumptuous action. After examining them, the Council of
Safety reprimanded Purviance and excused Smith, as he had
only been following orders. The real culprit, they declared,
was Lee, because he did not send them the original corres-
pondence and had encouraged Purviance to act. The Maryland
Convention, which assembled in May, censured Purviance for
67 ^The Maryland Council of Safety to John Hancock,
April 18, 1776, Browne, Maryl and Archives
,
11:349-350;
Governor Eden to Charles Carroll, John Hall, and William
Paca, April 16, 1776, ibid., 337-338; The Maryland Council
of Safety to Governor Eden, April 18, 1776, ibid., 338-339;
The Maryland Council of Safety to the Maryland Delegates in
the Continental Congress, [April 18, 1776], ibid., 339-341;
Same to same, [April 19, 1776], ibid., 354-356.
6 8 Thomas Johnson, Jr., to the Maryland Council of
Safety, April 17, 1776, ibid., 347-348; Thomas Johnson, Jr.,
Thomas Stone, and Robert Alexander to the Maryland Council
of Safety, April 18, 1776, ibid., 351-352; John Hancock to
the Maryland Council of Safety, April 16, 1776, ibid,,
334-335.
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History of Maryland , 2:216-217; Purviance, Baltimore Town
During the RevoluTTonary War , pp. 54-55; Proceedings of the
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of my present office, and serve as a volunteer." He also
explained his actions to Congress.
In July, after the Maryland Convention had asked
Eden to leave the colony the previous month, the chairman
of the Maryland Council of Safety wrote Lee that the Mary-
land government had forgiven him, for Eden's conduct had
justified his sentiment about having him seized. However,
Lee was additionally informed that the manner in which he
71had adopted to have Eden seized was not palatable to them.
Although Lee was probably the most active officer
taking the Tories to task on his own authority, many others
did so, including Washington. Isaac Sears, in November 1775,
with a force of seventy-five horsemen, on his own authority
began waging war on New York's Tories. He seized and con-
fined several leading Tories in Westchester County, and in
New York City he destroyed the printing press of the Tory
printer, Rivington, Sears believed his actions would moti-
vate New York's Provincial Congress to take actions of their
own against the Tories. The Provincial Congress did not act,
fearing to do so would result in civil war and social
Charles Lee to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer,
May 6, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4 (1872):
472-474; Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, May 7, 1776, ibid., 477.
'^"'"Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer to Charles Lee,
July 17, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 141.
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disorder, and eventually anarchy and military tyranny. "^^
On their own authority during the first months of 1776, Lord
Stirling had New Jersey's royal governor, Franklin, placed
under arrest, and New Jersey Colonel Nathaniel Heard seized
four New York Tories and marched them off to confinement in
New Jersey. The four v;ere later returned to New York for
trial and Governor Franklin was given a parole by Stirling
at the insistence of Chief Justice Smythe, but was eventually
arrested by Heard upon the order of the Provincial Congress.
Also early in 1776, the Rhode Island Assembly freed four
suspected Tories General William VJest had confined. In
doing so, they stated they would "ever approve the conduct
of their military commanders, in exerting themselves for the
securing and bringing to trial all persons conducting in a
suspicious manner, ... at the same time carefully observing
not to encroach upon, infringe, or supersede the civil
74
authority, by exertions of the military."
Early in the war, Washington also took Tory matters
into his own hands. On January 25, 1777, he issued a
7 2 Isaac Sears to Roger Sherman, Eliphalet Dyer, and
Silas Deane, November 28, 1775, Feinstone Collection #1254;
Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, November 26, 1775, Syrett,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 1:176-178; Journal of the Pro-
vincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety,
and Councjr~of~Saf ety~of the State o f New York , 1:333,335,
3lT;~35"5T
'^^Alan Valentine, Lord Stirling, pp. 160-161; Bliven,
Under the Guns, pp. 148-149, 299.
"^^Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 7:467-4 68.
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proclamation requiring that anybody who had taken an oath
of allegiance to the crown must either take an oath of
allegiance to the United States or be treated as an enemy.
He also required all who had received Lord Howe's protection
passes to deliver them up to the nearest military officer
or withdraw themselves and their families into the British
lines. Those that failed to comply with the proclamation
within thirty days were to be treated as enemies. A week
later, when General Parsons asked Washington v;hat actions
he should take against the Connecticut Tories with respect
to an oath, VJashington sent him a copy of his proclamation,
7 fi
suggesting he modify it for his own use.
Washington ' s action raised two important questions
.
One was whether any oath be to the United States or to a
particular state and the other was whether or not the mili-
tary should give oaths. Upset with Washington for making
the oath to Congress rather than to the states , and for
violating the March 9 , 1116
,
congressional resolution pro-
hibiting the mil i tary from imposing or requiring oaths of
citizens, two New Jersey delegates introduced a resolution
in Congress on the sixth of February questioning Washing-
ton's actions and authority. One of them wrote the Speaker
75
F it zpatrick
,
Writings o f VJa shington, 7:61-63.
'^^Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, February 3,
1777
,
Hall, San}E?l_y2l^??l-?^-?^^' P' '^^l George Washington
to Samuel H. Parsons, February 8, 1777, ibid.
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of New Jersey's Assembly that the state should "not tamely
Submit their Authority to the Controul of a power unknown
in our Constitution." Washington, however, was not chas-
tised by either Congress or New Jersey, in part because of
his recent victories at Trenton and Princeton and in part
because they believed Washington understood he was not to
administer any more oaths. Not only was he not chastised,
but a congressional committee reported on the twenty-seventh
of February that "considering the situation of the Army,"
7 7his action "was prudent and necessary."
While Congress was debating what to do about
Washington's proclamation. General Putnam, who disliked
Quakers because of their neutral stand, sent an officer to
Salem County, New Jersey, which was populated by many
Quakers, with instructions to collect fines from persons
refusing to march with New Jersey's militia. Governor
Livingston, with Washington's backing, persuaded Putnam to
7 8
stop this practice. During 1777, Washington also persuaded
the Commissary General of Prisoners from seizing a suspected
7 7
Abraham Clark to John Hart, February 8, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC , 2:243; Abraham Clark to Elias Dayton, March 7,
1777, ibid . , 292 ; William Livingston to George Washington,
February 15, 17 77, Lundin, Cockpi t of the Revolution, p. 276;
Ford, JCC, 7:95, 165-166.
Lund in. Cockpit of the Revolut ion, pp. 240-241;
George Washington to^'William Livingston, February 22, 1777,
Fitzpatrick, W^ i ting s_o^ Washington, 7:186-187; George
Washington to' Israel Putnam, February 22 , 1777 , ibid., 189.
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Tory and chastised General De Borre for having executed a
Tory for an offense not cognizable by martial law.^^ It
was also in 1777 that a mob, assisted by soldiers, ran
William Goddard, publisher and editor of the Maryland
Journal and Baltimore Advertiser, out of town for printing
what they considered unpatriotic news. Although Maryland's
governor issued a proclamation prohibiting the people from
associating for the purpose of taking suspected traitors
to task, a mob came together again during the summer of
1779, with the assistance of Continental officers and
soldiers, to threaten Goddard for publishing a piece,
written by Charles Lee, critical of Washington. Although
Goddard would later retract his apology to VJashington, his
8 0initial apology was enough to satisfy the mob.
Frequent unauthorized military actions against the
Tories took place during the winter of 1777-1778, as the
military seized individuals trading v/ith the British in
Philadelphia. Those seized often received corporal
7 9
Boudinot, Elia s Boud inot , 1:51; Louis Clinton
Hatch, The Adminis tra tion~^ f the American Revolutionary Army ,
pp. 6 3-6Ti [Rufus W. Grisv;old] , VJashing ton and the Ge nerals
of the /American Revolution , 2:230-231.
^^William Galbraith to the Council of State, March 26,
1777, Browne, Maryland Archives, 16:190; Scharf, History of
Maryland , 2:306-308, 308n.l, 338; Clayton Colman Hall, gen.
edT7"~BaTt2J5ore^Its_Kisto^ 3 vols. (New York:
Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1912), 1:31-32, 34-35,
709; Purviance, Baltimore Town During Jjie Revolutionary ^V^^
pp. '83-84 ; John Richard Alden , ' Ge^neral_Charles I^^|__Tra^
or Patriot?, pp. 282-283.
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punishment and had their supplies confiscated.^"^ Often this
was done without benefit of trial, and when a trial was held,
it was a court martial. The Pennsylvania government and
Congress were not in a very good position to halt these
actions by the military, nor were they really inclined to
do so. Many citizens, hov;ever, v;ere concerned about the
military trying and punishing suspected traitors and Tories.
Earlier in the war, when Roger Sherman learned that the
military had executed a spy, he complained to Governor
Trumbull that the spy should have been tried by the superior
court of the colony, not by court martial. He reminded the
8 2governor, "We cant be too careful of military incroachments .
"
This view was certainly shared by the Delaware
Council, who, during the spring of 1778, drew up a remon-
strance against Smallwood for seizing Tories and transporting
them out of the state, and confining them, all without due
8 3process of law. When Arnold imposed martial law in
Philadelphia during June 1778, after the British evacuation,
there were few objections, as most citizens realized the
Scharf, History o f P_hij-adelPj}j--j-> 1: 374 ; Penny-
packer, Valley Forge Orderly Book; P- 22 8; George Washington
to John Lacey, April 11 , 1778, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archj.ve_s,
1st ser
.
, 6:410.
^^Roger Sherman to Jonathan Trumbull, May 26, 1776,
MHSC , 7th ser., 2:52.
^
^Minutes of the_Co^unc_i]^_of_the _D£lav^^^^
1776 to 17 9Trpp".~2lT7~^6-218
.
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necessity of it. However, several months later, when a
court martial sentenced a citizen to death for treason,
Chief Justice McKean and others strenuously objected, main-
taining a civilian trial should have been held. The Supreme
Executive Council took the matter to Congress, which ruled
that a civilian trial be held and vacated the sentence of
the court martial.
Attacks against the Tories continued throughout the
remainder of the v;ar. They were particularly severe in the
south during 1781 and 1782, and often resulted in Tory
8 5
attacks against ^'Thig citizens. Even once victory was
assured, the Tories continued to have their lives, properties,
and liberties threatened. The military frequently intimidated
the Tories at elections, trials, and during other civilian
8 6proceedings. In many such instances, the civilian govern-
ments did not reprimand or punish the military, believing
8 4
Thomas McKean to the Supreme Executive Council of
Pennsylvania, August 22, 1778, Colonial Records of
Pennsylvania , 11:561-562.
^^Enos Reeves to [ ], April 16, 1782, John B.
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(1897): 474-475; Otho [H. Williams] to [Elie Williams],
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Papers in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 46; Nathanael
n^^PnP tn Joseph Reed, Mav 1781, Reed, Joseph Reed , 2:351.
^^Phillips Russell, North Carolina in the Revolution
ary War, p. 288; William Thompson Read, Li fe and Correspond-
ence of George Read (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and
Company, 1870) , p. 325; Harold B. Hancock, ed., "The
Revolutionary War Diary of William Adair," DH 13, no. 2
(October 1968): 165, 165n.46.
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they were justified in their actions. But in many more
instances the civilian governments reprimanded and punished
military officers for overstepping their authority, despite
justifications.
The military, v;ith a desire not to offend the civi-
lian authorities nor to be punished by them, generally
provided justifications and excuses for their actions which
had violated laws or tenets of civil supremacy. Often these
8 7excuses were simply pleading ignorance; sometimes military
necessity was held forth; and infrequently the military
reminded the civilians that without an army there could not
be a successful revolutionary war.
Frequently the military complained they could not
be expected to comply with congressional and state policies,
resolutions, and articles of war if they did not have copies
8 8
of them. "We are much in the dark with regard to the
resolution of Congress," General Moultrie complained. "We
o n
Alexander Hamilton to William Livingston, April 21,
17 77, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:235-236; John
Sullivan to the New Hampshire General Assembly, January 18,
17 76, Bouton , Documents and Records Relating to New
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may be guilty of errors and neglect of duty," he explained
to Henry Laurens, "without the least intention of either."
In asking Jefferson for a complete set of Virginia's laws,
Lafayette explained they were needed so he would not inter-
fere with the authority of "or through ignorance Be deficient
o qin Respect to the Civil Authority."
To some degree this excuse by the military was
justified. For most of the war they experienced great
difficulty in obtaining copies of the resolutions of Congress,
as well as the state laws. This was due to the fact that
both Congress and the states were dilatory in both publishing
9 0
and distributing their resolutions and laws.
The military also complained that the civilian
leaders did not keep them informed of policies, events, and
other matters which would better enable them to comply with
. . . . 91
the wishes of the civilian authorities. Part of the
89William Moultrie to Henry Laurens, June 5, 1778,
Moultrie, Memoirs of the Ame rican Revolution , 1:217;
Marquis de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, March 17, 1781,
Chinard, Lafayette in Virgin ia, pp. 7-8.
^'^Herbert Friedenwald, "The Journals and Papers of
The Continental Congress," Annual Report of the 7\mer ican
Historical Association for the Year 1896 , 2 vols. (VJashing ton
,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), 1:94-102; Roger
Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, July 12,
1781, MHSC, 7th ser . , 3:240; George Clinton to Robert Morris,
November 24, 17 81, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton ,
7:523.
^"""Lachlan Mcintosh to George Washington, February 16,
1776, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution ,
1:150-151; DanT¥l~Brodhea'd to Joseph Reed, November 4 , 1779 ,
Kellogg, "Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio 1779-1781,"
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reason for the state chief executives and legislators not
adequately keeping the military informed was because they
lacked the necessary staffs to perform correspondence func-
tions; lacked funds to pay express riders; and because their
governments and themselves were often incapacitated, being,
in the latter instances, killed, captured, and pursued by
92
the British army. Part of the reason also can be attri-
buted to an ineffective postal system, which subjected the
9 3
mail to being lost, stolen, delayed, and captured.
Most of the excuses the military used for having
violated the various tenets of civil supremacy involved
p. 109; Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke, March 6, 1777,
Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island, 8:212; Nathanael Greene
to George Washington
,
August 26, 17 81, Greene, Nathanael
Greene, 3:383; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, February 27,
17 82, Reed, Joseph Reed , 2:378; Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush,
October 10, TTTTSlT "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4
(1872): 211-212; George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson,
February 3, 17 79, Palmer, Calenda r o f Virgini a State Papers ,
1:315.
9 2 Benjamin Harrison to George Rogers Clark, Decem-
ber 20, 1781, Mcllwaine, Official Letters of the Governors
of Virginia , 3:114; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall,
April" 6 , 1778 , Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton ,
3:139-140; Nicholas Cooke to Nathanael Greene, July 8, 1775,
RIHSC , 6 (1897) : 116.
^^Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of the Executive
Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 , pp. 15 3-
171; John C. Fitzpatrick, New Light from Some of the Origi-
nal Sou rces of Amer ican History, pp. 237-265; Wesley Everett,
The~H
1
story of the_Un i ted_ States Post Off ice to the Year
ISlgT^HarvardnEconomT^' Studies, vol. 27 (Cambridge: Harvard
UnTi^ersity Press, 1924 ), pp. 4 8-67; Francis Johnston to
Nathanael Greene, September 11, 1781, Ryan, A_Salutejto
Courage
,
p. 247.
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justifications of military necessity. From the beginning
of the war, both the civilian and military leaders realized
the importance of the military to their revolutionary war.
. . 94VJithout the military, there would be no victory. As Greene
reminded Pennsylvania ' s chief executive
, "The army is the
great object on which all political institutions must depend
95
ultimately .
"
This is not to suggest the military continually
violated the tenets of civil supremacy and then justified
it upon military necessity, for they supported the concept
of civil supremacy and, as has been discussed, attempted
to comply with the desires of the civilian authorities.
But there were instances when they felt justified in taking
actions they knew the civilian authorities would not approve.
Greene probably offered the excuse of military
necessity more than anybody else. He began doing so the
first winter of the war, explaining in one instance that
^"^John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974), pp. 7'2-73; Russell F. V7eigley,
Towards an_Amer3^an _Ara
to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962),
p 4 ; Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 18, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; Captain [ ] Rogers
to Samuel B. Webb, May 17, 1782, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb,
2:398.
^^Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, June 29, 1780,
Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:217; see also General Orders, Fitz-
patrick, WrjtTngs of Washing ton , 5:245.
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"The Great Laws of Necessity must Justify the Expedient
.
This was with respect to the army seizing private property
to supply themselves. As Quartermaster General, he would
be involved in many more seizures of private property. Upon
leaving that position during the summer of 17 80, he wrote
his friend, Joseph Reed, that
It is impossible to carry on a war without oppres-
sing the Inhabitants in some degrees ; and however
disagreeable and inconvenient it may be to the
people, and to those in power, a regard to the
common good and general safety will justify the
measure; and th'o the people may be a little rest-
less & impatient in the present hour, they will
have reason at a future day to bless those who had
resolution enough to consult and persue their true
interest
.
As commander of the Southern Department, he certainly acted
upon this belief . Late in 1780 , he told North Carolina '
s
governor that it was his wish "to pay the most sacred regard
to the laws and Constitution of the State, but the emergencies
of war often so pressing that it becomes necessary to invade
the rights of the citizens to prevent public calamities .
"
He promised to preserve the property of the people from
unjust invasion, but reminded Governor Nash that the liber-
ties of the people was the great object, the security of
Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 31,
1775, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; see also Same
to same, January 4 , 1775 [1776], Showman, Papers_of ^neral
Nathanaej^ Greene , 1:17 7.
^"^Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, August 1, 1780,
Hazard, Penn5y lvaji3j_Archi^ves , 1st ser . , 8 : 475-476 .
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their property a little less so. Therefore, if property
was seized and the people properly informed why it had been
done, Greene believed they would not mind the inconvenience.^^
During the middle of February 1781, he wrote Virginia's
governor that
Necessity has and will oblige me to take many
measures to effect the removal of our Stores
contrary to the established laws of the differ-
ent States; the occasion must justify the
measure, and I trust the Legislature will make
charitable allowances accordingly. The Army is
all that the States have to depend upon for their
political existence. I trust therefore whatever
is necessary to its support will meet their
approbation
.
A month later, he wrote Jefferson that "civil polity must
accomodate itself to the emergencys of war , or the people
submit to the power of the enemy. There is no other alterna-
tive." In a more detailed explanation of military necessity,
late that April , he told Jefferson that "The rights of
Individuals are as dear to me as to any Man, but the safety
of a community I have ever considered as an object more
valuable. In VJar it is often impossible to conform to all
the ceremonies of Law and equal justice ; and to attempt it
would be productive of greater misfortune to the public from
the delay than all the inconveniencies which individuals may
^^Nathanael Greene to Abner Nash, December 6, 1730,
Greene , Nathanael Greene , 3:552, 551
.
^^Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, February 15,
1780, Boyd, Papers o f Thomas Jefferson, 4:616.
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suffer." That summer he made a similar explanation of actual
and expected misconduct to Governor Nelson. "'"^^
As one might expect, General Lee often cited military
necessity as justification for his unauthorized actions.
Early in 1776, he wrote Congress that "These are times v;hen
it is impossible, without great danger to the publick cause,
to wait for formal instructions; but as I shall never take
this liberty, unless urged by necessity, and a view to the
public service, I flatter myself I shall never incure the
censure of Congress." A few months later, when he took
unauthorized actions in Virginia, he wrote the president of
their committee of safety "there are occasions when the
necessity will excuse deviations, and this I hope will
appear to the Committee to be one of these occasions." Later
that year, he wrote the president of the Massachusetts Council
that "Affairs appear in so important a crisis" that even the
resolves of Congress should not always be followed. "We must
save the community in spite of the ordinances of the Legisla-
ture. There are times when we must commit treason against
the laws of the State for the salvation of the State. The
'"^^Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, March 31,
1781, ibid., 5:302; Same to same [April 28, 1781], ibid.,
568; Nathanael Greene to Thomas Nelson, Jr., July 18,
1781, "Original Documents," 6, no. 4 (October 1907): 242
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present crisis demands this brave, virtuous kind of
..101treason
.
Other officers, such as Generals Sullivan, Stephens,
Mcintosh, and McDougall, justified their unauthorized imprcs-
102smg on military necessity. Staff officers responsible
for supplies also justified their actions on military neces-
sity. As a Deputy Quartermaster General told Pennsylvania's
chief executive, after having impressed illegally, "You may
be assured I will not incroach upon the Rights of Civil
Authority, & exert Military force but in Cases that will not
103
admit the Delay of an Application to you."
Congress and the state governments often accepted
the excuses and justifications and did not reprimand or
punish the offending officers. It is important to remember
Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, February 27, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC,
4 (1872): 331; Charles Lee to Edmund Pendleton, May 4, 1776,
ibid., 469; Charles Lee to the President of the Massachusetts
Council, November 22, 1776, ibid., 5 (1873): 303.
"""^^John Sullivan to the President of the Council of
Massachusetts, August 1, 1778, Hammond, Lette rs and Pape^
of John Sull ivan , 2:163; Minutes of the Maryland Council,
October 5 , "l776 , Browne, Maryland Archives , 12 :232-324 ;
Lachlan Mcintosh to Archibald Steele, October 19, 1778,^^
Kellogg, "Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio 1778-1779,"
p 146; Lachlan Mcintosh to the Magistrates of Westmoreland
County, October 21, 1778, ibid., p. 147; Alexander McDougall
to. George Clinton, January 20, 1779, Champagne, Alexander
McDougalA, p. 154.
""^
"^Jonathan Mifflin to Thomas Wharton, September 7,
1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser . , 5:596; see
also Charles Pettit to William Livingston, June 19, 1777,
Selections from_ tj2e_Corre spondence of the^.xecutive_oOew
jiFsey, From 17 7 6 to_ 17^86, pp. 70-71.
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that the civilian leaders were practical men, who realized
that their principles relating to civil supremacy and
civilian control would have to be bent or broken in order
for the war to be won. Thus, they frequently allowed the
military to take unauthorized actions, as long as such
actions were infrequent, not long-lasting, did not question
the dignity and ultimate authority of the civil authorities,
and as long as the military acknowledged their wrong-doing.
Congress certainly operated in this manner.
Congress often let the military take unauthorized
actions without reprimanding or punishing them. Washington,
for instance, without consulting Congress, on September 2,
1775, issued orders creating a Continental Navy and during
October appointed prize agents. By the end of October
his
fleet had made several prizes. It was at that time
Washing-
ton informed Congress of his actions. Congress,
probably
assured by their committee at camp of the necessity
of his
actions, approved his conduct. It probably
did not hurt
Washington naming three of his ships after the
congressional
104
committee to camp.
l^^Georqe Washington to the President of the Conti-(ceuxy k
T77cr F-i i-7Datrick , VJritmqs of
nental Congress, October 5 , 1775 ,
tzpatricK, —
F^FdT JCC, '3:364 , 375 .
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Although Congress did not approve their actions,
they certainly did not reprimand Washington or Greene for
not investigating Gates' conduct at Camden as they had
ordered. Congress also overlooked violations of their
resolution of the fall of 1778 which prohibited soldiers
and officers from performing in or attending the theater.
This was probably because the military were often accompanied
to the theater by members of Congress .
"'^ Congress also
generally overlooked commanding officers, such as Schuyler,
Montgomery, and Mcintosh, who made unauthorized appointments
of line and staff officers. In part, this was because
Congress understood the military necessity, knowing to obtain
congressional approval would take weeks or months, and
because those making the appointments notified Congress of
the fact, generally with the understanding that Congress
would make the appointment permanent or would appoint some-
one else. Congress v;as not, however, so generous with
William Croghan to Barnard Gratz, March 4, 1779,
"Notes and Queries," im 1, no. 6 (June 1857): 180; Lieuten-
ant Enos Reeves to [ '], September [ ], 1781, John B.
Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-books of Lieutenant Enos
Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB 21, no. 1 (1897):
83; Samuel Adams to Samuel Phillips Savage, October 17, 1778,
Burnett, LMCC, 3:451-452.
^^^Richard Montgomery to Philip Schuyler, Novem-
ber 19 , 17 75, Force, Amer ican^_Archives , 4 th ser . , 3:1683;
Lachlan Mcintosh to George Washington, February 16, 1776,
White, Histori^]^ Co_lle_ct j^ns_o£_Georg3_a, p. 93; Don R.
Gerlach7"Philip Schuyler and 'The Road to Glory': A
Question of Loyalty and Competence," NYHSQ 49, no. 4
(October 1965) : 350
.
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respect to a string of appointments Lee made during the
spring of 1776 on his way south to take command of that
department. Upon learning of his appointments, Richard
Henry Lee wrote the general that Congress had "a jealous
eye" v;ith respect to "every instance of deviation (in a
Military or Naval Commander) from the line of instructions,
and every undertaking productive of expense which is not
warranted by express of Congress." He reminded Lee that
"the spirit of liberty is a jealous spirit, and that
Senators are not always wise and candid, but that frequently
they are governed by envy, enmity, and a great variety of
bad passions." Therefore, where prudent, and where the
common cause would not be threatened by delay, he suggested
Lee obtain consent of Congress to make such appointments or
107
simply make recommendations to Congress.
There were many times when Congress did not ignore
civil supremacy by the military, especially when it appeared
the military were questioning a decision made by Congress,
or its authority. Early in the summer of 1777, Knox, Greene,
and Sullivan publicly announced they v;ould resign rather
'^^'^Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 21, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC,
4 (1872): 360; Same to same, April 19, 1776, ibid., 434;
same to same, July 2 , 1776 , ibid., 5 (1873) : 109-11(3 ; Charles
Lee to Richard Henry Lee, April 12, 1776, ibid., 4 (1872):
416; Charles Lee to George Washington, July 1, 1776, ibid.,
5 (1873): 102, 102-103; Richard Henry Lee to Charles
Lee,
May 11, 1776, ibid., 24, 25.
than have Congress appoint du Coudray head of the Continen-
108tal artillery. Some members of Congress shared their
desire that Congress not acknowledge the agreement made in
France between Silas Deane and du Coudray, but they believed
the generals should have complained privately to individual
members of Congress, rather than writing Congress in such a
public and threatening manner. John Adams told Greene that
the du Coudray problem was "one of the most delicate and
perplexing Transactions that has ever fallen in our Way;
but those three Letters instead of relieving Us has only
encreased our Mortification." Adams informed him that not
one member of Congress justified their letters, and very
few could say a word in mitigation or excuse. "It was
universally considered, as betraying the Liberties of the
People, to pass them by uncensured. Some were even for
dismissing all three of you instantly from the service,
others for ordering you to Philadelphia, under arrest to
answer for this offense." VJhat Congress did do was give
them the option of apologizing for questioning congressional
"''^^Henry Knox to the President of the Continental
Congress, July 1, 1777, [copy], Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #4); Nathanael Greene to the President of
the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777, Nathanael Greene
Papers, vol. 1 (photostat), WLCL; John Sullivan to the
President of the Continental Congress, July 1, 1777,
Hammond , Letters and_Pape£S_of _John _Su^^ 1:403 .
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authority or resign. They apologi zed . '''^^ Three years later,
Greene apologized again for having written a letter to
Congress which that body considered improper, one member
describing it as being "very insolant" in nature. "^"^^
During the summer of 1780, in the process of attempt-
ing to resign as Quartermaster General, Greene wrote Congress
a letter he admitted contained "more tartness . . . than was
prudent."'^''""'" A congressional committee on the third of
August reported that Greene's letter had been written in
"very exceptional terms" and suggested he apologize. Two
days later, the committee suggested Greene be relieved from
duty. But, as Congress was busy with other matters and, as
it was assumed by most members that Greene had or would
acknowledge his letter may have been improper. Congress
John Adams to Nathanael Greene, July 7, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:404, 405; James Lovell to William Whipple,
July 7 , 1777 , ibid., 403 ; Eliphalet Dyer to Joseph Trumbull,
July 7, 1777, ibid., 405-406; Same to same, July 8, 1777,
ibid., 408; Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, July 13, 1777, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #4); Ford, JCC, 8:537,
553-554; Nathanael Greene to the President of the Continen-
tal Congress, July 19, 1777 , Greene, ^^^^iiael_Greene
,
1:422-426
.
^^°John Fell Diary, Burnett, LMCC , 4 : 292-293 .
"'""^"'Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, August [ ] ,
1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:336; Nathanael Greene to
the President of the Continental Congress, July 26, 1780,
ibid., 314-316; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael Greene, July 29,
1780*
'ibid., 320; Same to same, August 1, 1780, ibid., 322;
Joseph Jones to George Washington, August ' i;780 ibid ,
327-328; John Cox to Nathanael Greene, August 7, 17dU,
iDiQ.,
324 .
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allowed Greene to remain in the army, postponing the question
of his conduct to another day. That day never arrived, as
Greene went on to successes as commanding general of the
112Southern Department.
Other generals risking the ire of Congress by their
letters were Schuyler and Lee. The latter offended Congress
when, after being taken prisoner, he wrote Congress request-
ing a committee of Congress visit him to arrange his release
and discuss other matters. Congress refused, treating Lee's
letter with what Elias Boudinot called deserved contempt . "'"'^'^
Schuyler's letter had a stronger response. Upset Congress
had removed the surgeon of the Northern Department in
January 1777, Schuyler wrote Congress, suggesting he should
have been notified or the reasons as he had appointed him.
Most members of Congress, believing Schuyler's letter ques-
tioned their authority, on the fifteenth of March, resolved
that Schuyler's letter had been highly derogatory and
suggested that in the future he write them in a style more
suitable to their dignity. Shortly thereafter. Gates was
sent north to replace Schuyler who, elected as a delegate
to Congress, arrived in Philadelphia in April to plead his
"^"''^Charles Pettit to Nathanael Greene, August 20,
1780 ibid., 2:334-335; Ezekiel Cornell to Nathanael Greene,
[August 20, 1780], Burnett, LMCC, 5:323; Ford, JCC, 17:690-
691, 697.
'•'-^Boudinot, Journ£]_^rJfistori^^
D . 7 3.
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case for reinstatement. In the process of pleading his case,
he explained his letter had not meant to question or chal-
lenge the authority of Congress. Accepting this explanation,
Congress, on May 15, 1777, reinstated him in command of the
114Northern Department.
It was not just the generals who were threatened
with reprimand and punishment for questioning the authority
of Congress. For example, early in 1776, a major was made
to apologize to Congress for having abused them for not
giving him a higher rank. Additionally, naval officers ran
afoul of Congress. Late in 1777, when the congressional
naval committee instructed Captain Barry to sink his fleet
in the Delaware, he lost his temper and demonstrated his
insubordination to committee member Francis Hopkinson who
had been sent to oversee the operation. When Kopkinson
reported the incident to Congress, they resolved on
February 21, 1778, that Barry had twenty days to acknowledge
his wrongdoing or be relieved. Apparently acknowledgment
Philip Schuyler to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, February 4, 1777, Lossing, Philip Schuyler ,
2-165; see also ibid., 1:347; John Hancock to Philip
Schuyler, March 18, 1777, Burnett, LMCC , 2:304; William
Duer to Robert R. Livingston, May 28, 1777, ibid., 377;
James Duane to Robert R. Livingston, May 28, 1777, ibid.,
387; Harvey E. Brown, The_ Mediae a Depart^
States Army from 17 75 to_l87 3, pp. 21-23, 26, Ford, JCC,
8:336, 364; 8:375.
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was made, for Barry was not punished or relieved.''""'"^
Besides threatening punishment, Congress simply
exercised their prerogative to dismiss officers who violated
the tenets of civil supremacy. During the summer of 1777,
twelve naval lieutenants were ordered dismissed for making
an improper demand for an increase in pay. The following
summer, a lieutenant was ordered dismissed for opening pack-
ages from the British commissioners addressed to Congress . "'"'^^
Early in 1777, John Trumbull, upset with the congres-
sional decision of not making his commission as deputy
adjutant general of the Northern Department effective the
date he assumed that position, informed Congress that he
wanted his commission backdated or they could accept his
resignation. Congress immediately accepted the resignation.
James Lovell, afterwards, wrote Trumbull that "Congress is
greatly piqued at the style and manner of your demand."
Similarly, Elbridge Gerry wrote Trumbull's brother that
although the claim was proper, he could not altogether
^""^Richard Smith Diary, Burnett, LMCC, 1:381-382;
Ford, JCC, 4:188, 190; 10:189; "Memorials of the Revolu-
tionarTlTavy, " HM 3, no. 7 (July 1859): 202-204; George
Everett Hastings, The Li fe and Works of Francis Hopkmson
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), pp. 222-223,
225-226.
"''''^Henry Laurens to John Lev/is Gervais, July 25,
1777, Burnett, LMCC, 2:423-424; Orderly Book, First Penn-
sylvania Regiment, Linn, Pe^nnsylvand^_j.
Revolution, 2:327.
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approve the style in which the legislative authority of the
continent was addressed. "It is the fixed Determination of
Congress," he wrote, "to preserve the civil above the
military, and the authority of that will not be surrendered,
should it be necessary to disband the army in preserving
117the same." It should not be surprising that Generals
Lee and Conway, particularly the former, would eventually
run afoul of Congress and be dismissed from service.
While Lee was suspended from command during 1779, he
frequently questioned the propriety of the French alliance.
This upset many members of Congress; so much so that, on
December 4, 1779, one day before his suspension was to
expire, it was moved and seconded that he not be taken back
into service. Despite the motion being defeated, Lee, upset
that Congress even considered dismissing him, wrote them an
insulting letter expressing his displeasure. Congress
responded by dismissing him, and refusing to change the
118
decision despite Lee's explanations and apologies.
James Lovell to John Trumbull, March 22, 1777,
John Trumbull, Autobiography, Reminiscences and Letter s of
John Trumbu ll, from 17_56_to 1841, pp. 4 3-4 5; John Trumbull
to the President of the Continental Congress, February 22,
1777, ibid., p. 36; John Trumbull to James Lovell, Febr-
uary 22, 1777, ibid., pp. 40-42; Same to same, March 30,
1777, ibid., p. 46; Elbridge Gerry to Joseph Trumbull,
March 26, 1777, Joseph Trumbull Collection, vol. 1, CSL,
Ford, JCC, 5:753; 7:176, 185, 187, 281.
-^-^^Ibid., 15 : 1348-1349; 16:33-34 ; Charles Lee to
the President of the Continental Congress, January 30, 1780
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 6 (1874): 407-409; Same to
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Conway suffered a similar fate, when he attempted
to resign early in 1778. Henry Laurens, on the first of
May, reported to South Carolina's chief executive that
Conway "lately for the second time taunted Congress by an
application for leave to resign his Commission, and in notes
so extremely rough as secured a Majority of 8 States of 9 in
his favor." Indeed, with only four delegates supporting
Conway, Congress, on April 28, 1778, accepted his resigna-
tion, and did not relent despite his subsequent attempts
119
to be reinstated.
Although Conway had his difficulties with Congress,
he did not have trouble v/ith any of the state governments.
In this he was somewhat unique among the Continental generals.
Most of them, and many other officers, at one time or another,
ran afoul of the state governments with respect to violations
to the tenets of civil supremacy. As was discussed earlier
in this chapter, the military often became engaged in diffi-
culties with the state governments because of plundering,
impressing and improperly dealing with the Tories. They
also had their difficulties with respect to questions
of
authority and minor procedural points. The remainder
of
same, April 22 , 1780 , ibid., 423-426;
^^^^^^^^f^^^2-Genera]^Charle^J,eej^^ PP • 59 260, 282
283, 285.
"
^^^Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes, May 1, 1778,
Burnett, LMCC, 3:211; Ford, JCC, 10:399; 11:536,
567.
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this chapter will explain what the military did to irritate
the state governments, and how the latter responded.
During the first two years of the war, there was
much confusion among the army, the state forces, Congress,
and the provincial and state governments with respect to
their authority. As a result, the military often took
actions which the provincial and state governments considered
challenging their authority. As one might have guessed, the
general who had the most difficulties with the provincial
governments the first two years of the war was Charles Lee.
Throughout 1776 Lee antagonized the provincial
governments of New York, South Carolina, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Maryland, as he consciously and unconsciously
took unauthorized actions. The latter tv;o instances, relat-
ing to impressing, quartering, and making war upon the
Tories, have already been discussed, and it should be noted
that, although Lee was not formally reprimanded by the pro-
vincial governments, they nevertheless made it perfectly
clear that they would not tolerate repeat offenses. In the
confusion of authority between Congress and the New York
provincial government, Lee, during his short stay in New
York state frequently offended the government, as he author-
ized actions the civilians believed they only had authoriza-
tion to approve. Before a major confrontation took place
between the general and the provincial congress, Lee was
rc-ssianed to the southward. Three months later, Lee had
534
similar difficulties in South Carolina, with similar results.
Before a major confrontation took place, Lee vacated the
state. Lee offended the North Carolina government by
authorizing Georgia and South Carolina officers to fill up
their battalions by enlisting troops from North Carolina
then serving in Georgia and South Carolina. The civilian
leaders were so upset with Lee's action that they had the
legislature pass a resolution condemning his action and
12 0
recalled their troops back to North Carolina.
Although Lee was probably the general who most often
consciously or unintentionally offended civilian leaders
early in the war, he was by no means the only general having
difficulty with the provincial congresses. Artemas Ward
inadvertently offended the Massachusetts Committee of Safety
during the latter part of June 1775 when he issued orders
informing his officers who needed arms for their men to make
application to the committee of safety. Taking a provincial
congress resolution literally, he added that "the committee
of safety are hereby ordered to deliver out arms to such
commanding officers as make application to them for the
"-^Bliven, Under the Guns, pp. 84-186 ; "The Charles
Lee Papers," NYHSC , 4 '(1872): 234-352 passim; Drayton,
Memoirs of _jtl2e_ American Revolution, 2:280; Edward McCrady,
The~llistory of South Carolina in the Revolut ion_r77 5^17^,
^ 14 0-141; Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 15 , 177 7,
Clark, NCSR, 11:357; Saunders, NCCR, 10:795-796, 858-859,
8 80; Hugh F. Rankin, 7lie_J^or th^Carol ijTa_
pp. '80, 80-81n.20.
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same." The committee of safety reprimanded Ward, and
despite his assurances that he had not meant to set the
military above the civilian government, they complained to
the provincial congress "that it is of vast importance that
no orders are issued by the military, or obeyed by the civil
power, but only such as are directed by the honorable repre-
sentative body of the people, from whom all military and
civil power originates." They stated they v;ere satisfied
with Ward's explanation of the misunderstanding, and that
he "does not mean or intend to set up the military power
above the civil, yet lest this order of the general, should
be adduced as a precedent in future, we think it our indis-
pensable duty to protest against the general's said order."
Agreeing, the provincial congress made Ward reword his
121
order. Such misunderstandings continued throughout the
war
.
Another source of confusion, as well as a constant
source of irritation between the civilian and military
leaders was the matter of flags of truce under which people
and goods moved between the American and British camps.
The military generally viewed flags as a means by which
unscrupulous men were able to trade with the enemy and thus,
they frequently undertook operations to prevent their use,
"'^"'"Lincoln, Journals of Each Provincial Congress
of Massachusetts, pp. 579, 580.
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even when they had been properly authorized by the civilian
governments. These actions, as well as those instances v;hen
the military authorized flags without civilian knowledge
12 2
or approval, upset the state governments. Because of
the ill feelings surrounding the use of flags, Washington
and his subordinates often issued instructions and reminders
to their officers, stressing the need to be cognizant of the
rules of each state governing flags, and to cooperate with
12 3
the state executives m the issuance and use of them.
Despite such orders, the matter of flags continued to be
a problem till the end of the war, as the military viewed
flags as a military function, and the civilians viewed them
as coming within their purview.
Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, March 8,
17 81, Boyd, Papers of Thomas_jJe£^fer_son , 5:98-99 ; Thomas
Jefferson to Baron von Steuben, March 10, 1781, ibid.,
117-119; George Clinton to William Denning, November 29,
177 9, Hastings, Public__Papers of George Cl inton, 5:377;
George Clinton to William Heath, November 29, 1779, ibid.,
378-379; Same to same, December 2, 1779, ibid., 393-394;
William Heath to George Clinton, December _ 2 , 1779, ibid.,
390-391; Same to same, December 3, 1779, ibid., 397.
"'"^"^George Washington to Alexander McDougall,
November 24, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington, 13:
321; George Washington to Israel Putnam, November 27, 1778,
ibid., 341, George Washington to William Maxwell, January 7,
1779, 'ibid., 483; Instructions to Samuel H. Parsons,
December 13, 1779, ibid., 17:257; George Washington to
Benedict Arnold, August 13, 1780, ibid., 19:370; George
Washington to Elias Dayton, March 28, 1782, ibid , 24:92;
Instructions to John Greaton, June 14, 1782, ibid., J4U.
^^^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, April 9,
1783, Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 86, WLCL; Nathanael
Greene to [Otho Holland Williams], April 11, 1783, Calendar
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The return of captured property was another source
of confusion of authority. General Greene and the South
Carolina government, who had their problems over the matter
of flags, were also at odds on the matter of the return of
captured property. In 1782, the governor and council
demanded that Greene return to private ownership horses that
Kosciuszko had carried off during a raid on James Island.
Rather than give the horses to citizens who claimed the
British had taken them from them, Greene wanted to auction
the horses, and use the money to support the army. Congress
finally adjudicated the matter by ruling that the recaptured
property be returned to its original owner after one-fourth
125
of the value of the horses was given to the army.
Another source of difficulty between the military
and the state governments involved the question of whether
of the General Otho_Hol landj^inian^
M"storrc'aT~SocIety , p. '80; Nathanael Greene to the Sheriff
of CharlestonT^pril 6 , 1783 , Adele Stanton Edwards,
Journals of the_Privy Counc il 1783-17 89 (Columbia: University
of South Carolina "Press for the South Carolina Department of
Archives and History, 1971), p. 16; Nathanael Greene to
Benjamin Guerard, April 6, 1783, ibid., pp. 16-18; Minutes
of a Council of War, April 7, 1783, ibid., pp. 22-26; Min-
utes of the Privy Council, April 9, 1783, ibid., pp. 19-21,
27-28 .
'^^Nathanael Greene to John Mathews, October 22,
17 82 Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the 7\me_rican Revolu^
tion', Polish Institute, ser. no. 4 (New York: Polish
Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1943), p. 13^;
Edward McCrady, The_Kistory^^outh_Ca_rolinaJ,n tj.^
tion 1780-1783, pp. 662-664; Marvin R. Zahni ser, Charles
Cote^sworBi P- ^^"""^ ' —
'
"2378 2 5-82 7'."
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or not soldiers should be turned over to state courts to
face civilian charges. Although the military generally
resisted turning over soldiers to state courts, they usually
complied with a court order to do so. But not always. When
they resisted, the state government normally exerted itself.
Early in the war, when Colonel Oilman refused to turn one
of his soldiers over to the civil magistrate, stating that
soldiers were only subject to military law, the New Hampshire
legislature resolved that Oilman "is ignorant of the Laws &
received Rules & Regulations always practiced in the English
Constitution; and the military Power setting up an authority
uncontrollable by the Civil magistrate is Subversive of Lav;s
,
Rights & Privileges of Englishmen, and what our inveterate
Enemies never attempted." Oilman was made to appear before
the General Assembly, and the situation was resolved to the
126
satisfaction of the civilians.
Inadvertent violations of civil supremacy and debates
over authority were generally resolved without too many
recriminations and with the civilians generally successfully
exerting the principle of civil supremacy. Not so were the
Bouton, Documents ^nd_^cords_Relati^ to New
Hampshire, 8:182, 190; Robert Oorden to Philip Schuyler,
August 4 , 1775, Howard Swiggett, \^_out__o^i^garaj_JVal ter
Butler and the Tory Range rs, p. 56; John Stark to George
ClTHt^T^ rri7 81. Stark, John_Stark, pp. 213-214; John
Stark to William Heath, September 11, 1781, ibid., p. 248;
Division Orders, First Pennsylvania Orderly Book, Lmn,
Pennsylvania in the War_o f_th^_Revoljrt ion , pp. 364 , 366 .
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more direct violations of civil supremacy. Throughout the
war, civilians complained about the military trampling on
127
civilian authority. This was particularly true on the
frontier, where the military acted forcefully where the
12 8
civilian government was v;eak. Frequently the civilian
authorities, because of the weakened condition of their
government, did not respond to military violations of
12 9
civilian authority. Additionally, they often overlooked
12 7John Dowdney et al. to Thomas VJharton, July 26,
1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 2d ser., 3:111-112;
Joseph Donaldson et al . to Thomas Wharton, August 6 , 1777,
ibid., 1st ser., 5:496; Thomas Burke to John Rutledge,
March 6, 17 82, (extract) Gibbes, Documentary History o f the
American Revolution , 3:265-266; John Davenport to Joshua
Huntington7~^anuary 28, 1779, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC,
20 (1923): 111; Same to same, February 3, 1779, ibid., 114;
Same to same, February 28, 1779, ibid., 123-124.
""^^Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779 ,
Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records 1778-1790," pp. 83-89; Petition
of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia,
May 4, 1781, ibid., pp. 234-238; The Magistrates of Kaskaskia
to John Rogers, November 10, 1780, ibid., p. 208; Same to
same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 212; Memorial of the
Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to Mottin de la Balme, September 29,
1780 ibid., pp. 189-191; Richard Winston to John Todd,
October 17 , 1780, ibid., p. 195; Richard McCarty to John
Todd, September 18, 1779, Alvord, "Cahokia Records 1778-1790,
pp 614-615; Richard McCarthy to John Montgomery, Septem-
ber 19, 1779, ibid., p. 616; Memorial of the Inhabitants of
Cahokia to Mottin de la Balme, September 21, 1780, ibid.,
pp 537 543, 545; John Todd to Thomas Jefferson,
January 24,
1781, Palmer, Calendar_o^^^ginia_St
Richard McCarthy to John Todd, October 14, 1780, ibid., _
380; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settlement of Illinois
1778-1830," Chicago Historical Society Collections, 5 (1908).
19-20.
-•-^^Aanes Hunt, The Provin cial Commit tee s_o^_Safety
of the American RevolutT^FT^ . 89-90; J°hn W Jackson
|he
PP . 6 2-66.
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violations when they believed them necessary. Such were
the instances when Washington had citizens around his Morris-
town camp innoculated against smallpox and when he seized
money the Massachusetts legislature had sent to pay their
troops and used it to pay for the transportation of
130
supplies
.
Most violations of civil supremacy, however, were
met with prompt civilian action. The offending party was
generally informed that such violations would not be tole-
rated, and often this notification was accompanied by a
reprimand. Thus, one officer v;as reprimanded by the
Pennsylvania Council of Safety for having violated the
privacy of bawdy houses in the process of searching for
deserters. Three years later, the Pennsylvania government
rebuked Colonel Brodhead for his conduct toward the civilian
authorities of Westmoreland County. Earlier in the war,
when Arnold refused to cooperate with a committee the
Massachusetts Provincial Congress sent to oversee the mili-
tary activities at Fort Ticonderoga, the committee chastised
him and forced him to resign his commission. In 1775, the
New Hampshire Committee of Safety reprimanded Sullivan for
suggesting the military were better qualified to appoint
"^^Ward The War of the Revolut_ion, 1:320; George
Washington to the"PF¥iTdint of 'the Continental Congress,
Mav 1 1781, Fitzoatrick, Wr itings_ofJ;Jash3^gton , ZZ: zij
John i. Fit^patrick, ed . , Thi:;Di^s_oL^eorge J^^^
1748-1799, 2:208.
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officers than the provincial congress. When he went ahead
and made appointments without authorization, New Hampshire
sent a committee to Washington to complain about Sullivan
usurping their authority. Learning the government was not
pleased with his actions, Sullivan assured them of his
subordinate position in a letter that could have been
couched in more conciliatory terms. Nevertheless, the
committee of safety decided not to take disciplinary actions
• 4- K- 131against him.
Offenses against the civilian governments, such as
Sullivan's, were often more directly addressed by the
civilian authorities, than offenses against the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people. Generally, the
state governments were greatly irritated when the military
•^^•'"Brooke Hindle, David Rittenhouse (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964), ppl 176-177; Joseph Reed
to Daniel Brodhead , February 14 , 1780 , Hazard, Penr^ylvania
Archives, 1st ser. , 7:466-467; Samuel Mott to Jonathan
T^^TIJHb^T, June 30 , 1775 , Force, Amer ican_Archives , 4th ser.,
2-1140; Same to same, July 6, 1775, ibid., 1592; Walter
Spooner to the President and Members of the New York Conven-
tion July 3, 1775, ibid., 1539-1540; Walter Spooner
to
Jonathan Lu^bull
,
' July 3, 1775, ibid. 1^^0-1541; Walter
SDOoner's Report to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,
Tulv 6 1775, ibid., 1596-1598; The New Hampshire
Committee
of safety to John Sullivan, September 28, 1775,
Hammond,
Letters and Papers of John Sullivan , 1:92; Same to
same,
Hampshire Committee of Safety, September ^^/^ 1^75
ibid
96, 96-97; Same to same, October 4, 1775,
ibid., 101, Douton,
Documents and Records Relating to Nev^Hampshire_, 8 = 48
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?l^^l8-'J^hn'sOTwan-tb-^^^ HampshTre General Assembly,56, ilB, Jon bux Sullivan to the New Hamp-
January 18, 1776, ibid., J/, •-, 92-93.
shire Committee of Safety, March 14, 1776,
ibid., ^
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made improper suggestions, did not keep them informed, and
when they verbally or physically abused members of the
government. Of a more serious nature, which will be
discussed in the next chapter, were instances where the
military interfered with the political, electoral, govern-
mental, and judicial processes.
Civilian leaders often complained about the lack of
132information received from their military commanders.
They and Congress both urged m.ilitary leaders to keep them
informed of their plans and actions, reminding them of their
obligation to do so. Some officers were even reprimanded
for not doing so, such as William Smallwood, who was taken
to task by the Maryland state convention during the fall of
133
1776 for not reporting to them in a timely manner.
132William Hooper to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr.,
August 6, 1776, Burnett, LMCC , 2:40; Cornelius Harnett to
William Wilkinson, December 8, 1777, ibid., 584; John
Banister to George Washington, April 16, 1778, ibid., 3:169;
Pierce Butler to James Irdell, April 6, 1782, Griffith J.
McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Irdell, One of the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the Un ited States,
2:9; John Adams to Abigail Adams, August 30, 1776, Butter-
field, AFC , 2:114; Same to same, September 22, 1776, ibid.,
131; Same to same, October 8, 1776, ibid., 140.
""^^William Smallwood to Mathew Tilghman, October 12,
1776, David Ridley, ed., Annals of Annapolis, Comprising
Sundry Notices of that Old City from the Period of the First
Settlement in its Vicinity in the Year of 1649, Until the
Wqr 1812; Together with Var ious Incidents in the History
5f~MaryTand (Baltimore: Gushing and Brother, 1841), pp. 256-
257- see also Thomas Burke and Henry Laurens to George
Washington, March 15 , 1779 , Burnett, LMCC, 4 : 104-105 ; _ Thomas
Nelson to Nathanael Greene, September 5, 1781, Mcllwame, _
Official Letters of the Governors of ^^^9^-111^; ^ • 35 ; Benjamin
H^Ii^'to George Rogers Clark, October 14 , 1782, ibid., 340
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As has and will be discussed, the military frequently
took the opportunity to keep the civilians advised of their
needs, plans, and actions, as well as occasionally offering
political suggestions. Political suggestions were generally
made in an informal manner, and when they were formally made,
they were usually done so with apologies and explanations,
generally to the effect that military and political questions
were blended and that the exigencies of the moment demanded
they go out of their province to make such suggestions .
"'""^^
As one might have assumed, Charles Lee often made
such political suggestions. In giving Congress his views
on Howe's peace overtures, he voiced his hope they would not
think him impertinent and presuming, but would attribute
his views to his "anxiety and zeal for the publick welfare."
Similarly, in his giving his views to Rhode Island's chief
executive about the selection and quality of New England
generals, he stated, "I must entreat you not to impute the
freedom with which I shall offer my thought upon this
occasion, to a petulance of disposition, but to the most
^^^Uuqh Mercer to the President of the Continental
congress, September 4, 1776, Force, AmericanAchr^es ,
5th
se? 2-158; Robert Howe to John Ru t ledge
,-oHt^ 6 , 1776 ,
Hemphill, Journals of the General ^Asseir^l^a^^^M mpjiJ-x J-
, T-T-7Z"iTfin ^ 130- WilITam Moultrie to
|^nf AP?n"2 2VV7ao,- (copy), DuoU, m^.fus_Putn2!l.
pp. 145-146.
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pure and disinterested zeal." ""-^ Washington was hesitant
early in the war to publicly express himself on political
topics, but by 1780, he increasingly did so, always explain-
ing why he was stepping into the political realm and asking
1 fithat he not be thought impertinent.
Most suggestions of a political nature were received
without charges that the military were violating the princi-
ple of civil supremacy. However, certain subjects did cause
the civilians unrest. One such was the impost. Washington's
circular to the states calling for support of the impost was
not well received in Virginia, nor was Greene's letter to
South Carolina's chief executive calling on him to have the
137legislature support the impost. Greene v/rote that his
letter was met with "some alarm and much disgust," and
1 OCT
Charles Lee to the President of the Continental
Congress, October 10, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC ,
5 (1873): 260; Charles Lee to Nicholas Cooke, December 7,
177 6, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Isl and, 8:111; see also
Charles Lee to the President of the Continental Congress,
January 22, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872):
247, 249.
•'"^^George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, August 20 , 1780 , Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington, 19:413; Same to same, January 30, 1783, ibid.,
26^2^"Circulars to the States, October 18, 1780 , January 22,
1782 , 'May 4 [-8] , 1782 , and June 8 , 1783 , MHSC, 5th ser . ,
10:212, 258; Fitzpatrick, Writing s of Washington, 24:237;
26 :486 .
""^^Edmund Randolph to James Madison, June 28 , 1783 ,
ibid 491n.30; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard,
March's, 1783, Autograph Letters of General Nathanael
Greene,
1:27, WLCL.
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caused the legislature to reject immediately the impost.
Despite subsequent apologies, Greene was widely condemned
in South Carolina, and was frequently referred to as a
Cromwell
.
Upsetting the civilian leaders even more than
improper suggestions were those instances where the military
verbally or physically abused civilian authorities, as well
as those instances where the military insulted the state
governments. Such abuses and insults were generally
acknowledged and punished. With respect to insulting
governments, during the May 1775 session of the Connecticut
Assembly, a captain was cashiered for speaking contemptuously
of the General Assembly's measures. John Stark avoided a .
similar fate the first winter of the war, after having
written what he described as warm and illiberal reflections
upon some of the members of the New Hampshire Provincial
Congress. He was saved from being punished by asking for-
giveness, stating the remarks came from passion not from
settled design, and subsequently making the same acknowledge-
ment of wrong-doing to a military court of inquiry. Later
"^^Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 3,
1783 Sparks, Gouverneur Morris , 1:252; Nathanael Greene to
George Washingt^HT^^li^ 15, 1783 , Sparks, Correspondence _
of the American Revolution, 4:4; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin
Guerard, Mai^FT4 , 1783 , Autograph Letters of General
Nathanael Greene, 1:29, WLCL; Captain [ ] to Nathanael
Greene, April 9, 1783, ibid., 2:64; Edward McCrady The
Hi^torv_c^ South Carolina in the^evolu^n^ ^Z 8 0^:1^^
,
pp. 690-694
.
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in the war, General Maxwell came very close to being
disciplined by the New Jersey legislature, after having
written them a letter they considered as containing indecent
and undeserved reflections upon themselves. Not so fortu-
nate was Commodore Oliver Bowen , commander of Georgia's
navy, who was suspended from command in 1778 for having
139
written an insulting letter to Governor Houston.
Physical abuses were also generally acknowledged
and punished. This was particularly true in Pennsylvania
where Chief Justice McKean and President Reed did not
tolerate the military physically abusing the civilian
authorities in any manner whatsoever. McKean and Reed were
quite upset with the military during 1778 and 1779 as the
state's attorney general was beaten up three times by
Hoadly, Public Records of the Colony of
Connecticut, 15:54; Bouton , Document s and Records Relating
to New Hampshire , 8:71, 96; Stephen Moylan to Matthew
Thornton, February 7, 1776, ibid., 70; John Sullivan to the
Court of New Hampshire, January 17, 1776, ibid., 32; Samuel
Hobart to the New Hampshire Provincial Congress, January 1,
1776, Lawrence Shaw Mayo, "Colonel John Stark at Winter
Hill' 1775," PMHS 57 (October 1923-June 1924): 331-333;
William MaxwellT^Apr il 25, 1779, Select ions from the
Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey_;_^on]_1776^
t^-lT86TTP^ 146-148; Esaac S. Mulford, Hi^ory_of_New
Civil and Pol itical , p. 457n.ll; Chandler, Revolu-
FTT^KiRTR^^^^^T^orgia , 2:78-88 , 92 , 118-119 ; Kenneth
Coleman,' 'The American Revolution in Georaia_1^163^:llQ9_,
pp. iii-iir:
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military officers. McKean himself was even struck by
General William Thompson, who believed McKean and Congress
had not been aggressive enough in getting him exchanged
while he was a prisoner of war. When Thompson was called
before Congress on November 20, 1778, to answer for his
conduct, he admitted he had called McKean a rascal and a
villain, but denied being disrespectful to Congress. After
much debate. Congress, late in December, ordered Thompson
to apologize to Congress, which he did. But when the
apology appeared in print, it contained the accusation that
McKean was a coward. Although a duel was discussed, McKean
settled the matter by taking Thompson to court for libel
and won a judgment in the amount of £5,700, which he
141declined taking.
Thomas Wharton to Thomas McKean, February 15,
1778
,
Hazard, Pennsyl\^d^_Arcl^^ 1st ser., 6:266-267 ;
Joseph Reed to George Washington, May 8, 1779, ibid.,
7:382; Nathanael Greene to Thomas McKean, June 3, 1778,
Coleman, Thomas McKean , p. 225; Thomas McKean to Nathanael
Greene, June 9, 1778, ibid., p. 225; Roberdeau Buchanan,
Lif e of Hon. Thomas McKean (Lancaster, Pennsylvania:
Inquirer Printing Company, 1890), p. 60.
^^^Ford, JCC, 12:1146-1147, 1148, 1149, 1151-1152,
1153, 1161 , 1199, "T200 , 1227, 1239, 1249-1250; Nathaniel
Scudder to Richard Henry Lee, December 9, 1778, Burnett,
LMCC, 3:523; Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes, December ib,
1778 ' ibid., 537; William Thompson to Joseph Reed,
January 7 , 1779, Hazard, Pennsy Iv^ani^^^rchiv^ 2d ser.,
3-262-263; G. S. Howe, "A Valuable Acquisition in Congress:
Thomas McKean, Delegate from Delaware to the Continental
congress, 1774-1783," PH 38, no. 3 (July 1971): 234n.20,
The_Pennsylvania^cket7^_G^ December 29,
31, 1779 .
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The Pennsylvania courts also took two other officers
to task for striking public officials. Upset at being asked
at the 1782 election poll to show his certificate of having
taken the oath to the Constitution, Thomas Proctor assaulted
the poll inspector, maintaining that as a veteran he con-
sidered demonstrating a certificate an insult. Brought to
trial, Judge McKean fined him t80, stating "You gentlemen
of the army hold your head too high, but I will bring you
down, we shall be overrun else." At the same term of the
court. Colonel Francis Nicholas was fined tSO for assaulting
142
a member of the council.
When a state government was unable to have a
Continental officer acknowledge his wrongdoing, or when they
were unable to properly chastise or punish him, or when they
believed Congress should administer the rebuke, they called
upon Congress to determine the degree of guilt and the
appropriate punishment. Thus, upon the complaint of the
Pennsylvania government, Pulaski, for resisting the serving
of a writ upon him by the Sheriff of Philadelphia County,
was ordered during the fall of 1778 to submit to the state
authority and was informed Congress was determined to
resent any opposition made by any officer to the civil
-'-'^^The Independent Gazetteer, October 1, 1782
Scharf, Hi^toryjofJPhiladel 1:4"26.
5 4 9
14 3authority. Already, the previous year. Congress had
resolved that it would "discountenance and punish any
indecent behaviour of any officer
. . . towards the civil
authority of the several states." Such a statement would
be made again during 1779. "^"^"^ And Congress was true to its
word, as many officers were reprimanded and punished by them
for their actions against the state governments and state
officials
.
Late in April 1777, Congress received complaints
from Maryland that naval Captain James Nicholson had impres-
sed citizens of their state and had been disrespectful to
the civil authority of the state when queried about his
actions. Congress, believing Nicholson had acted improperly,
suspended him, giving him five days to provide such satis-
faction as the governor and council of Maryland shall accept,
and failing that, he was to be dismissed from the navy. In
giving him this ultimatum, one member of Congress wrote that
it had been done so as to "convince officers that they were
very inferior to the Magistrates of States, and must treat
them with the most profound respect." Nicholson made amends
"''^
"^Samuel Adams to James VJarren, October 20, 1778 ,
Burnett, LMCC, 3:458-459; Ford, JCC, 12:974.
14 4
Ibid., 8:656; 13:413.
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with the Maryland state officials and Congress lifted his
145
suspension
.
Later that year, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Carrington
faced a similar dismissal, for having unduly attempted to
influence the Virginia government's appointment of officers
for the Virginia Continental regiment of artillery. Upon
Governor Henry's complaint. Congress gave Carrington five
days to apologize to the governor or be dismissed. Carring-
ton complied. The following year, as has already been
discussed. General Thompson was forced by Congress to
apologize to Chief Justice McKean for having verbally and
physically abused him."*"^^
Benedict Arnold and his aide-de-camp, Matthew
Clarkson, after the former became military commander of
Philadelphia, constantly ran afoul of the Pennsylvania
145Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, May 2, 1777,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:354; William Paca to the Governor and
Council of Maryland, May 24, 1777, ibid., 372; Richard Henry
Lee to Samuel Purviance, May 3, 1777, ibid., 372n.3; Mary-
land Council to James Nicholson, April 24, 1777, Browne,
Maryland Archives, 16:226-227; Same to same. May 8, 1777,
ibid . , 2 4T"r Maryland Council to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, April 26, 1777, ibid., 229-230; Maryland
Council to the Maryland Delegates in the Continental
Congress, April 26, 1777, ibid., 230; Robert Morris to
Thomas Johnson, May 1, 1777, ibid., 237; Thomas Johnson to
William Paca, May 29, 1777, ibid., 264; James Nicholson to
Thomas Johnson, April 25, 1777, Beverly W. Bond, Jr.,
"State Government in Maryland 1777-1781," p. 22, Ford, JCC,
7:312, 318; 8:665.
-^"^^Ibid., 8:655-656 , 675 ; 11:527-529; 12:1146-1147 ,
1148, 1149, 1151-1152, 1153, 1161, 1199, 1200, 1227, 1239,
1249-1250, 1250-1255.
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government. When that government had no success in curbing
what they considered violations of civil supremacy by the
two officers, they turned to Congress. When Congress learned
that Clarkson had been disrespectful to the Pennsylvania
government, they suspended Clarkson on February 18, 1779,
and a week later resolved they would "not countenance any
military officer in disrespectful conduct to the civil
magistracy . "''^^ Clarkson offered to serve in the southern
theater as a volunteer and was allowed to do so, but before
leaving, he was called before Congress late in March and
reprimanded
.
With respect to Arnold, the Pennsylvania government
formally complained to Congress during February 1779, charg-
ing the general with profiteering and misconduct towards
the Pennsylvania government. Two months later, after
an
acrimonious debate. Congress ordered Washington to have
Arnold court-martialed. Eventually, during January
1780,
a court-martial found Arnold guilty of being
"imprudent and
improper" in using public wagons to transport
his personal
property and having given permission for a
ship to leave
Philadelphia without permission of the state
authorities.
1^'^Ibid., 13 : 250 , 206 , 249-250 .
l^^Ibid 360-362 , 363; Donald W. Whisenhunt,
[ed
] ,
oelegat^fr^e^se^^ '
61, 61.
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and was ordered reprimanded by VJashington. Congress approved
the sentence and he was reprimanded during April 1780."'''^^
Arnold, as we know, was so dissatisfied with the
civilian authorities, that within six months of his repri-
mand , he switched sides . Many American officers and
soldiers shared Arnold ' s dissatisfaction with the civilian
authorities, and with the American people, as has been dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter, but few joined Arnold in
becoming traitors. Nonetheless, as has been demonstrated
in this chapter, many American soldiers violated the princi-
ples of civil supremacy , as well as the 1 iberties and
properties of the people they were fighting to defend. The
next chapter will show how the military, dissatisfied with
the American revolutionary governments, including Congress,
attempted to influence, change, and even overthrow them.
Like the Puritans of English Revolution, many in the military,
and some civilian leaders, believed the military offered the
only hope of guiding the revolution to a successful conclusion
""^Nathanael Greene to [ ], July 25, 1778 , Greene,
Nathanael Greene, 2:103; John Cadwalader to Nathanael Greene,
December~57 1778 , NYHSC , 3:270; Francis Lewis to Governor
George Clinton, March 8, 1779, Burnett, LMCC , 4:92; General
Orders Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18:222-225;
Ford, JCC, 13:184, 188-189, 324-326, 379, 412-417, 16:161-
162.
CHAPTER IX
MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN AND INTERFERENCE
WITH THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS
AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Throughout the war the military involved themselves
in and interfered with the civilian governments and the
political process. They did so individually and organiza-
tionally. To some degree, as will be demonstrated, their
involvement and interference was encouraged and expected,
for, after all, these military leaders to great extent had
been civilian leaders before the war. The military involved
themselves in the operations of the governments and inter-
fered with them in the belief they could make them function
more effectively. In a few isolated instances some civilian
and military leaders actually contemplated the military
replacing establ ished governments , or at least control ling
them. And in a few instances the military did control or
replace the civilian governments for a limited time or on a
limited basis. The military also interfered with the actual
operations of all branches of governments and with the
operation of the political process. Most military involve-
ment in government and politics, however, related to
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individuals participating directly or indirectly in their
operations
.
Just because Americans put on uniforms, they did
not discard their civilian beliefs nor their desire to
participate in the political process and government. The
military, with a few exceptions, were first and foremost
civilians, with civilian concerns and desires. During 1775
and 1776 many civilian leaders, temporarily in uniform,
played active roles in forming the revolutionary wartime
governments. Those that decided to take permanent positions
in the military continued to express their interest in the
adoption of the new state constitutions and the implementa-
tion of the governments under them.^
Many in the military, reflecting the desires of their
communities, desired that Congress declare independence.
This desire was prompted in part by ideological considera-
tions, and in part because the rebellious soldiers realized
Timothy Pickering to John Pickering, April 26, 778,
[Copy], Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5) ;
John Sullivan to Meshech Weare, December 12, 1775, Hammond,
Letters and Papers of John Sullivan , 1:141-148; John Haslet
to CaesaF" Rodney, [Fall 1776], Harold B. Hancock, ed . ,
_
"Letters to and from Caesar Rodney," DH 12, no. 1 (April
1966) : 72; Lachlan Mcintosh to George Walton, December 15,
1776, Lilla M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan Mcintosh,
1774-1799," GHQ 38, no. 3 (September 1954): 256; George
Washington to John Augustine VJashington, May 31, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wash ington, 5:92; Charles Lee to
Patrick Henry; July 29, 1776, "The Charles Lee Papers,"
NYHSC, 5 (1873) : 178 .
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they were representing revolutionary governments unrecognized
by any nation and, should the war be lost, legally they would
be traitors. Thus, the soldiers, even more than their
civilian leaders, were potentially more apt to lose their
life, liberty, and property should independence not be
established and the war lost. "We are high Gamblers," one
officer wrote two weeks before independence was declared,
"who are playing for all we are worth. "^
Although Washington did not express his desire for
independence, many of his subordinates did. As early as
October 1775, Greene informed his colony's civilian leaders
that the people wanted independence and that they might as
well declare that fact, for they should begin the war in
earnest, "for we have no alternative," he told Samuel Ward,
3
"but to fight it out or be slaves." Stephen Moylan, after
reading the King's speech calling the Americans rebels,
wrote Joseph Reed, who had left the army early in November
to lobby for independence, asking whether Congress would
"not declare what the Most Gracious Majesty insist on they
have already done?" In another letter, Moylan asked "shall
2Thomas Mifflin to Elbridge Gerry, June 26, 1776,
Elbridge Gerry Papers, Russell VJ. Knight Collection, MHS;
see also Jeremy Belknap, "Journal of My Tour to the Camp,
and the Observations I Made There," PMHS 4 (1858-1860): 78 .
"^Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, October 23, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL.
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we never leave off debating and boldly declare independence?"
He believed "That and that only will make us act with spirit
and vigour."^ James McHenry learning of the King's speech,
and believing reconciliation impossible, wrote that "Strength
must decide the present dispute."^ For many, strength could
only come by having direction, and direction meant independ-
ence. One person who certainly believed this was Charles
Lee. He had much to gain if America won the war--honor and
fame. But if she lost, as a retired British regular
officer, he had much to lose, including his life. Thus,
from the beginning of the war, he pleaded with the civilian
leaders to declare independence.
After hearing the King's statements concerning the
war, he wrote Robert Morris that "We must be Independent or
Slaves." Three months later, with independence not declared,
he again wrote Morris, urging Congress to act, reminding him
that if Congress would not act the people would, and this,
he added, "must produce a noble anarchy." In May, he again
pleaded with Morris. "For God's sake," he wrote, "declare
yourselves at once what you really are and must be-an
4 Stephen Moylan to Joseph Reed, January 2, 1776,
Griffin, Stephen Moylan , p. 27; Same to same, January 30,
1776, ibid.
^James McHenry to John McHenry, January [ ], 1776,
Steiner, James McHen ry, p. 6.
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independent state. Several days later, he told Patrick
Henry that if independence was not declared, the people
might take the direction of the war into their own hands.
During April and May, he also appealed to Richard Henry Lee
and Edward Rutledge, writing the latter that "unless you
declare yourselves independent, establish a more certain
and fixed legislation than that of a temporary courtesy of
the people you richly deserve to be enslaved." Lee, like
Washington, also took actions which pushed the colonial
9governments towards independence."
By June, the call for independence had increased,
with the military continuing their appeals on a larger
scale. Early that month, over two thousand officers and
soldiers of four battalions of Associators of Philadelphia
Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776, "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 233; Same to same,
April 16 , 1776 , ibid., 426 ; Same to same, May 3 , 1776, ibid.,
467; See also Same to same, January 23, 1776, ibid., 255-256.
7Charles Lee to Patrick Henry, May 7, 1776, ibid.,
5 (1873) : 1-3 .
p
Charles Lee to Edward Rutledge, April 3, [1776],
ibid., 4 (1872): 372-373; Charles Lee to Richard Henry Lee,
April 5, 1776, ibid.; 380; Same to same, May 10, 1776, ibid.,
5 (1873) : 20; see also Charles Lee to John Dickinson,
January 18, 1776, John Richard Alden, General Charles Lee:
Traitor or Patriot?, pp. 91-92; Same to same, February 22,
1776 , ibid. , pp. 93-94 ; Same to same, July 3 , 1776 , ibid.,
pp. 116, 327n.52.
^E.g., Benjamin Rumsey to William Rumsey, June 3,
1776 , James F. Vivian and Jean H. Vivian, eds., "'A Juris-
diction Competent to the Occasion': A Benjamin Rumsey Letter,
June 1776," MHM 67, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 152.
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and its suburbs were polled on the question of independence
.
Less than thirty voiced any opposition. Later that month,
Mifflin pleaded with a member of Congress, "For Gods sake
Mr [ . ] Gerry, give a little more velocity to Congress-you do
not know the situation of your Country, or your conduct
,.10
would be more Decisive.
From the first days of the war, the military were
not content to let the provincial governments and Congress
make military and political decisions without contributing
their ideas and beliefs, usually in the form of suggestions.
These suggestions were generally conveyed in a polite and
decorous manner, but, as was noted in the preceding chapter,
some suggestions were, or were thought to be, threatening
or in some way improper. Civilian leaders, as we have
already seen, generally chastised the military for such
intemperate behavior. For the most part, military sugges-
tions were properly made, and generally were well received,
often being encouraged and expected by the civilian govern-
ments .
Realizing how closely military and political ques-
tions were often intertwined, Washington did not
hesitate
publicly and privately to suggest to Congress and its
members
courses of action he wished them to take. He made
l^The Pennsylvania Eveniiig_P^' '"'""^^^^ J • ^
Thomas Mi ffrnTtB-Elbr-Idg^ 'Gerry , June 29, 1776,
Llbridge
Ge?ry Papers, Russell W. Knight Collection,
MHS.
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suggestions relating to the organization and operations of
the support departments; the recruitment of foreign officers;
military and naval strategy; recruitment of soldiers, appre-
hension of deserters; powers of congressional committees
at camp; test oaths; promotions; the refugee problem;
exchanges of prisoners; and the status of Vermont."'"'^ With
respect to Vermont, Washington did not publicly get involved
in its status, but he did so privately, writing members of
Congress and state officials of New York and New Hampshire,
as well as the leaders of Vermont, expressing his desire to
12
see the problem of its status resolved.
George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, July 4, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
5:216; Same to same, July 10, 1775; ibid., 3:324;
Same to same, December 18, 1775, ibid., 4:172; Same to same,
July 22, 1780, ibid., 19:236; Same to same, November 19,
1782, ibid., 25:350-351; Same to same, December 31, 1775,
ibid., 4:197; George Washington to Henry Laurens, July 24,
1778, ibid., 12:224; George Washington to James Duane,
December 26, 1780, ibid., 21:15; George Washington to
Benjamin Franklin, August 17, 1777, ibid., 9:85-87; George
Washington to Silas Deane, August 13, 1777, ibid., 9:63;
George Washington to Richard Henry Lee, November 27, 1775,
ibid., 4:117; George Washington to John Jay, April 23, 1779,
ibid., 14 :435-437 ; "^George VJashington to the Secretary at
War, 'October 7, 1782, ibid., 25:240; Ford, JCC, 8:593;
President of the Continental Congress to the Several States,
June 15, 1781, Burnett, LMCC , 6:120; Arthur Lee to James
Monroe, August 23, 1783, ibid., 7:277.
^^George Washington to Philip Schuyler, November 28,
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings_c^f VJashington , 2 3 : 361-36 2 ; Same
to same, January 8 , TT8T7"^bid . , 4 32 ; Same to same, Febru-
arv 6, 1782, ibid., 487; Same to same, January 29,
ibid., 468 ; Same to same. May 14, 1781, ibid 2 2 : 8
1-8 2
;
George Washington to Joseph Jones, July 10, 1781, i^id ,
J:^^,
Georae Washington to Thomas Chittenden, January 1, 1782,
ibid"^ 23-419-421; George Washington to Meshech Weare,
5G0
Washington was frequently successful in having
Congress adopt his suggestions and recommendations. James
Duane wrote him during 1779 that "You will find that most
13
of the Acts you recommend are passed in Congress."
Other Continental officers were also relatively
successful in having Congress consider and adopt their
suggestions and recommendations. This was particularly true
of Charles Lee, who could not resist giving his opinion on a
variety of matters, including the size of the army, strategy,
opening up ports to foreign trade, and the treatment of
Tories.''"'^ Greene also made frequent suggestions, generally
when he was the Quartermaster General. Early in the war,
he suggested to one member of Congress that if northern and
southern troops were exchanged it would cure the itch for
them wanting to go home on furloughs. In the same letter,
he expressed hope Congress would send Continental soldiers
to every colony to "support the spirited, confirm the
weak
and wavering, and awe our Opposers into submission,
for there
July 31 1782, ibid., 24:449-450; George
Washington to Jacob
Bayler, 'September 29, 1782, ibid., 25:216.
^^James Duane to George Washington, March 16,
1779,
Burnett, LMCC , 4:106; see also Curtis P.
Nettles, G^eorge
Washi^TgtoH^ln^ P'
^"^rharles Lee to John Adams, October 5 , 1775,
"The
Charles Lofp^p^^s," NVHSC, 4 (1872,:
Charles ee o
r'^^o'ZTreT.enroTT.l ^^.^is^^^^r^. October 10,Lee to the
^^^^
J^^"^
. J., _^lcs Lee to Samuel Ward, [January1776, Ibid , 259-260, Char e ^^^^ Samuel Ward,
1776], Knollenberg, Corresponaenct^uo.
—
^
p. 170.
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are no Arguments however well supported by Reason that
carries such conviction with them as those that are enforced
from the Muzzle of a Gun or the Point of a Bayonet. "'^^
Hamilton also frequently contacted members of Congress
giving them his opinion on promotions and financial matters."*"^
Other Continental generals, such as Benedict Arnold and
Lafayette, also made suggestions to Congress about policies
17
that legislative body should adopt.
The military probably made more suggestions and
recommendations to the provincial and state governments and
their leaders than they did to Congress. Washington was
quite active in contacting state leaders, making recommenda-
tions and suggestions relating to political, military, and
other matters. Eleven times during the war v^ashington sent
circulars to all the states, and thirty times to a particular
Nathanael Greene to Samuel Ward, December 31, 1775,
Nathanael Greene Papers, vol. 1, WLCL; see also Nathanael
Greene to John Jay, February 1, 1779, Morris, John Jay,
pp. 542-543.
"""^Alexander Hamilton to William Duer , May 6, 1777 ,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 1:246; Same to same,
June 18,~1778, ibid., 498; Alexander Hamilton to [ ],
[December 1779-March 1780], ibid., 2:236-251; Alexander
Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3, 1780], ibid., 400-418,
Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 30, 1781, ibid.,
604-635
.
-^"^Benedict Arnold to the President of the Continental
Congress, June 13 , 1775, Force, American_M;chjA^es, 4th ser.,
2-976-977- Marquis de Lafayette to the President of the
continental Congress, April 21 , 1778 , "Letters f^^^ ^he
Marquis de Lafayette to the Hon. Henry Laurens, 1777-1780,
SCHGM 8, no. 1 (January 1907): 65-66.
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region or state. He also wrote letters to state leaders.
He urged state governments to give more powers to their
executives; made recommendations for promotions; suggested
Virginia send more and better qualified delegates to Con-
gress; suggested laws be adopted to stop trade with the
enemy and allowing the military to administer an oath and
sv;ear any person to the truth of matters relative to public
service; suggested Virginia delay opening her land office in
the west, for to open it would cause officers to leave the
service to become land adventurers: and requested New Jersey
prohibit their chief justice from rendering decisions regard-
ing the status of the enlistments of New Jersey's Continental
soldiers. Ke was careful to always couch his letters in the
most unoffensive manner, and normally prefaced or concluded
his remarks by apologizing for interjecting himself into
civilian affairs. "''^
1 R
Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A
Biography, 5:443-444.
"'"^George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, Decem-
ber 18, [-30], 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washingtoji,
13:466-467; Same to same, October 25, 1779 , ibid. , 17:22-23;
George Washington to William Livingston, February 19, 1780,
ibid., 18:28-31; Same to same. May 27, 1781, ibid., 22:117;
Same to same, November 13, 1782, ibid., 25:337; Same to
same, October 4 , 177 9 , Selecti^n£_from_the_Corr^^
the Executive of New Jer sey^_f£om _17 7_6_to_1^786^, pp. 188-189;
George Washington to William Greene, January f ], 1782,
Circular, Bar tie tt. Record s _o fJR^^^^ ' 9:525 ; Same to
same. May 4, 1782 , ibid'., 555'; George Washington to Nicholas
Cooke, March 17, 1776, ibid., 7:503; Same to same, Octo-
ber 12, 1776, ibid., 8:34-35; Same to same, January 6, 1776,
FitzDatrick, Writings of Washing ton, 4:216-217; George
Washington to^lHi^ITPeed , 28 , 1780, ibid., 18:439; Same
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Throughout the War, General Greene was quick to
express his opinion regarding civilian matters, and fre-
quently informed civilian leaders and state governments of
20them. With the encouragement and assistance of General
Wayne, Greene lobbied the chief executive of Georgia during
the winter of 1781-82 to allow the "disaffected" to return
to Georgia from Florida, if they would give their allegiance
to the state, or at least remain neutral during the remain-
der of the war. Wayne, supported by Greene, appealed to the
Georgia legislature to issue a proclamation opening the door
for absent citizens and encouraging desertion from the enemy.
21
The legislature agreed. Earlier in the war, several
generals, among them Smallwood, riaxwell, and Lee, suggested
same, July 4, 1780, ibid., 19:113-114; Same to same. May 5
[-7], 1781, ibid., 22:50; Same to same. May 27, 1781, ibid.,
118; George VJashington to John Trumbull, November 13, 1782,
ibid., 25^334-334; Circulars to the states May 24, 1781,
January 22, 1782, March 5, 1782, and June 8, 1783, in ibid.,
22:111; 23:458-461; 24:44-46; 26:487-488.
20Nathanael Greene to Thomas Jefferson, November 20,
1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson , 4:130; Nathanael
Greene to Nicholas Cooke, October 16, 1776, Bartlett, Records
of Rhode Island, 8:37; Nathanael Greene to Henry Marchant,
November 17, 1111 , Greene, Nathanael Greene , 1:511.
^^Nathanael Greene to John Martin, December 27 , 1781 ,
"Original Documents," MH 14 (1911): 204 ; Same to same,
January 9, 1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Letterbook, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1); Same to same, March 12 , 1782 , ibid..
Same to same, January 7, 1782, "Letter from General Greene
to Governor Martin," GHO 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 336 ;
Stevens, A Hi story oil Georgia, 2:272: Chandler, Revolutionary
Records of Georgia, 2:320.
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policies the states should adopt with respect to the Tory
22problem. Even Washington got involved in the Tory problem,
calling on the provincial governments to seize and try those
who were inimical or suspected to be.^"^
Steuben lobbied the Virginia legislature and chief
executive frequently during the winter of 1780-81. He made
so many suggestions regarding recruiting, drafting, prevent-
ing desertion, the militia law, the supply system, and
strategic policies that he was generally considered a nui-
sance. He even suggested that Jefferson call the assembly
into session so they could adopt the proper measures, includ-
ing those he had suggested, to prevent the loss of the
state .
^'^
Other generals in the south, including Gates,
Moultrie, Lafayette, and Lee, made suggestions to the chief
2 2William Smallwood to [ ] Jenifer, March 3, 1777,
Browne, Maryland Archives , 16:157-159; William Maxwell to the
New Jersey Legislature, April 26, 1779, Selections from the
Correspondence of the Executive of New Jersey, from 1776 to
1786
, pp . 151-15 4; Charles Lee to the President and Council
of the State of Georgia, August 28, 1776, "The Charles Lee
Papers," NYHSC, 5 (1873): 248.
2 3George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Novem-
ber 15, 1775, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington , 4:90;
George Washington to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress,
November 9, 1775, ibid., 78.
^'^Baron von Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, December 28,
1780, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:244, 245; Same to
same', DGcembeF~97" 17 80, Ibid 7, 'l 9 3-1 9 4 ; Same to same, Decem-
ber 16, 1780, ibid., 213-214; Same to same, December 18,
1780 ibid., 216; Same to same, January 2, 1781, ibid., 299;
Same'to same, January 21, 1781, ibid., 423; Archibald Gary
to Thomas Jefferson, February 13, 178], ibid., 596-597.
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executives respecting policies their states should consider
25
and/or adopt. Generals also made suggestions in the
northern theatre of operations and on the frontier. Putnam,
for example, early in 1777, suggested to Pennsylvania's
Council of Safety they consider adopting price controls
similar to those adopted by the New England states. George
Rogers Clark lobbied with Virginia's chief executive to have
a certain individual appointed County Lieutenant of the
newly created Jefferson County. Later that year, 1781, and
the following year. General William Irvine lobbied v/ith both
the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council and Virginia's
governor to have their respective states run a mutually
satisfactory boundary line.^^
The military were probably the most active in lobby-
ing for a more effective Congress. On one hand this meant
^^Charles Lee to Cornelius Karnet, President of the
North Carolina Council of Safety, July 24, 1776, "The Charles
Lee Papers," NYHSC , 5 (1873): 164; Charles Lee to John
Rutledge, June 16, 1776, ibid., 71-72; Same to same, August 1,
1776, ibid., 187; Horatio Gates to Abner Nash, July 19, 1780,
"Original Documents," MAH 5, no. 4 (October 1880): 284;
William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney, January 14, 1779,
_
Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revol ution, 1:262; Marquis
de Lafayette to Thomas Jefferson, July 1, 1781, Chinard,
Lafayette in Virginia , pp. 19, 19-20.
^^Israel Putnam to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety,
January 31, 1777, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser.,
5.209- George Rogers Clark to Thomas Jefferson, January 2i,
1781 'soyd. Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 4:420; William
Irvine
to William Mo^F¥7"De^ember 3, 1781, Butterfield, ^^hington::
Irvine Correspondence, appendix g, p. 232; William J^vine
to
Bi^fa^Ti^Ha^rTs^^ril 20 , 17 82 , ibid., appendix h, p. 267.
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making it more efficient, and on the other, and more import-
antly, making the whole system of Continental government
equal to the exigencies of the war. With respect to the
former, a good example is the military's desire that Congress
give more authority into the hands of single executive
department heads, or at least boards v;ith sufficient power
27
to properly conduct the public's business. The military's
lobbying efforts for these changes were somewhat successful,
as Congress did improve the functioning of some of their
boards and in 1781 did create relatively strong executive
departments. The military were not as successful in getting
the states to give Congress sufficient authority to conduct
the war as the military wished.
Although most revolutionary leaders looked to Congress
to play the primary role in directing the military forces of
the continent, few were willing to give Congress the necessary
authority to oversee properly the military and economic for-
tunes of the continent. From 1775 until 1781, the powers of
Congress were exercised by an authority based solely on the
^"^Alexander McDougall to Joseph Reed, March 25 , 1779 ,
fRufus W. Griswold] , Washing ton and th_e _General£_ol_tl2e
American Revolution, TT298T"Alexander Hamilton to James Duane,
-[Si^tiSb^rTT^rTTSr, Syrett, Papers_of_Alexander Ham^^
2-404-405; Alexander Hamilton to Isaac Sears, October 12,
1780 ibid., 472; Alexander Hamilton to Robert Morris,
Aoril 30 1781, ibid., 604-605; George Washington
to James
Duane Decelle^ 26 , 1780, Fitzpatrick, ^^rj^_s_c^V^Hl^^'
2^t?5; George Washington to Robert R. Livingston,
January 31,
1781, ibid., 164.
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tacit acquiescence of the states. Even after the ratifica-
tion of the Articles of Confederation, for the most part,
sovereignty, authority, and power remained in the states.
Congress did not raise revenue nor levy taxes, but only had
the delegated authority to make requisitions on the states.
If the states ignored them, Congress had no coercive force
to require the states to comply. Congress, similarly, had
limited war-making powers. Under the articles, it took nine
states to act on many things, and freauently nine states
were not even represented. Because of these deficiencies,
the military were very critical of Congress and the Conti-
nental system of government, both before and after the
adoption and implementation of the Articles of Confederation.
As will be discussed later, some members of the military
actually contemplated gaining partial or total control of
Congress in order to make it function more effectively.
Most, hov;ever, lobbied peacefully for change, desiring the
civilian leaders would realize that only with a nationalis-
tic program, even a temporary one, would Congress be able to
effectively give direction to the war effort.
Americans, to a large extent, lacked a sense of
nationalism before 1775. The Revolutionary War changed that.
As the Americans came into closer contact with one another,
a feeling of nationalism developed, especially among the
568
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military. In his The American Crisis No, 10, dated
March 5, 1782, Thomas Paine wrote "The union of America is
the foundation-stone of her independence," Most Continen-
tal officers agreed with this assessment, as the war had
given a nationalistic outlook towards themselves and the
central government. This was more true as the war progressed
and many in the military began to lose their local attach-
ments. Only a unified army under a unified central govern-
ment was victory possible, so believed many in the military.
Thus they desired the influence of the individual states to
decrease, and that of Congress to increase. Captain
Samuel Shaw wrote that unless power was "vested in some
supreme head, sufficient to enforce a compliance with such
regulations as are evidently calculated for the general good.
2 8 Henry Steele Commager , The Empire of Reason : How
Europe Imagined and America Realized the Enlightenment,
pp. 182, 185. ~
"
on
.
Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Writings of
Thomas Paine , 1:204.
"^'^Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21,
1783, Callahan, Henry Knox , p. 200; Nathanael Greene to
Charles Pettit, December 21, 1782, Merrill Jensen, The New
Nation: A History of the United States During the Confedera-
tion 1781-1789 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 407-408;
Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, September 14, 1780,
Thayer, Nathanael Greene, p. 277; Nathanael Greene to Robert
Morris, January 24 , 1782 , Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris ,
4:109; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, July 25, 1782,
Palmer, Calendar of Virqinia State Papers, 3:229-230; _
Timothy Pickering to [Joseph] Orne , August 18, 1782, Timothy
Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); Timothy Pickering
to Stephen Higginson, April 17, 1783, ibid.
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adieu to all government- [.] " He believed that the "Thirteen
wheels require a steady and powerful regulator to keep them
in good order, and prevent the machine from becomming use-
less." Similarly, Greene wrote one of New Hampshire's
principal civilian leaders that Congress "must have powers
31
to control all the States, or America is forever lost."
Hamilton, sharing this belief, was most active in lobbying
for the nationalistic point of view, most notably in a
series of letters to the newspapers, as "The Continentalist .
"
He wrote James Duane during the summer of 1780 that "the
confederation itself is defective and requires to be altered;
it is neither fit for war nor peace." "It may be appre-
hended," he wrote, "that this may be dangerous to liberty.
But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run
much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal
government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the
33
rights of the people."
^'"Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22 , 1782 ,
Quincy, Major Samuel Shaw , p. 100; Nathanael Greene to
Nathaniel Peabody, D'^S^er 8 , 1780, Moore, Nev^ampshire
,
2:374 .
^^The New-York Packet, and the Amer ican Advertiser ,
July 12, 19rAn^^^it-9r30 , 1781; April 18, July 4, 1782 ;
Alexander Hamilton to Isaac Sears, [October 12, 17B0J,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:472.
^^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [September 3,
1780] , ibid. , 402 .
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Washington was perhaps the most active in lobbying
for a stronger and more effective central government. Dur-
ing the summer of 1780, he wrote the President of Congress
that it was the wish of the army "that every matter which
relates to it should be under the immediate direction and
34providence of Congress." Throughout 1780 and 1781, he
complained constantly that Congress did not have sufficient
power to properly conduct the war effort, and called for
power to be given or taken by Congress. "^^ As the summer of
1780 began, he wrote Joseph Jones that unless Congress was
vested with powers by the states competent to the great
purposes of the war, or assumed them as a matter of right,
and unless Congress acted with more energy, "our Cause is
3 6lost." He continued the same theme that fall in letters
34 George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington , 19:412.
3 5George Washington to George Mason, October 22,
1780, ibid., 20:242; George Washington to William Fitzhugh,
October 22, 1780, P.S., ibid., 246; Same to same, March 25,
1781, ibid., 21:375-376; George Washington to John Parke
Custis, February 28, 1781, ibid., 320; George Washington to
Joseph Jones, March 24, 1781, ibid., 374; George Washington
to Philip Schuyler, February 20, 1781, ibid., 261-262; George
Washington to James Duane , October 4 , 1780 , ibid., 20:117;
Same to Same, December 26 , 1780 , ibid., 21:14; Same to same,
February 19, 1781, ibid., 248; George VJashington to Fielding
Lewis, May 5 [-July 6], 1780, ibid., 19:131; Circular to the
States, October 18, 1780, ibid., 20:210; George Washington
to John Sullivan, February 4, 1781, ibid., 21:183; George
Washington to Robert R. Livingston, January 31, 1781, ibid.,
164 .
^^George Washington to Joseph Jones, May 31 , 1780 ,
ibid., 19:412.
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to members of Congress and other civilian leaders. "Unless
there is a material change both in our military, and civil
policy," he warned George Mason late in October 1780, "it
37
will be m vain to contend much longer." After Congress
appeared to be straightening itself out by creating executive
boards and giving the Superintendent of Finance extraordinary
powers, Washington curtailed his lobbying efforts for a
stronger Congress. His attention during 1781 was primarily
focused upon military matters. However, after the victory
at Yorktown, he renewed his lobbying efforts. He believed
there should be a stronger union of the states, under a
Congress with sufficient powers; otherwise, he warned, the
states would be like a rope of sand with the result being
anarchy and confusion. "It is clearly my opinion," he wrote
one member of Congress during the spring of 1783, "unless
Congress have powers competent to all 'general* purposes,
that the distresses we have encountered, the expences we
have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the course of
3 8
an Eight years war, will avail us nothing."
^"^George Washington to George Mason, October 22,
1780 ibid., 20:242; see also George Washington to James
Duane, October 4, 1780, ibid., 117; George Washington to
John Mathews, February 14, 1781, ibid., 21:226-227; George
Washington to Joseph Jones, March 24, 1781, ibid., 374.
^^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 4,
1783 Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:279; seealso
Georoe Washingt^ to A^^^hibaTd^rey , June 15, 1782 , Fitz
Patrick, writings of Washington, 24 : 347 ; George Washington
to BenjamiHnTI?FiWri^1^Fa^r^l78 3 , ibid., 26:184 , 184-185,
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In many instances the military made their recommenda-
tions and suggestions without invitation to do so, but most
times they did so because a public official had asked them
to, either publicly or privately. Members of Congress
frequently asked Washington to privately correspond with
them, desiring he would share things with them that he could
3 9
not publicly. Washington appreciated the attention shown
him, as well as the practical effect such communication
afforded. Members of Congress wrote other officers,
soliciting their thought about political, economic, and other
non-strictly military matters. Hamilton, for example, having
George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 31, 1783,
ibid., 276-277; George Washington to Tench Tilghman,
April 24, 1783, ibid., 359; Circular to the States, June 8,
1783, ibid., 487, 488; George Washington to John Augustine
Washington, June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:12.
^^Thomas McKean to George Washington, July 14, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:146; John Hanson to George Washington,
November To7~lV81, ibid., 261; Elias Boudinot to George
Washington, November 27, 1782, ibid., 550; John Mathews to
George Washington, April 16, 1781, ibid., 56; John Sullivan
to George Washington, November 9, [-30], 1780, ibid.,
5:463-
464; Same to same. May 2, 1781, ibid., 6:74; Same
to same,
June 11, 1781, ibid., 114; Robert Morris to George _
Washing-
ton
,
May 29 , 1781, Ferguson, Paper^ol^obertMorris , 1:97;
Samiel Ward, Sr., to George Washington, September 17,
1775,
John ward, "Lieu; . -Colonel Samuel Ward, of the
Revolutionary
war?" NYGBR 6, no. 3 (July 1875): 115; Thomas
Lynch to
George-Wi^ington, January 16 , 1776 , Force, American
Archives , 4th ser., 4:687.
^°George Washington to John Mathews, June 7, 1781,
FitzDatrick Waitings of Washington, 22:176; George
Washing-
ton ^fjoh^ j!77^#ir-r3VT7^^ Revolutionary
D ip 1omatj^c__Cor£espondence , 3:132.
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just been elected to Congress, wrote Greene, "I shall be
happy to correspond with you . . . and I shall entreat you
not to confine your observations to military subjects but
to take in the whole scope of national concerns."'^"'" Civilian
leaders frequently urged military leaders to voice their
opinions respecting purely political matters. Early in the
war, Benjamin Rush, for instance, urged Wayne to join
Generals St. Clair and Thompson in publicly condemning
Pennsylvania's constitution. Gouverneur Morris later in
the war urged Greene to lobby with the governments of the
southern states to agree to a congressional plan for raising
42
revenue for the central treasury.
Many in the military wanted to do more than just
give their opinion about public affairs. They wanted to
participate in a more active manner. After all, some mili-
tary leaders had been active in political life before they
donned their uniform. Frequently those with political
inclinations were encouraged by their peers to leave the
military for positions in government, believing they could
influence the legislative bodies to take actions which
"^^Alexander Hamilton to Nathanael Greene,
[October 12, 1782], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton,
3:183.
^^Benjamin Rush to Anthony Wayne, May 19 , 1777 ,
Stille, Anthony Wayne, p. 68; Gouverneur Morris to
Nathanael
Greene, D¥^¥SblF-2T7'l781 , Sparks, Gouverneur_^^^
1:241.
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4 3
would benefit the military.
Civilian leaders also believed the country would
benefit from having military men serving in the political
arena. John Adams, for one, believed that annual elections
of generals would result in many generals being removed from
military command and many of them would eventually serve in
the civil government, thereby benefiting the governments by
4 4their military experience. James Duane
,
however, was
opposed to military men, particularly his friend, Philip
Schuyler, coming to Congress. "Your lips," he told Schuyler,
"will be sealed; and your knowledge and Abilities in a great
45
Measure lost to your Country." Schuyler did not heed this
advice and took his seat in Congress. William Ellery told
Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, November 2, 1776,
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC , 2 (1873): 263; [Edward]
Giles to Otho Ho[lland] Williams, November 15, 1781, Calen-
dar of the General Otho Holland Williams Papers in the
Maryland Historical Society, p. 56; Elias Boudinot to Mrs
.
Boudinot, March 15, 1778, Boudinot, Elias Boudinot , 1:109;
Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, October 26, 1778, Roche,
Joseph Reed, p. 149; George Washington to James McHenry,
December 11, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington ,
33:381; George Washington to Alexander McDougall, October 24,
1780, ibid., 20:254; Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion, The
Swamp Fox, pp. 265-266; Moultrie, Memoirs of the American
Revolution, 2:29; William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln,
July 17, 1779, ibid., 26; Benjamin Lincoln to William
Moultrie, July 19, 1779, ibid., 28-29; Alexander Hamilton
to John Laurens, [August 15, 1782], Syrett, Paper s of
Alexander Hamilton , 3:145.
"^^John Adams to Nathanael Greene, March [ ], 1777 ,
Burnett, LMCC, 2:300-301.
"^^James Duane to Philip Schuyler, January 3 , 1779,
ibid., 4:4.
his friend, William Whipple, a general of New Hampshire's
militia, that he preferred him to serve in the cabinet, not
in the field, but would support him in either. VVhipple
would serve adequately and often in both, being a member of
Congress for over four years, a member of the state legisla-
ture for numerous years, and commanding New Hampshire's
militia at Saratoga and those serving in Rhode Island.
Many revolutionary leaders did not believe military
officers should hold civilian positions while holding mili-
tary commissions, not even after they departed military
service. Benjamin Rush, before the war, wrote that military
men, because of their "knowledge in arms and their popularity
with the soldiers and common people would give them great
advantages over every other citizen, and v/ould render the
transition from democracy to anarchy, and from anarchy to
monarchy, very natural and easy." Thus, Rush believed, "it
would be best that military officers should be entirely
47
excluded from having any share in the legislature." When
Greene learned that Schuyler might be made president of the
Continental Congress and allowed to retain his military
"^^William Ellery to William Whipple, October 30,
1777 Brotherhead, ed. , The Book of the Signers: Containing
Fac-Simile Letters of the Signers of the Declarationoj
Independence (Philadelphia: William Brotherhead, 1861), p. 73
"^"^ Benjamin Rush to Catherine Macaulay, January 18,
1769, Butterfield, Letters of Benjamin Rush , 1:70.
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commission, he wrote John Adams in objection. "No free
people," he wrote, "ought to admit a junction of the civil
and military." "I will not hold a commission under that
State who blends those two characters together. I Think
them incompatible with the safety of a free people, and I
can assure you, I am not fighting for a change of masters,
but to have not but the law." Responding, John Adams told
him not to worry because no member of Congress would allow
4 R
an individual to hold two positions simultaneously.
Governor Henry wrote George Rogers Clark he thought
it improper to put the top civil and military authority in
the same hands, otherwise Clark would have been made county
49lieutenant of Illinois County. Frequently during the war.
Congress ruled that an individual could not hold a Continen-
tal commission while holding a state office.
Because many colonial governments had restrictions
regarding plural military-civil office holding, it is not
4 R
Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 28 , 1777 ,
Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary Correspond-
ence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH 1, no. 3
(July 1942): 74 ; John Adams to Nathanael Greene, June 2,
1777
,
ibid., 75; see also John Adams to Benjamin Rush,
February 8, 1778, Revolutionary War Correspondence, BPL.
^Patrick Henry to George Rogers Clark, December 15,
1778, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 64.
^^Ford, JCC, 14:861; Thomas Jefferson to the Vir-
ginia Delegates in^Congress, March 26, 1781, Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madison, 3:31-32, 32n.l; The Virginia
Delegates~Tt Congress to Thomas Jefferson, April 17, 1781,
ibid., 74-75.
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surprising to find the issue debated in Lhc provincial
congresses and constitutional conventions.^''^ Elbridge Gerry,
during December 1775, informed Samuel Adams that the revolu-
tionary legislature had before it a bill to "Exclude
Gentlemen of the Army from the legislative, that military
52Influence may never reach our senate." Many states during
the war adopted restrictions regarding Llie military liolding
civilian positions, to keep, for the most part, the military
influence from having too large a role in civilian delibera-
53
tions.
51William Clarence Webster, "Comparative Study of
the State Constitutions of the American Revolution," AAAPSS
9 (J,in\]nry-Junc 1897): 389-390 .
52Elbridge Gerry to S.iinucl Adams, December 13, 1/75,
Gerry-Knight Papers 1713-1825, MlIS; see also John Gary,
Joseph Warrc
n
: Phy sician
,
Politician, Patriot
, p . 2 00;
BrennarT, Plural Office-Holding in Massachusetts, p. 27; John
Wendell to Elbridge Gerry, June 25, 1776, Jere R. Daniel!,
Experiment in Republicanism: New Hampshire Politics and I lie
AmericalT'RevbTution , 1741-1794~, p. 165; Portsmouth Instruc-
tions to their Representatives in the New Hampshire General
Assembly, July 31, 1776, Bouton , Documents and Records
Relating to New Hampshire, 8:301; Proposed New Hampshire
CoHstrtTTtion of'l 7'7 9 bTd . , 9:840 .
^^Saunders, NCCR, 1 0:210, 579 , 101 0; Foote, Sketches
of North Caroljlrm, p. 71; Hemphill, Extracts from the Jour-
fraTs~cf
r
~the~T"Fjvincia l Congresses of South Carolina r775-
17T6~
,
passim, 63-259; A. S. Salley, ed.. Journal of the
General Assembly of South Carolina, September 17, 1776-
bctober 20, 1776 (Columbia, South Carolina: Historical Corn-
mi ss ion "^r^uth Carolina, 1909), pp. 1 54-155n.2; Delapl.iine,
Thomas Johnson, pp. 184, 198; Silver, "The Provisional
G^^nmelit~^^Maryland (1774-1777)," p. 49; Ronald Hoffman,
A Spirit of Pi ssension : Economjxs , Politics, andJJTgJRevqluj^
tion~rn~M"a'fyiand, p . "1 6T; Rowland, Cha£les__Carron__jof
CarrollTon, "2V4 7; Browne, Ma r\Oji_nd_ Ajrchives , 11:71, ChandJor,
Revo 1 u
t
i^n a rx_Recor d s of G^r^Ta, 1 : 277 , 288 , 289 ; Peyton
RinTdfTfiThno George Washington, September 6, 1775, Sparks,
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Despite the restrictions and beliefs against the
military serving in the government, or being involved in the
governmental affairs, the military did involve themselves in
the governments
•
They were involved in several ways, includ-
ing voting and holding office.
John Adams told a friend during the early summer of
1776 that to open a controversy on suffrage would be asking
for trouble. Once opened, "there will be no end of it" he
maintained. "Women will demand a vote," as well as men with-
54
out a farthing. But it was opened, particularly by men
in arms, who believed their willingness to shed their blood
55in the revolutionary cause entitled them to the vote.
This was especially true in Maryland and Pennsylvania.
During the summer of 1776, Maryland was beset by
disturbances by the militia who demanded suffrage for all
who were willing to support independence by shouldering arms.
They maintained that bearing arms and paying taxes should
entitle an individual to vote, but the revolutionary
Correspondence of The American Revolution , 1:33; Journals
of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee
of Safety and Council of Safety of the State of New York,
1775-1776-1777, 1:488, 495, 551; "The Militia Resolves,"
The Maryland Gazette , July 18, 1776.
^"^John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26 , 1776 , Adams,
Works of John Adams , 9:378.
^^Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage from
Property to Democracy 1760-1860 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), p. 103.
legislature declared that in order to vote for members of
the convention which would write the constitution, one would
have to possess fifty acres or property worth t40 sterling.
Upset with this decision, a large number of the militia and
members of the Flying Camp attempted unsuccessfully during
August 1776 to vote in Frederick, Prince Georges, and Kent
Counties, and in Annapolis. Frightened by this outburst by
the military, the conservative faction who controlled the
convention wrote a constitution, which to some degree, was
far more restrictive and less democratic than the proprie-
tary charter.
When the Pennsylvania Assembly convened in February
1776, they were met by demands from the disenfranchised
Associators for more representation and greater suffrage.
These demands continued throughout the spring and into the
summer, as committees of privates lobbied for the suffrage,
maintaining those risking their lives for the state should
be entitled to vote for the civilian leaders who would be
making decisions respecting their lives as soldiers. The
Provincial Congress on June 20, 1776, agreed, allowing all
military Associators who had paid a tax or who had been
assessed, to vote in the ensuing elections to create a new
Ibid., pp. 108-109, 109; David Curtis Skaggs,
Root s of Maryland Demo cracy^_1 7 5 3-17 76 , pp. 181-182, 182,
r90"-191, 194-19 5; Crowl, "Maryland During and After the
Revolution," p. 30.
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machinery of government.
Most states provided for those eligible to vote
before they had entered military service to be allov;ed to
5 8do so while in the army. Maryland was a notable exception,
denying the military the right to vote and to hold seats in
59the convention during the summer of 1776. It is impossible
to calculate how important the military vote was during the
war; however, it is safe to suggest that on occasion their
vote played an important role in certain elections.
Besides voting for public officials, many soldiers
during the war left military service to take positions in
the government. This was primarily a southern phenomenon.
The Pennsylvania Packet, and General Advertiser ,
July 1, 1776; The Pennsylvania Gazette , March 6, 1776;
'
Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 , p. 86; see
petitions in Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives ,~2"d ser., 3:640 ;
ibid., 8th ser., 8:7397-7405, 7406, 7409, 7422, 7438-7439,
and 7449.
^^Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial
Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety oT~the
State of New York, 1775-1776-1777, 2:948, 957, 957-958;
Alexander C. Flick, ed.. History of the State of New York ,
4:169; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett , p. 143.
^^Silver, "The Provisional Government of Maryland
(1774-1777)," p. 46; Crowl, "Maryland During and After the
Revolution," p. 30; Scharf, History of Maryland , 2:239-240.
^^Alexander C. Flick, ed.. History of the State of
NewYork, 4:169; Spaulding, George Clinton , p. 92; Gerlach,
PhTTTF^chuyler, pp. 309-310 ; Charles Coleman Sellers, The
AFETit^rtfe-^evolution :_jrhej^^
P^ale"(H¥b^^ , Connecticut: Feather and Good, 1939), pp. iui
roT7~22i.
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especially during 1781 and 1782 when many officers left the
military, either temporarily or permanently, to take posi-
tions in the state legislature. During those years over tv/o
dozen South Carolina officers, including Thomas Sumter,
Francis Marion, and Andrew Pickens, left military service
6
1
to take positions in the state legislature. Many North
Carolina officers also left the military to take civilian
6 2positions. Among them were Colonel Alfred Moore who
became Attorney General in 1782, and Colonel Alexander Martin
6 3
who became a senator and subsequently governor in 1782.
Virginia officers also left military service for positions
in the state government. Captain John T-larshall left to
serve in the House of Eleegates and Privy Council; Brigadier
General Andrew Lewis also served on the council after leav-
ing the military. Major General Adam Stephen, after leaving
the military, served in the assembly and senate. Militia
Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion; The Swamp Fox ,
pp. 262, 265, 270; Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and
Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter , pp. 215, 217; Reynolds,
Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South
Carolina, pp. 172, 222, 239, 244, 261, 292, 293, 299; David
Ramsay, Ramsay's History of South Carolina from its first
Settlement in 1670 to the year 1808 , 2:257-258.
^^Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina ,
pp. 134, 212-213; Draper, King's Mountain , pp. 475-476;
J. B. 0. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary History of
Upper South Carolina (Greenville, South Carolina: Shannon
and Company, Printers and Binders, 1897), pp. 167-169.
^"^Ashe, Biographical History of North Carolina ,
2:303-305; 3:275-277.
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General Andrew Moore, who served earlier as a Continental
officer, served in the House from 1780 until the end of the
war. James Monroe, after leaving the Continental Army,
served in the House before going to Congress. John Francis
Mercer, who spent time as both a militia and Continental
officer, left military service for a position in the Con-
gress. Also going to Congress was John VJalker, who had
served as an aide-de-camp to Washington. Another Washington
aide-de-camp, Edmund Randolph, left military service to
serve as Attorney General and as a member of Congress. John
Tyler, who served as a militia and Continental officer, left
military service to serve in the House and Council. And
Archibald Gary served as a militia colonel during 1775 and
1776, before becoming Speaker of the Senate during the latter
year.^"^ Many Maryland officers left military service for
positions in government . Among the most notable were
James McHenry, who left service in 1781 to serve in the
senate and later in Congress; Robert Hanson Harrison became
Chief Justice in 1781; and Alexander Contee Hanson, who, in
^"^Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Ma rsha^l^
1-161-164, 209; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revol ution,
2;25n.2; BDC, pp. 1399-1400, 1425, 1429, 1584, 1870; Leon G.
Tyler, Thi^etters and_Times_of the Tylers, 3 vols (Rich-
mond and Williamsb{l??rwhittet and Shepperson, 1884-1896) ,
1-54, 64, 67; Brock, Archibald_Cary , pp. 100, 133, IbJ;
Thwaites, Documentary~HT¥to^jDl Du^nmore^^_^ p. 191n.Jb.
65 Scharf, Hi^tnrv^^e stern Maryland , 1:455 , 479
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1778, became a judge of the Supreme Court. Georgia
officers also left military service to take positions in
the government . ^
^
Many officers from the middle states, particularly
Pennsylvania, left the field for the cabinet during the
6 8
war. Among the more notable examples are Joseph Reed,
who served as military secretary to Washington and Adjutant
General of the army before going to Congress and serving as
chief executive of Pennsylvania . Samuel At lee and John
Armstrong both served as Continental officers before going
to Congress in 1778 and 1779, respectively. And William
Bradford, Jr., left the army during 1780 to become the
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state's Attorney General. New Jersey, Delaware and New
6 6 Schar f , Hi story of Maryland , 2:575n.l, 560n.l;
BDC
, p. 1378.
6 7Thomas Gamble, Savannah Duels and Duell i sts 1733-
1877 (Savannah: Review Publishing and Printing Company,
1923)
, pp. 37-38; William Omer Foster, Sr., Jame s Jackson:
Duelist and Militant S ta tesman 1757-1806 (Athens : University
of GeorgTa Press, 1960), p. 17.
Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of the Revolution,
l: 238n., 39 7 , 64 6 ; Morton L. Montgomery, History
"
"oT^erTcs
County, Pennsylvania , in the Revolution, from 1 774 to^/7^83/
pp. 262'^26T7 W. A. Dor land, "The Second Troop Philadelphia
City Cavalry," PMHB 45, no. 3 (1921): 289-290n.65; George R.
Powell, Continental Congress at York, Pennsylvania and York
County in the Revolution {York: York Printing Company , 1914 )
,
^^7T52~-^54 ; Kirkland, Letters on the American Revolu tion,
2 : lOln . 3
.
^^George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, August 20 , 1780 , Fitzpatrick, Wri_t_ings^ of
Washington , 19:413; BDC, pp. 523-524, 531-532, 1594.
584
Vol k liad r.c^voval of f i (mm r. 1 (^.ivi nt] lui 1 i t .n y r.c i v i ( or
potiiLinn:; in t lu; civil tiovd luin'iil
. Aiuoin) t luvu- t i im
I iJ t t t * I : . I » 1 1 Wi ' I A 1 1 'Xa luit M ILun i 1 t un wl u > wt 'ii I I o ( \ i t
.
,
»uul ( a > 1 I ' ( M i 1 1 1 t >ii , who 1 >t 'o. mn ' \j( >vt i i u > i , I . i k i luj Lho oath
70
wl)ile in m i l i l a i y iii li I o iin . Tho N* 'W 111 n i 1 . i in 1 : . I . i U ; m 1 :;o
1 Ku 1 M u M I III i 1 i t a ! y ! t m( h a i: 1 i 'a \' i a a I I lo I i t ^ 1 1 1 I ( m ] u i;; i I i > .i i ;
;
71
ill Mu ^ cal > M\t * I . 'I'W( > ( ' X . 1 lui 0 t ' s wer© Ct in a a 1 : : I'V/t^k i o 1 Co i lu ^ 1 1
a !u1 JanK^s M . 1 1 m im , who 1 I h 1 ( ' I t I 1 it » Mold fo]^ v.< m I :; in
Cony loiiii
.
Ml • vt a a 1 o 1 I i ot a : ; It'll m i 1 i I a i y r.ia v i oo to take
adin i a I S tratiVo [ u >: ; i I 'u 11 1 w i I 1 1 I't ui v i i i ' : ; : ; , ('( > 1 » m k ' 1 William
Gray SC>a , who i » * t i i t ^ I t h 1 1 i i n ] 17 7*), i mnn I i a I ( • 1 y 1 x n - aiiu ' a
coilun i J ; : : i oiu a ( )H M iG BO.» m1 of Wa i . 1 a t mi I i aiaii t Co! < >a( ^ 1 Roht m t
Troup , ^k I |o r I'oter r>(ai1 1 , and Tap t a i n lu mi j a in i n : I > n i. K 1 1 1 1 all
I l> i d .
, p . I ()'»(» ; New Jersey A i i-h i va^n , ?d Rrr . ,
3 : 4 ISn . I , 4 H Sm . 1 ; laui i l^rederlck Hny?; , ii< a ^ ol llui nt^t ' .s^
N(^c;( . A Mioai.iphy ol I'.li 'iMli ("laik 17 M to 17<59, p. 147;
Ct'OM)*^ AiLim:; IW.yd, 111 i a:: iU)a(lMu>! : I'mI i oM mimI Stci t c;.man
174 0 - 1 M :M ( I' I i IM M • I on : PrTn* •< - 1 . >n l in i \'. a : ; i l y 1 ' i < 'SS , 1 ,
p"^ 1 0 ; J ^ 'I'lu )iim: i : a m i 1 , 1 1 i ; : t mi y o I ! )m I Mwa i c I (>()!! I S MH ,
1:208; Ma i a. i i < ' I lUi i nhaiii MaoM i I I an , The War C.nv. m lu a :. \ w
tlu' Aima icMii KcVMlaliMii, p. 49; HanSOn , Miiinn' iw-ok ol I he
(•,>,Mmi I I of I'.MtMly of Tiyon (\ainly, p. Illn.lO; lUaiiy M-
Uawson, Wta;! ohMst .a "(\Minty^ New Yol k, Durii ui I tu^ Anua loan
KMVolnt i(Mi, p. IU7n.t4; 1 :dw Tn" H t . u-kholst Li vincj:; I on , rtio
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l^ovolnliMn, p. 2A[>; U. W. C . Va . I , -d . , r\u ^ U.'V. \ ^n^.^r^Y
1)1.., y ui hi ^ad , Ohadi.di^cU.iM, Jr^ (Ni'W V-ik: New V-<
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left the field for positions as secretaries to the Board
of War. Colonel John H. Stone becaine a clerk in the office
of the secretary of foreign affairs. And Lieutenant Colonel
Henry Brockholst Livingston left the army in 1779 to accom-
pany John Jay to Europe as his secretary and Major David
Franks left the army the following year and, during 1781,
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carried messages to Europe for Congress.
About three weeks before the Declaration of Independ-
ence, a Maryland delegate to Congress introduced a motion
that members of Congress not be allowed to hold any office
under the new governments. John Adams seconded the motion,
with an amendment that no member hold any office, civil or
military, under any government, old or new. "This," he wrote
Samuel Chase, "struck through the assembly like an electric
shock, for every member was a governor, or general, or judge,
or some mighty thing or other in the militia, under the old
government or some new one." The motion was dropped, and
as Adams wrote Chase, "I have never heard another word about
it
""^^ John Adams was, for the most part, accurate in his
"^^Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:571n.l; Morton L.
Montgome
Revolut
of Robe
Troup; Ag
1942) : 167 .
^Sohn Adams to Samuel Chase, June 14 , 1776 , Adams,
Works of John Adams, 9:397.
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observation about members of Congress holding several
military and civilian positions at the same time. He would
have been just as accurate if he had expanded his observa-
tion to include revolutionary leaders serving in the
provincial and state governments. Despite some opposition
to members of the military being involved in the political
process, especially holding civilian office while possessing
a military commission, many revolutionary leaders served in
a military and civilian capacity at the same time.
It was a common colonial practice to have civilian
officials hold militia positions, and this practice carried
over into the early revolutionary civilian bodies, especially
75
the provincial congresses and committees of safety. In
Massachusetts, for example, over 60 percent of the delegates
to the 1774 Essex County Convention and over half of the
Salem Committee of Correspondence held militia commissions.
And approximately one-third of the members of the Provincial
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Congress that met in May 1775 held military positions.
Serving in the military and in a civilian capacity
remained a frequent occurrence in Massachusetts, as well as
^^Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety
o f the American Revolution , p. 154.
"^^Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a
Social Institution: Salem, Massachusetts 1764-1775 ," 36,
no. 4 (December 1973): 127; Force, American Archives, 4th
ser., 2:1375-1379.
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the state level where individuals in New York held military
and civilian positions at the same time. At the county level
8 4there were many individuals serving in dual roles. For
instance, four members, including James Clinton, of the New
Windsor nine-member Committee of Safety were active in the
•1-^ 85military
.
New York's neighbor. New Jersey, particularly early
in the war, had numerous individuals serving in civil and
military roles at the same time. Militia officers, who were
active in the field. General Philemon Dickinson, Colonels
Elijah Clark, Ephraim Martin, and Theunis Dey all served in
either or both the Provincial Congress and first state
Assembly
.
Pennsylvania probably had as many, if not more,
individuals holding both military commissions and civil
positions as any other state. During 1776, approximately
half of the members of their provincial conference and later
^^Ibid., pp. 104-146.
^^Russell Headley, ed., The History of Orange County,
New York (Middletown, New York: Van Deusen and Elms, 1908),
p. 82.
^^New Jersey Archives, 2d ser., 3:2n.l; l:170n.2;
Joseph Fulford Folsom, "The Preakness Valley and Reminis-
cences of Washington's Headquarters in the Dey Mansion,
PNJHS, new ser., 6, no. 4 (October 1921): 222 ; Edmund J.
j^Hi¥, "Some Additional Information Concerning Ephraim
Marti^, Esquire, Colonel of the Fourth f
-
of the Continental Line." PMHB 36, no. 2 (1912): 146
149.
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constitutional convention held military titles. Colonels
John Nixon, Thomas Hartley, and Timothy Smith were all quite
active in the field and in the cabinet. The latter, during
1779, served as a Deputy Quartermaster General, a militia
8 8
colonel, and as a member of the assembly.
Delaware and Maryland also had many individuals
serving in a military and civilian capacity at the same
89
time. During December 1777, fifty of the eighty members
of the Maryland convention were field grade or general offi-
90
cers. Two of the three Delaware militia generals, John
McKinly and Caesar Rodney, during late 1776, were active in
both the field and cabinet, with the former being the chair-
91
man of the Council of Safety.
8 7
James E. Gibson, "The Pennsylvania Provincial Con-
ference of 1776," ibid., 58, no. 4 (1934): 328-330; Selsam,
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 , pp. 136-137, 147-148.
8 R
Charles Henry Hart, "Colonel John Nixon," PMHB 1,
no. 2, (1877): 194; John W. Jordan, "Biographical Sketch of
Colonel Thomas Hartley of the Pennsylvania Line," ibid.,
25, no. 3 (1901): 303-304 ; Burton Alva Konkle, The Life and
Times of Thomas Smith 1745-1809: A Pennsylvania Member of
the Continental Congress (Philadelphia: Campion and Company,
1904) , pp. 113, 115, 123, 126.
^^Delaware Archives, 3:945; Minutes of the Council
of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792 , p. 35; Clayton
rnlman Hall, aen . ed., Ba ltimore: Its History and Its Peop le,
3-514; "Committee of Observation for Elizabeth Town District,
MHM 12, no. 4 (December 1917): 324, 325, 345; 12, no. 3
TSeptember 1917): 266; 13, no. 1 (March 1918): 29.
^^David Curtis Skaggs, Roots of Maryland Democracy
1753-1776
, p. 167.
^-"-Christopher L. Ward, The Delaware Continentals
1776-1783, pp. 111-112.
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The southern states also had many individuals serving
simultaneously in civilian and military positions. Numerous
Virginia militia officers served also in the state's legisla-
92ture. Edward Stevens, for example, served from 1776 until
1790 as a member of the senate; from 1776 to 1778 as a
Continental colonel; and from 1778 until 1782 as a militia
93brigadier general. Militia generals Evan Shelby and
William Campbell served often in the legislature, with the
9 4former also serving m the North Carolina legislature.
North Carolina also had many militia officers serv-
95ing in the legislature during the war. During the first
two years of the war. North Carolina had many officers hold-
ing militia or Continental commissions, who served at the
96
same time in Provincial Congress or committees of safety.
9 2 Thwaites, Documentary History of Dunmore ' s War
,
pp. 106-107n.53; Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest
Virginia 1746-1786, Washington County 1777-1870 , pp. 817-820
9 3Butterfield, Washington-Irvine Correspondence ,
p . 39 3n . 2 .
^^Draper, King' s Mountain
, pp. 383, 387, 396-397,
412, 414; J. B. O. Landrum, Colonial and Revolutionary
History of Upper South Carolina , pp. 221-223.
^^Wheeler, Historical Sketches of North Carolina ,
2:74, 84, 86, 110; Ashe, Biographical History of North
Carolina, 1:154-155; 2:17-19; Leora McEachern and Isabel M.
Williams , eds., Wilmington-New Hanove r Safety Committee
Minutes 1774-17 76, Appendix, 4:123, 124, 128, 132.
^^Ibid., 121, 124, 125, 128, 130, 131; Ashe,
Biographical History of North Carolina, 2:65-66, 178-179,
307'^rr3TT68^70"r^5 = 31-32, 368-369 , 398; 6:114-116.
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Benjamin Cleveland, Isaac Gregory, and Griffith Rutherford
were North Carolinians who served in civil and military
capacities at the same time during the war. Cleveland,
while a member of the House and later the Senate, was active
in the field as a militia colonel. Gregory, who served as a
colonel and general of the militia, served at the same time
in the Provincial Congress, and from 1778 until 1782 in the
Senate. And Rutherford, who served during 1775 and 1776 as
a militia colonel and general, was also a member of the Pro-
vincial Congress; and between 1777 and 1780, he served as a
9 7militia general and as a member of the Senate.
South Carolina, probably more than any other southern
state, had more individuals serving in the military and as
. . 98
state officials at the same time . Among them were Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, Andrew Pickens, William Moultrie, Isaac
Huger, and Stephen Bull. Pinckney served as a Continental
officer the whole war , whi le serving in the Provincial Con-
gress , Council of Safety , Assembly , and House of Representa-
tives. Pickens, who served most of the war as a militia
97
Ibid., 1:139-140; 5:70-71; J. B. 0. Landrum,
Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina,
pp. 224-227; Wheeler, Sketches of North Carolina , 2:71; J. G
DeRoulhac Hamilton, ed., "Revolutionary Diary of William
Lenoir," JSH, 6, no. 2 (May 1940): 250n.5.
no
Reynolds, Biographical Directory of the Senate of
the State of South Carolin a, pp. 195, 198, 207, 209, 218,
^30", 242 , 239 , 212 , 251 , 255 , 269 , 299 , 305 , 311, 319 ,
321, 324, 328, 329, 330, 337.
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a lieutenant colonel of the militia, he served in the legis-
lature during 1782, and in January 1783, he became governor.
Because of the lack of leaders on the frontier,
individuals were often required to hold various civil and
military positions at the same time. This was particularly
true in the western areas of New York, Pennsylvania, and
New York.
Dual serving did create some problems. Frequently,
state legislatures could not obtain quorums to meet because
many of their members were in the field with the military,
10 3in their military capacity. Often the military was weak-
ened when many of its officers had to leave the field to
"Official Letters of Governor John Martin,
1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 4 (December 1917): 282-282; White,
Historical Collections of Georgia
,
p, 214.
102Jack M. Sosin, The Revolut ionary Frontier
1760-178 3 (New Yo rk : Holt, Rinehart and" ¥in s'ton
, 1967 ) ,
pp. 167, 167n.l0; Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During
the Revolutionary Wa r, new ed., passim; William W. Campbell,
Anna Is of Tryon County or, The Border Warfare of New York,
During the Revolution, 4th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead and
Company, 1924), p. 5; John Floyd to Thomas Jefferson,
April 24, 1781, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-
1781," p. 541; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settlement of
Illinois 1778-1830," Chicago Historical Society Collections
,
5 (1908) : 18.
10 3John Laurens to Alexander Hamilton, July 14,
1779, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:103; George
Clinton to John Jay, June 7, 1779, Hastings, Public Papers
of Geo rge Clinton , 5:54; Se 1 sam , The PcnnsylvanTa ConstT^
tution of 1776
, pp. 2 35-2 36; Burton Alva Konkle, The Life
and TTmcs o f Thomas Smith 1745-1809: A Pennsylvania Member
of the Continental Congress , p. 87.
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return to the sessions of the legislature . "^^"^ Another set
of problems related to whether a person was acting his
military or civilian capacity. Early in 1777, for instance,
Washington was informed that Artemas Ward was present in
Boston, but whether he was acting as a member of the council
or a Continental general was "difficult to say." About the
same time, Maryland's Thomas Johnson was confused as to
whether his first duty was to Congress or to the Maryland
contingent of the Flying Camp, of which he was a brigadier
general. General McDougall was more certain of his status,
upon being elected to Congress during the fall of 1780.
He informed Washington that the New York legislature con-
sidered his civilian responsibilities secondary to his
105
military duties. Often dual service created interesting
situations. For example, after the failure of Spencer's
1777 Rhode Island expedition, the Rhode Island Assembly
appointed a committee to investigate Spencer's conduct. At
the first meeting, one of the committee members. Senator
John Sayles, was absent, standing guard as a militia private
at Spencer's headquarters. When a sheriff was sent to fetch
William Moultrie to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17,
1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolut ion, 2:26;
Benjamin Lincoln to William Moultrie, July 19, 1779, ibid.,
28-29
.
'"^^Henry Knox to George Washington, February 1 , 1777,
Drake, Henry Knox , p. 41; Delaplaine, Thomas Johnson , pp. 209
231; Alexander McDougall to George VJashington, October 30,
1780, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolut ion, 3:
.12 6.
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him, Sayles declined to attend the cominittee meeting, stat-
ing he could not leave until relieved. Upon learning of
this situation. Spencer had him relieved, and Sayles made
his appearance at the committee meeting, ready to pass
judgment on his commanding general . "''^^
Although some problems did result from this inter-
mingling of the civilian and military functions in single
individuals, it is my belief that, to some degree, it
explains why the American Revolution did not suffer a mili-
tary tyranny as had beset England during the seventeenth
century and would the French Revolution. This belief will
be discussed in some depth in the last chapter.
The military involvement in politics and government
did have its negative aspects, such as the military inter-
fering with the electoral process, the operations of the
government, and in some isolated instances, the existence
of the governments.
Often during the war, the military interfered with
the electoral process, at times preventing people from vot-
ing, intimidating voters, and in other ways disrupting
elections. This happened despite both a heritage and state
prohibitions against such activities. Part of the Whig
heritage was prohibitions against the military being present
or near polling places during elections. In their recent
"^^^Cowell, Spirit of '76 in Rhode Island , pp. 249-
250 .
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past, many revolutionaries recalled the great outcry when
the British troops attempted to interfere with the Massachu-
10 7setts general election of 1769. Most states adopted a
variety of provisions in their constitutions prohibiting
the military being present at polling places, having armed
persons at polling places, holding muster day on election
day, having the military voting by units, and setting the
distance from and time at which the military could be at a
polling place.
The military interfered with elections VN7hen they
thought it was necessary to prevent those they suspected of
being Tories from voting; when they desired to vote, and
were not authorized to do so; and in a partisan manner,
supporting one candidate over another. Tories, or those
suspected of being so, were generally prevented from voting
during most of the war. However, beginning in 1782, many
10 7
Burgh, Political Disquisitions , 1:433; Samuel
Adams in an unsigned letter in The Boston-Gazette ,
February 13, 1769, Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams , 1:306;
A Report of the Record Gommissioners of the Gity of Boston
containing the Boston Town Records, 1758 to 1769 , p. 278;
Boston Selectmen to Governor Francis Bernard, February 16,
1769, A. L. Elwyn, Papers Relating to Public Events in
Massachusetts Preceding the American Revolution , p. 116
;
Same to same, February 23, 1769, ibid., pp. 120-122
.
"''^^Proceedings of the Gonvention of the Delaware
State, p. 34; Scharf, History of Maryland , 2:239; Silver,
f^"The~Provisional Government of Maryland [1774-1777)," p. 46;
Saunders, NCCR, 10:874 ; Albert B. Saye, New Viewpoint s in
Georgia History (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1943),
^7~T81; Ghandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia , 1:286-
287.
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state governments, hoping to rehabilitate the Tories, gave
them the right to vote. This was displeasing to many in
the military and they responded, particularly in Delaware
and Pennsylvania, by preventing Tories from voting or, at
least, helping anti-Tory tickets to prevail . """^^
Problems with the military interfering with elections
began the first year of the war, as that summer at Braintree,
Massachusetts, one company of militia opposed another in
support of different candidates for that city's representa-
tive to the Congress. The following summer in Georgia,
Continental Major Joseph Habersham, while working at the
polls, became involved in a squabble in counting ballots,
and in the process killed another officer of the opposing
political faction. A grand jury found no cause for trying
him and he was promoted soon thereafter. Complaints about
the military being illegally involved in elections were
numerous during the middle years of the war, especially in
New York and the middle states, where there were many
soldiers during those years. Pennsylvania experienced
Richard P. McCormick, Experiment in Independence:
New Jersey in the Critical Period 1781-1789 , Rutgers Studies
in History, no. 6 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press, 1950), pp. 76-77, 76n.23, 93; Scharf, History o f
Phi ladelphia , 1:432; Johann David Schoepf, Travels in the
Confederation [1783-1784], trans, and ed. by Alfred J.
Morrison, 1:374-375; Harold B. Hancock, ed . , "The Revolu-
tionary War Diary of William Adair," DH 13, no. 2 (October
1968) : 165 , 165n. 46
.
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difficulties with the military at the 1781 and 1783
elections. For most, the military's involvement in the
electoral process was more of a nuisance than a real threat
to civilian control. Similarly was their unwanted presence
at the seat of government.
In keeping with James Otis' opinion, expressed dur-
ing November 1768, with the British troops occupying Boston,
that it was "utterly derogatory" to the people to have
government administered "at the point of bayonets, and
mouths of cannon," most chief executives did not desire the
military to be present at the seat of government, particu-
larly when it appeared the military would influence the
operations of government.'^''""'" Governor Clinton objected to
Abigail Adams to John Adams, July 16, 1775,
Butterfield, AFC , 1:248-249; Jenkins, Button Gwinnett ,
pp. 99-100; David Forman to George VJashington, November 7,
1777, Worthington C. Ford, ed.. Defences of Philadelphia
in 1777, pp. 92-93; George Washington to George Reed,
February 22, 1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington ,
10:497; George Read to George Washington, March 2, 1777
[1778] , Read, George Read , p. 303; Memorial of the Citizens
of Philadelphia to the Supreme Executive Council, unsigned,
undated [1778], Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives , 2d ser.,
3:220-223; Jno . Graham et al., to George Clinton, April 18,
1781, Hastings. Public Papers of George Clinton , 6:786-878;
Scharf, History of Philadelphia , 1:419; Staughton Lynd,
"The Tenant Rising at Livingston Manor, May 1777," NYHSQ
48, no. 2 (April 1964): 175; Brunhouse, Counter-Revolution
in Pennsylvania , pp. 105-107, 144.
''""'"''William Tudor, The Life of James Otis of
Massachuse tts: Conta i
n
ing Al^Q—^-^^Lj:^^ of "Some Con temporary
Characte rs and Events'" from the Ye aFi:760 to~T77 57""( Bo s ton :
Wells and Lilly, 1823), p. 338.
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General McDougall's efforts to billet a regiment at
Poughkeepsie, then the seat of government. Clinton relented
when McDougall assured him that "sooner than they should
interrupt the Del iber tat ions of the Legislature, I will
remove them to the most dreary valley in the Highlands,
altho they, and I, should share the fate of their unfortu-
nate Brethern last Winter, at the Valley Forge."
The military's presence at the seat of government
did influence the operations of government at times, but
for the most part their involvement was more of a nuisance
than a threat to civilian control. Nevertheless, there were
occasions when the military's presence and influence was
believed to pose a threat of military control. This was
especially true in Pennsylvania and Georgia.
Georgia had many difficulties between the military
and their chief executives, especially between General
113
Lachlan Mcintosh and Governor Button Gwinnett. Both had
strong personalities and belonged to opposing political
factions. If this was not enough to create a tense situation
"'"•^^Alexander McDougall to George Clinton, Decem-
ber 15, 1778, Hastings, Public Papers of George Clinton ,
4:38 6; see also Same to same, earlier letter of same date,
ibid., 377; George Clinton to Alexander McDougall,
December 15, 1778, ibid., 382-383.
'-'^john Wereat to Henry Laurens, August 30 , 1777 ,
Frank Moore, Ma t e r ials_fo r Uis tojLy /_PJ in t^d^ Frojn_Or i g i n a 1
M;^nnscrj.pts_^Wj^hrN^ and Illustrations , 1st ser . (New
YorkT^ZorTger Club, 1861), pp. 39-52.
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between them, there were other problems involved in their
relationship. For instance, George Mcintosh, brother of
the general, as a member of the council refused to sign
Gwinnett's commission as governor and was later jailed by
Gwinnett for treasonable activities. Additionally, Gwinnett
believed he should have been made general of the Continental
line, not Mcintosh. Thus, on many occasions he interfered
114
with military affairs and undermined Mcintosh's authority.
The problems between them, and between Gwinnett and
General Howe, began in March 1777, when the governor did
not desire Mcintosh to lead an expedition against Florida
and Howe refused to allow Continental soldiers to go on such
an expedition. Upset with the military, Gwinnett wrote
Congress reminding them that the Declaration of Independence
addressed the issue of the military affecting to render the
military independent of, and superior to, the civil power.
And because Howe and Mcintosh had such a poor opinion of
the
civil authority, he asked they be removed from the state.
Not waiting for Congress to act, and seeing the
necessity of
using Mcintosh's troops, Gwinnett led an expedition
against
Florida in April, with Mcintosh commanding them.
The
ll'^Huqh M'Call, The_Iiistory^f_Georgia_Co^
n^^^-F qketches of the Most Remarkable Events_jap_to_the
T^TT-"m6')"^Tr"33T; Jenkins, Button Gw innett, PP • ^J;'
sl- B^ton'Gwlnneti to PresidiHW^Hancock ,
March 28,
1777, ibid., pp. 215-220.
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campaign faltered way short of its goal because of the
constant bickering between Gwinnett and Mcintosh. This
bickering continued later in April, when Mcintosh actively
supported Gwinnett's opponent for the governorship. Hoping
to settle the difficulties between them, the Assembly called
them before the legislature to explain their actions. \Vhen
the Assembly vindicated Gwinnett's conduct, Mcintosh publicly
called the governor a scoundrel and a lying rascal. This
resulted in Gwinnett challenging Mcintosh to a duel. It
took place on May 16, 1777, with both parties being wounded
in the leg. Mcintosh's wound healed, but not so Gwinnett's,
as he died of gangrene three days after the duel."'""'"^
The civil-military dispute did not end with
Gwinnett's death, as his supporters did their best to dis-
credit Mcintosh. Mcintosh did not help matters. Shortly
after the duel. Continental officers sent to arrest his
brother, George Mcintosh, were, on the general's orders,
arrested by Colonel Joseph Habersham, and George Mcintosh
was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia to plead his treason
case. It should be added that by the end of 1777 George
Mcintosh was cleared, although the evidence would suggest
he was somev/hat guilty by association, as his business
''""'"^Same to same, March 28, 1777 , ibid., pp. 220-221 ;
Lyman Hall to Roger Sherman, May 16 [-June 1], 1777, ibid.,
pp. 228-229; see also ibid., pp. 151-154.
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connections were often Tories . ''"'^ In June, Governor
Treutlen wrote Congress complaining that Habersham and
Mcintosh had subverted the civil power by allowing George
Mcintosh to escape answering charges levelled against him
by the state's executive council. "Such a stretch of mili-
tary Power will undoubtedly be taken notice of by
. . .
Congress, who have always asserted & shewn the greatest
tenderness to the Liberty of the Subject & are duly convinced
of the necessity of the Subservience of the military to the
Civil Authority." Gwinnett, according to Treutlen, had
"lost his life in endeavouring to maintain the civil Power
in opposition to the cunning & subterfuges of a designing
man." "While the Command of the Continental Troops remains
in the hands of the Mclntoshes," he concluded, "our People
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will never think themselves safe." Later in the summer,
the Georgia Assembly sent a petition to Congress calling on
them to remove Mcintosh, and about the same time they sent
to Congress a petition signed by over five hundred residents
.
^118
of Chatham County with a similar request.
"'""'^Ibid.
, pp. 138 , 159-160 ; John Adam Treutlen to
John Hancock, August 6, 1777, ibid., pp. 244-249; Ford, JCC,
8:9, 757; 9:764-765, 787-789.
""""^^John Adam Treutlen to John Hancock, June 19 , 1777,
Jenkins, Button Gwinnett , pp. 244-245, 245, 245-246.
"""^
^Petition of the Georgia Assembly to Congress,
September 13, 1777, ibid., pp. 265-266; Petition of Chatham
County to Congress, July 1, 1777, endorsed by the Governor
and Council on September 26, 1777, ibid., pp. 266-271.
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Mcintosh responded to the various charges against
him by writing Henry Laurens that the civilian leaders, by
criticizing him, were undermining his authority which was
sapping the foundation of the military and the subordination
and respect so necessary in the army. "Unless the Congress,"
he wrote, "fixes some line between the government of their
army and the interference of the civil government of this
restless and unsettled State, it will not only become use-
119less, but a nuisance to the inhabitants." In mid July,
he wrote a Georgia delegate to Congress that "the unhappy
divisions of our State now infect the army who are takin[g]
sides and I fear will ruin all military order and subordina-
tion." He maintained he had not been disrespectful to the
civil authorities. In fact, he argued, the civil authori-
ties were trying to subvert his officers to their views on
all matters. "In short," he complained, "officers now are
at a loss who to obey properly." Therefore, he requested
Congress fix some line between the authority and responsi-
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bility between the civil and military officials. Congress
did address this question and also addressed the pleas of
the Georgia officials by removing Mcintosh from their borders,
assigning him duty elsewhere.
-^^^Lachlan Mcintosh to Henry Laurens, May 30 , 1777 ,
ibid
. ,
p. 254
.
^2°Lachlan Mcintosh to [ July 14, 1777,
ibid., pp. 256, 258.
Before going on to discuss the civil-military
difficulties involving politics in Pennsylvania, it should
be noted that the Gwinnett-Mcintosh situation was not
unique. There were numerous quarrels between military and
civilian leaders over both political and personal matters.
Several were settled by duels, or involved the threat of
duels. During 1780, another chief executive of Georgia,
George Wells, was killed in a duel by a member of the
opposing political faction. Major James Jackson. During
the summer of 1778
,
General Howe fought a duel with South
Carolina state leader, Christopher Gadsden, who had been
critical of him. Although they shook hands after having fired
at each other, Howe would be removed from his southern
command for having upset the South Carolina government.
General Sullivan, believing that Thomas Burke, a member of
Congress, had been critical of his actions at Brandywine,
challenged him to a duel. The duel did not take place and
the two men would eventually serve together in Congress on
a somewhat amicable basis. And Charles Lee challenged
member of Congress William Henry Drayton to a duel as he
had criticized Lee's actions at Monmouth. Drayton, though
sanctioning duelling, declined, explaining that duels
should not be participated in by members of the judiciary.
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He was also South Carolina's chief judge.
Probably nowhere else did the military involve them-
selves in the political and governmental affairs more than
in Pennsylvania. This involvement began early in the war,
as the Associators were quite active in lobbying to be
recognized as the legitimate body of the colony and that
a committee of safety be appointed to oversee their military
activities. Their efforts resulted in the House recognizing
them and appointing a committee of safety. The Philadelphia
Associators urged throughout the spring of 1776 that a
provincial conference write a state constitution. They
were joined in their lobbying efforts by some of the more
radical members of Pennsylvania's navy, by a Philadelphia
Committee of Privates, and by Associator battalions through-
out the colony. With Associator backing, county committees
William Omer Foster, James Jackson: Duelist and
Militant Statesman 1757-1806 , p. 6; Thomas Gamble, Savannah
Duels and Duellists 1733-1877 , pp. 37-38; Thomas U. P.
Charlton, The Life of Major James Jackson (Augusta, Georgia:
Geo. F. Randolph, and Company, 1809), p. 18; Charles Cotes-
worth Pinckney, Life of General Thomas Pinckney (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin"and Company, 1905), p. 52; John H. Wheeler,
Reminiscences and Memoirs of North Carolina and Emi nent
North Carolinians (Columbus, Ohio: Columbus Print . Works
,
1884), p. 135; Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences , p. 2 04;
John Sullivan to Thomas Burke, April 18, 1778, [draft]
,
Hammond , Letters and Papers of John Sullivan, 2:35; John
Sullivan to Alexander McDougall, January 27, 1781, ibid.,
3:271-275; Same to same, March 16, 1781, 296-298; Alexander
McDougall to John Sullivan, May 22, 1781, ibid., 320-321;
Drayton, Memoirs of the American Revolution , l:xxiii-xxv.
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early in June 1776 elected representatives for a provincial
conference, which would decide what should be done about
lack of energy in the existing government. Over half of
its members held military titles. Faced with the call for
a new government, the conference assumed the powers of
government and issued a call for a constitutional convention.
With a majority of its members Associators, the convention
met on July 15, 1776 . A constitution v;as adopted two months
later and elections for its approval were called for on the
fifth of November. Organized opposition to the constitution
began in mid October, with memibers of the military playing
active roles as detractors and supporters of the document.
The common Pennsylvania Continental soldier and the
Associators were perhaps the most ardent supporters of the
new constitution, and it was charged in The Pennsylvania
Packet on October 22, 1776, that like Cromwell, the conven-
tion was defending its work with armed men, allowing no
opportunity for the people to pass free judgment on it.
Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 ,
pp. 78-79 , 117-118 , "T26^28 , 136-137 , 147-148 , 212n. 23, 223,
225, 2 27; Agnes Hunt, The Provincial Committees of Safety
of the American Revolution, p. 89; Roberdeau Buchanan, Life
of the Hon. Thomas McKean , LL. D. , Member of the Continental
Congress from Delaware, Chief Justice and Governor of
Pennsylvania, S igner of the pFcla ration of Independence, and
President of Congress , p. 50; The Pennsylvania Evening Pos t,
Miy~TT, June 1, 6 , 1776 ; Thg,_Pggnsylvania Gazette , May 22,
June 5, 12, 19, 1776 ; The_^Pe]p_sylvania__Jo^
V7eekly Advertiser, June 5, 1776; The Pennsylvania Packet,
5Fr"nie~General Advertiser, June 17, 1/76.
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Debate on the constitution was limited during the
fall and winter when the British army was in New Jersey and
again during the spring of 1777
,
v/hen it appeared they would
invade Pennsylvania. In May, when fear of a British inva-
sion abated, the debate was renewed. To demonstrate their
opposition to the government operating under the constitution,
several military leaders, including Joseph Reed, John Cad-
walader , and Samuel Miles , refused positions under it , and
numerous officers resigned their commissions
. Others
,
including Generals Mifflin, St. Clair, Thompson, and Wayne,
publicly condemned the constitution . " I pronounce it , "
Wayne wrote during the summer of 1777, "not worth defend-
12 3ing." At the prompting of Thomas Mifflm and others,
Wayne left the army for a short period during the winter
of 1778-1779 to return to Pennsylvania to lobby against the
constitution
.
During 1779 and 1780, opposition to the constitution
and the government operating under it by the military
'"^^Anthony Wayne to Benjamin Rush, [June or July] 2,
1777, Stille, Anthony Wayne , p. 71; Benjamin Rush to Anthony
Wayne, May 19, 1777, ibid., p. 68; Rossman, Thomas Mifflin ,
pp. 87-88.
"^^^Thomas Mifflin, Mark Bird, Jonathan Potts, Edward
Biddle, Samuel Potts and James Wilson to Anthony Wayne,
[Fall 1778], Moore, Anthony Wayne, p. 72; Anthony Wayne to
Thomas Mifflin et al., November 23, 1778, ibid., p. 73;
Anthony Wayne to George Washinqton, February 10, 1779, ibid.,
pp . 75-7 6 .
609
125
continued. Many in the military, particularly the
militia, supported the constitution and the government, at
times demonstrating their support by physically attacking
its opponents, such as during the riots of the fall of
1779, which culminated in the "Fort Wilson" riot. James
VJilson, fearing that his opposition to the constitution
would result in his being run out of Philadelphia by the
militia, gathered about thirty supporters in his house to
fend off the militia. Among his supporters included Colonel
Stephen Chambers, a militia officer and member of the
supreme executive council; General William Thompson; Thomas
Mifflin; David Franks, General Arnold's aide; Robert Morris;
George Clymer; and Mark Bird, Wilson's brother-in-law and
colonel of the Berks County battalion. The attack on
Wilson's house resulted in the defenders having one killed
and three wounded and the attackers having five killed and
fourteen wounded. The fighting was stopped by President
Reed and the City Troop of Light Horse, with the assistance
of some of Baylor's Dragoons. Arrests were made and Wilson
left town for several weeks until tempers calmed. Those
arrested v;ere soon released by the authorities when it
appeared they might be released by military force. The
'"^'^Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6 , 1779 ,
Rood, Joseph Reed, 2:62; Roche, Jose^^h Reed, PP- 188,
262n 105lTr'ancT¥~Johnston to Anthony Wayne, October 16, l/«u,
"Notes and Queries," PMHB 31, no. 2 (1907): 250.
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following spring the supreme executive council granted a
general pardon to all those involved in the riot."*"^^ The
military opponents to the constitution were somewhat more
circumspect in their actions of opposition. Progressively,
they tempered their criticism, believing as did Generals
Wayne and St. Clair, that they should concentrate on winning
the war, and once won, they could devote their energies to
12 7
adopting a constitution more to their liking.
In a few instances, for the most part at the insist-
ence of the civilian authorities, the military leaders were
the supreme authority for a state or area. There were
instances when some individuals desired the military to
take over the whole country, and at two critical times,
during 1780 and 1783, the possibility of this happening
existed. But in only one instance did the military actually
seize control of a civilian government, and that was on the
frontier, and just for a limited period of time.
C. Page Smith, "The Attack on Fort Wilson,"
ibid., 78, no. 2 (April 1954): 177-188; Samuel Patterson
to Cac^sar Rodney, October 9 , 1779 , Ryden , Letters to and
from Caesar Rodney , pp. 323-324; Jacob Cox Parsons, ed.
,
Extracts from the Diary of Jacob 11 i 1 tzheimer , of Philadelphia
1765-1798 (Philadelphia: Wm. F. Fell and Company, 1893),
p. 41.
"^^"^Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Rood, March 6 , 1779 ,
Smith, The St. Clair Paper s, 1:466-4 67; Anthony Wayne to
Robert Morris et al., October 17, 1780, Moore, Anthony
Wayne
,
p. 120.
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During the summer of 1778, George Rogers Clark's
Virginians captured the western cities of Kaskaskia, Cahokia,
and Vincennes. Early in December 1778, the Virginia legis-
lature provided for the newly captured area to be consoli-
dated as Illinois County and established a government for
its inhabitants, which were mainly French-speaking. Governor
Henry named John Todd Colonel and County Lieutenant, and
instructed him to prevent the military from alienating the
12 8French inhabitants. Todd believed he could control the
military, as Clark was instructed by the governor and council
to cooperate with him, and because he and Clark were
129friends. Todd arrived m the area during the late spring
of 1779, and found that the military did pretty much what
they pleased. Todd, not able to control the military, nor
able to get Clark to control them, as he was involved in
other projects, such as an expedition against Detroit and
laying out the town of Louisville, resigned in November,
12 8
Honing, The Statutes at Large: Be ing a Collection
of all the Laws of Virginia , 9:552; Patrick Henry to John
Todd, December 12, 1778, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers
1771-1781," pp. 83-87.
""^^The Virginia Council to George Rogers Clark,
December 12, 1778, ibid., pp. 78-81; Patrick Henry to George
Rogers Clark, December 15, 1778, Alvord , "Kaskaskia Records,"
p. 61; Speech of George Rogers Clark to the Inhabitants of
Kaskaskia, May 12, 1779, ibid., p. 82.
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leaving behind Richard Winston to act in his stead. ^"^^
V7hile Todd was present, Colonel John Montgomery showed the
minimum of respect to the civilian authorities, but once
Todd left, Montgomery became an absolute dictator at
Kaskaskia. When the magistrates reminded him that the
thirteenth article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights
provided "that in all cases the military must be under the
most exact subordination to and governed by the civil
131power," Montgomery increased his tyranny. Throughout
1780, Montgomery controlled the Illinois country with a
strong hand, paying little or no attention to the civilian
132
authorities. Montgomery's successor. Captain John Rogers,
assisted by Captain Richard McCarthy, during the winter of
1780-1781, continued to ignore the civil authorities.
13 0
Kaskaskia Magistrates to John Todd, May 21, 1779,
ibid., pp. 83-89; John Todd to the Governor of Virginia,
August 18, 1779, James, "George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-
1781," p. 357.
"^^
"^Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Montgomery,
December 9, 1779, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 142;
Citizens of Kaskaskia to the Magistrates of Kaskaskia,
December 8, 1779, ibid., p. 137; John Montgomery to Richard
_
Winston, March 5, 1780, Alvord, "Cahokia Records," p. Ixxxii
^"^^Memorial of the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to
Mottin de la Balme, September 29, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia
Records," pp. 189-191; Richard Winston to John Todd,
October'l7, 1780, ibid., p. 195; Memorial of the Inhabitants
of Cahokia to Mottin de la Balme, September 21 , 1780 ,
Alvord, "Cahokia Records," pp. 537, 543, 545.
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despite their pleas they obey Virginia's laws . ^ ^ V7hen
Rogers departed, John Dodge, the Indian agent, became the
Captain-Commandant of the militia at Kaskaskia, and during
the winter of 1781-1782 attempted to be the supreme ruler
of the area. This resulted in a debate with Deputy County
Lieutenant Richard VJinston, which ended in late April 1782
when Dodge had VJinston arrested and jailed for treason.
For the two weeks Winston was jailed. Dodge ran the govern-
ment. His domination of affairs continued even after
Winston was found innocent by a Kaskaskia court and released.
This domination by the military finally ended early in 1783
when the military finally departed. Thus ended the only
example where friction between the civilian and military
authorities resulted in the military supplanting the civilian
134
authority with their own power.
The military's involvement in civilian affairs in
the Ohio country was the rare exception to general positive
"'"^^The Magistrates of Kaskaskia to John Rogers,
November 10, 1780, Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 208;
Same to same, January 10, 1781, ibid., p. 212; Petition of
the Inhabitants of Kaskaskia to the Governor of Virginia,
May 4, 1781, ibid., pp. 2 36, 2 38; John Todd to Thomas
Jefferson, January 23, 1781, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia
State Papers, 1:460; Richard McCarthy to John Todd,
October 14, 1780, ibid., 380.
-"-^^John Dodge to Israel Dodge, April 29 , 1782 ,
Alvord, "Kaskaskia Records," p. 272 ; see also ibid., pp. 274
284 293 304, 320-322; Arthur Clinton Boggess, "The Settle-
ment of Illinois 1778-1830 ," Chi^goJIi^stori^al^^^
Collections, 5 (1908): 41-42.
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military involvement in civilian affairs throughout the war.
As we have seen in this chapter, and in earlier chapters,
the military's relationship with the civilian governments,
though often stormy, for the most part had the positive
influence of allowing the military to participate in
civilian affairs without the necessity of seizing power or
using military force to have their views heard or accepted.
It also had the influence of reinforcing the belief that the
civilian governments were the suprem.e authority and if any
changes were to be made, especially those relating to how
the military was controlled and directed, they would be made
by the civilians, not by the military. Additionally, such
involvement had a way of reinforcing civilian values,
especially when the military assumed civilian roles, either
while in the military or once leaving the military; or
upholding the civilian governments
.
Although the civil-military relationship was
relatively tranquil throughout the first five years of the
war, it became sorely tested beginning with the winter of
1779-1780 as the army suffered, and it appeared to them that
the civilians were incapable or unwilling to assist them.
In the next chapter, this testing will be discussed.
CHAPTER X
A DELICATE BALANCE: THE CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONSHIP DURING THE TIME OF CRISIS
1779-1781
The American military, as we have seen, frequently
involved themselves in civil affairs and in a few instances
subordinated the civilian authority to their own. But at
no time did they, as the military in England in the previous
century, take control of the primary civilian governments.
There were times during the war, however, when this might
have happened. The first was during 1780, when the collapse
of the civilian governments and the war effort seemed
imminent. The other was during 1783, when it appeared that
the military was to be disbanded without being compensated
sufficiently for their efforts. This and the following
chapter will analyze why a military take-over might have
taken place during 1780 and 1783 and the reasons why military
control did not replace civilian control of American affairs
during the last years of the Revolutionary War.
A military take-over of civilian affairs was on the
minds of the revolutionary leaders throughout the war, not
just during the last years of the war. From the beginning,
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many Americans feared a Cromwell rising from the military
to assume the authority of the weak Congress and state
governments.^ Americans were quite familiar with James
Burgh's admonition that "when a country is to be enslaved,
the army is the instrument to be used."^ They were ever
mindful that a parliamentary army in England a little more
than a century before had turned upon its creator and erec
ted a military dictatorship under Cromwell and the major
generals. From Paris, late in 1777, Arthur Lee wrote his
brother that "next to entire slavery, a standing army is
the greatest evil than can exist in a young state; and the
continuance of a civil war . . . may kindle the fatal
ambition of some Cromwell." By the end of 1778, many
Americans shared Benjamin Rush's belief that there was no
longer serious danger of tyranny from Great Britain, and
that if any tyranny was to take place it would be "only in
3the shape of a Whig,"
See Ebenezer Elmer's August 7, 1776, speech in The
Pennsylvania Journal and VJeekly Advertiser, August 28, 1776;
Wi 1 n-ajri"'Tirdor ' s MaFch 5", ry79"'Boston Massacre Oration in
N i 1 e s , P
r
inciples and Act s of the Revolution in America
,
p. 37; Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, October 28,
17 78, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris , 1:176.
2
Burgh, Political Disquisitions, 2:349.
^Arthur Lee to Richard Henry Lee, October 4 , 1777 ,
Lee, Arthur Lee, appendix 8, pp. 114-115; Benjamin Rush to
William'Gordon, December 10, 1778, "Exceipts from The Papers
of Dr. Benjamin Rush," PMHB 29, no. 1 (1905): 21-22.
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Although some Continental officers thought about
taking temporary control of the government if the civilians
could not properly manage the war effort, such thoughts
were not often openly expressed, nor seriously contemplated
during the first five years of the war.^ After all, most
of the officers were former civilians who shared generally
held fears of military tyranny.
There was, however, one foreigner, the Comte de
Broglie, who, early in the war believed that if he had con-
trol over the civilian authorities he could produce military
victory. A born intriguer and lover of adventurous schemes,
he had served in the French army as a general and as France's
Ambassador to Poland. During 1776, using his protege, Baron
De Kalb, as his spokesman, he attempted to get Silas Deane
and Benjamin Franklin to back his plan to have Congress make
him a Stadtholder of the American states. Broglie, knowing
that Deane and Franklin would be somewhat chary of his pro-
posal, informed them that he would only hold the position
for three years. On the other hand, he demanded that
Congress agree to grant him absolute control over the army,
without interference, and that he be allowed to carry on
negotiations with foreign powers. Franklin and Deane did
^E.g. "A Continental" in The Connecticut Courant,
November 25, 1777; Alexander McDougall to John McKesson,
January 24, 1779, Champagne, Alexander McDougall, p. 151;
Dexter, Litera_ry_Diary of Ezra Stiles_ , 2 : 306 .
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not support Broglio-s plan, nor did Dc Kalb, once he arrived
in America. He wrote his mentor that it would be an injus-
tice to Washington and an affront to America's honor to
lobby for the plan. Congress, learning of the plan early
in 1777, did not consider it.^
Although few in the iniUtary contemplated rni 1 i 1 ary
dictatorship during the first years of the war, and few
civilians were amenable to military control, by 1779, the
number of leaders who wanted some type of military control
increased as it was believed that the revolutionary war
would be lost otherwise.
Financially, America was in poor shape by 1779, and
the condition worsened during 1779 and 1780. Both Congress
and the states liad their paper money depreciate to the point
5
Baron De Kalb to Comte de Broglie, Sepgember 24,
1777, Honri Doniol
, Historie do la Participation de la
F-L^^^_j?_J-_[_!l^tab]J^s^^
PPI^il^^^TP^^'^liSJ:^?. _® t Documon t , 5 vol s , fPar i s7~France"^
Imprimerie NationaTe, 'I8W-T892)
,
3:227; Silas Dcane to the
Coimnittee of Secret Correspondence, Docomber 6, 1776, "The
Deane Papers," NYIISC 19 (1887): 404-405 ; Baron De Kalb to
Silas Deane, December 17, 1776, ibid., 427-431; Comte de
Broglie to Baron De Kalb, [December 19-20?, 1776], Charles J.
Still^, "Comte de Broglie, the proposed stadtholder of
America," PMHB 1 (1888): 380-381; A. E. Zucker, General De
Kalb, Lafayette's Mentor, pp. 94-107; Louise Burnh.nn Dunbar,
"A Study of 'Monarchical' Tendencies in the United States
from 1776 to 1801," University of Illinois S tudies in the
Social Sciences, vol. 10,^ no." 1 (1922)", pp\" 27-35 ; James
Breclc Perkins, France _in jthe Ainorican Revolution, (Boston:
Hought on M i f f 1 in' Company", 1911), pp. I'9 3-20 3 .
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of worthlessncss during these years. ^ By the end of 1780,
one member of Congress reported that Continental bills were
"fit but for little else but to make the tail of a paper
kite with." The previous spring, Washington complained
that a wagon load of money would scarcely purchase a wagon
load of provisions."^ Instead of alleviating their financial
plight by taxing and confiscating Tory estates, the states
experimented with ant i
-monopoly laws, prohibitions on export
of necessities, laws requiring the acceptance of paper money,
loans, wage restrictions, and price controls; as well as
continuing to print large sums of paper money.
^
6.Anne Be z an son. Pr ices and Inflation During the
American Revolution: Pennsylvania, 1770-1790
,
Univer¥ity
of Pennsylvania Research Studies, no. 35 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 67; ibid..
Table 1, pp. 334-337; Bulloch, "The Finances of the United
States from 1775 to 1789," pp. 133, 135; George Washington
Greene, Histo ri cal View of the American Revolution (Boston:
Ticknor and Fields, 1865), appendix, pp. 455 , 457'.
7Oliver VJolcott to Jonathan Trumbull, December 18,
1780, p.s., MHSC, 7th ser., 3:168; George Washington to
John Jay, April 23, 1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wash ing-
ton , 14:437; see also Charles Gregg Singer, South Carolina
in the Confederation
, p. 15; Richard S. Rodney, Colonial
Finances in Delaware (Wilmington, Delaware: Wilmington Trust
Company, 192 8) , pp. 50-51.
g Ralph Volney Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary
Finance, 1775-1783," AHR 25, no. 1 (October 1929): 66; chart
between pp. 50-51; William G. Sumner, The Financier and
Finances of the American RcvoTution (New York: Dodd
,
Mead,
and Company, 1892) , 1:29 , 5'5, '59,~ 60 , 65 , 74 , 84 , 92 , 93;
Albert S. Bol]os, The Financial Hi story of the United States
from J. 7 74 to 1 7 89 : "Embracing tlie Period of the American
Revolution, 4th ed'. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896),
pp'. r58-17 3 ; Ralph V. Harlow, "Economic Conditions in Massa-
chusetts During the American Revolution," Publications of
Congressional attempts to improve the nation's
finances during 1780 were ineffective and, in some instances,
worsened the situation.^ By the summer of 1780, the states
were financially exhausted, the Continental treasury was
nearly empty, and the central government lacked any real
credit. This financial exhaustion resulLcd in the dimin-
ishing activity and influence of Congress
.
the Colonial Society of Massachusetts. Transactions (1917-
1919), 2U: 168-1837 Kenneth Scott "Price Control in Nc^w
England During the Revolution," NEQ 19, no. 4 (December
1946) : 472
.
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"Warren-Adams betters," MHS^, 73 (1925): 124; Philip
Schuyler to George Clinton, November 29, 1779, Burnett, LMCC,
4:529; Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth, April 11,
1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; Robert D. Arbuckle,
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Congress
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"^^Lewis Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr.,
December 29, 1780, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC,
8 (1896): 475; James Duane to George Washington, December 9,
1780
,
Burnett, ],MCC, 5 :477; John Sullivan to Mcshech V-Joare,
November 15, 1780," ibid., 447; Whitmill Hill to Thomas Burke,
October 9, 1780, ibid., 413; Elbridge Gerry to John Adams,
May 5, 1780, Adams, Works of John Adams, 7:189; Nathanael
Greene to Jonathan TruTnburr7 May" 7rT780 , MIISC, 7th ser.,
3:36-37; Oliver Wolcott to Jonathan Trumbul 1 , 'December 18,
1780
,
ibid., 168; David Humphreys to Natli.m.ir 1 Greene, May 30,
1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers
of Ma jor-General Nathanael Greene," UM, 2d ser., 2, no. 3
(September 1867): 133; Ford, JCC, 16:326.
"'"^Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 3,
1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene, 2:258; Robert R. T,ivingston
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The continent was suffering from other causes than
financial exhaustion. States were quarreling over western
lands. New state moveinents were on the rise in the v;est.
There were boundary disputes between states. The Articles
of Confederation still had not been adopted by all the
states. The internal war was at its zenith. The army was
living off impressments and by plundering. Greene resigned
as Quartermaster General, disgusted with Congress. Benedict
Arnold defected. Cornwallis was on the move in the south.
During the summer, Gates was defeated at Camden and Lincoln
surrendered his army at Charleston. Colonel Burfort's Vir-
ginia regiment was annihilated at Warhawks and Fort 96 was
captured. And the French still had not arrived in force.
If the country suffered and was demoralized, the
army suffered even more so during 1779 and 1780. The winter
of 1779-1780 was the coldest in memory, and the army at
Morristown suffered greatly. Its condition continued to
worsen during 1780, so that by the summer, the northern
army was in a desperate shape. This situation continued
12
through the summer and fall, despite increased impressing.
'"^John Paterson to William Heath, May 7, 1780 ,
Egleston, John Paterson , p. 115; William Irvine to Joseph
Reed, May 26, 1780, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:201; Nathanael
Greene to Joseph Reed, May 10, 1780, ibid., 191; Nathanael
Greene to Clement Riddle, June 29, 1780, ibid., appendix,
p. 469; Samuel Cogswell to Mr. Cogswell, July 15, 1780,
"Unpulbished Letter from the Camp, July 1780," KM, 2d ser.,
8, no. 2 (Auaust 1870): 102; Rufus Putnam to Robert Howe,
July 14 , 1780 , Buell, Rufus Putnam, p. 172; Eb [enezer]
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Conditions in the Western Department were just as bad, as
soldiers at Fort Pitt suffered from the lack of food and
1
3
clothing. During the summer and fall of 1780, the
southern army also suffered from the lack of supplies. "^^
Besides not receivinq supplies and clothing, the
military received little or no pay, and when thoy did, it
was generally depreciated to the point of worthlossness
.
Not only did this result in the soldiers sufferiiuj, but also
their families. Thus, there were many pay complaints begin-
ning during the winter of 1778-1779 .-^^ Certain categories
Huntington to Andrew Huntington, July 7, 1780, Blanchfield,
Letters Written by Ebenezer Hunt ington, p. 87; Ephraim
Blaine to Isaac Carty, May 20
,
1 7 80 ,~~Delaware Archives,
3: 1355; Ephraim Blaine to Samuel Huntington
,
Octobe'r~T7,
17 80
,
[ copy ] , Hastings , Pjj^blij2_Pa_pers^ of George Clin ton
,
6:298-299; William Heath to George Clinton, November~17",
1780, ibid., 418; Ephraim Blaine to George Clinton,
August 14, 1780, ibid., 100-101; The Congressional Committee
at Camp to the Several States, May 25
, 1780
,
Burnett, LMCC,
5:165; Francis Johnston to Anthony V^ayne
,
May [ ], 1780 ,
~
"Notes and Queries," PMUB 29, no. 3 (1905): 362-363.
1
3
Daniel Brodhead to Joseph Reed, September 16,
1780, Hazard, Pennsylvan ia Archives, 1st ser., 8:558-559;
Same to same, October 17, 1780, ibid., 589.
14 Baron De Kalb to Chevalier de la Luzerne,
August 14, 17 80, Garden, Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War,
p. 298; Horatio Gates to Peter Muhlenberg October 12," 1780,
Paul A. W. Wallace, The Muhlenbergs of Pennsylvania , p. 201;
Nathanael Greene to George Washington , December 28, 1780,
Sparks, Correspondence_of the American Revolution , 3:191;
Same to same, Decembe'r 7/1780 , Greene, Nathanael Greene ,
3:543; Nathanael Greene to Baron von Steuben, December 7,
1780, ibid., 541.
''"^Charles Lee to Benjamin Rush, October 10, [1778],
"The Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC, 4 (1872): 212; Anthony
Wayne to Richard Peters, October 21, 1778, "Original Letters
and Documents," PMHB 5, no. 2 (1881): 231; Anthony Wayne to
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of officers suffered more than others, such as those of the
sixteen additional regiments which had no particular state
to look after their interests. The generals also suffered
disproportionally.l^ Lord Stirling, for example, who entered
the war in debt, had creditors hounding him throughout the
war, and was unable to get his tenants in New Jersey and Now
York to pay their rent. By the end of 1779, his farm had
been sold to pay his debts and he was virtually broke. '^
McDougall, who also had financial problems, complained to
Joseph Reed, December 28, 1778, Still^, Anthony Wayne,
pp. 162-163; Charles Pope to Caesar Rodney, OctobeF~28, 1778,
Harold B. Hancock, ed., "Letters to and from Caesar Rodney,"'
DH 12, no. 2 (October 1966): 155; Eb[enezer] Huntington to
Ja[bez] Huntington, December 21
, 1778 , Blanchfield , "^Letters
Writ ten by Ebene zer Huntington
, p. 77; Israel Putnam to
Jonathan Trumbull, [ ], 1779, MHSC, 7th ser., 2:339;
Egleston, John Paterson, p. 110; Christopher Ward, The
Delaware Continental s 1776 -1783, p. 2 85 ; George V/ashirTgton
to the Congressional Committee of Conference, January 29,
1779, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14:26-32; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
May 27, 1780, ibid., 18:430; George Washington to John
Sullivan, November 20, 1780, ibid., 20:374; The Congressional
Committee at Camp to the Several States, May 25, 1780,
Burnett, LMCC, 5:165; Other citations on this subject found
later in this chapter on threats of and actual resignations
and on lobbying by officers.
1
6
George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 27, 1779, Fitzpatrick, V7ri tings
of Washington , 15:330; Same to same, April 3, 1780, ibid.,
18:207.
17George Washington to Joseph Reed, October 22,
1779, ibid., 17:30; Ford, JCC, 15:1286; 17:689.
1
8
Alan Valentine, Lord Sti rling , pp. 137-143 , 239 ;
Lundin, Cockpit of the Revolution , pp. 88-89.
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Greene that the generals had been "insulted and neglected ."
Not only did the officers complain about pay deficiencies,
but they were upset with the civilian leaders and the
American people for a variety of reasons, many of which
have been discussed earlier.
Many officers were upset with the whole country.
Early in September 1780, Hamilton wrote, "We begin to hate
the country for its neglect of us." Five weeks earlier, an
officer described his plight as being "Injured by my country,
destitute of money & consequently Friends." Also during
July, Ebenezer Huntington wrote "The Insults & Neglect v;hich
the Army have met with from the Country, Beggars all descrip-
tion, it must Go no farther they can endure it no longer."
His brother, Jedediah, two weeks later, complained that "the
Country are triffling with their Array or Rather with their
20
own salvation." The army was also upset with the American
people
.
During 1779 and 1780, the military became increas-
ingly upset with the lack of virtue demonstrated by the
1
9
Alexander McDougall to Nathanael Greene, Hay 29,
1780, Champagne, Alexander McDougall , p. 159.
2 n
Alexander Hamilton to James Duane , [September 3,
1780], Syrett, Papers_o_fMexander^ Hamilton , 2:406; James
Duncan to John Clark, July "28 , 1780 , """Original Documents,"
MH 2 (1905): 67; Eb[enezer] Huntington to Andrevs? Huntington,
July 7, 17 80, Blanchfield, Letter s Written by Ebenezer
Huntington, p. 88; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
jin:y~r77T780 , "The Huntington Papers," CHSC , 20 (1923): 441
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American people. McDougall wrote Greene during the summer
of 1780 that he told a member of Congress that "our Army no
longer considers themselves as fighting the Battles of
'Republics in principle,' but for Empire and Liberty to a
people whose object is property." General Davidson believed
the people were so tied to their property that the loss of
it seemed "to touch them with more Sensibility than the loss
2 2of their Country's Freedom." The military, by 1779, had
lost faith in Congress.
"0-the C[o]ngress-I wish my cursing them would make
them better-" one officer complained during the summer of
231779. Many officers shared a similar view, as the military
developed an increasing frustration and dissatisfaction with
21Alexander McDougall to John McKesson, January 24,
17 79
,
Champagne , Alexander McDougall
, p. 151 ; Alexander
McDougall to Egbert Benson, February 9, 1779, ibid., p. ISC-
John Paterson to William Heath, October 23, 1780, MHSC, 7th
ser., 5:114-115; Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody
,
Apr i 1 2, 1779, Coffin, The Lives and Services of Thomas
,
Knowlton , Scamme ll , Dea rborn
, p . 90 ; Francis Johnston to
Anthony Wayne, July 2"57~T780 , "Notes and Queries," PMHB 30,
no. 1 (1906) : 115; David Humphreys to Nathanael Greene,
May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene, "Selections from
the Papers of Ma jor-General Nathanael Greene," HM, 2d ser.,
2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133.
2 2Alexander McDougall to [Nathanael] Greene,
August 8, 1780, Feinstone Collection #844; William L.
Davidson to Horatio Gates, October 6, 1780, Davidson,
William Lee Davidson
, p. 82.
Samuel B. Webb to Jeremiah Wadsworth, July 9,
17 79 , Jeremiah V?adsworth Papers, Box 128, CHS.
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that body, and the state governments, who seemingly were
letting the army suffer unnecessarily and were seemingly
indifferent to the exigencies of the times. For many, this
frustration and dissatisfaction turned to hatred, a term
24
used by some officers. During the spring of 1780, Greene
complained that "The [Congress] are a great set of [rascals]
as ever got together." Later that year. General Parsons
observed that "the wretches who have crept into Congress
,,25
are almost below contempt.
By the summer of 1780, many in the army believed
the people had lost faith in Congress to direct success-
fully the war effort, and certainly many in the army had
^^Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody,
September 29, 1779, [extract], "Colonel Alexander Scammell
and His Letters, from 1768 to 1781, Including His 'Love
Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d ser., 8, no. 3
(September 1870): 144; Anthony Wayne to William Irvine, _
March 10 1780, "Letters of General Wayne to General
Irvine,
1778-1784," ibid., 6, no. 10 (October 1862): 323; David
Humphreys 'to Nathanael Greene, May 30, 17 80, George
Washington Greene, "Selections from the Papers of Major-
General Nathanael Greene," ibid., 2d ser , 2 , no . 3 r.^^^^
(September 1867): 133; James Craik to Andrew Cragie [August
1780], "Letter of Dr. James Crailc," PMHS 35 (1901 ,
1902).
373; Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens [September
12,
1 7801 Svrett, Paoers of Alexander Hamilton, 2 : 4
2 8 ; Nathanael
Green; tl sl^nueT^^^^^TJ^ |^"-^^f^#^F
Webb, 2:269; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed,
April 29, 1780,
sfnEson Nathanael Greene, 1:172; Samuel H.
Parsons to
Bened?ci P^^T^^^t^r 5 , 1780 , Hall, SamueLHolden
Parsons, p. 303.
^^Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah ^'^^^f^^^^^h
April 11,
1780 , Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS;
Sa-el H Pa.sons^t^
Benedict Arnold, September 5 , 1780 , Hall,
bamuei
.
Parsons, p. 303.
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lost confidence in Congress. ^ During September 1780,
Hamilton wrote one member of Congress that the army had "lost
all confidence in them, and give the worse construction to
all they do" and Greene wrote an ex-member of Congress that
"there is hardly remaining the shadow of confidence in
27Government .
"
A primary reason the military had lost confidence
in Congress was that they believed they had been led astray
by false or unfulfilled promises. "Promises," one officer
wrote during May 1779, "cannot feed or Clothe a Man always-
Performance is sometimes necessary to make a man believe you
intend to Perform." Later that year, a member of Washing-
ton's staff asked a member of Congress, "Does Congress mean
to make the officers any permanent consideration? or do they
intend to coax them on by doing a little and promising them
a great deal, till the war is over, and then leave them with-
out money (consequently without friends) , without estates
,
and many without property or constitutions, the two latter
2 6Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsworth
,
April 11
,
1780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; George Washington to
John Laurens, [January 15, 1781], Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington , 21:109-110; Marquis de Lafayette to Joseph Reed,
May 31, ITS 0 , Wharton , Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspond-
ence , 3:147.
^"^Alexander Hamilton to James Duane [September 3,
17 80 ] , Syrett , Pa^rs of Alexander Hamilton , 2:406 ;
Nathanael Greene to Lewis Morris, Sr., September 14, 1780,
"Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC , 8 (1876): 469.
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of which they have generously sacrificed in the defence of
2 8their country."
This lack of confidence, coupled v/ith the sad
state of the country and the suffering of the army,
caused many contemporaries to see this period, from the
spring of 1780 until the following spring, as the most
2 9critical period of the war. Late in April 1780, Washing-
ton wrote General Howe that "We are at a most delicate
crisis; I dread with you the consequences." In a circular
to the northern states in June, he wrote "The present crisis
is by far the most important and delicate that this Country
Eb[enezer] Huntington to Joshua Huntington, May 3,
1779, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer Huntington
,
p. 81; and Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody,
September 29, 1779 [extract]. Coffin, The Lives and Services
of Thomas, Knowlton, Scammell, Dearborn
, p. 90.
29 Duane , Extracts from the Diary of Christopher
Marshall
, p. 248 ; Francis Johnston to Anthony Wayne, May [ ],
1780, "Notes and Queries," PMHB 29, no. 3 (1905): 362; James
Craik to Andrew Cragie, [August 1780], "Letter of Dr. James
Craik," PMHS 35 (1901, 1902): 363; Alexander Scammell to
Nathaniel Peabody, September 5, 1780, [extract], "Colonel
Alexander Scammell and His Letters, from 1776 to 1781,
Including His 'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM, 2d
ser., 8, no. 3 (September 1870): 144; James Craik to
Jeremiah Wadsworth, August 17, 1780, Kirkland, Letters on
the American Revolution , 1:67; Nathanael Greene to Alexander
McDougall, February [ ], 1780, Douglas Southall Freeman,
George Washington: A Biography , 5:152; Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, February 29, 1780, Greene, Nathanael Greene ,
2:273; Joseph Reed to Nathanael Greene, February 14, 1780,
ibid., 266; Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22,
1780, NYHSC, 11 (1879): 456.
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has ever experienced "Our present situation," John
Hanson wrote in September, "is truly alarming-our Army in
want of every thing; no money in the Treasury, and our
Credit exhausted. "^^ Early in February 1781, James Varnum
wrote that unless Congress exercised its powers, "a few
months will put an end to their existence ."
What would make things better? Many believed a
stronger army, a stronger central government, and the means
of bringing forth the wealth of the continent would bring
3 3
a successful conclusion to the war. Most agreed a
30George Washington to Robert Howe, April 28, 1780,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
18:308; Washington's
circular, June 30, 1780, ibid., 19:104-105; see also George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
March 18, 1783, ibid., 26:231.
31John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee, September 10, 1780,
Helen Lee Peabody, ed., "Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor
Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49, no. 2
(June 1954) : 126
.
32 James M. Varnum to Innis Clarke, February 3, 1781,
Wilkins Updike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar (Boston:
Thomas H. Webb and Company, 1842), pp. 157, 163.
33Tench Tilghman to Robert Morris, December 22, 1780,
NYHSC, 11 (1879) : 457; John Hanson to Thomas Sim Lee,
September 10, 1780, Helen Lee Peabody, ed. , "Revolutionary
Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-
1782," MHM 49, no. 2 (June 1954): 127; John Sullivan to
George Washington, January 29, 1781, Hammond, Letters and
Papers of John Sullivan , 3:227; Jesse Root to Jonathan
Trumbull, December 27, 1780, MHSC , 7th ser., 3:172, 173;
Oliver Wolcott and Jesse Root to Jonathan Trumbull,
January 16, 1781, ibid., 188; Joseph Jones to Thomas Jeffer-
son, April 16, 1781, Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson ,
5:469-471; James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 16, 1781,
ibid., 473-474; Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody,
December 8, 1780, Moore, New Hampshire 2, no. 12 (December
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stronger central government was a prerequisite to the other
two. "Our perplexities/' one member of Congress wrote early
in 1781, "do not arise from poverty, or the want of men,
but from the absolute want of government ." "^"^ But there was,
however, little hope of a stronger government being adopted
or Congress adequately using the powers they possessed.
"To effect an entire reformation of the plan and politics
of this country," Greene observed late in 1780, "would be a
greater task than that attempted by Martin Luther in the
Romish church. What is the true interest of this country
appears to be least likely adopted." John Sullivan who left
camp for a position in Congress, wrote Washington early in
1781 that he was not hopeful for change, believing that the
old members of Congress would be in heaven or at home before
they adopted powers to bring forth the resources of the
continent. Gouverneur Morris wrote Greene that he had no
expectation that Congress would acquire adequate powers and
no hope that the union of the states could subsist under
the current arrangement. Robert Morris was somewhat more
optimistic. He wrote Greene "That more power ought to be
given to Congress is evident now to many, and will probably
1823): 374, 375; Alexander Hamilton to James Duane , [Septem-
ber 3, 1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:401-
402, 408-409.
^"^James M. Varnum to Innis Clarke, February 3, 1781,
Wilkins Upkike, Memoirs of the Rhode-Island Bar, p. 157.
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become soon very apparent to all." Many military and
civilian leaders did not share this belief, nor did they
see the war being successfully concluded. "I foar,"
General Huntington wrote during the summer of 1780, "the
period of our Deliverance is at a great Distance. "^^ With
little or no expectation of the civil governments, particu-
larly Congress, being able to bring forth the resources of
the continent many feared the military, like Cromwell the
century before, would turn on the civil governments.
Early in 1779, the president of Harvard College wrote
that "it is to be feared our Soldiers, who have been greatly
oppressed while fighting for their Country, will become
I
mutinous and turn their Arms against their Neighbors, or
3 6disband." Such fears grew during 1779 and 1780 as the
condition of the army worsened. Early in April 1780,
Washington wrote Congress that "There never has been a stage
35Nathanael Greene to Nathaniel Peabody
, December 8
,
1780, Moore, New Hampshire, 2, no. 12 (December 1823): 374;
John Sullivan to George Washington, March 6, 1781, Burnett,
LMCC
,
6:12; Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene,
December 24, 1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morri s, 1:240; Robert
Morris to Nathanael Greene, October 3, 17 817 VJharton,
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence
,
4:765; Jedediah
Huntington to Andrew Huntington
,
July 17 , 1780 , "The
Huntington Papers," CHSC , 20 (1923): 441; see also Ezekiel
Cornell to William Greene, May 30, 1780, Staples, Rhode
Island in the Continental Congress
,
p. 29 3,
3 6 Samuel Langdon to William Whipple, March 9, 1779,
Charles F. VJetherell , "Samuel Langdon ' s Critique of Early
Revolutionary War Era Finance," HNH 28, no. 3 (Fall 1973):
193-194.
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of the War in which the dissatisfaction has In-.n r.o cj.noral
or alarming." 37
, summer, (here were great fears the
acru,nul,.lr.d distresses in 1 ho a nuy would cause their patience
to give wcy to "some viol(Mit convul sion . " After the
Connecticut l,inc inuliinod during May, Washington wrot o i l>at
state's chief execuliv.> "Lhere are certain l>oundr. l.oyond
whicli it i:; ii;ii)Ossible for humuu uuluio U) go" ...i.l (h,,t he
believed lh(> ,uiiiy had reached that point. T]u> 11.
-wing
iiuMdh, Tiom h\r, rotiremcMil liome, Charles J.,>o wrote "We have
noillior mfniarchy, Aristocracy, nor Drnnocracy . " "I am
. . .
fully I'orsuadod llial al((>r some months or at highest a couple
oX years' anarchy .uid c-on fusion, an absolute Tyranny will
be the conclusion of l lu.« lUoce; buL wlu-llier I ho Tyrant will
be foreign or democratic is out of the roach of foresigh L . "
°
37Ceorge Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, FiL^patrick, Writings
of Washington, 18:209.
3 8
Phi 1 ip Schuyler, Nathaniel Peabody , nm] Ji
Mil L hews to the Presiden t f I he Continental Congress
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17 80
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hMCC, 5 : i J J ; Circular T loin I he Con gross i nn.i I
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"Letter of General Schuyler to Ezra 1/ liomniod i ou , " PMllS 10
(1867-1 869): 488; NaLhanael Greene to Joseijli Kt't'ti,
Februai y 29 , 1780
,
Greene, Nal h.m ael Greene , 2 :273; Nalhanael
Greene to Clement Biddle, June 29 , 17 80, Reed, Joseph Rcu^d
,
2 : appendix, 4 69 ; Tliacher , M i 1 i tary Join na 1 of tfie TVmericalT
Revol ut ion, p. 19 7 .
39George Washington to J( >im Mi.in Trnml )ii I I
,
May 26
,
1780, MHSC, 51 h . , 1 0 : 1 (.^) .
•1 0Charles Lee to James Monroe, June 25, 17H(), lluiil,
Fragments of Revolutionary History
, i
>p . 117, 1 I H
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Two months earlier in ^ ^^^^ ^^-^le , m a coded letter, Greene
Observed that affairs were verging on revolt, as the people
no longer had confidence in Congress, and there was nothing
else left to save the.. m March, willia. Gordon expressed
h.s fear to Washington that "the unhappy state of our
•currency and finances
.ay occasion so.e internal convulsion
among ourselves." During the sunder, one member of Congress
informed its president that he soon expected the army to
disband or turn upon their civilian leaders. A .onth later,
Greene confided in Pennsylvania's chief executive that "The
change of sentiment which has taken place in the army
respecting civil government, has for the first time given
me apprehension." Early in October, a member of Congress
observed, "In short, I know not what is to become of us.-^^
Out of this situation grew the belief that extra-
ordinary power ought to be placed in someone's hands. If
this was not done, Robert R. Livingston wrote James Duane
,
the people would take matters into their own hands and "will
vest elsewhere what Congress are unwilling to trust
41Nathanael Greene to Jeremiah Wadsv/orth, April 111780, Nathanael Greene Papers, CHS; William Gordon to GeorgeWashington, March 1, 1780, "Letters of the Reverend WilliamGordon: Historian of the /imerican Revolution 1770-1799 "
PMHS_63 (October 1929-June 1930): 428; John Mathews to'thePresident of the Continental Congress, Auaust 6, 1780
Burnett, LMCC, 5:310, 311; Nathanael Greene to Joseph'Reed,
September 2 , 1780, Johnson, Na^thanael Green e, 1:166-167;
Whitmill Hill to Thomas Burke, October 9, 1780, Burnett,
LMCC, 5:414.
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themselves with-Or some daring Genious, with necessity for
his plea, shall seize what they dare not give." Many
believed that this extraordinary power should be lodged in
Congress. After all, as one member of Congress wrote Greene,
"This power is certainly more safely lodged in the hands of
such a body as Congress, than any other. "^^
Many military, and some civilian, leaders did not
believe that Congress, even with additional powers, would
be able to guide America through this critical period. They
believed, as did young Lewis Morris, that the spirit of their
governments were "illy adapted" to the spirit of war."^"^ What
they desired was some form of military dictatorship.
By 1779, many civilian and military leaders believed
that a limited military dictatorship needed to be established
in order to prevent anarchy and to bring a successful conclu-
sion to the war, even at the expense of civil supremacy and
civilian rights. As General Moultrie stated early in 1779,
"it has always been the maxim of all communities to abridge
the people of some of those liberties for a time, the better
42 . .Robert R. Livingston to James Duane
,
May 2, 1780,
George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston of New
York 1746-1813 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960),
pp . 12 3-124; John Mathews to Nathanael Greene, May 20, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:94.
4 3 . •
Levels Morris, Jr., to Lewis Morris, Sr., June 7,
1781, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYKSC 8 (1376):
487 .
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to secure the whole to them in the future." Two days
previously, McDougall wrote a civilian leader it was one
of his first wishes to see the "civil at all times superior
to the military," but he believed the military may have to
seize control of government to ensure victory. Earlier, he
wrote the people would have to support the army, or else the
generals would take over, or they would be conquered—either
way, the people would lose their liberties/"^
Calls for some form of military dictatorship con-
4 5tmued during 1780
. During September of that year,
Lafayette wrote Luzerne that there was much talk of making
Washington a dictator, and though by nature he was opposed
to it, he believed Washington shared his belief that it
might be necessary for the public v/elfare.'^^ Such talk by
the military declined the following year, with the approval
of the Articles of Confederation and the establishment of
executive departments, but nevertheless some in the military
44 .William Moultrie to Charles C. Pinckney,
February 11, 1779, Moultrie, Memoirs of the Amer ican Revolu
tion
,
1:311-312; Alexander McDougall to Egbert Benson
,
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.
45Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September 2,
17 80, Johnson, Nathanael Greene , 1:166-167.
46
Marquis de Lafayette to Chevalier de la Luzerne,
September 10, 1780, Waldo G. Leland and Edmund C. Burnett,
eds., "Letters from Lafayette to Luzerne, 1780-1782," AHR
20, no. 2 (January 1915): 374.
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still believed a n^ilitary dictatorship was necessary . ^
Some civilian leaders believed that extraordinary
power needed to be placed in the hands of the military in
order to save the country from military defeat and anarchy/^
As was pointed out earlier, the congressional committee at
camp during the summer of 1780 favored a limited military
dictatorship and that fall the Hartford Resolves called on
Congress to give the military extraordinary power.
Many Americans, fearing anarchy, were willing to
sacrifice their civil supremacy principles and republican
beliefs for a strong government which would be able to pre-
vent anarchy. And if not a strong government, a strong man
on horseback, a military dictator. Many revolutionary
leaders did not believe America had the virtue to experiment
with democracy, while others believed that their only hope
lay in the form of an absolute monarchy. "There are some
amongst us," Thomas McKean complained to Samuel Adams, "who
47John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr.,
May 10, 1781, "Original Letters and Documents," PMHB 5,
no. 1 (1881): 109; Simeon DeWitt to John Bogart, May 8,
1781, The John Bogart Letters: Forty-Two Letters Written
to John Bogart of Queen's College now Rutgers College and
Five Letters Written by Him, 1776-1782
, pp. 29-30.
4 8William Livingston to John Witherspoon,
December 28, 1780, William Livingston Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Philip Schuyler to James Duane, May 13, 1780, "The
Duane Letters," Southern History Association Publications
8, no. 5 (SeptembeF^19 04) : 380-381 ; Ezekiel Cornell to
William Greene, August 1, 1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:305; James
Lovell to Elbridge Gerry, November 20, 1780, ibid., 451-452;
Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 460.
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are so fond of having a great and powerful Man to look up
to, that, tho' they may not like the name of king, seem
anxious to confer kingly powers."" Washington was the most
likely candidate for such powers to be conferred upon, for
by the critical period the army was devoted to him and most
civilian leaders saw in him the glue that held the revolu-
tionary cause together.
By 1779, Washington was honored, respected and loved
by most of the army. He had slowly won their respect and
gained their confidence. This was most aptly demonstrated
during the Conway Cabal, when they rallied to his support.
John Laurens wrote his father, then President of Congress,
that "If ever there was a man in the world whose moderation
and patriotism fitted him for the command of a republican
army, he is, and he merits unrestrained confidence." A week
later, the adjutant of the First Connecticut Regiment wrote
that any general could be replaced but Washington, The
country, even Congress, he believed, "are not aware of the
Confidence the army Places in him."^^
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The younger officers, especially, had great faith
in General Washington.
"when I contemplate the virtues of
the .an," a young Massachusetts officer wrote of Washington
during the spring of 1778, "uniting in the citizen and
soldier, I cannot too heartily coincide with the orator of
the Fxfth of March last who so delicately describes hi.,
as a person that appears to be raised by Heaven to show how
high humanity can soar." Another young officer, on learning
that Washington might be replaced, wrote a friend that the
army, almost to a man, had the highest opinion of their
commander in chief, and he doubted they would submit to
another. "They," he added, "love" and "adore him."^^
The army's confidence and adoration increased during
the critical period, so that by the summer of 1781 the Abbe
Robin observed that Washington's subordinates were "rivals
in praising him." Other Frenchmen made similar observations
during 1781. One wrote in July that the soldiers regarded
Washington as their "friend and father," and earlier that
year another wrote Washington was "beloved and respected by
his men." By the time of the Yorktown campaign, a young
French officer observed that the army had "supreme confidence
^"'"Samuel Shaw to John Eliot, April 12
,
1778
,Quincy, Samuel Shaw
, p. 45; Nathaniel Chipman to Elisha
Lee, April 10, 1778, Johnston, Yale and He r Honor-Roll in
the American Revolution, p. 86; see also Mercy Otis Warren
to James Warren, March 10, 1778, "Warren-Adams Letters,"
MHSC, 7 3 (1925) : 7.
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in General Washington." The following year, young Prince
Broglie noted that around Washington his officers exhibited
an air of "respect," "confidence," and "admiration ." ^2
On July 4, 1779, Steuben wrote that Washington's
"authority is as unlimited as that of a Stadtholder in
Holland can be."" Although this is an exaggeration, cer-
tainly with respect to control over the civilian government,
Washington, nevertheless, during the critical period had
great authority over his officers and soldiers. They looked
to him for leadership and were quite willing to follow wher-
54
ever he lead. what of the civilians?
During the spring of 1779, a young officer wrote
that Washington's "fortitude, patience, and equanimity of
soul, and the discouragements he has been obliged to encoun-
ter, ought to endear him to his country." It already had,
he added, done so "exceedingly to the army."^^ After the
52 , .Robin, New Travels Through North America, p. 34;
Acomb, Revolutionary Journa l of Baron_jAjdv/iq von Closen,
p . 102; Rice , American Campaigns of Rochambeau
'
s Army,"~l : 2 5
,
152; E. W. Balch, trans., ""Narrative of the Prince de
Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 5 (May 1877): 309.
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battles of Trenton and Princeton, Washington's popularity
grew, and he was perceived by nany to be the savior of his
56
country. One member of Congress wrote early in 1777 that
"America has been rescued from ruin by the mere strength
of his Genius, conduct, and courage," and believed "an
Impartial world will say with you that he is the Greatest
57
man on Earth." So popular was Washington that early in
1777 one person observed that "The ignorant and deluded part
of the people look up to him as the Saviour and Protector
of their Country, and have implicit confidence in everything
he does .
"
Washington's popularity increased during the middle
years of the war, even though victories were few and far
59between. "A Citizen," in the April 1, 1778, issue of the
New-Jersey Gazette wrote that Washington's uncommon abili-
ties, patience, fortitude, and humanity "furnished the most
convincing proofs that Heaven directed their choice" of him
5 6Caesar Rodney to William Killen, January 27, 1777,
[draft], Delaware Archives
,
3:1439.
57William Hooper to Robert Morris, February 1, 1777,
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as commander in chief. Just keeping the army together
without them turning on the civilians earned him much praise
And, as soldiers and officers came and went, only Washington
remained, and was thus seen by many as the revolution itself
"IVhile Washington survives," Caesar Rodney wrote
early in 1777, "the great American cause cannot Die."^°
Actually, from the beginning of the war, many people viewed
Washington in this light. Lacking national symbols,
Washington, especially after his dramatic successes at
Princeton and Trenton, came to be viewed as the national
symbol, the embodiment of the aspirations of the American
revolutionaries and their revolution
.
60C^aesar Rodney to William Killen, January 27, 1777,[draft], Delaware Archives
,
3:1439.
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By 1781, before Yorktown, Washington had endeared'
himself to most Americans . ^ ^ Greene, early that year,
reported that wherever he went Washington was "little less
than ador'd; and universaly admir'd." During the summer,
the Abbe Robin observed that in all the states Washington
was considered in the light of a "benef icient God . " "The
Americans," he observed, "that cool and sedate people, who
in the midst of their most trying difficulties, have attended
only to the directions and impulses of plain method and
common reason, are roused, animated and inflamed at the very
6 4mention of his name." This was certainly true during the
Yorktown campaign, as everywhere he traveled, people vied
with one another "in demonstrations of joy and eagerness to
6 5see their beloved countryman."
Despite this adulation for and confidence in
Washington, most civilian leaders were loath to give him
dictatorial powers. As was noted earlier, Washington and
some other generals were given dictatorial powers for a
6 3Jeremy Belknap to Ebenezer Hazard, March 8, 1781,
MHSC, 5th ser., 2:87; Ebenezer Hazard to Jeremy Belknap,
April 17, 1781, ibid., 87.
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limited time, but these grants were reluctantly given, as
it was feared once given, it would not be relinquished,
even by Washington
.
As has been pointed out throughout this dissertation,
the revolutionary generation, which was a jealous one, had a
strong fear of military tyranny in any form. They were
especially fearful of generals who were too popular or
powerful. When Gates was victorious at Saratoga, John Adams
was pleased Washington had not been present, for had he been
in command, "Idolatry, and Adulation would have been
unbounded, so excessive as to endanger our Liberties ."
^
But as we have seen, by 1779, there was great adulation by
both the army and the civilian population for Washington,
so much so that the civilian leaders feared that Washington
would seize power.
"Are you sure we have no Caesars nor Cromwells in
this country?" 'Leonidas' asked in The Pennsylvania Packet
6 8
on July 3, 1779. Earlier that year there were some who
66
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believed Washington was to become a Caesar or Cromwell and
dissolve Congress. Francis Dana, a member of Congress,
spread the story in Philadelphia that he had heard said that
Hamilton had stated that "it was high time for the people
to rise, join General Washington, and turn Congress out of
doors." It is probable that Hamilton did not make this
statement; however, it was very easy for civilian leaders
to believe such rumors.
During May of 1779, the French minister to the
United States reported the eastern party in Congress, i.e.,
Adams, Lee, had affected a dread of the army's power "and
allowed itself every sort of proceeding and imputation in
70justification of this pretended dread." Although this
was a slight exaggeration. Congress nevertheless attempted
to limit the military power when they believed it was get-
ting too powerful. Late in 1779, for example, John Sullivan
wrote Washington that the faction in Congress which had
raised against him during the Conway Cabal was still alive,
waiting to "collect Strength & Seize Some favorable moment,
to appear in force." "Their plan is," he explained, "to
take Every method of proving the Danger, arising from a
^^John Brooks to Alexander Hamilton, July 4, 1779,
Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:91; for related
correspondence see ibid., 99, 108-109, 127-128, 141-143, 149,
153-156, 187-188, 222, 224, 313, 313-315, 316-317.
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Commander, who Enjoys the full & unlimited Confidence of his
Army, & Alarm the People with the Prospects of Imaginary
Evil." Sullivan believed this faction intended to persuade
Congress that the military power of America should be placed
in three or four different hands, each having a separate
quarter of the continent to command, answerable to Congress,
not to a supreme military commander. Sullivan told
Washington that this faction believed splitting the military
power would prevent an aspiring commander from enslaving the
71
country. This plan was not adopted.
During 1780, there were also rumors of a military
coup. That summer, Joseph Reed wrote Greene to explain such
rumors. "I have made inquiry at headquarters whether there
was such a proposition made to the general, either by an
officer or officers of any rank, to assume dictatorial
powers," Greene wrote, "and am assured by Colonel Hamilton
that no such thing ever took place. And you may depend upon
it, that the principal officers of the army are far from
proposing any such thing to the general. Nor can I see what
he could effect by dictatorial powers, without the helping
. . 72hand of civil-government. " As we know, the civilian
helping hand was present in the form of the congressional
71 John Sullivan to George Washington, December 1,
1779, Hammond, Letters and Papers of John Sullivan , 3:169,
170 .
7 2Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, September 8,
1780, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 1:167.
conmiittee to camp, which supported some form of dictatorial
powers being authorized. It was pointed out earlier this
committee was recalled when it appeared they were becoming
too attached to the military, and when one of its members,
John Mathews, attempted to introduce legislation giving
Washington dictatorial powers he was severely condemned by
the members of Congress. This concern continued into 1781.
Early in 1781, John Adams told a European nobleman
that the American people were "keeping a watchful eye over
the army to see that it does not ravish from them that
liberty for which all have been contending." Samuel Adams
certainly kept a watchful eye. John Armstrong, Jr., wrote
his father that Adams, because of the continued discussions
of making Washington a dictator, had left Congress "much
displeased and in a temper to awaken the jealousies if not
the resentments of his countrymen and constituents . ""^"^ A
loyalist newspaper that summer played on this fear of making
Washington a dictator by reporting the French had given
Washington a considerable amount of money and intended to
make him the king of the United States. "^^ Although the
73John Adams to Baron Van Der Capellen, January 21,
1781, Adams, Works of John Adams
, 7:357; John Armstrong, Jr.,
to John Armstrong, Sr., May 10, 1781, "Original Letters and
Documents," PMHB 5, no. 1 (1881): 109.
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(Louvain , France : Desc lee be Brouwer, Brug"es BTbTToteque De
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story was far-fetched, there was a small grain of truth
contained in it, one that certainly touched on the jealousies
and fears of the civilian leaders. During the late spring
the French king made a substantial loan and guaranteed
another from the Dutch, with the stipulation that it be
drawn by Washington. Luzerne, realizing how upsetting this
was to the Americans, told Congress that Washington could
be interpreted to mean Washington or some other person.
Congress designated Robert Morris as the person authorized
75to receive the loan.
The civilian leaders had reasons to be fearful of a
military dictatorship or anarchy taking place, other than
those that have been mentioned. During the critical period,
the military often made threats, officers threatened to
resign, the military was often unruly, and at times mutinous.
"Without a speedy change the army must dissolve; it
is now a mob, . . . , without cloathing, without pay, with-
out provision, without morals, without discipline," Hamilton
wrote James Duane early in September 1780. Two days later,
St. Clair wrote Pennsylvania's chief executive that if the
army was not helped, it v/ould either disband or turn "'free-
booter'." "If relief cannot be afforded," Heath wrote Rhode
Silas Deane to Jesse Root, May 20, 1781, "The Deane
Papers," NYHSC, 22 (1890): 377; William G. Sumner, The
Financier and the Financ es o f the American Revolution,
TT296-29T.
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Island's chief executive later in September, "i cannot hold
myself answerable for consequences to which necessity will
drive the troops to sustain life."^^ Such threats were made
frequently during 1780, even by Washington. Early that year,
knowing of the military's dislike of the inequality of the
terms of enlistments and bounties, their growing distrust of
the civilian authorities, and realizing some soldiers and
officers had not been paid for lengthy periods of time,
Washington wrote Congress he was afraid the "seditious com-
binations" would result in the army becoming uncontrollable.'^^
During May, he informed Congress that he had ever tried to
"preserve order and promote the public service," but in the
accumulation of present distresses, it would be difficult
to continue to do so. Late in August, he wrote Congress
that something must be done or else the army would cease to
exist, or it would stay together, exhibiting "an example of
more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance than
perhaps ever yet been parallelled in . . . history." A week
later, he informed the states that, if they did not act, he
7 6Alexander Hamilton to James Duane [September 3,
1780], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 2:406; Arthur
St. Clair to Joseph Reed, September 5, 1780, Smith, The
St. Cl air Papers , 1:523-524; William Heath to William Greene,
September 28, 1780, Bartlett, Records of Rhode Island , 9:
307-308 .
7 7George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, April 3, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writing s
of VJashington, 18:207-211 .
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would soon be forced to disband the army or let it reinain
intact by plundering . "^^
These threats increased the fears of the civilian
leaders, who desired neither anarchy or military tyranny to
subvert the war and the revolution. Also of great concern
to them was the fact that officers, who they placed great
faith in to control the army, began threatening during 1779
and 1780 to resign unless their situation was improved.
"^^
Not only were there threats, there were actions by
the military which raised great concern and fear among the
civilian leaders. During the summer of 1780, one member of
Congress reported that "The army now live principally by
plunder" and that if they were kept together, will "soon
8 0become free-booters
.
" During 1780
, the army, especially
7 8George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 27, 1780, ibid., 431; Same to
same, August 20, 1780, ibid., 19:412; copy of Washington's
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the southern forces, lived by plunder. This was in great
part because of necessity, but also because of lack of
discipline, and continued plundering further eroded
discipline
.
Between the summer of 1779 and the spring of 1781,
the discipline of the army was at its lowest point, as
evidenced by numerous instances of mutinous behavior and
8 2several mutinies. During 1779, there were numerous
potential and actual mutinies. The most serious, as far as
the civilians were concerned, were the threats by Hunting-
ton's brigade to march on the Connecticut legislature to
present their grievances and Pawling 's regiment to march on
the New York legislature to present theirs.
8
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The chief executive of Pennsylvania early in
December 1779 wrote General St. Clair that it gave him
"great satisfaction to see harmoney so prevailing in the
military line. God grant it may continue and increase ."
This did not happen. Throughout 1780, the army, after
having suffered through the coldest winter in memory, fre-
quently exhibited mutinous behavior and in several instances
threatened to march on the civilian authorities for redress
of their grievances. As 1780 came to a close, there was a
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growing concern that if the army suffered through another
winter a major mutiny would take place. A major mutiny,
it was feared, could result in the revolution being undone,
by military defeat, or even worse, by anarchy or military
tyranny. Two weeks before the end of the year General
Wayne wrote, "I sincerely wish the Ides of Jany was come
& past-I am not superstitious, but can't help chershing
disagreeable Ideas about that period. "^^
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Wayne's worst fears came true on January 1, 1781, as
over one thousand soldiers of his division mutinied, and
began a march on Philadelphia, after having wounded and
kiUed several officers, and even fired upon him. within two
weeks this mutiny was quelled after the civilian authorities
promised the soldiers would receive som,e of the monies owed
them: clothing; those that had enlisted for three years or
the war, having served three years would be discharged; and
many others would be furloughed until April. when the
mutiny began, Wayne commanded 2,500 soldiers; by the summer
when he headed south, he commanded less than half that
8 7
number. The New England troops almost mutinied as well,
but the promise of pay and supplies calmed them.^^ Not so
8 7Anthony VJayne to George Washington, January 2,
1781, Stille, Anthony Wayne
, p. 242; Same to same, Janu-
ary 29, 1781, ibid., p. 260; Enos Reeves to [ ],
January 2, 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-
books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line,"
PMHB 21, no. 1 (1897): 72-75; Thacher, Military Journal of
the American Revolution
, p. 24 7; George Kyte, "General Wayne
Marches South, 1781," PH 30, no. 3 (July 1963): 302, 305;^
Diary of Joseph McClellan, Linn, Pennsylvania in the War of
the Revolution
,
2:631; see also ibid., 649-673.
8 8William Heath to George Washington, January 23,
1781, MHSC , 7th ser., 5:159-160; William Heath to John
Hancock, January 17, 1781, ibid., 165; Samuel H. Parsons to
Jonathan Trumbull, January 31, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden
Parsons, p. 324; Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton,
January 25, 17 81, Syrett, Papers of Al exander Hamil ton , 2:542;
John P. Wyllys to Hezekiah Conneet, February 10, 1781,
Seymour, A Digressive History
, p. 196; Washington Circular to
the New EngTand Stat^es^ Janilary 5, 1781, Fitzpatrick, VJritings
of Washington, 21:61-63; George Washington to Timothy
Picker ing7 January 5, 1781, ibid., 60.
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easily quelled was the New Jersey Line, which mutinied on
the twentieth of January, when nearly three hundred soldiers
marched on their brigade headquarters with the intention of
continuing on to Trenton to make demands upon the civilian
89
authorities. Mutinies and the spirit of mutiny continued
throughout 1781, despite the increased military activity and
the numerous provisions made by Congress and the states for
the physical well-being of the military.
These threats of and actual mutinies were of great
concern to the civilian leaders, but even more so to the
8 9 The New-Jersey Gazette
,
February 7, 1781; Lundin,
Cockpit of the Revolution
, p. 4 41; Abbatt, Memoir s of Major-
General William Heath by Himself
, p. 2 52. '
"
90John Taylor to Thomas Jefferson, December 5, 1780,
Boyd, Papers of Thomas Jefferson
,
4:180-181; James Innes to
Thomas Jefferson, February 21, 1781, ibid., 675; Same to
same, February 24, 1781, ibid., 699; Daniel Brodhead to
Joseph Reed, August 23, 1781, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives
,
1st ser., 9:365; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major
General James Ja ckson
, pp. 34-36, 91; James Clinton~to George
Clinton^ July 11, 1781, Hastings, Public Papers of George
CI inton
,
7:70; William Gordon, The History of the R ise,
Progress, and Establishment, of the Independence of the
United States of America: I nc luding an Account of the Late
War: and of the Thirteen Colonies, from their Origin to that
Period , 4 vols . (London: printed for the author, 1788)
,
4:172-174; John Stark to William Heath, December 12, 1781,
Frederic Kideer, History of the First New Hampshire Regiment
in the War of the Revolution
, p. 75; Moore, John Stark ,
p. 474; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, April 3, 1781,
Smith, The St. Cl a ir Papers , 1 : 544 ; Joseph Reed, to Arthur
St. Clair, April 3, 1781, ibid., 544n.l; Samuel H. Parsons
to Jonathan Trumbull, July 10, 1781, Hall, Samuel Holden
Parsons, p. 375; George Washington to Jonathan Trumbull,
August 3, 1781, p.s., ibid., pp. 387,388.
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military leaders who believed that, with a well-disciplined
army and the help of the French forces, they could win the
war. And, like their civilian brethren, they also feared
anarchy and military tyranny. This was especially true of
Washington
.
It has been suggested that VJashington, by 1780, was
held in the highest esteem by most Americans and that, if
he desired, could have imposed his will upon both the mili-
tary and the civilian authorities by force of personality
and arms. In 1847, a biographer of General Lincoln observed
that if V7ashington "had willed it, the revolutionary war
might have ended in the establishment of a military despot-
ism." This view was held at the time as well. The Abbe
Robin, during August 1781, wrote that Washington's "reputa-
tion has at length arisen to a most brillant pitch; and he
may now grasp at the most unbounded power without provoking
envy, or exciting suspicions." Two years earlier, the
French minister to America reported to Vergennes that if
Washington was ambitious and intriguing it would have been
entirely in his power to lead a coup, but that nothing on
Washington's part had justified the shadow of suspicion. In
fact, Washington, he wrote, was constantly operating under
the principle that one must be a citizen first and a soldier
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afterwards
•
Washington indeed put the citizen before the soldier
A neighbor wrote in his diary on May 23, 1776, that he
"never knew but one man who resolved not to forget the
citizen in the soldier or ruler and that is G. V?."^^ ^he
civilian leaders greatly appreciated this. The Maryland
legislature addressed him on November 22, 1781:
Your military talents, eminent as they are, form
not the most admired part of your character; your
inviolate regard to the civil authority manifested
on all occasions, and in situations the most try-
ing, claims the warmest acknowledgements of the
guardians of the rights and liberties of the
people . ^
Washington had no desire for any form of military coup, for
the various reasons discussed in this dissertation ; but
primarily because of his fear that the revolution would be
subverted by anarchy and military tyranny. Although his
family motto was "Exitus Acta Probat" (the end justifies the
means)
,
Washington placed great importance upon the means
of accomplishing his ends. He had no desire to shake the
91 . .Bowen, Benjamin Lincoln
, p. 37 3; Robin, New Travels
Through North-America
,
pT 3T; Conrad Alexandre Gerard to
Comte de Vergennes, March 8, 1779, Meng, Despatches and
Instructions
, p . 5 6 9.
92Jack P. Greene, ed., The Diary of Colonel Landon
Carter of Sabine Hall , 1752-1778 , Virginia Historical
Society 'Documents T~~&~'5', 2 vols . (Charlottesville : University
Press of Virginia for the Virginia Historical Society, 1965)
,
2:1042-1043.
q o
Scharf, History of Maryland, 2:463.
social or political order by military means, even if such
means shortened the war.
"I do most heartily pity General Washington,"
Jedediah Huntington wrote late in 1777. "He bears his dis-
appointments with the greatest equanimity, and is anxious to
do the best he can in his circumstances."^'^ One historian
has noted "the patience and forbearance displayed by
Washington in his relations with Congress are perhaps not
the least of his titles to greatness; he might well be
accorded rank alongside Job."^^ Washington indeed took his
disappointments in stride, believing that things would work
out for the best. Early in the war, he wrote that "Time
only can eradicate and overcome customs and prejudices of
long-standing; they must be got the better of, by slow and
96gradual advances."
Self-restraint and patience were among the most
notable aspects of Washington's character . ^"^ He, for the
94 Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull,
November 10, 1777, MHSC , 7th ser., 2:190.
95
,John C. Miller, Triumph of Freedom 1775-1783,
p. 242 .
96George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 11, 1776, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington , 5:33.
97Henry T. Tuckerman, Biographic al E ssays. Essays,
Biog raphical an d Criti cal; or. Studies o f~cFaTa c t e r (Boston":
Phillips
,
Sampson and Company, 1857), pp. 5-28^!
-St part, accepted things he could not or did not desire
to change. As he told Joseph Reed, "i will not lament or
repine at any act of Providence because I am in a great
measure a convert to Mr. Pope's opinion, that whatever is,
is right." v,hen Schuyler complained about his plight,
Washington wrote him, "I must recommend to you what I
endeavour to practice myself. Patience and Per severance ^
8
He told the army in his general orders of January 30, 1781,
after the mutinies of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Lines:
We expected to encounter many wants and distressesand we should neither shrink from them when theyhappen nor fly in the face of Law and Governmentto procure redress. There is no doubt the public
will in the event do ample justice to men fighting
and suffering in its defence. But it is our dutvto bear present Evils with Fortitude looking for-
ward to the period when our Country will have it
more in its power to reward our services. 99
Most soldiers did not want military tyranny, and
were willing to wait to be compensated . "^^^ For the most
part, they shared Washington's belief they should not take
matters into their own hands, for the result would inevitably
98
George Washington to Joseph Reed, March 7, 1776,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wa shington, 4:380; George Washing-
ton to Philip Schuyler, July 28, 1775, ibid., 3:374.
99
Ibid., 21:159.
100 S^amuel Cogswell to Mr. Cogswell, July 15, 1780,
"An Unpublished Letter from the camp^ July, 1780," HM 2d
ser., 8, no. 2 (August 1870): 102; David Humphreys to
Nathanael Greene, May 30, 1780, George Washington Greene,
"Selections from the Papers of Ma jor-General Nathanael
Greene," ibid., 2, no. 3 (September 1867): 133.
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be the subversion of the revolution, by a form of anarchy
or military dictatorship, or both. Thus, while some offi-
cers contemplated or wished for more power, most were
content to adjust themselves to their circumstances. This
is not to suggest they did nothing, for as we have seen,
the military frequently lobbied for change and involved
themselves in the political process. But they did not,
except in rare instances, effect change themselves.
During the critical period, Washington and his
generals were well aware of the p] ight of the country and
the army, and although they could not always improve the
former, they knew they could improve and control the latter.
As was dicussed earlier, the military officers went to
great lengths to control the army. This was especially true
during the critical period, when the army was as great a
threat to the success of the revolution as was the British
army
.
Washington and other officers frequently used force
during this period to quell mutinies and mutinous behavior . "'^^^
This was especially true during 1781. Soldiers, and even
officers, were confined, sentenced to death, executed, or
Jolin Glover to Wi ] 1 i am Heath, January 1
,
1780,
George Athan Rillias, Gen e ral John Glover and His Marblehead
Mariners
, pp. 181 , 232n.20, 21; William Heath to George
Washin'gton, January 10 , 1780 , MHSC, 7lh sor. , 5:8-9; Abbatt,
Memoi rs o f Ma j or-General William Heath , p. 208, Benians, A
Journal by Th6¥T Hu gh e"i", pp . 79-80 .
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in some other way punished for mutinous behavior.
Washington showed great restraint when the Pennsylvania Line
mutinied early in January 1781, but such was not the case
when the New Jersey Line mutinied later that month.
Washington believed he needed to act immediately, as "This
spirit of mutiny will spread itself through the remainder of
the Army, if not extinguished by some decisive measure."
This decisive measure was to send General Howe with over
five hundred well-clothed and properly officered New England
troops to New Jersey to force an unconditional surrender
with orders to "instantly execute a few of the most active
and incendiary leaders." To ensure his orders were com-
plied with, Washington went to the scene of the mutiny.
Once the mutiny was quelled, two of the leaders were execu-
ted, by twelve of the foremost participants, who were
James Clinton to George Clinton, July 11, 1781,
Hastings, Public Paper s of George Clinton
,
7:70; William
Gordon, The History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment
of the Independence of the United S tates of Amer i c a , 4 :Tl2-
174; John Bell Tilden Phelps, "Extracts from the'^urnal of
Lieutenant John Bell Tilden, Second Pennsylvania Line, 1781-
1782," PMHB 19, no. 1 (1895): 52; The New-Je rsey Gazette,
March 28, 17 81; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major-
General James Jackson
, pp. 34-36, 91.
'
''^"^George Washington to John Sullivan, January 21,
1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
21:128; George
Washington to Robert Howe, January 21, 1781, ibid,, 128;
see also David Humphreys to William Heath, January 21, 1781,
MHSC, 7th ser. , 5 :165.
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sentenced by a court-martial to be the executioners
.
When the Pennsylvania Line threatened mutiny during May,
General Wayne was also severe in his punishment. He had
twelve leaders court-martialed on the spot. Friends of six
of them were forced to be the executioners. With tears run-
ning down their cheeks, they obeyed the order to fire. Five
died instantly, and the sixth, badly wounded, was bayoneted
by another of the mutineers by order of Wayne. Wayne then
marched the Line, by divisions, around the dead and, to make
the point plainly clear, he ordered the remaining six muti-
neers hanged. ''"^^
Early in May 1779, twenty-one officers of the New
Jersey brigade sent a memorial to their legislature
threatening to resign if the depreciation due them was not
made good. Washington, very upset by this action, told their
commanding general that the officers had used the wrong means
106to obtain their desired end. Washington and most of the
officers believed that threats, mutinies, and military coups
were not the best way to improve things. The means they
104^
,
.
. .George Washington to William Livingston, Janu-
ary 27, 1781, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21:149;
The New-Jersey Gazette
,
February 7, 1781; Thacher, Military
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considered most effective was by lobbying peacefully and
forcefully.
Many generals and officers went to their state's
executives and legislative bodies to personally plea for
assistance or to present petitions on behalf of their
10 7soldiers and themselves. For example, during the late
summer of 1779, General Paterson and Colonel Tupper left
their Highlands camp to visit the General Court of Massa-
chusetts on behalf of their officers. The next year,
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Ward appeared before Rhode
Island's General Assembly and Colonel Marinus Willett and
other officers went to the New York state legislature to
10 9lobby on behalf of their respective line's officers.
Also in 1780, Heath went to the Massachusetts General Court
to lobby on behalf of the officers and that year and the
107Samuel H. Parsons to George Washington, June 26,
1781, Hall, Samuel Holden Parsons, pp. 370-371; Louis
Gottschalk
,
Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolu -
tion, p. 193; Hugh Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals ,
p. 36 6; NHHSC , 7:250.
"
10 8William B. Weeden, "Diary of Enos Hitchcock, DD.
,
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new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 212, 214.
""^^John Ward, "Lieut . -Colonel Samuel Ward, of the
Revolutionary War," NYGBR 6, no. 3 (July 1875): 122; After
Brigade Orders, September 18, 1780, Lauber, Orderly Books,
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Marinus Willett, Nicholas Fish, and Thos. Machin to George
Clinton
,
September 12, 1780, ibid., 216-217.
663
next Knox personally lobbied with the legislatures of
several of the New England states. And the Pennsylvania
Line sent three colonels to Philadelphia to lobby the legis-
lature on behalf of the officers.^ Some officers, unable
to personally lobby their state legislatures, frequently
sent memorials and petitions to them.^^^ Others wrote
''"''"'^William Heath to the Massachusetts Council
March 3, 1780, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:43; William Heath to ' the
Massachusetts General Assembly, April 7, 1780, ibid., 51-54;
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36; Same to same, March 27, 1780, ibid., 38; George
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directly to the legislatures or councils. During the
critical period, soi.e officers wrote state executives,
hoping they could use their influence with the state legis-
latures to make immediate and future provisions for the
officers and their qnl H i f^r-c -'-^^ n -u •rn so diers. Washington, besides sending
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circulars to the states, wrote personal letters to the chief
executives, asking them to help their states comply with
past promises, as well as to encourage them to have their
states adopt new provisions for the officers and soldiers
of their respective state 1 ines . "'""''^
Washington continually wrote Congress about the
116plight of the army. So did his generals, often in the
form of a memorial or petition
.
"^-^"^
Others wrote to indivi-
dual members of Congress, hoping they could influence their
Joseph Reed, November 19, 1780, Moore, Anthony Wayne,
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colleagues to support the army.^^^ And some, like Lafayette
and McDougall, did not hesitate visiting Congress to person-
ally plea on behalf of their officers and soldiers . "'^
These lobbying efforts not only had the effect of
keeping the army's dissatisfaction within peaceful bounds,
but also made the civilian leaders realize that something
needed to be done for the military, before the military took
matters into their own hands. Having the same effect on the
civilian leaders was the large number of desertions and
officer resignations during the critical period.
During 1780 and 1781, the desertion rate was very
high."'^^^ Numerous officers resigned during the summer and
118Alexander Scanmiell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2,
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121fall of 1779. The winter of 1779-1780 took its toll on
the officers. Rather than suffer in poverty and nakedness,
or continue to listen to complaints from their families and
soldiers, many officers resigned before the spring.
number of resignations declined somewhat during the summer,
but nevertheless, Washington reported during October that
160 officers had resigned since January. These desertions
and resignations served somewhat as a safety valve, as many
of the discontented in the army departed. They also served
to show the civilian leaders that they must do something for
the present state of the army, as well as to make provisions
for the future veterans.
121William B. Weeden, "Diary of Enos Hitchcock; D.D.,
A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP,
new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 185; Enos Hitchcock to [Captain '
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William Woodford
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122 Samuel H. Parsons to John Jay, May 30, 1780, Hall,
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March 31, 1780, MHSC , 7th ser., 5:44; Thacher, Military
Journal of the American Revolution, pp. 194-195; Letter of
resignation , dated February 1, 1780, and addressed to General
George Washington in Hastings, Public Papers of George
Clinton, 5:478-480; Michael Jackson to William Heath,
April 13, 1780, Ryan, A Salute to Courage
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Many civilian leaders agreed with Oliver Wolcott
that "To pay and Provide for the Army ought certainly to be
the primary Objects in every Deliberate Council." Fearing
the consequence of not making such provisions, James Lovell
wrote they must get money to the army so as to "prevent
stupid plans of creating absolute Dictators to get supplies
without paying for them.""'"^'^
Congress and the states frequently responded to the
pleas for helping the officers and soldiers, and improved
their own affairs, so the army would not have to intercede.
With respect to the latter. Congress certainly improved
itself. The critical period caused many leaders to realize
that Congress had to have more power, and many of those once
leery about giving Congress too much power were now willing
to do so. This was especially true after the January 1781
^ • • 125 ^ . ^ ^mutinies. During February, Congress established a
Department of Finance and elected Robert Morris its
Superintendent. Morris accepted the position that summer
after obtaining from Congress almost unlimited control over
124 Oliver Wolcott to Tapping Reeve, January 16, 1781,
Burnett, LMCC, 5:537; James Lovell to Samuel Holten, Septem-
ber 5, 1780, ibid., 363; see also Pierre Van Cortlandt to
Philip Van Cortlandt, February 8, 1780, Judd, Memoir and
Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt, p. 146.
125 John Sullivan to George Washington, January 29,
1781, Burnett, LMCC, 5:548; James Duane to George Washington,
January 29, 1781, ibid., 551.
the expenditure of public monies. ^^6 with the support of
Congress, Morris set about to increase and expend the
public revenue in the most frugal, fair, and honest manner
possible. In May, at his prompting, Congress authorized a
national bank, believing it would revive public credit . "'^'^
That summer. Congress placed in Morris's hands all the
monies borrowed from France; gave him authority to import
and export goods on the account of the United States; placed
the Marine Department under his control; allowed him to
replace the specific supply system with a contract system,
as well as the authority to secure and dispose of any speci-
fic supplies; and granted him other economic powers. "^^^
During the summer and fall, Morris worked diligently
to meet the needs of the army, particularly their pay.
Helping in this regard v/as the arrival of the French loan.
This hard money not only paid the army a small portion of
the monies due them, but also provided the capital for the
Bank of North TVmerica which was chartered by Congress on
12 6 Young, Robert Morris
, p. 92; Jennings B. Sanders,
Evolution of the Executive Depa rtments of the Cont inental
Congress7'l7 74-1789 , pp. 128-173 2 .
12 7 Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, May 17, 1781, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris ,
1:66, Ford, JCC, 20:545-548.
'"^^Ibid., 19:290-291
,
180, 4 32-433 ; 2-:545-54 8 ,
597-598, 721, 723, 724-725, 734; 21:813-814, 908, 943,
954-955, 1024-1025, 1027, 1062, 1068, 1070, 1135, 1149-1150.
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the last day of 1781, and opened its doors for business
during January 1782. This quasi-public institution began
loaning the government money in anticipation of revenue and
was, because of Morris's solid reputation and prospect of
high dividends, able to attract merchants to invest in its
129
stock. Morris was successful in reducing the cost of
operating the government, and making it more efficient. He
also helped the financial state of the government by trans-
ferring his ovm money to the government and issuing money
1^0
under his own name.
Congress did not sit still and expect Morris alone
to solve all their problems. They also took actions and
adopted measures to improve their operations and the Conti-
nental finances, realizing that an effective Congress and
adequate funds would inevitably result in the improved
131condition of the army. In February 1781, Congress asked
for an impost on all goods imported into the states, with
129
Ibid., 1186-1190 ; Young, Robert Morris
, pp. 95,
98; Lawrence Lewis, Jr., A History of the Bank of North
America, the first Bank Chartered in the United States~
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company, 1882) pp. 27-
30, 32-34, 35, 36, 37.
130Young, Robert Morris
, pp. 137, 139-140; Ver Steeg,
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, p. 87; Robert Morris to Benjamin Harrison,
January 15, 1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris , 4:46.
131 Joseph Jones to George Washington, October [2],
1780, Burnett, LMCC, 5:396; Thomas McKean to Samuel Adams,
August 6, 1782, ibid., 6:430; Herbert James Henderson,
Party Politics in the Continental Congress, p. 181.
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the revenue raised to be applied to discharging the princi-
pal and interest of debts arising from the war. Two months
later Congress devalued the Continental money, and later
that year abandoned the paper money program and asked the
states to repeal all laws making any kind of bills a legal
tender. Also, because the monies had depreciated so badly,
Congress, to help calculate the debt and help people holding
the worthless money, urged the states to set up tables of
depreciation. Most did so during 1781. Early in 1781,
Congress created executive departments for marine and war,
as well as for finance; and, with Morris's help, they
reorganized the medical and treasury departments, and con-
solidated the clothier general's department. Realizing the
seriousness of the times. Congress, although opposed to
impressing and having only authorized it infrequently
earlier in the war, now felt compelled to make such author-
132izations.
The states also became actively involved in
authorizing impressing, and in a few instances, even
133
authorized the military to plunder. The states did more
Ford, JCC, 17:758-759; 18:1157-1164; 19:102-103,
110-113, 126, 225; 20:501, 516, 555-556, 598; Ralph Volney
Harlow, "Aspects of Revolutionary F'inance, 1775-1783," AHR
35, no. 1 (October 1929): 62, 64, 64n.75.
Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during the
American Revolution," Vera Largent, ed.. The Walter Cl inton
Jackson Essays in the Soci al Sc iences by members of the
Woman
'
s College of the Un iversity of North Caroli na (Chapel
Hill: University of^North Carolina Press, 1942), pp. 99-109;
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than just authorize impressing and plundering to help the
army. Pennsylvania authorized Robert Norris, already the
Superintendent of Finance, to use their monies to procure
specific supplies for the Continental Army.134
^^^^
also helped by the fact that some states, particularly those
no longer actively battlegrounds, improved both politically
and economically during the 1779-1781 per iod . "'^
Realizing the importance of mutual cooperation, and
prompted by political expediency, the states during this
period increasingly took a Continental position. During
1780, New York ceded her western land claims and Virginia
did so the following year. These actions, as well as
Robert D. Bass, Gamecock: Life and Campaians of GeneralThomas Sumter
,
ppT 144-146 . ' ' ' ~
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, 2 vols . (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institu-
tion of Washington, 1933), 2:589, Table 16; P. E. Du
Simitiere to George Clinton, May 15, 1781, Hastings, Public
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because of diplomatic and military pressures, prompted
Maryland to ratify the Articles of Confederation early in
1781. These actions had a positive influence on the
army, as they must have believed that they were indeed
fighting a continental war for a nation's independence. As
will be discussed later in this chapter, the Continental
outlook with respect to the western lands was a very import-
ant factor in the army's mind, as they were fighting for
their own stake in society in many respects, for a piece
of land.
Help for the army not only came from the governments,
it also came from private citizens, in the form of loans and
voluntary contributions, and from some military officers,
who supplied their soldiers from their own funds. ^^"^
136^ ,Ford, JCC, 17:806-807; 18:915-916; 19-208-Herbert James Henderson, Party_Politic^^ ContinentalCongress
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, p. 171; James McHenry to Nathanael" '
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Jolin Adams did not. fear a mi 1 i l .n y innip 1 od l)y n
general as he believed "It was not
.» i i .u'Iu.umi i. lo m.-n
, but
to n cAur.r, wh\rh i-kmIimnmI,
.,ih1 has supported, I he revolu-
\\nn; \\ w.in not at I .u'luu(M^t to officers, l>iit to lilu-ity,
whirli mad(^ \ ho soldic^rs en 1 i 5; I . ^ Adams might also
nddtul lli.it I hc^ r.dlditMS wore fiiilil i lu] to nrol ,iiul (j.iin
r'^'P^'ily- 'I was cerUiinly cui imnoil.ml un; i dt m .d i on v^hon
it came to rewarding l he soldicM:;. IL was conj;i dc n^ii p( . 1 i ^
tic lo givc^ MiiMu i)roperty, in I lie foiiii of land, slaves,
material (](n)d:;, monetary bonuses, and pensions, as a means
of not only rewardiiuj Mkmh, hut al;;o (livinc] them a :d ala^ in
soci ly
,
somethi nq to f i (jh t lor, somei h i lu] to protect ,^ '^^'^
'r\\o mi 1 i Lary 1 (Mdd s co 1 t a i n I y ieved in ( lu^ nc^cess i ty
ol this.
Congress, seeincj the necessity, especially after
independence was declared, on SepteiTibei I ()
, 1776, provided
land bounties ranging from one lumdred acres for a or i vate
to f i ve hundrcvl acres for a colonel . Two days later , t he
bounty was extendt vl to 5':o1 d i (M^r. a 1 roady r^n 1 is ted in f lie .i rmy
,
•^^^John Adams lo Mr. c\ilkdon, OcLobur A\-2'/\, 1780,
Adams , Works of John Adams , 7:308.
139 Silas Deane to the Secret Committee of Congress,
October 1
,
1776, "The Deane Papers," NVllSC, 1 (MiH7): 293 .
"'^'^
^Alexander MoDomia 11 \ n [Nat lianat^l ] Ca (u-m^ ,
"'illAugust B, 1 780, I'oinstone CollecLion i!844; Arthur :d . el.
lo Joseph Reed, September 5, 1780, Rmilh, The St. Cl air
Papers , 1 : 52 3
.
and on the twentieth, as a means of keeping the soldiers
ties to the cause. Congress prohibited them from transfer-
ring the bounties during the war.-""^?-
The states, almost from the beginning of the war,
were rather generous in giving land bounties as a means of
not only recruiting, but giving those already enlisted a
stake in society; making them truly citizen-soldiers."^^^
During the war, eight states gave land to the soldiers,
often with the provision that it would be given at the end
of the war or the soldier's enlistment, provided he had not
been punished for plundering . "^"^ ^
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Most southern states provided slaves in addition to
other induceinents, hoping that by having slaves, the soldiers
would believe their status would be increased once their
military service was completed. Northern states, with no
slaves to give, joined the southern states in providing the
soldiers with other forms of property, such as confiscated
estates
.
Another important factor in controlling the army by
self-interest was by giving the officers a special stake in
the cause. This was done by granting them pensions, usually
in the form of half-pay for seven years or life. Many
believed that by granting such pensions the officer's commis-
sion would become more desirable, which would make for a
more disciplined officer corps, which in turn would result
144
Ibid., 2 32; Hening, The Statutes at Large, Being
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in a more disciplined army.^^^ Elbridge Gerry believed that
the pension system would "introduce that subordination to
civil authority which is necessary to produce an internal
security to liberty, and to the high officers of the mili-
tary department such authority as to enable them to
establish discipline, without which an army can be neither
14 7vigorous nor successful." Despite some opposition to a
pension system, which was not in keeping with republican
ideology, Congress, believing in the absolute necessity of
the measure, on May 15, 1778, granted half-pay for seven
years after the war to all line of ficers . "'"'^ ^
During the critical period, 1779-1781, realizing
something must be done for the army, five states extended
the promise of half-pay to life. Pennsylvania, during this
time, gave pensions to widows and exempted all lands given
to officers and soldiers from taxation. North Carolina also
146Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell, April 9, 1778,
Burnett, LMCC
,
3:162; James Lovell to Samuel Adam.s
,
December 20, 1777, ibid., 593-594.
14 7Elbridge Gerry to George Washington, January 13,
1778, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution , 2:67
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to James Warren, May 26, 1778, Gardiner, Warren-Gerry Corres-
pondence, p. 120; Henry Laurens to William Livingston,
April 19, 1778, Sedgwick, William Livingston , pp. 272-276;
Same to same. May 6, 1778, ibid., p. 284; Henry Laurens to
George Washington, May 5, 1778, Burnett, LMCC , 3:220-221;
Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington, and Oliver Wolcott to
Jonathan Trumbull, May 18, 1778, ibid., 255; James Lovell to
William Whipple, May 25, 1778, ibid., 262; William Ellery to
William Whipple, May 31, 1778, ibid., 270.
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gave a tax exempt status to land given to soldiers. Georgia
provided that soldiers be given a tax exempt status for ten
years after leaving military service. "^^^
Congress also realized they needed to make provisions
for the military during this critical period; or at least
encourage the states to do so. During the first part of
1779, Congress authorized special bonuses for soldiers who
had enlisted before that year, so they would not feel pen-
alized for having enlisted early in the war when bounties
were much smaller. That summer. Congress strongly urged
the states to extend half-pay to life; provided to pay up
deficiencies of food and clothing in cash; provided for
pensions for orphans and widows; and increased the pay of
officers. During the latter part of the year. Congress made
149Alexander Scammell to Nathaniel Peabody, April 2,
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Otho Holland Williams Papers in the Mary land Historical
Society
, p. 12; Arthur St. Clair to Joseph Reed, March 6,
1779, Smith, The St. Clair Papers
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1:462-466, 464n.5; Stille,
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, pp. 65, 165; Clark, NCSR , 14:301-302, 335;
Christopher Ward, The Delaware Continentals 1 776-1783,
pp. 285-286; Saffell, Records of the Re volutionary War
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p . 50 8; Minutes of the Counci l of the Delav/are State, from
1776 to 1792
, pp. 4 34-4 36; Chandler, Revolutionary Records
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,
2:73-74; Wm. H. Glasson [ed. by David Kinley]
,
Federal Military Pension s in the United States (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 18.
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attempts to make up arrears in pay and to provide for
depreciation losses. The following year, Congress promised
to make up all depreciation losses and adopted a scale of
depreciation allowances. On August 12, 1780, Congress
increased the land bounties for generals and recommended to
the states they make up compensation to the officers and
soldiers for the depreciation losses they had incurred, as
well as to pay their respective lines for arrears of pay for
the period before August 1, 1780. Later that summer. Con-
gress extended half-pay for seven years to orphans and
widows, repealed a restricting clause prohibiting half-pay
officers from holding public office, provided for the half
pay of the general officers to be in proportion to their
pay, and provided for hospital officers to receive land
, ^. 150bounties
.
Probably the most important provision made by
Congress for the officers during 1780 was to extend half-pay
from seven years to life. Late in August, and again early
in October, Washington told Congress that the most politic
150
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and effective thing they could do would be to grant half
pay for life. Hamilton, early in September, wrote a member
of Congress that granting half pay for life "would be a
great stroke of policy, and would give Congress a stronger
tie upon them than anything else they can do."^^^ Although
some members of Congress believed that half pay for life
would create a pensioner class, and thus was "inconsistent
with the genious & spirit of our constitution," as one
member of Congress wrote, most members of Congress saw the
absolute necessity of granting half pay for life; as a means
of retaining their officer corps, and thereby ensuring the
continued discipline, as well as the existence of the army."^^^
On October 21, 1780, by a substantial majority, half pay for
life was voted for company and field grade officers. The
following month, it was extended to generals; in January
1781, to officers of the medical department; and in May 1781,
to chaplains.
With the army relatively passive after the mutinies
of January 1781, Congress made fewer provisions for them."''^'^
''"^''"George Washington to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, August 20, 1780, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
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But Congress frequently called upon the states to make up
depreciation and pay owed the army. with respect to the
latter, the states were quite dilatory in complying
.
But the states were not inactive in making other provisions
for the officers and soldiers.
To keep the military calm during the critical period,
the states frequently voted special one-time monetary grants
to their officers and/or soldiers. Most often the money and
other material goods were to be given the military at the
end of the war. However, often seeing the immediate need
to get the money in the military's hands, the states sent
1 S fi
specie to camp.
The states, especially toward the end of the war,
made numerous attempts to settle the depreciation problem of
their soldiers, by establishing depreciation tables and
155
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making promises to make good the depreciation
.
The most important provision the states made for
recruiting and rewarding their veterans during this period
was the granting of land bonuses, including increasing
previous grants of land. The southern states were particu-
larly generous during this time as their states were the
ones most involved in the fighting, and needed the support
of the military more than ever. In most instances, the land
was not to be given until the end of the war, thereby ensur-
ing, supposedly, the good behavior of the military.
157^
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To demonstrate that their promises of land would be
fulfilled, several states during this critical period set
aside land to be given to the soldiers . ""^
Another way by which the military wore tied to the
civilian institutions and kept under control was by the
civilian governments and institutions recognizing and reward
ing them for their bravery and fidelity. This was done in
the form of presentations of medals, swords and horses;
granting honorary degrees; erection of monuments; naming
geographical areas for them; and giving them individual
grants of land and money. This was especially true during
this critical period.
Early in the war, Greene wrote John Adams that
giving the military medals was a great idea, especially
since they did not cost much to produce and "They will also
serve to fix the honors of the Army, dependent upon the
dignity of Congress; and I conceive it an object of great
importance to unite the wishes of the army with the views
16 0
of Congress." Congress, agreeing, during the war
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160Nathanael Greene to John Adams, May 2, 1777,
Bernhard Knollenberg, [ed.], "The Revolutionary
Correspondence of Nathanael Greene and John Adams," RIH
no. 2 (April 1942) : 50 .
nulhorized eleven different medals for thirteen indivi-
duals. They also voted swords, horses, and stands of
colors to nuuKM-ous officers and ,n,l],orized monuments for
several fallcMi lieroes.^^^
The state governments also especially rewarded
individual members of the military. South e-.ioUna vottnl
Marion a medal; North Carolina voted Evan Shelby and Sevier
swords and pistols, and Klijah Claik (lurty thousand dollai.-,
Virqinia voted William Campbell a horse, rmnituK^, and a
sword; New Hampshire voted Joseph Cilley a pair of pistols;
and Georgia voted James Jackson a liouse . ''^^"^ The states also
rewarded individual officers with land.^^'^ The most gener-
ous grants were made by Georgia, which duriny the spring of
1782 granted Generals Greene and Wayne two-thousand acre
plantations; by South Carolina, which voted Greene an estate
plus slaves; and by North Carolina, which voted him 25,000
161
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164 Chandler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia, 3:116.
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acres; and by Virginia, which granted Gates 17,000 acres.
Geographical areas were also named after military leaders.
North Carolina, for example, named counties after Generals
Wayne, Lincoln, and Gates, in 1779, and Greene and Davidson
in 1783.^^^
Throughout the war. Congress never really gave
Washington symbolic or personal awards or gifts. During
1779, they gave him a suit of clothes and after Yorktown
they voted him a stand of colors. At war's end, they pro-
vided for an equestrain statue of him to be located at the
16 7seat of government. The state governments were somewhat
more generous. Virginia, during 1778, presented him with
four geldings. Pennsylvania in 1779, and Maryland in 1781,
commissioned Charles Wilson Peale to paint portraits of
Washington for their respective legislative chambers . "'"^^
"""^^Ibid., 108-109
,
109
,
171; Johnson, Na_thanael
Greene
, p. 400; Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates:
A Biography
, pp. 283-284.
166Wheeler, His torical Sketches of North Carolina,
2 : 159 , 225 , 454 ; Samuel Cole Wi 11 iams ,~~Tennessee~~During the
Revoluti onary War
, pp. 232-233, 233; ClarkTHNCSR
,
1974237;
24:569.
'"^'^Ford, JCC, 21:1081; 24:494-495 ; George
Washington to Samuel Griffin, November 6, 1779, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington , 17:80.
16 8 George Washington to Benjamin Harrison,
December 18, 1778, ibid., 13:422-423; The Penn sylvania
Packet, and Daily Advertiser
,
August 26, 1780, Chastellux,
TravelT'ln North-America, 1:222-22 3; William S. Baker, "The
History of a Rare Washington Print," Pni|B 13, no. 3 (1889):
257-258, 260, 262; Thomas Sim Lee to Charles Wilson Peale,
December 7, 1783, Helen Lee Peabody, "Revolutionary Mail Bag
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Virginia, early in the war, named a county for Washington
.
Civilian institutions also made acknowledgements of Washing-
ton's efforts. Several schools gave him honorary degrees.
And during 1782, a college was even named after him.^^°
By continuing to make the army feel a part of
civilian society, by giving them a stake in society, the
civilian leaders were able to keep the army from turning
against the existing political and social structure. But
there were several other factors which kept the army from
becoming the source of military tyranny. Many of these have
been discussed in earlier chapters. And in this chapter we
have seen the various means and factors by which the army
kept itself from turning on the civilian governments and
the civilians were able to prevent a military coup. Perhaps
the most important factor was that the army, for the most
part, did not desire a military tyranny of any form for even
a short period of time. Often the opportunity was there for
Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Correspondence, 1779-1782," MHM
50, no. 2 (July 1955): 104.
169
Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest
Virginia 1746-1786, Washington County 1777-1T70
, p. 254
.
170George Washington to Ezra Stiles, May 15, 1781,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of VJashington
,
22:90, George
Washington to William Smith, August 18, 1782, ibid.,
25:37-38; George VJashington to the Trustees of the Univer-
sity of the State of Pennsylvania, [December 13, 1783],
ibid., 27:267-268.
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the military to directly involve themselves in the political
process, but as we have seen, the military did not desire to
intervene. This was especially true during the 1779-1781
critical period.
As we will see in the next chapter, the opportunity
for military tyranny again was present during the winter of
1782-1783 and the following spring. But, as before, the
military did not take matters into their own hands, despite
a greater desire by some civilians for them to do so.
CHAPTER XI
THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP TESTED
1782-1783
With Yorktown behind them, most Americans believed
the war had been won, and that it was only a matter of time
until a peace treaty was signed and ratified, and the army
disbanded. Therefore, they turned their attention away
from the war and the army, and only thought of domestic
concerns as a free and independent people.
For the most part, the military shared the same
beliefs about the peace and disbanding, hoping that both
would soon take place. They desired, however, to be
properly compensated before disbanding, or at least
guaranteed they would be in the not-so-distant future. As
we will see in this and the following chapter, the military
became upset with their civilian brethren the last year of
the war because it appeared they would not be compensated
before they were disbanded; nor would they obtain everything
that was due them once they were home. This situation, as
we will see, created the conditions whereby the civil-
military relationship was greatly tested during the last
year of the war. And tested it was, as some civilian and
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military leaders attempted to use the discontent in the army
to further certain political aims. That the discontent did
not develop into mutiny or some form of military tyranny,
was the result of numerous factors, which will be discussed
in this and the last chapter.
The army was pleased with the money they had received
from Robert Morris during the fall of 1781, particularly
since it was in the form of hard specie.^ Not all the mili-
tary, however, got paid, nor were the amounts received
enough to offset the large amounts owed to the officers.^
In December, Glover complained that he had not been paid in
over two years. Another officer early in 1782 complained
that he had received only $120 since January 1780. Also,
"'"William Popham to George Clinton, September 8, 1781,
Henry P. Johnston, The Yorktown Campaign and the Surrender
of Cornwallis 1781
,
appendix 5, p. 1747 Enos Reeves to 1 ' ],October 4, 1781, John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-
Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves of the Pennsylvania Line "
PMHB 21, no. 2 (1897): 237.
2 Robert Wharry to Reading Beatty, January 5, 1792,
Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., [ed.], "Letters from Continental
Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," ibid., 54,
no. 2 (1930) : 163; William Allen to Theodore Foster,
DecemJDer 15, 1781, RIHSC, 6 (1897): 291; Oliver Rice to
Jonathan Rice, March 9, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1206;
Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 9, 1782,
Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1) ; Nathanael Greene to the President of
the Continental Congress, March 9, 1782, Edward McCrady,
The History of South Carolina in the Revolut ion 1780-1783,
p. 615; John Lamb and Ebenezer Stevens to Ge^ge~Washington
,
February 12, 1782, Ryan, A Salute to Courage, pp. 255-256.
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early in 1782, McDougall complained that he had only been
paid twice since 1775, and was owed about seven thousand
3dollars
.
Throughout 1782, financial problems continued to
plague the officers, and by the fall many had been driven
to despair and poverty/ St. Clair complained that he was
not the "master of one single shilling." "i am," he wrote
Washington, "in debt, and my credit exhausted, and, were
it not for the rations I receive, my family would actually
5
starve." One officer wrote his brother during November
3John Glover to Benjamin Lincoln, December 11, 1781,
"Letter of General John Glover," HCEI 36, no. 1 (January
1900): 39; Stephen Abbott to Joshua Ward, February 12, 1782,
"Revolutionary Letter Written by Ma j . Stephen Abbott," ibid!,
38, no. 2 (January 1902): 54; Alexander McDougall to George
Clinton, March 28, 1782, Champagne, Alexander McDougall,
pp. 182-183.
4Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, July 17, 1782,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); Henry
Knox to [ ], October 8, 1782, Revolutionary War Collec-
tion, BPL; Silas Goodell to Joshua Huntington, November 11,
1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC 20 (1923): 166, Samuel
Shaw to Mr. Shaw, November 13, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw
,
p. 98; George Washington to James McHenry, October 23, 1782,
Fitzpatrick, Writings o f Washington
,
25:285; George
Washington to John Armstrong, Sr
. ,
January 10, 1783, ibid.,
26:26; George Washington to the Secretary at War, October 2,
1782, ibid., 25:227-228; Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew
Huntington, December 9, 1782, Blanchfield, Letters Written
by Ebenezer Huntington
, p. 102; George Athan Billias,
General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners
, pp. 190-191.
5Arthur St. Clair to George Washington, November 26,
1782, Smith, The St. Clair Papers, 1:572.
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that he was "entirely destitute of money. This same
officer, receiving his discharge that December, wrote that
he was now a "private gentleman, 'gentleman indeed,' desti-
tute of 'money' 'Horse' or anything that this World calls
Valuable- [.] Another officer that fall wrote "To enter
into a detail of my circumstances would not be entertaining
to you, and must be painful to myself."^ Especially when
payment had been promised so often it was particularly
upsetting to the military not to be paid.^
The military were not only upset because they did
not get paid, but also .because it appeared they would not
be fully compensated until Congress and the states resolved
their differences with respect to whose responsibility it
was to pay them, as well as provide their pensions."*"^ And
^Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, November 15, 1782,
Feinstone Collection #1208; see also Same to same,
October 23, 1782, ibid., #1207.
7Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, December 25, 1782,
ibid., #1209.
g Robert Gamble to Peter Muhlenberg, November 1, 1782,
"Correspondence of Col. James Wood," TQHGM 3, no. 1 (July
1921) : 37 .
9 .William Heath to George Washington, March 13, 1782,
MHSC , 7th ser., 5:354; William North to Baron von Steuben,
October 29 , 178 2
,
Kapp, Steuben
, p. 50 3; Baron von Steuben
to Benjamin Walker, December 27, (1782), "Notes and Queries,"
PMHB 42, no. 3 (1923): 278.
"'^Benjamin Lincoln to Artemas Ward, Septem.ber 13,
1782, Artemas Ward Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3); Alexan-
der McDougall and Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 7,
178 3 , Burnett, LMCC, 7:35-36n.3.
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it appeared that the differences would not be expeditiously
resolved. Initially, Morris refused to pay the army on the
grounds it was a state responsibility and thus had to come
out of Continental requisitions. Consequently, the army
received only a little over $500,000 from the central
government during 1781 and 1782, an amount less than two
months' pay. When the states attempted to pay their soldiers
directly, Morris and Congress informed them these monies
would not be counted toward their Continental requisitions.^^
Doubtless many in the military approved this, particularly
those officers attached to independent commands who were not
paid by a particular state. And undoubtedly many New
England officers favored Continental funding of their
pensions, knowing their own states' opposition to pensions.''"^
Some officers, of course, did not care who paid them, as
long as they got paid, and it appeared they were more likely
Ferguson, Papers o f Robert Morris, l:176n.2; Ford,
JCC, 24:206-210; 23:630-6 31; Robert Morris to Nathanael
Greene, April 24, 1782, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence
,
5:328; Robert Morris to the Governor of
Rhode Island, June 26, 1782, ibid., 524; Robert Morris to
William Livingston, July 29, 1782, Selection s from, the
Correspondence of the Executive of New Je rsey7 fr6iTrT776 to
1786
,
p. 318.
12Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias
Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The
St. Clair Papers , 1 : 576 ; Alexander Ham.ilton to George
Washington
,
[April 8, 1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, 3:320; Herbert James Henderson, Party Politics
in the Continental Congress, p. 331.
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Many officers were also quite upset with Congress
and the confederation system itself."*"^ With respect to
Congress, the small attendance by its members was, for Knox,
"a good proof of the badness of the present Constitution.""^'^
One officer complained early in 1783 that Congress was "weak
1 8
as water and impotent as old age." Another officer
com.plained that, although his soldiers have confidence in
their officers and Washington, they had "not the least
19confidence in the government- [.]
"
This lack of confidence in government also applied
to the state governments, with whom the army became
increasingly dissatisfied the last years of the war. Most
of the reasons related to the inability or lack of desire
of the state governments to directly support the army or
to indirectly support them, by failing to support Congres-
20
sional requisitions. Rhode Island ' s objection to half-pay
General Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall,
John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, December [ ], 1782,
Smith, The S t. Clair Papers , 1:575.
1 7Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, March 3, 1783,
Drake, Henry Knox , p. 79.
John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, May 9,
1783, Burnett, LMCC , 7:160n.3.
'"^Charles Armand-Tuf f in to George Washington,
September 10, 1782, NYHSC , 11 (1879): 350.
^^Otho Holland Williams to Thomas Sim Lee, July 7,
1782
,
Scharf, Hi_story_of Maryland, 2 : 486-487 ; Benjamin
Harrison to the President of the Continental Congress,
January 21, 1782, Elizabeth Cometti, "Impressment during
the A-merican Revolution," Vera Largent, ed., The_Walter
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pensions and its failure to adopt the in^post elicited strong
opposition fror. the military. ^1 Washington complained early
in 1783 that the states seemed perfectly indifferent to the
cries of the army and late that spring a young officer
complained the states were "obdurate and forgetful . "^^
Besides being upset with the Congress and the states,
the military were particularly upset with the American
people. As one officer observed, "I think with you that
every honest good citizen are our friends, but the honest
and good compose but a very small part of the world at this
23day." Most Americans appeared to the military to be too
Clinton Jackson Es says in the Soc ia l Sciences by members of
the Woman's College of the Universi ty
_of_NoFth~CaroTIn"a~
"
3: 316, 32 3; Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:3To", 3T57'~DavTd
Jones to Anthony Wayne, December 25, 1781, Stilled Anthony
Wayne, p. 2 85 ; Nathanael Greene to Joseph Reed, ApriT^37~
1783, Reed, Joseph Reed
,
2:395; Nathanael Greene to Benjamin
Lincoln, February 6, 1782, Harry M. Ward, The Department of
War, 1 781 -1795
, p. 25; George V7ashington to James~McHenry
,
October 23, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
25:289.
21Caleb Gibbs to Henry Knox, July 13, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #13) ; George Washington to
Benjamin Harrison, March 4, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington
,
26:184 ; James Madison's "Notes on Debate¥7^^
Hutchinson
,
Papers of James Mad i son
,
6:31-34.
22George Washington to John Armstrong, Sr.,
January 10, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
26:26; John Arstrong to Horatio Gates, May 9 , 17 8 3, Burnett,
LMCC, 7:160n.3.
2 3 [Joseph] Wright to Samuel B. Webb, February 28,
1783, Ford, Samuel Blachley Webb, 3:4.
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self-interested, more concerned about their own well-being
than that of the military
.
The civilian leaders feared this would happen; that
revolutionary virtue would turn to materialistic vice. John
Warren, in his July 4, 1783, oration, warned that peace and
tranquility at war's end was bringing with it a time of
great danger as virtue may be given over to luxury and cor-
ruption. Fearing this had happened, the Reverend Oakes Shaw
of Barnstable, Massachusetts, told his congregation on
April 25, 1782, that the Revolution had been a moral failure,
for it had brought vice and iniquity into the land.^^
Self-interest, corruption, and vice were indeed
abundant in the land the last years of the war, as the
business of the country shifted from supporting the war and
2 6the army, to business itself. Also abounding in the
24 Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, March 9,
1782, Nathanael Greene Papers, Nathanael Greene Letterbook,
LC (Microfilm Reel #1) ; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot,
December 22, 1782, Quincy, Samuel Shaw
, p. 101.
25Gordon Wood, ed.. The Rising Glory of America
1760-1820
, p. 67; Lemuel Shaw Papers, MHS .
'
26Mercy Warren to Wmslow Warren, December 18
, 1782
,
Mercy Warren Letterbook, Mercy Warren Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, July 10,
1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL: James Manning to John
Ryland, November 8, 178 3, Reuben Aldridge Guild, Life, Times,
and Correspondence of James Manning, and the Ea rly History of
Brown University (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1864), pp. 308-
309; Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry, September 9, 1783,
Gushing, Writings of Samuel Adams, 4:286; Jacob E. Cooke,
Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early T^erican
History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1978), pp. 56-
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country was an interest in the western lands. Thus, the
last years of the war found many giving more attention to
moving west or profiting from the westward movement than to
the plight of the army.^^ aisq g^^^^ interest to the
civilians the last years of the war was their social life.
While the military barely survived during 1782 and 1783
,
Philadelphia took on a gay appearance with balls, theaters,
and new women's fashions capturing its citizens' attention.
When the military reminded the civilians, who were
now busy in their own pursuits, of the obligations to the
army, they were met often with indifference and, not infre-
quently, with contempt. The army, for many civilians, were
now considered, according to one officer, as the "Harpies &
Locusts of the Country." Indeed, for many T^ericans, the
60; John Beatty to Reading and Eurkies Beatty, July 16
, 1782
,
Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four Beatty Brothers
of the Continental Army, 1774-1794 ," PMHB 44, no. 3 (1920)-
229 .
27 .William Croghan to Michael Gratz, April 20, 1782,
Byars, B . and M. Gratz
, p. 208; John Neville to George
Rogers Clark, April 14, 1782, James, "George Rogers Clark
Papers 1781-1784," pp. 57-58.
2 8Jeremiah Wadsworth to Nathanael Greene, February 1,
178 3, Jeremiah VJadsworth Box , CSL : Lynn Montross , The Reluc-
tant Rebels : The Story of the Continental Congress 1774-1789
(New York: Harper and Brothers , Publishers
, 1950), p. 328;
Bonsai , When the French Were Here
, pp. 218-222 ; William S
.
Dye, "Pennsylvania VeTsus the Theatre," PMHB 55, no. 4
(1931): 360-361; J. Thomas Jable, "The Pennsylvania Sunday
Blue Laws of 1779: A View of Pennsylvania Society and Poli-
tics During the American Revolution , " PH 4 0 , no . 4 (October
1973) : 424 .
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army had become the last enemy to rid themselves of. As
the French minister observed, "No voice is raised in favor
? Q
of the army."
This indifference and contempt was of great concern
to the army, as they v/ere afraid they would be soon forgot-
ten and not provided for, once they were discharged
. They
were all too aware of the old refrain:
God and a Soldier all men doth adore
In time of War, and not before;
When the War is over, and all Things righted,
God is forgotten, and the Soldier slighted. 31
For officers visiting Philadelphia late in the war, this
seemed very true. Visiting that city during December 1781
29Eben[ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer
Huntington
, p. 106; Chevalier De la Luzerne to Comte de
Vergennes, August 4, 1783, William Emmett O'Donnell, The
Chevalier De la Luzerne: French Minister to the United
States 1779-1784
, p. 244. '
'
30Mercy Warren to Wmslow Warren, December 18
, 1782
,
Mercy Warren Letterbook, Mercy Warren Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #1); Anthony Wayne to Robert Morris, October 26, 1781,
Stille, Anthony Wayne
, p. 283; Walter Stev;art to Anthony
Wayne, December 24, 1781, ibid., p. 284; George Washington
to the President of the Continental Congress, May 10, 1782,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
24:243; Nathanael
Greene to [Daniel Morgan?] , October 9, 1782, "Notes and
Queries," PMHB 14, no. 1 (1890): 83-84; Joseph Orne to
Timothy Pickering, June [ ], 1782, Pickering, Timothy
Pickering, 1:365; William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair
,
April 17, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers , 1:582.
3
1
Malcolm Decker, Brink of Revolution: New York m
Crisis 1765-1776, p. 106; Mabel Lorenz Ives, V7ashing ton '
s
Headquarters (Upper Montclair, New Jersey: Lucy Fortune,
1932f, p. 300
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and seeing that nothing was being done for the military,
Chaplain David Jones observed "The old adage is true, 'Out
of sight out of mind.'" A little over a year later,
McDougall reported the people of Philadelphia had their
minds on two things, rejoicing at the news of peace and
hoping for profits; their concern for the army was mini-
32
mal
.
Some officers expected this attitude on the part of
the civilians. During late December 1782, St. Clair told
the army's committee to Congress that he had seen it written
somewhere that "kings may be ungrateful, but republics must
be." Similarly, Washington told General Putnam that ingrati-
tude seems common to republics.
Most officers, however, believed they were owed a
debt of gratitude, as well as the monetary debt by the
civilians. "It appears to me," Knox wrote the Secretary at
War, "to be highly reasonable that America, who under heaven
is indebted to the army for her existence." Samuel Shaw,
who had served since May 1775, wrote a civilian friend during
32
David Jones to Anthony Wayne, December 25, 1781,
Stille, TVnthony Wayne
, p. 285; Alexander McDougall to Henry
Knox, February 19, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #11)
.
3 3Arthur St. Clair to Alexander McDougall, Matthias
Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782, Smith, The
St. Cla ir Papers, 1:576; George Washington to Israel Tutnam,
June 2, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:462.
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May 1783, that many civilians "think the distinction of a
uniform coat and the spleandor of a military character a
sufficient compensation for the hardships and dangers it is
obliged to encounter." Shaw wrote, however, we do not
expect gratitude, "but we have a right to justice." simi-
larly, Washington sent a circular letter to the states a
month later explaining the officers deserve the half-pay
they had been promised, as it was a reasonable compensation,
and that it should not be seen in the odious light of a
34pension
.
The military were quite upset with the American
people as the war came to a close, learning that they v;ould
probably not be compensated and the fact that this did not
appear to bother the civilians; now that they were more
concerned about their own affairs than those of the army.^^
34 Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, August 19, 1782,
Callahan, Henry Knox
, p. 196; Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot,
May 3, 1783, Qumcy, Samuel Shaw, p. 107; Washington's
Circular of June 8, 1783, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of
VJashington
, 26 : 492 .
35George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, May 10, 1782, ibid., 24:243; Nathanael
Greene to John Barnwell, July 31, 1781, Johnson, Nathanael
Greene
,
2:351; John Beatty to Reading and Eurkies Beatty,
July 16, 1782, Joseph M. Beatty, Jr., "Letters of the Four
Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-1794," PMHB
44, no. 3 (1920): 229; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice,
November 15, 1782, Feinstone Collection #1208.
"The hour of danger is past, and avarice and meaness have
usurped the places of gratitude and justice/' Pickering
complained during May 1783.^^ Ebenezer and Jedediah
Huntington held similar feelings about the ;^jnerican people.
The former wrote that he hoped a return to a private life
"with all the care & Comfort, ... an ungrateful Countryman
will permit-[.]" A month later, September 1783, Ebenezer
Huntington wrote that he and Joshua Huntington would proba-
bly head west, "for we can not be very happy to continue
with a people who criminate us for making them free."
Jedediah Huntington, also in September, wrote that the value
of the commutation they expected to receive "bears no Proper
tion to a Sense of the Ingratitude of the People. ""^^
Despite the financial plight of the army, there was
little the civilian governments or populace could do to
support them; to a large extent as they had their own prob-
lems. Jeremiah Wadsworth observed late during 1782 that
Robert Morris was a good financier, "But he cannot create
3 8Money." This was true. For money, he had to rely on
3 6Timothy Pickering to Horatio Gates, May 28, 1783,
Pickering
,
Timothy Pickering
,
1:468; see also Timothy Picker
ing to [ "1 Pickering
,
September 22, 1782, ibid., 376.
37Eben [ezer] Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Letters Written by Ebenezer
Huntington
, p . 10 6; Same to same , September 2, 1782, ibid.,
p. 107; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington, Septem-
ber 3 , 1783 , *'The Huntington Papers," CHSC , 20 (1923): 465 .
3 8 Jeremiah Wadsvjorth to Nathanael Greene
,
December 12, 1782, Jeremiah Wadsworth Box, CSL.
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requisitions from the states. And they had little to give.
Between July 1781 and April 1782, he continually sent
circulars to the states, reminding them of the sad state of
the nation's finances, and the necessity of them complying
with congressional requisitions. These appeals fell on deaf
ears as, by the beginning of 1782
,
the civil departunents did
not have any money to pay their creditors. And, by March
1782
,
it became impossible to pay even the interest on the
loan office certificates. Late that month, Morris complained
that since his appointment the year before, he had not
received a single farthing from any state. Also upsetting
to Morris was his inability during 1782 to get Congress to
adopt various taxes to fund the public debt."^^
Continental finances continued to suffer into and
through 1783, as the states failed to meet their requisi-
40tions. The national debt was over $35 million as the year
began, and by March, Morris reported to Congress that there
39 Robert Morris Circulars, Ferguson, Papers of
Robert Morris, 1:305
,
380-383; 3:83-87; 4 : 191TT75-376 , 519-
520; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, February 11, 1782, ibid., 205-213; Robert Morris
to William Smallwood, March 28, 1782, ibid., 472-473;
Ephraim Blaine to Robert Morris, February 19, 1782, Ephraim
Blaine Papers, Letterbook, LC (Microfilm Reel #2); Bullock,
"The Finances of the United States from 1775 to 1789 ," p. 145;
Ford, JCC, 22:439; 23:545-546.
40 . ...Samuel Huntington and Benjamin Huntington to
Jonathan Trumbull, July 30, 178 3, HHSC, 7th ser., 3:437;
Lynn Montross, The Reluctant Rebels: The Story of the
Continental Conq¥ess'TTlA'-lT3 9~i~'pT''36'2'.
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could no longer be any doubt "that our public credit is
,.41gone . "
The states could do little to help Congress meet
its financial obligations during the last years of the war
as most were financially exhausted/^ The southern states
suffered in part because their wealth was tied up in slaves,
a cominodity that was not so easily converted into the sinews
of war. And, to make matters worse, many slaves were lost
4 3during the war. Southern trade was hurt by not only the
British army and navy, but by pirates operating out of St.
44Augustine. The northern states had their unique financial
problems, such as the illicit trade with New York City,
41Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 17, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence
, 6:309; Young, Robert Morris
, p . 14 2.
"
42 Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in
Congress, January 31, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison, 6:176; Stille, Anthony Wayne, p"! 287 ; Hugh F\
Rankin, The North Carolina Continen t a"ls
, p. 38 6 ; William H.
Masterson, William Blount, p. 65; Stephens, A History of
Georgia
,
2:336; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, April 12,
1782, Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris
,
4:564-565, 565.
4 3Benjamin Harrison to Nathanael Ggeene, January 21,
1782, Mcllwaine, Official Lette rs o f the Governors of
Virginia, 3:132; Benjamin Guerard to John Hancock,
October 6 , 1783, Feinstone Collection #438; Lewis Cecil Gray,
History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to
1860 , 2:59^
~
^'^Thad [deus] Kosciuszko to O[tho] H[olland] Williams,
February 11 , 178 3 , Ca_lendar of the General Otho Ho ll and
v:illiams Papers in tlTe" Maryland Histo r ical Society , p. 78.
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which drained off what little hard currency that existed/^
Internal problems also plagued the states the last
years of war. Besides the domestic war with the Tories,
other internal problems tore at the social, economic, and
political fabric of the states/^ Additionally, problems
continued to exist between and among the states during the
last years of the war, generally relating to boundary
1- ^ 47disputes
.
These domestic factors which prevented the states
and Congress from supporting the army were made perfectly
clear to the military during the fall of 1782 and the follow-
ing winter. Such civilian leaders as the Superintendent of
Finance and Secretary at War frequently informed the military
leaders of the inability of Congress to act on behalf of the
army, particularly with respect to pay and pensions. Morris,
45 John Taylor Oilman to Meshech VJeare, June 19, 1782,
Burnett, LMCC, 6:374; James Madison to Edmund Randolph,
June 18, 1782
,
ibid., 373.
4 6 Robert E. Moody, "Samuel Ely: Forerunner of Shays,"
NEQ 5, no. 1 (January 1932): 108-109; John Dickinson to [ ]
Finley
,
February 6, 178 3, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archive s, 1st
ser., 10:163-165; [ ] Finley to John Dickinson , April 28,
1783, ibid., 40-41; Same to same, March 18, 1783, ibid.,
41-44; W. S. Long, "Judge James Moore and Major James Moore,
of Chester County, Pennsylvania," PMHB 12, no. 4 (1888): 470.
^"^Adele Stanton Edwards, Journa_ls_of the Privy
Council 1783-1789, pp. 4, 9, 101-103, 107-110; William
irvine to George Washington, April 20, 1782, Sparks,
Correspondence of the Ainerican Revolution , 2:503, 504 ;
\^lTTaml:F6ghTn~to~Michael Gratz, April 20, 1782 , Byars, B.
and M. Gratz, p. 208.
705
in doing so, painted a bleak picture for the military and
the country. He wrote Washington in September 1782, that,
unless revenues were forthcoming, "I need not describe the
consequences." A month later, he wrote Washington that "if
the States cannot be prevailed on to make greater Exertions
if is difficult to forsee where the Thing is to terminate ." ^
^
During January and February, Morris and other nationalists
in Congress informed the army's committee to Congress of
the unlikelihood of the army being compensated, at least
until a nationalist funding system was established.^^ And
that was not likely.
Because of the poor condition of the army, and the
apparent inability or desire to help them, many officers
feared the army might turn on the civilians, as plunderers,
mutineers, or even worse, as an organized military tyranny.
4 8 Robert Morris to George Washington, September 9,
1782, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomat ic Correspondence , 5:
715; Same to same, October 15, 1782, Fitzpatrick^ Wri tings
of Washington, 25:231n.42; see also Benjamin Lincoln to
George Washington, October 13, 1782, ibid., 229n.38;
Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, December 3, 1782, Henry Knox
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^10).
4 9Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 8, 1783,
ibid., (Microfilm Reel trll) ; Alexander McDougall to Henry
Knox, February 19, 1783, ibid.,; Same to same, March 15,
1783, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #12).
5 0
Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris, April 23, 1782,
"Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC , 8 (1876): 502;
Nathanael Greene to Otho Holland Williams, June 6, 1782,
Reed, Joseph Reed , 2: Appendix, 470; Benjamin VJalker to Baron
von Steuben , November 20 , 17 82 , Kapp, Steuben , p. 501;
William Van Lear to Reading Beatty, June 9, 1782, "Letters
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"The patience and forbearance of the army," General Greene
wrote during the suiimier of 1782
, "under their sufferings,
have no equal; but, despair will, in time, break throuqh
the best disposition, all the force of discipline . "^^
Throughout the spring and summer of 1782, military officers
informed the civilian leaders of this potential explosive
situation, warning them of the dangers, and urging them to
^ . 52action
.
Such warnings continued throughout the fall and
winter, as the military officers informed their civilian
friends and the civilian leaders of the uneasiness of the
army and the possible consequences if the army was not
calmed by expeditious civilian action. During October,
Washington wrote Lincoln the "patience and long sufferance
from Continental Officers to Doctor Readina Beatty, 1781-
1788 ," PxMHB 54, no. 2 (1930): 168 .
51Nathanael Greene to General [John?] Barnwell,
July 31, 1782, Johnson, Nathanael Greene
, 2:351.
52Nathanael Geeene to Benjamin Harrison, April 22,
1782, Nathanael Greene Collection 58, WLCL; Nathanael Greene
to John Mathews, April 1, 1782, Greene, Nathanael Greene
,
3:488; Nathanael Greene to Robert Morris, January 24, 1782,
Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris
,
4:109; Nathanael Greene
to Benjamin Lincoln, March 9, 1782, Thayer, Nathanael Greene
,
p. 396; Also, O[thoi H[olland] Williams to T[homas] S[im]
Lee, July 7, 1782, Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society
, p. 67.
5 3 Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw
, p. 100; Arthur St. Clair to Thomas
Fitzsimmons, January 21, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers,
1:579.
of this Army are almost exhausted" and that there "never was
so great a spirit of Discontent as at this instant." He
believed that while in the field they could be kept under
control, but once in winter quarters, there could be bad
54consequences. During mid December, he warned one member
of Congress that the army had "become more irritable than at
any period since the commencement of the War."^^ A week
later, Knox wrote the Secretary at War that "The expectation
of the Army, from the drummer to the highest officer fare]
so keen for some pay, that I schudder at the idea of [them]
not receiving it."
Such warnings were also frequently made to members
of Congress by the army's committee to Congress during
January 1783. At one of their first meetings with members
of Congress, Colonel Brooks declared that "the temper of the
54 George Washington to the Secretary at War,
October 2
,
1782
,
Fitzpatrick, Wr^itij2g£_o^_W£sh^^ 25:230 .
55 George Washington to Joseph Jones, December 14,
1782, ibid., 430; see also George Washington to the
Superintendent of Finance, October 2, 1782, ibid., 230.
^^Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, December 20, 1782,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6); missing
portions provided from Knox's copy in his papers in the MHS
(Microfilm Reel #10) ; see also Henry Knox to the Hon. [ ]
esq., October 8, 1782, Revolutionary War Collection, BPL;
Copy of the same letter, addressed to John Lowell in Sidney
Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Pov;er: Economic Grievances of
the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution," BPLQ 3, no. 1
(January 1951): 31; Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln7
liovember 25
,
1782
,
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS (Jlicrofilm
Reel #6) .
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army was such that they did not reason or deliberate cooly
on consequences and therefore a disappointment might throw
them blindly into extremities." A week later, on the
thirteenth of January, Colonel Ogden told a congressional
committee that he would hate to go back to camp with news
that Congress was unable to do anything for them. He
explained the problem of maintaining discipline among the
soldiers was becoming more difficult and that the officers
were becoming more unruly themselves. Mutiny, he explained,
was a real possibility. McDougall and Brooks informed them
the officers were ready to resort to extreme measures.
Early in March, worried by the temper of the
officers, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., wrote his father that
"affairs are in a more critical situation, perhaps, than
they have been for some time." A week earlier, Knox wrote
the Secretary at War a private letter telling him of the
impatience of the army, stating
Let the public only comply v;ith their own promises,
and the Army will return to their respective homes,
the Lambs and Bees of the Community. But if they
should be disbanded previous to a Settlement, with-
out knowing who to look to, for an adjustment of
accounts and a responsibility of payment they will
be so deeply stung by the injustice and ingratitude
of their country as to become Tygers and wolves.
A little over a week later, after an anonymous letter was
circulated throuahout camp urging drastic action, Knox again
^'^Ford, JCC, 25:846-847, 850-853 ; James Madison's
"Notes on Debates," Papers of James Madison , 6:31-34.
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wrote Lincoln, explaining the impatience of the army had
turned to despair and urging Congress to act. Washington,
on the tv;elfth of March, wrote similar letters to two mem-
bers of Congress.
In the south, Greene informed the chief executive of
South Carolina that "Nothing short of permanent and certain
revenue can or will keep them subject to authority," refer-
ring to the army. lie explained that the northern army was
in a high state of discontent and that unless the states
acted to support Congress, there could only be bad conse-
59quences
.
Despite efforts to keep the army under control after
Yorktown, there v;ere many instances of lack of discipline on
the part of both the northern and southern armies during
1782 and 1783. In part, this was because many of the soldiers
6 0
were new recruits, not used to military discipline. It
was also the result of the lack of leadership in the army
5 P
Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr.,
March 10, 1783, MHSC , 7th ser., 3:405; Henry Knox to Benjamin
Lincoln, March 3, 1783, (copy), Henry Knox Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #11); Same to same, March 12, 1783, ibid.,
George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 12, 1783, Fitz-
patrick, Writings of Washing ton, 26:213-216; George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 12, 1783, ibid., 217.
^^General Nathanael Greene to [Benjamin] Guerard,
March 8, 1783, Nathanael Greene Papers (Read Collection),
1:27, WLCL.
^^David Richard Palm.er, TheJRi ver and the Rock
:
The Historv of Fortress V7est Point 17 75-178 3, p. 342 .
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at the end of the war, as many experienced officers had
retired or left active duty on extended furlough. Most
instances of undisciplined conduct on the part of the
soldiers was the result of inadequate supplies. During the
last years of the war, soldiers frequently plundered food-
stuffs and firewood, and sold their uniforms in order to
buy food and other needed supplies. ^"^
Lack of adequate supplies plagued the army during
1782 and 1783, as it had throughout the war. This was
especailly true of the southern army. Greene's army was
not that well fed, clothed, or housed during most of 1782.^^
6
1
General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing-
ton, 25:130; Jer. Clark to Henry Knox, October 16, 178"3',
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #14); General Orders,
Lauber, Orderly Books
, pp. 695, 702-703, 706, 732; Regimental
After Orders, ibid., p. 621; Acomb, Revolut ionary Journal of
Baron Ludwig von Closen, p. 259; Regimental" Orders,
January 13, 1783, Peter Casper Order Book, Special Collec-
tions, USMAL; Timothy Pickering to [ ] Pickering,
September 22, 1782, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:376;
D[ ] Brooks to David Humphreys, August 22, 1782, Humphreys,
Life and Times of David Humphreys, 1:248-249.
6 2Nathanael Greene to Jethro Sumner, February 2,
1783 [1782], Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene
Papers, LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Otho H. Williams to George
Washington, June 2, 1782, Calendar o f the General Otho
Holland Williams Papers in the Maryland Historical Society,
p. 65; Otho H.^Williams to Thomas Sim Lee, July 7, 1782^
Scharf
,
History of Maryland
,
2:486-487; Nathanael Greene to
John Mathews, April 1, 1782, Greene, Nathanael Greene
,
3:448;
Nathanael Greene to Otho H. Williams, June 6, 1782, Reed,
Joseph Reed , 2 : Appendix , 4 70; Same to same
,
September 7
,
1782 , ibid
. ,
Appendix , 4 72; Nathanael Greene to Clement
Biddle
,
September 1 , 1782 , ibid
.
, 38 0; Nathanael Greene to
Benjamin Harrison, April 22, 1782, Nathanael Green Collec-
tion, vol 58, WLCL; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris,
April 24, 1782, "Letters to General Lewis Morris," NYHSC,
8 (1876) : 502 ; Nathanael Greene to the President of 1:he
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This contributed to much sicknuss, inc]udinq Wayno nnd
Greene, who wore both quite ill for a period of time during
the summer of 1 782 . Tn all, some two hundred soldiers in
the south died f i-om sickness during 1782 .''^ Early that year,
r,roone described his army to Washington as "really deplor-
<ilxle." luilcM-, nnother officer informed liis brother that "The
troops are naked and discontented, ,ind ihc spirit of mutiny
and desertion prevails to a vory great degree. "^^
Continental Congress, March 9, 1782, Edward McCrady, The
History of South Carolina in the Revo lution 1780-17837^. 615;
Alexander Roxburgh to William Smallwood, May~31
, 17 82, Thomas'
Balch, ed.. Papers Rela t ing Chie fly to the Maryland Line
During the Revolution , p . 1 82 ; exander Dick toHBenyamTn
Harrison
,
June 18
, 1 782 , Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State
Papers
, p. 19 6; Jolin Bol field to Will i.im Davies, March "2T,~~
1782, ibid., p. 105; Churchill Jones to William Davies,
January 17, 1782, ibid., p. 30; William Ronald to Benjamin
Harrison, January 20, 1782, ibid., p. 39; Christian Febiger
to William Davies, January 23, 1782, ibid., p. 44; Same to
same, March 10, 1782, ibid., p. 94.
6 3Alexander Dick to William Davies, January 17, 1782,
ibid., p. 30; Christian FobiqtM- to VJilliam Davies, March 10,
1782
,
ibid., p. 94; Steward [John Stewart 1 to William Small-
wood, July 1 1 , 1782 , Thomas l^alch, od., Papers Relating
Chiefly to the Jiaryland Line During the Rel^lution, p. 186;
Alex a rTde r~ Roxbur gl^^^ IViTriTam Sma 1 Iwood , July 1 4, 1 782 , ibid.,
p. 187; Willi.iin McKennan to John Dickinson, July 8, 1 782 ,
Delaware Ai-cli i vi^n
,
1:132; Same to same, Aucnist 1 (> , 1.782,
Tbid . , 134 ; N<illianael Greono to [D.miol Mo tnaii 1 , October 9,
1782 , "Notes and Queries," I'MIM'. 14, no. 1 (1H90): 83;
[Nathanaol] Greene to [Otho llollandl Williams, Sc^ptembtM- 17,
1782 , Calendar of the General Otho Holland VVilli ams l\ip(M-s
in the Maryland Historical Society, p. 7"51 (Denny 1 , Mil it a ry
Journal
, pp. 47-48; Thayer, Nathanael Greene , pp. -lOd 1 OTi
6 4
Nathanael Greene to George Washington, M.n eh 9,
1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers,
LC (Microfilm Reel #1); Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob Morris,
April 24, 1782, "Letters to Geneial Lewis Morris," NYHSC, 8
(1876) : 502 .
712
AlLhoucjh .-uMuo officers and soldi, mt. believed that
force of arms could resolve their prol)l(Mns, most were will-
ing to lobby peacefully the civilian aulhoiities for rodress
of their grievances. Using tlu- tiaditional methods of
appeal, during 1 782 many officers instil ioncul I Ium r state
legislatures, chief exomlives, and civilian leaders for
redress of t lioir grievancos. Thoy did so individually and
as groups, in parson and by monu^-ial.^^ Many of i ho generals,
including McDougall and Otho llollaiui Williams, by lettor and
in person, contacted chief executives and state legislatures
about supporting their state's line, as well as themselves/'^'
Some officers left military service for positions in thoir
state legislaturos
,
in \ho belief ( lioy could directly influ-
ence the legislature to provide for the military/'^
6 5William Davios to the Governor in Council,
February 28, 1782, Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State
_Pagers
,
3:79-81; Journal of the House oT'Pelega tes of Vi rq i n i'a".
General Assemb 1 y_Bc g un ^qnd^ Ho 1den at the "Publ ic Hu iTd i n"g_s i
n
the" City "of RicHmond, on Monday the fif th "of " Ma"y7~in~rhe
year of our Lord One TFousan'^T'Seven Hundred an d Eiqh t y rh t ee
(n.p., n.d.), pp. 22-23, 39, 52; CommXssioners on Uoha 11 ol
the North Carolina Continental Line to the Genct .il A;-,;;oiiil)l y
,
[April 1783], James R. Morrill, The__P£actice and Poll tics of
l^'iat Finance: North Carolina in the" Co"n7e^l(M a l ic^n, 1 783-1789
(Chapel HiTl : University of North Carolina I'ress, 19 69)
,
pp. 58, 173n.9.
^^'Alexander McDouc|<il ] to ('(xucje Clinton, Majch 28,
1782, Champagne, Aloxandor McDougall, pp. 1H2-181; O[tho]
ll[olliUid] Williams to f c W n > i > ' 1 Wal'Jii nc 1 1 on , Juiu^ 2, 17»2,
Calendar of tlio General Otho llo 11 and Will i ams Papers in tlie
M^ylaTTd' Historical Society, p. 65; Ottho] iilolland] Willi. mis
to 'r[homa's] S[im] Lee, 'July 2, 1782 , ibid., p. 67.
6 7
Robert n. Bass, Gamecock; Life and Campaigns of
General Thomas Sumter, pp. 219-221.
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Probably the i.ost active line in petitioning their
legislature was that of Massachusetts, which had the largest
number of Continental officers. During the summer of 1782,
deciding that Congress would not be able to discharge the
obligations due them, they turned to their state legislature,
hoping thoy would discharge the half-pay debt, or at least
pay them a lump sum commutation. They did so knowing they
would be criticized by the nationalists, but they believed
if they could get the state legislature to act, that other
states, singularly, or in conjunction, would do likewise.
During July 1782, the officers of the Massachusetts
line drew up a petition calling upon the General Court of
their state to adjust their depreciation claims and table
of rations, and to make good on the depreciation of money
promised to the soldiers in lieu of clothing. They requested
the state send a committee to camp, with authority to adjust
claims and to give the officers interest-bearing certificates
for the amount due. They also asked the state to assume
their half-pay obligation, or give them a lump sum in commu-
tation. The petition indicated that if the state did not
6 9comply, they would make the request of Congress. The
petition, with a letter from General Knox to Governor
6 8 Benjamin Lincoln to Henry Knox, August 26, 1782,
Louis Clinton Hatch, The Adminis trat ion of the American
Revolutionary Army
, pp. 14 3-1-14.
69 . ...Petition in ibad., p, 144,
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Hancock, asking for his help, was carried to Boston by
Colonels Putnam, Brooks, and HulL^^ Before the legislative
committee to which it was referred could formulate a recom-
mendation, the legislature learned from one of the
Massachusetts delegates to Congress that Congress planned
to take up the question of half-pay early in January 1783.
That delegate, Samuel Osgood, informed them that although
Massachusetts might make a special provision for her own
officers, this would not free the state from its responsi-
bility for contributing to the half-pay for the officers of
the other states. Thus, the legislature tabled the issue,
waiting to see what Congress would do.'^"'"
This action, or lack of action, caused the officers
to turn their attention back to Congress for relief.
Actually, throughout 1782, the officers, both in person and
by letter, contacted Congress requesting financial relief. 72
70Henry Knox to John Hancock, September 2, 1782,
ibid., pp. 144-145; George Washington to William Heath,
August 29, 1782, MHSC , 5th ser., 4:277; John Brooks to Henry
Knox, September 27, 1782, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm
Reel #10); Same to same, October 17, 1782, ibid.
71Knox and Paterson, Greaton, Brooks, Crane, Maxwell,
and Lowell to Benjamin Lincoln, November 28, 1782, PMHS 13
(1873-1875): 127; Samuel Osgood to Henry Knox, December 4,
1782, Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American
Revo lutionary Army
,
p, 14 6.
72 Baron von Steuben to the President of the Conti-
nental Congress, December 4, 1782, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 505-
506; Henry Knox to Samuel Osgood, July 9, 1782, "Original
Documents," :m 12 (1911): 239; John Paterson to Henry Jack-
son, February 3, 1782, Egleston, John Paterson, p. 128; Henry
715
Washington was quite active in lobbying on the army's lumbal f,
especially for its officers. During February 1782, he,
Rc.bcM-t Morris and Robert Livingston signed a secret agree-
ment wUli Thomas Paino to write essays on behalf of the
aimy and the
1 inancial program of the nat iona 1 i st s .
"^"^
During October, many officers thcnujht t l,oy would
apply pressure to Congress by LhroaUMiiny to losiqn en masse
in successive groups until their demands were met by
Congress. Washington and several generals talked them out
of this, suggesting they present their desires to Congress
in a formal jcvint petition.
Several meetings were held dnrinq November by the
officers of the different lines at which they drew up
7 6petitions for redress. On the first of December, a
Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #6), Same to same, December 20,
1782, ibid.
73George Washington to the Superintendent of Finance,
June 16, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 24:348-
351; Same to same, October 2, 17 82, ibid., 25:230; George
Washington to tlie Secretary at War, October 2
,
1 782
,
ibid
,
226 .
74 Robert Morris Memorandum on the Paine Agreement,
and the agreement itself, dated February 10, 1782, are found
in Ferguson, Papers of Robert Morris
,
4:327-328, 201.
75George Washington Lo James McHonry, October 17,
17 82, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25:269; George
Wasliington to Joseph Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 4 30.
For reports of the meetings held by the Massachu-
setts T,ine, see Henry Knox Papers, M!1S (Microfilm Pool ^10)
716
general committee, chaired by Knox, drafted an address and
petition of the officers to Congress. Five days later, the
committee selected McDougall, who was in a financial plight,
and Colonels Brooks and Ogden, to take the address and
petition to Congress. On the seventh and eighth, officers
of the army affixed their names to the petition. It set
forth the failure of Congress to meet their obligations to
the army and the hardships the army had suffered as a result.
It specifically mentioned their ration allowance, the cloth-
ing arrears, balance due for forage purchased, settlement of
their accounts, lack of pay, and the unfortunate situation
of those officers who had been previously retired. The
officers stated they would accept commutation in lieu of
half pay and begged Congress to include in any arrangement
full provision for disabled officers and soldiers, and for
the widows and orphans of those who had lost their lives in
service. "Our distresses are now brought to a point," they
informed Congress. "We have borned all that men can bear-
our property is expended-our private resources are at an end,
and our friends are wearied out and disgusted v;ith our
incessant applications." The petition also warned that "The
uneasiness of the soldiers, for want of pay, is great and
dangerous; any further experiments on their patience may
77have fatal effects."
"^^Ford, JCC 24 : 291-293; see also Henry Knox to
Benjamin Lincoln, November 25, 1782, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
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By the time the army's committee arrived in
Philadelphia late in December 1782, several of the national-
ist leaders had decided to use the plight and uneasiness of
the army as an ally in their attempt to get Congress and the
states to agree to a stronger central government and to the
nationalist financial program. The arm.y and the war were
important factors in the nationalist's plans. They believed
that America could only be secure with a stronger central
government and this could only be accomplished during war-
time, when the states needed a strong national government
and its army for their survival. Once peace was established,
there would no longer be a need for the army or a strong
7 8
central body to direct it.
After Yorktown, the nationalists realized their
chances of getting approval of their program were slim, and
by the time the committee arrived from the army, chances
seemed non-existent, especially since Rhode Island rejected
the impost and Virginia repealed its earlier approval.
MHS (Microfilm Reel #6) ; Results of the meetings of
December 1, 5, 7, 8, and draft of the address and petition
found in Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reels HO, 11).
7 8Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, December 24,
1781, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris
,
1:239, 240; Gouverneur
Morris to Matthew Ridley, August 6, 1782, BPL; Same to same,
October 6, 1782, Young, Robert Morris
, pp. 149-150; Jeremiah
Wadsworth to Major General Nathanael Greene, December 12,
1782 , Jeremiah V.'adsworth Box, CSL.
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several of the nationalist leaders decided the only way they
could get their financial program enacted was for the army
to be kept together, hoping the states would give Congress
sufficient finances to provide for it. But with peace
approaching, the only way to keep the army together was by
having them refuse to disband until they were assured that
they would be adequately provided for.
The way the nationalists attempted to use the army
and the way the army responded has been labeled the Newburgh
Conspiracy. The complete story of what happened will proba-
79bly never be known. From the available evidence, it is
certain a group of nationalists wanted to join together the
civilian and military creditors and use this alliance to
coerce Congress and the states into accepting their funding
system to pay off the wartime debts. It should be noted
that this group, as well as the nationalists themselves,
were not united in means and ends, nor were their efforts
8 0
well organized. Nevertheless, a small group of them believed
79
For good treatments of the Newburgh Conspiracy,
see Richard Kohn , "The Inside History of the Newburgh
Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ, 3rd ser.,
27, no. ] (April 1970) : 187-220 ; Paul David~lTel son , with
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they could use the army as the means to achieve their ends.
It is certain this small group did not want a mili-
tary coup d'etat to take place, and thus they did not push
the army in this direction. They knew all too well that if
the army was pushed in this direction the result could very
well be anarchy and military tyranny, the two things they,
and the other revolutionary leaders feared most. As
Hamilton explained to Washington, "any combination of 'Force
would only be productive of the horrors of a civil war,
might end in the ruin of the Country & would certainly end
in the ruin of the army."^^ These nationalists desired to
strengthen the national government, not discredit it; some-
thing a threatened or actual coup d'etat would do.
This group v^anted to take advantage of the potential
and actual unrest in the army and play this off against the
fears of the civilians. If necessary, they believed they
could stir up the army, forcing them to declare they would
not disband until they were provided for, including a commu-
tation of the officers' half pay pension and the means of
funding the commutation. With the help of the military
leaders, they believed they could keep the army in check.
Thus, they did not fear the army with the sword in its hand
as the war cam.e to a close. As Gouverneur Morris, a member
of this group of nationalists, wrote John Jay on the first
8
1
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Ilarch 7,
1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:293.
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day of 1783, "Depend on it, good will arise from the
situation to which we are hastening." He explained "that
much convulsion will ensue, yet it must terminate in giving
to government that power, without which is but a name."^^
V7hen the army's committee arrived late in December
1782, this small nationalist group, consisting of Robert
Morris, Gouverneur Morris, Alexander Hamilton, Richard
Peters, and several others, decided the time was right to
implement their plans. Their plans consisted of getting the
committee and the army's leaders to object to anything but
a nationalist funding system and to have the military
8 3leaders stir up the army.
With respect to the funding system, the nationalists
lobbied both the army leaders and the army's committee from
camp. Gouverneur Morris, during February, wrote Greene and
Knox that the states could do nothing for the military and
therefore the military should stop wasting their time
8 2 Gouverneur Morris to John Jay, January 1, 1783,
Sparks, Gouverneur Morri s, 1:249.
8 3 Ibid., 249; Alexander Hamilton to George Washing-
ton, March 17, 178 3, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton,
3:290-293; Same to same, April 8, 1783, ibid., 318-319;
Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, January 12, 1783, ibid.,
240-241; Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); James Madison
to Edmund Randolph, December 30, 1782, Hutchinson, Papers of
Jame s Madison, 5:473; Same to same, March 18, 1783, ibid.~
6:355-356; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid,, 348;
Richard H. Kohn , "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspir-
acy: America and the Coup d'Etat," WMQ , 3rd ser., 27, no. 2
(April 1970): 191-192.
appealing to the. "it is
. . . not
.y persuasion but
conviction," he wrote Knox, "that the only wise n^ode is for
the army to connect themselves with public creditors of
every kind
... and unremittingly to urge the grant of
general permanent funds." He suggested to Knox that "The
army may now influence the legislatures and if you will
permit me a metaphor from your own profession after you have
carried the post the public creditors will garrison it for
„84you. Similar tlioughts were expressed to Greene.
Throughout February, Gouverneur Morris wrote Knox
urging him to action and supplying him with information
favorable to the nationalists' program. Greene was told
by Morris that "If the army, in common with all other public
creditors, insist on the grant of general permanent funds
for liquidating all the public debts, there can be little
doubt that such revenues will be obtained." He was told
also that Congress, with permanent funds, could obtain a
degree of influence essential to the happiness of the coun-
try. But without the army's support, the public creditors
84 Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, February 7, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).
8 5Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene, February 11,
178 3, Johnson, Nathanael Greene, 2:395.
8 6Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, February 15, 1783,
Sparks, Gouverneur Morris
,
1:251; Same to same, February 28,
1783, Henry Knox"Papers ,"MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).
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could not produce relief for the army.^'^ The army's
committee to Congress were also lobbied, v/ith the same argu-
ments put forward. They were told the army's only chance
of getting what was due them was for the army to join with
the other creditors in urging the states to accept the
nationalists' financial system to fund the national debt.
They informed the committee if they did not support this
position they would oppose referring the army's claims to
the states till all prospect of obtaining Continental funds
8 8
were at an end. The committee was urged, therefore, to
support the Continental funding of the national debt and to
O Qkeep the army's uneasiness before Congress.
It was left to Hamilton, VJashington ' s former aide,
to inform the commander-in-chief of the role the army needed
to play, and to urge him to moderate the discontent of the
army and to direct it into proper channels, i.e.
, nationalist
90
ends . During February , Hamilton v/rote Washington several
8 7Gouverneur Morris to Nathanael Greene
,
February 15
,
17 83
,
Sparks , Gouverneur Morris , 1:250-251.
8 8Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, January 9, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11) ; Alexander
McDougall and Matthias Ogden to Henry Knox, February 8, 1783,
Burnett, LMCC, 5:35-36n.; Arthur Clairy to Alexander
McDougall"!^ John Brooks, and Matthias Ogden, January 5, 1783,
Champagne , Alexander McDougall, p . 187
.
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times, urging him to have the army join the civilian
creditors in demanding a nationalist funding system. He
urged him to act discreetly in the forthcoming crisis. He
must not forfeit the army's confidence by opposing any action
it might take, but neither should he espouse the army's case
too openly, or he would lose the confidence of the civilians.
At the moment of decision, he would have to "guide the
torrent" and "bring order perhaps good, out of the confusion
Hamilton told him that the army had confidence in Knox, and
that he could be safely used; this based on Hamilton's
belief that Gouverneur Morris had won Knox over.
Hamilton's friend, John Brooks, a member of the
army's committee, was indoctrinated with the nationalist's
plans and was sent back to camp early in February with
instructions to prepare the junior officers to support the
nationalist's plans and to participate in some form of pro-
test, if necessary . Brooks , however , apparently was not
convinced of the nationalist's means to their ends, informed
Washington and Knox of what was happening in Philadelphia,
92
and did not stir up the officers. Although Brooks was not
9
1
Alexander Hamilton to George Washington,
February 7, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:33-35; Same to same,
February 13, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton ,
3:253-255.
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willing to (JO along with tlic nationalist's plans, other
officers were.
Tlie nationalist conspirators found a few officers
who, for a variety of reasons, were willing to support Llieir
plan of joining the army and civilian creditors together to
force Congress into funding the dobt
. Arthur St. Clair,
wlio was in Plii 1 adelphia , seems to have been won over by t he
argument of using the army as a lever by the civili.m
creditors. Additionally, he feared once the at my was dis-
banded any resolutions adopted to pay them would not be
implemented. Thus, he informed the committee from the army
late in December 1782 that the debts due to the army had to
be funded by the nationalist plan, and that the army should
9 3be kept together until that happened.
Gates's aide, John Armstrong, Jr., also desired to
keep the army together, in part because he did not, it
appears, want to return to civilian life. Unlike many other
officers, Armstrong did not have a set future to which to
return. Late in February 1783, he wrote his father, asking
what he was to do when the war ended, mentioning he was not
suited for law or business, nor sure he wanted to be a farmer
Arthur St. Clair to Alox<inder McDougall, Matthias
Ogden and John Brooks, December [ ], 1782 , Smith, The
St. Clair Papers, 1:575-576; Arthur St. Clair to WillTam
lYvTne
,
May" 6 , 1783, ibid., 583.
^'^John Armstrong, Jr., to John Armstrong, Sr.,
February 26, 178[3], "Original Letters and Documents," PMjlB
5, no. 1 (1 8H1) : 108.
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Armstrong's mentor, Gates, was also amenable to the
nationalist's plans, but for different reasons. Gates, in
many respects, was an unlikely candidate to be used by the
nationalists, as all his congressional friends were anti-
nationalists. And, according to his most recent biographer.
Gates would not have allowed himself to be used as a tool,
especially by the nationalists.^^ Nevertheless, he got
involved. Although not a proponent of a coup d'etat, he
"knowingly launched into activities that bordered upon
tiny," according to his biographer
. Gates probably v/ent
long with the nationalists as he sav7 an opportunity to
replace Washington if the commander-in-chief did not support
the officers in their demands and was ousted as a result.
He explained after the collapse of the nationalist plan to
use the army that his only reason for supporting the
nationalists was that he saw having the army cooperating
with the civil creditors "as the way most likely to obtain
9 7justice" for the army. Sharing this view was the officer
who set the nationalist plan in action at camp. Colonel
Walter Stewart, a former aide-de-camp to Gates.
mu
a
95 Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A
Biography
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9 7Horatio Gates to John Armstrong, Jr. , June 22,
1783, ibid., p. 274.
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During the winter of 1782-1783, Stewart, a holder of
a huge amount of public securities, spent sick-leave in
Philadelphia. While there, he spent much time in conversa-
tion with the nationalist group. They were able to convince
him he should go back to camp at Newburgh and stir up the
officers, as well as sound out V7ashington as to his willing-
ness to support them, and if he was unwilling, to get Gates
to organize a military protest to being disbanded without
being fully satisfied the debt due them would be paid. He
arrived at camp on or about the eighth of March and, finding
Washington would not support using the army as a tool,
9 8turned his attention to Gates
.
Many civilians, knowing of these plans, strongly
objected to them, believing that once the military were
unleashed in civilian affairs, the revolution could be undone
9 9by a military tyranny. Horace Walpole predicted "the
American loaders will not easily part with dictatorships and
consulships to retire to their private ploughs " once the war
ended ^-^^^ In his March 5 , 1119 , Boston massacre oration
,
9 8 Douglas Southall Freeman , George Washington : A
Biography , 5 : 4 36-4 37n . 4 8 ; Louis Clinton Hatch, The Adminis
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Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27,
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"'"'^'^ John Richard 7\ldcn , The Americ a n Revolution
1775-1783 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row,
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William Tudor warned that at the end of the v;ar, a triumphant
army, headed by a popular general "may become more formidable
than the tyrant that has been expelled At the end of
the war there was a great fear held by many that the army
would not disband until they were assured they would be
adequately provided for. A few even feared that not only
would the army not disband, but would, by the force of arms,
10 2assure themselves of being compensated
. These fears
''"^"'"Douglas Southall Freeman
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seemed all the more real early in 1783 as the civilian
leaders learned from the army's committee to Congress of the
discontent of the army and the possible consequences if
Congress did not act soon to soothe the temper of the army.
The army's committee was willing to let the members of
Congress believe the worst was about to happen and did not
try to dissuade their fears. "'"^'^
As will be shortly discussed, some nationalists
played on these fears in hopes that Congress would adopt
their financial program. At a private meeting of members
of Congress on the twentieth of February, Hamilton and
Peters reported that the army had secretly determined not
to lay down their arms until satisfactory measures were
104
adopted. Such reports prompted Arthur Lee to observe
that "The terror of a mutinying Army is played off with con-
siderable ef f icacy . " "''^^
The immediate response to these fears was the urging
of the military to take no drastic action. As early as the
fall. Congress sent, at Washington's prompting, the Secretary
'^'^
"^Champagne , Alexander McDougall
, p. 198.
104 James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madisoii, 6 : 266 .
"'"'^^Arthur Lee to Samuel Adams, January 29
,
1783,
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at War to camp to urge calm.l^^ This visit was followed by
letters to military leaders urging restraint. Hamilton
wrote Washington that •'Republican jealousy has in it a
principle of hostility to any army whatever be their merits,
whatever be [their] claims to the gratitude of the community
It acknowledges their services with unwillingness and
rewards them with reluctance." What could be done?
Hamilton told Washington the army must submit to its fate,
for to seek redress by arms would mean its ruin. Elias
Boudinot wrote Washington in March expressing his hope the
army would not dishonor itself and explaining that violent
measures would not help them. Several weeks earlier, Joseph
Jones v;rote Washington, expressing his hope the army would
show patience in their plight. He wrote:
To you it must be unnecessary to observe that v/hen
all confidence between the civil and military
authority is lost, by intemperate conduct or an
assumption of improper power, especially by the
military body, the Rubicon is passed, and to
retreat will be very difficult from the fears and
jealousies that will unavoidably subsist between
the two bodies • To avoid therefore the adoption
by the army of any hasty and rash measure , should
employ the attention and draw forth the exertions
of every worthy officer in it; for from these
alone can opposition be expected. The ambition of
some, and the pressure of distress in others, may
produce dangerous combinations, founded on the
pretence that justice is delayed, and will be
Champagne , Alexander McDougall, pp. 184-185
;
Ford, JCC, 23:657n.4; George Washington to the Secretary at
War, October 2 , 1782 , Fitzpatrick, Writings of Wa shington,
25:226-229.
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refused to them. The pretext is plausible and
ensnaring, and may draw into engagements the
unsuspecting, honest soldier, from which it willbe difficult to extricate himself, even when he
sees the dangers they lead to.l07
Although a few officers were willing to let the army
be used by the nationalist conspirators, most did not.
Fortunately, those that did not included Washington, Greene,
Knox, McDougall, and the Secretary at War, Lincoln; the
military leaders of the continent. The latter was probably
the only member of the executive leadership v;ho refused to
endorse the nationalist plan to use the army. Samuel Osgood,
late in 1783, wrote John Adams it was fortunate that Lincoln
"was a true Republican, & totally oppos'd to Intrigue &
aristocratic Measures." Osgood feared that if Schuyler had
been the Secretary at War the army might have been used by
the nationalists. Robert Morris, according to Osgood,
"wanted a Person in that Office who would go any Lengths
with him." Lincoln, however, refused to be drawn into
108Morris's plans. Greene, although sharing m.uch of the
philosophy of the nationalist conspirators, was against
using the army as a tool. "When soldiers advance without
107Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [March 25,
1783], Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 3:306; Elias
Boudinot to George v7aFhington, March 17 , 1783, Burnett, LMCC,
7:84; Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27, 1733,
Ford, Letters of Joseph Jones , pp. 99-100.
10 8 Samuel Osgood to John Adams, December 7, 178 3,
Burnett, LMCC, 7:380-381.
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authority," he wrote Gouverneur Morris, "who can halt them."
"We have many Clodiuses and Catilinies in America, who may
give a different direction to this business, than either you
or I expect," he wrote Morris. He reminded Morris that using
the army was "a critical business [, ] . . . pregnant with
dangerous consequences , " "'''^^
McDougall and Knox also shared a nationalist
philosophy, and both probably considered going along to some
degree with the nationalist's desire to use the army, in a
limited manner. McDougall was heavily lobbied by the
nationalists to declare openly the army would accept commu-
tation only if it were funded by the nationalist funding
system. He remained silent, knowing if he sooke out for the
nationalist plan, the nationalists' opponents would kill the
commutation. If he supported the anti-nationalists, the
nationalists would block commutation
. McDouqall
' s first
concern was getting both sides to agree to the principle of
commutation, believing the funding part could be worked out
later. While walking a tightrope
,
McDougall kept Knox
109 Nathanael Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 3,
178 3, Sparks, Gouve rneur Morris , 1 :251, 251-252 , 252.
"'''^Henry Knox to Ben j amin Lincoln , March 3 , 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS, (Microfilm Reel #11).
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,
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advised, and sought his advice, as well. On February 21,
1783, Knox wrote McDougall that he was opposed to uniting
the army with the civil creditors against the government,
and hoped the army would "never be directed but against the
enemies of the liberties of America." He believed the best
thing that could take place was a convention, called before
the peace took place. Such a meeting could recommend ways
of strengthening the national government, which would result
in the army eventually being taken care of."^^^ Three weeks
later, he wrote McDougall his hope that "we shall not be
influenced to actions which may be contrary to our uniform
course of service for eight years. I know not how by any
violence we can obtain a settlement of accounts, and the
half-pay placed upon proper principles, except by the appli-
113
cations we have made."
Knox shared similar thoughts with Gouverneur Morris.
During February, he wrote Morris that "a hoop to the barrell"
and "cement to the union" were favorite toasts of the army,
and that the army would gladly help strengthen the govern-
ment, but that it "must be directed in the mode by proper
authority." He suggested that if the present constitution
112Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, February 21,
1783, draft, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11).
113 Same to same, March 12, 1783, draft, Henry Knox
Papers, ibid., (Microfilm Reel #12).
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was so defective the states hold a convention to form a
better one, "This appears to us . . . the most efficacious
114
remedy." Knox's efforts to prevent the army from being
used by the nationalists was seen by John Armstrong, Jr., as
a primary reason that it was not used.^^^ The person most
responsible, however, for keeping the army from being used
by the nationalists was Washington.
Throughout the war, Washington had opposed using the
army in any unauthorized activity, as he believed strongly
in the necessity of the subordination of the military to the
civilian authorities. This was all the more important now
that it appeared the Revolution would be safely concluded.
Although Washington's beliefs were widely known, the
nationalists hoped to have him use the army to further their
plans. His response to them was the same as it had been to
those that were suggesting the year before that he become a
monarch.
Mercy Otis Warren in her history of the Revolution
wrote that Americans had little desire for a monarchy when
the war began, but such ideas were suggested during the war
by aspiring individuals, nurtured by designing characters.
'^Henry Knox to Gouverneur Morris, February 21,
178 3, Sparks, Gouverneur Morris , 1:256.
115 John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 22,
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and matured by circumstances
. Monarchy was indeed a
subject of some speculation during the last years of the
war, as it was viewed as one solution to overcoming the
defects of a weak Continental government
.
Gouverneur Morris, in a despondent mood, wrote
Greene late in 1781 that he had "no expectation that the
government will acquire force; and no hope that our union
can subsist, except in the form of an absolute monarchy,"
but "this does not seem to consist with the taste and temper
of the people. ""'"'"^
One person who believed that a monarchy, with
Washington as the monarch, was the answer to America's
salvation, was the commanding officer of the Invalid Regi-
ment, Lewis Nicola. On May 22, 1782, believing a stronger
form of government was needed to control both the military
and civil authorities, Nicola wrote Washington proposing a
monarchy be established by the military. Washington res-
ponded immediately, telling him it was "With a mixture of
Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise
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great surprise and astonishment" he had read his sentiments.
•YOU could not have found a person to whom your schemes are
more disagreeable," Washington wrote Nicola. He told him to
banish such thoughts from his mind, and to never mention them
again. In three letters, written between the twenty-third
and twenty-eighth of May, Nicola assured Washington he would
comply with his desires . "'"^
Another person who suggested a monarchy was James M.
Varnum, a general and member of Congress. During the summer
of 1782, he suggested to Washington the only salvation of
America lay either with a monarchy or a military state.
Washington replied that he did not believe America was so
badly off they had to resort to either form of government
.
Washington, learning of the plans of the nationalist
conspirators, was quick to explain to Hamilton his opposi-
tion to using the army to further their ends, as it might
result in civil discord. He told him that redress by force
"is too chimerical to have had a place in the imagination
119George Washington to Lewis Nicola, May 22, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of VJash ington
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of any serious Mind in this Ar.y," reminding him that the
army was "a dangerous instrument to play with.-^^l
^^^^^
March, Washington told Hamilton it "Would be impolitic to
introduce the Army on the Tapis; lest it should excite
jealousy, and bring on its concomitants." What he would do,
Washington explained, was to "pursue the same steady line of
conduct which has governed me hi therto . " ^^2 This was indeed
what Washington did.
The military allies of the nationalist conspirators,
realizing that Washington would not go along with their
plans, decided to act without him. On March 10, 1783,
Gates' aide-de-camp, John Armstrong, with the help of
several officers, issued an anonymous address to the
officers, inviting them to a meeting the following day to
discuss securing redress of their grievances. The address
called on them to "change the milk-and-water style" of their
previous memorial and urged them to "Assume a bolder
123tone .
"
121George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 4,
1783, ibid., 26:292, 293; see also Same to same, April 16,
1783, ibid., 324.
122 Same to same, March 4, 178 3, Syrett, Papers of
Alexander Hamilton
, 3:278.
12 3The Nev/burgh Addresses are printed in Ford, JCC,
24:295-299; Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16,
1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering
,
1:440; George Washington
to Benjamin Harrison, March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of V7ashington, 26:239-241.
Trying to avoid an unauthorized meeting of officers,
Washington requested a postponement until the fifteenth, at
which time they could hear the report from the committee of
the army to Congress and adopt measures "best calculated to
attain the just and important object in view.""'-^'^ He
explained to Hamilton that he had taken this action "to
prevent the Officers from being taken by surprise while the
passions were all inflamed, and to rescue them from plunging
themselves into a gulph of Civil horror from which there
might be no recovering."
Washington called for the general and field grade
officers, one officer from each company, and a proper
representation from the staff departments to meet at noon
in the Public Building, "The Temple," and directed the
senior officer present to preside and report the results to
, . 126him.
Armstrong responded to Washington's postponement by-
issuing, on the twelfth , a second address hinting that
VJashington was secretly in favor of the original meeting,
but v;as prevented by his pos it ion from taking an open stand
.
124 George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 12, 1783,
ibid.
,
208-215; see also George Washington to the President
of the Continental Congress, March 12, 1783, ibid., 211-212.
12 5George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, March 12,
1783, ibid. , 216-217.
"^^^General Orders, ibid., 208 .
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By calling an official ineeting, he was giving additional
weight to any declaration by having it originated and trans-
mitted by and through regular channels. Thus, despite
Washington's seeming disapproval, the officers were told
not to be deterred from acting boldly at the official
12 7
meeting
.
There was great concern during the following days
with respect to what would happen on the f ifteenth . "^^^
Pickering wrote his wife that he believed if the meeting was
conducted with prudence, it might have the effect of prompt-
ing Congress to settle with the army and the other creditors
"But," he worried, "should rashness govern the proceedings,
the consequences may be such as are dreadful even in idea.
God forbid the event be so calamitous . ""^^^
On the morning of the fifteenth, one officer, prob-
ably Rufus Putnam, released an address in reply to the
anonymous addresses, stating the army could not extort the
monies owed them. Not only would it be wrong, but there
were not enough men in arms to carry out such an extortion.
127
Ford, JCC, 24:298-299.
12 8
Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 12, 1783,
(copy made from the draft), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Micro-
film Reel ^fl2) ; Henry Knox to Alexander McDougall, March 12,
1783, draft, ibid.
129 .Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 13,
1783
,
Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel ^=1) .
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Even if they had enough soldiers to support them, they would
have to live by plunder and face the threat of civil war.
Additionally, he correctly en^phasized the soldiers siniply
wanted to return home, and would not support them. "Our
business," he wrote, "lies within a very narrow compass-Viz.
a warm & affectionate address to our 'Illustrious Chief-
pointing out the disadvantages that will arise to the Army
if they should be disbanded before their Accounts are
settled. ""^^^
The meeting began at noon as scheduled, with Gates,
as the ranking officer present, in the chair. Before the
meeting could begin in earnest, Washington arrived unexpect-
edly. Silence came over the room and every eye fixed upon
the commander-in-chief, who "appeared sensibly agitated .""'-
After apologizing for his appearance, he explained that he
had not intended- to come to the meeting, but the second
anonymous address forced him to state personally his views
on the role the army should play in obtaining redress of
their grievances. He told the gathering to give greater
130
"To Officers of the Army," March 15, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12). On the back of the
manuscript is the endorsement that it had been written by
Rufus Putnam.
131
J. A. Wright to Samuel B. Webb, March 16, 1783,
Ford, Samuel Blach ley Webb
, 3:6; for reports of the meeting,
see Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16, 1783,
Pickering, Timothy Pi ckering, 1:437-440; Samuel Shaw to
[John] Eliot, April f ], 1783, Quincy, Samuel Shaw , pp. 103-
104; Judd, 'Memoir' and Selected Correspondence of Philip
Van Cortlandt, p. 68,
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lucidity to his views he had co:n.itted the. to writing and
desired to read the.. He bagan by criticizing the un.ili-
tary character of the anonymous addresses, as they are
addressed ".ore to the feelings and passions, than to the
reason and judgment of the ar.y." He told the. the addressee
only gave two alternatives; either deserting the country for
western lands or turning ar.s against it, if Congress could
not be compelled into instant compliance. Washington
questioned the .otives behind the person proposing these
alternatives, suggesting they .ight have originated in New
York City, as the British desired to sow the seeds of
discord and separation between the civil and military powers.
Congress, Washington told the., would do them
complete justice, once that body was able to establish funds
for that purpose. He told them Congress would not cease
attempting to get the funds until they had succeeded, but
reminding them that "like all other large bodies, where
there is a variety of different interests to reconcile"
their deliberations were slow. He promised to help the ar.y
in any way he could to obtain justice and entreated them
"not to take any measures, which, in the calm light of
reason, will lessen the dignity and sully the glory you have
hitherto maintained." "Let me request you," he asked, "to
rely on the plighted faith of your country, and to place a
full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress
,
that, previous to your dissolution as an army, they vjill
74]
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sentiment, Washington continued reading the letter, which
explained the plans and efforts by Congress to obtain revenue,
declaring that if a discrimination was to be made in paying
the public debt, it would be made in favor of the army;
explained the delay in answering the officers' petition was
due to the slowness natural to a body like Congress and
referred to the dependence of Congress upon the states.
Washington most emphasized that portion of the letter that
pointed out that once the military assumed undue powers,
there was no telling where they might be led, and they may
be carried farther than at first they meant to go. Washing-
ton did not read all the letter, purposely omitting the
negative portions of it."'""^'^
Finished reading the letter, Vv^ashington left the
building, believing the temper of the officers had been
sufficiently cooled so as to allow them to deliberate in
moderation. Gates assumed the chair, and rather than
attempting to sway the officers against Washington's call
for a moderate appeal to Congress, he recognized a motion
by Knox, seconded by Rufus Putnam, to have the gathering
give their thanks to VJashington for his "excellent address"
and to assure him the "officers reciprocate his affectionate
134 Joseph Jones to George Washington, February 27,
178 3, Sparks, Correspondence of the American Revolution
,
3:554-560; For what Washington deleted, see Pickering,
Timothy Pickering, l:444-4 4 5n.; J. A. Wright to John VJebb,
March 16 , 1783
,
Webb, Samuel B. V7ebb, p. 60.
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expressions with the greatest sincerity of which the hu.an
heart is capable." This was unanimously agreed to. Then
the December memorial to Congress, the resolutions of
Congress acknowledging the right of the soldiers to security
and promising to obtain revenue, and the report of the com-
niittee to Philadelphia were read. That finished, Israel
Putnam moved, and Edward Hand seconded, that a three-member
committee be appointed to draw up resolutions and report
back in half an hour. This approved, chosen were Knox, John
Brooks, and a Captain Howard. They prepared three resolu-
tions and presented them to the gathering. After a minimum
of discussion, they were adopted.
The first resolution professed the patriotism of the
officers and their resolution to preserve their reputation
despite any distress or danger. The second affirmed their
confidence in the justice of Congress and their country, and
their conviction that the army would not be disbanded before
its accounts were adjusted and adequate funds provided for
securing the amount due, including the commutation for half-
pay. The third requested Washington write Congress and ask
for speedy action with respect to their December memorial.
The third resolution declared prompt action "would produce
immediate tranquillity in the minds of the army, and prevent
any further machinations of designing men to sow discord
between the civil and military powers of the United States."
Tv;o more resolutions wore also adopted. The fourth thanked
744
the com:nittee at Philadelphia for their work and requested
McDougall reinain in Philadelphia until the objects of his
mission were accomplished. The fifth resolution stated "the
officers
. . .
view with abhorrence, and reject with disdain,
the infamous propositions contained in a late anonymous
address to the officers of the ari.y, and resent with indig-
nation the secret attempts of some unknown persons to collect
the officers together in a manner totally subversive of all
discipline, and good order. ""^"^^
With few exceptions, most officers were pleased the
meeting had been conducted with "Order, Moderation and
Decency," and that it had not resulted in the military turn-
ing to extreme measures to obtain redress of their
136grievances. Knox believed the officers' performance
would set the military character of America on a high point
of view. "It was a proud day for the Army," Colonel
Humphreys declared, and "aught not to be forgotten in the
137Annals of America." Especially praised was Washington,
135 Ford, JCC
,
24:31-311; Boynton, General Orders of
George Washington
, pp. 61, 103-104; Timothy Pickering to
Samuel Hodgdon , March 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Pi ckering,
1:437-440.
136
J. A. Wright to John Webb, March 16, 1783, Webb,
Samuel B , Webb
, p. 60; George Washington to Lund Washington,
March 19, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
26:245;
George Washington to the President of the Continental
Congress, March 16, 1783, ibid., 228,
137Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 16, 1783,
[copy m^ade from the draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Micro-
film, Reel ^12); David Humphreys to Benjamin Lincoln,
745
who was seen as the key in keeping the meeting from being
the starting point of a form of military tyranny. ^^B Knox
believed Washington's address had been a "masterly perform-
ance." Schuyler reported on the seventeenth of March that
"Never, through all the war, did his Excellency achieve a
greater victory than on this occasion-a victory over jealousy,
just discontent, and great opportunities." After the meeting,
Schuyler reported that "I rode with Knox to his quarters in
absolute silence, because of the solemn impression on our
minds. I have no doubt that posterity will repeat the
closing words of his Excellency's address Had this day
been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of
perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.'"
Samuel Shaw was also impressed by Washington's address. He
observed
:
I rejoice in the opportunities I have had of seeing
this great man in a variety of situations ;
-calm and
intrepid where the battle raged, patient and perse-
vering under the pressure of misfortune, moderate
and possessing himself in the full career of victory.
Great as these qualifications deservedly render him,
he never appeared to me more truly so, than at the
assembly we have been speaking of. On the other
occasions he has been supported by the exertions of
an army and the countenance of his friends; but in
this he stood single and alone. There was no saying
where the passions of an army, which were not a
little inflamed, might lead; but it was generally
March 19, 1783, Humphreys, Life and Times of David Humphreys
,
1:270.
Jedediah Huntington to Androv: Huntington, March 18,
1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 460.
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allowed that longer forbearance was dangerous
and moderation had ceased to be a virtue. Underthese circumstances he appeared, not at the headof his troops, but as it were in opposition tothem; and for a dreadful moment the interests ofthe army and its general seemed to be in competi-tion! He spoke,
-every doubt was dispelled, andthe tide of patriotism rolled again in its
wonted course.
Learning what had happened. General Weedon wrote, "Nothing
rejoyces me more than to hear the disturbances in the Army
are reconciled, it would have been a sad stain in the
History of the war had they gone to extremes . ""'"^^
Not all the military were pleased with what had
happened at the meeting, especially when it seemed likely
that the army would take a stand that would send a message
to the nation that they would stand for nothing less than
being fully compensated. Pickering believed his fellow
officers had acted in a hypocritical manner at the meeting.
Writing an assistant on the sixteenth, he reported that four
days previously "most of them had read v/ith admiration, and
talked of v/ith rapture" the anonymous addresses. Why the
change? Pickering wrote his v;ife on the eighteenth that,
like the greater part of mankind, the officers had been over-
awed by "'great men.'" Tv70 days earlier, he had written her
139Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln, March 15, 1783,
[copy made from the draft], Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Micro-
film Reel #12) ; Philip Schuyler to [ ] Van Rensselaer,
March 17, 1783, Lossing, Philip Schuyler, 2:427n.; Samuel
Shaw to [John] Eliot, April [ ], 1783, Quincy, Samue l Shaw ,
p. 104; Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History, p. 124.
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the result of the n^eeting demonstrated the fickleness of
popular assemblies and how easily a fluent orator, with only
plausibility to support him, may govern at will. John
Armstrong, Jr., was similarly upset, believing Washington
lacked the will to support the officers' desire for compen-
sation. He told Gates they should not have trusted
Washington. -^"^^
The civilian leaders, on the other hand, were
pleased they had trusted Washington as he had, in his
actions at Ncwburgh, apparently prevented the military from
undermining their revolutionary principles and goals. They
really appreciated what Washington and the army had done, or
actually had not done, at this critical moment of the
141Revolution. John Jay, upon learning what had happened
at Newburgh, wrote from France that "The general and the
army have, by their late moderation, done themselves infi-
nite honor." William Peartree Smith wrote the President of
Congress that Washington's conduct had been "truly admirable"
and "Superior to what the common principles of Human Nat iire
140 .Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, March 16,
1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering
,
1:439-440; Timothy
Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, March 18, 1783, ibid., 443;
Same to same, March 16, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel ^tl); John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates,
May 30, 1783, Nelson, General Horatjo Gates; A Biography,
p. 2 79; Same to same, April 2 9
,
~ 1 7 8 3
,
"Thid^
14 1 The Virginia Delegates at Congress to Benjamin
Harrison, June 17, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison, 7:155.
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would have dictated to a Soaring Genius." "Had an Oliver
commanded a republican army at such a delicate and critical
Juncture," he wrote, "his towering brain would have traced
out instantaneously a very different Line of Conduct. But
Washington is the Patriot of Patriots. Talk of your Catos,
y^ Brutus, & y^ Cassius-they are meer Fools to him." Smith
suggested that each state erect a statue to Washington.
Congress, v^hich would itself make provision for a statue,
voted Washington their sincere thanks for his actions at
Newburgh .'^^^
Washington and his officers believed their restraint
and moderation in the face of adversity deserved more than
appreciation and statues
.
'"'^
^ They believed once the American
people learned what had happened at Newburgh, they would
promptly and properly reward them, by paying them what was
owed and making provision for post-war compensation. They
consequently set about making sure all the facts about the
142 John Jay to V7illiam Livingston, July 19
, 1783
,
Jay, John Jay
,
2:122; William Peartree Smith to Elias
Boudinot, April 22, 1783, "Letters from Wm. Peartree Smith
to Elias Boudinot, on the Suspension of Hostilities Between
the United States and Great Britain," PNJHS 4, no. 3 (1849)
123, 124; Ford, JCC, 24:306, 305-306n.l.
143George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, March 18, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of \Jashington
,
26:229-232; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to
Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., March 18, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser.,
3 :406 .
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Nevvburgh incident were niade public, particularly Washington's
address
.
"^'^ ^
The civilian loaders, for a variety of reasons,
including the fear of military tyranny, believed the military
were indeed entitled to what was owed them, and perhaps, even
more. This belief was, of course, strengthened by what had
happened at Newburgh. But it was a belief that was fre-
quently expressed throughout 1782 and 1783, often with the
provision that the compensation be consistent with republican
. , 145principles
.
From January until early March, Congress debated the
question of compensating the officers by way of a commutation
of their lialf-pay pension to a specific nurnl^er of years.
14 4Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, July 2S, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #13); Henry Knox to
Benjamin Lincoln, March 16, 1783, Benjamin Lincoln Papers,
MHS (Microfilm Reel #6) ; Timothy Pickering to Rebecca
Pickering, March 16, 1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel ^1) .
145 Samuel Osgood to Henry Knox, December 4, 1782,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #10); John Chester to
Joshua Huntington, March 21, 1783, "The Huntington Papers,"
CHSC, 20 (1923): 171; William Paca, In Council, to the Mary-
land General Assembly, May 6, 1783, Browne, Maryland Archives ,
48:407; John Dickinson's message to the Delaware Assembly,
January 19, 1782, Minutes of the Council of the Delaware
State, from 1776 to 1792 , pp. 69 5-700^; William Gordon to
Arthur Lee, April 2, 1783, "Letters of the Reverend William
Gordon: Historian of the American Revolution 1770-1799,"
PMI[S 63 (October 1929 -J\ine 1930): 490 ; Willi, im Gordon to
George VJashington, February 26
,
1783, ibid., 4 95; Jfilin
Collins and Jonathan Arnold to William Greene, February 4,
178 3, Staples, RItode I s la n d in the Continental Cong re . r,
,
p. 4 25 ; Edmund RandoTph to" James Madison, ApriT 26, ^
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There was much opposition to the conn^utation
, as well as to
the half-pay pension itself, but with the lobbying efforts
of the army's committee and news of the Newburgh incident.
Congress, on the twenty-second of March, agreed to a commu-
tation of five years pay for the officers and voted the
soldiers three months pay.^^^ ^^^.^^ following two
months. Congress also made provisions for the relief of dis-
abled veterans and adjusted final rank of officers in
meritorious cases. It should be noted that earlier, in
January, Congress called on the states to complete settle-
ments with the army up to August 1, 1780, and provided that
they would take care of the rest, once the states paid
Congress the monies they owed it."'"'^'^
As has been noted, the states were very dilatory in
paying Congress and their soldiers during 1782 and 1783.
Nevertheless, some attempts were made by several states to
pay their soldiers in specie, and when this was not possible,
to pay them in goods, such as tobacco. Some individuals.
James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 348,
355, 370, 375; Ford, JCC, 24:207-210, 253, 364; 25:926;
Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, March 15, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Benjamin Lincoln to
Henry Knox, March 22, 1783, Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS
(Microfilm Reel #6)
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14 7Ford, JCC, 24:93-95, 321-324.
14 8John Montgomery to William Irvine, July 26, 1783,
Burnett, LMCC, 7:235; Clark, NCSR, 24:419-422, 484; Thos.
Posey to Benjamin Harrison, July 30, 1782, Palmer, Calendar
of Virginia State Papers, 3:241-242.
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Congress "the Liberal allowance of Congress in lue of half
pay must give general satisfaction and will enable we poor
Continentals to drink our Beer with a contented niind."^^^
Had Weedon been with the main army, he would have seen there
was not a general satisfaction, as the problem still remained
as to how Congress was going to pay for the comm.utation and
how the states were going to satisfy their financial obliga-
tions. The army also had other concerns and were still
upset with the civilian leaders for several reasons.
One of the first concerns of the military was the
actual payment of the commutation, especially since there
was great objection to it in New England and also in New
154York. As the chief executive of Rhode Island explained
152George Weedon to John F. Mercer, April 1, 1783,
Hunt, Fragments of Revolutionary History
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George Washington to the President of the Continental
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to their delegates in Congress, "The General Assembly
.
cannot comply with a requisition of this kind [referring to
the coinrautation]
,
because the measure tends to a military
establishment in time of peace." He also cited several
other reasons the Assembly refused to make funds available
for the commutation. At a Farmington, Connecticut, town
meeting early in August, a resolution was adopted accusing
the officers of attempting to profit at the expense of the
people. '^^ This attitude General McDougall described as a
1 S 7
"dishonorable Spirit." This dishonorable spirit was
certainly not held by the non-commissioned officers of the
Connecticut Line, who, during April, began demanding a half-
pay pension for themselves; upset only the officers were
1 5 Rgetting this special provision. They, as well as the
other soldiers, were also upset during the spring that they
had not received the pay they had been promised. The offi-
cers were as much, if not more, concerned about having their
'"^^William Greene to the Connecticut Delegates at
Congress, May 10, 1783, Bartlett, Re cords of Rhode Island
,
9 :703 .
•^^^ The Connecticut Courant
,
August 12 , 1783 .
157Alexander McDougall to [ ] Wyllys, July 27,
1783, Ford, Samuel B lachley Webb , 3:23.
15 8George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22,
1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:351; Henry
Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783, Merrill Jensen,
The New_Na t ion: A History of the United States Dur ing the
ConfedeFatTon 17 8r^r7 89 80 .
"
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accounts settled as they were about receiving the back pay
due them. They were especially concerned that they were to
be discharged before the accounts were settled . ""-^^
These concerns of the military caused several
officers to believe that the army could still turn against
160tne civilians. Since there was little prospect of relief,
this remained a continuing threat. Early in May, one officer
described the soldiers as "loud and insolent" and the
officers "broken, dissatisfied and desponding ." Such
feelings, and the belief the nationalists could still stir
the army to violence, prompted Washington to observe, "How
far nen, who labor under the pressure of accumulated distress,
and are irritated by a belief that they are treated with
159George Washington to Theodorick Bland, April 4,
1783, Fitzpatrick, V\frit ings of Washington
,
26:285-291
;
George VJashington to the President of the Continental
Congress, June 7, 1783, ibid., 478; George Washington to
Joseph Jones, March 18, 1783, ibid., 232-233; George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 4, 1783, ibid., 292;
Same to same, April 22, 1783, ibid., 352; Edward Dunscomb to
Peter Gansevoort, June 10, 1783, Feinstone Collection ^291;
William Irvine to Arthur St. Clair, April 17, 1783, Smith,
The St . Clair Papers, 1:582; Arthur St. Clair to William
Ifvlhe, May 6, 1783, ibid., 583.
''^'^John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29,
178 3, Paul David Henson, General Ho ratio Ga tes: A Biography ,
p. 279; Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783,
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United
^^^^1 Duy i g t heHc
o
n f e de r a t i on _ l_7_81jj. 78 9 , p. 80; Jedediah
iTun^a^'ngtorr'to George' Washington
,
April 16, 1783, ibid.;
Nathanael Greene to Joseph Trumbull, April 21, 1783, Joseph
Truirtbull Collection, vol. 2, CSL.
"'^^John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, May 9,
1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:160n.3.
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neglect, ingratitude, and injustice in the extreme, night
be worked upon by designing men, is worthy of very serious
consideration. ••-'-^^
Because of this unsettled state of the army,
Washington decided to stay with the army, rather than retir-
ing from military service, and required other officers to
remain with the army to ensure that discipline was main-
16 3tained. Additionally, he and other officers informed the
civilian leaders of the continued uneasiness of the army and
the necessity of their fulfilling their obligations to the
. . 164
military. Washington wrote a member of Congress that
although the late "disturbance" had been quelled, the offi-
cers were too much pressed by their present condition and
past sufferings to maintain their forbearance much longer.
Early in April, he wrote Hamilton the suspicions of the
officers were high. Any attempt to discharge them before
their accounts were settled, he wrote, "will convey the most
unfavorable ideas of the rectitude of Congress." The next
month, Steuben wrote Lincoln that the "Officers and soldiers
162George Washington to Lund V/ashington, .March 19,
1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
, 26:246.
16 3George Washington to Tench Tilghinan, April 24,
1783, ibid., 358; George Washington to Henry Knox, May 14,
1783, ibid., 429-430.
164George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, March 19,
1783, ibid., 240-241; George Washington to Alexander
Hamilton, April 22, 1783, ibid., 352; Nathanael Greene to
Joseph Reed, April 23, 1783, Reed, Joseph Reed, 2:395.
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are discontented in the highest degree," and stated "The
officers can not stand it any longer." "I almost fear some-
times that the suffering lot of these brave men will prove
too hard for their patient virtues," Jonathan Trumiull, Jr.,
wrote his father early in June. "Yet," he concluded, "the
experience we have had of their patriotism & firm attachment
to their duty hitherto gives us confidence in their perse-
16 5
verance to the end."
Other officers shared the belief the military would
persevere without turning on the civilians . "^^^ But to make
certain, commanding officers constantly urged their officers
and soldiers to remain peaceful and disciplined until the
civilian governments could fulfill their obligations to the
167
army
.
George Washington to Joseph Jones, March 18, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, VJritings of Was hington
, 26:2 32-2 33; George
Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 3, 1783, ibid., 292;
Baron von Steuben to Benjamin Lincoln, March 25, 1783, Kapp,
Steuben
, pp. 491, 492; Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., to Jonathan
Trumbull, Sr., June 4, 1783, MHSC , 7th ser., 3:423.
^^^Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, February 6,
1782, Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers,
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May 6, 1783, "Letters of General St. Clair to General Irvine,"
HM 7, no. 5 (May 1863): 154-155.
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Baron von Steuben to Elias Dayton and the officers
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no. 1 (1850) : 14 ; General Orders, Whiting, Revolutionary
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Most civilians hoped, now that the war appeared over
the army would melt peacefully away. "We have no reason to
apprehend," the Virginia Delegates to Congress wrote Governor
Harrison, the army "will forget they are Citizens as well as
soldiers; or be dissatisfied with the best provision that
can be made for them during the distress of the war.-^^^
The belief the army would be disbanded without
resorting to violence was not held by all the civilian
leaders. Many still feared the army would turn violent.
Violence, they knew and feared, could result in anarchy and
military tyranny, the things the revolutionary leaders
feared most.^'^^ Thus, for many revolutionaries, the spring
of 1783 was the most critical period of the war, as the
168^, . .
.The Virginia Delegates at Congress to BenjaminHarrison, February 11, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James
Madison
, 6:219. —~
Edmund Pendleton to James Madison and Joseph
Jones, June 30
, 1783, Mays, L^tite^s
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Pendle ton, 2:454 ; Abigail Adams to 'John Adams, June~2y7"l78 3
,
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Jay, John Jay
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2:129; John Chester to Joshua Huntington,
March 21, 1783, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923):
171; Richard Peters to Charles Thomson, October 20, 1783,
NYHSC, 11 (1878): 178; Jonathan Trumbull's Farewell Address,
October [ ], 1783, Trumbull, Jonathan Trumbull
, pp. 304-312;
VJilliam Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot
,
April [ ], 1783,
"Letters from Wm. Peartree Smith to Elias Boudinot, on the
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Great Britain," PNJHS 4, no. 3 (1849): 122; Jeremy Belknap
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,
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,
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,
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things they were fighting for could be lost.^^^
The likelihood of the military subverting the
civilian governments or in some other way undermining the
Revolution during the last nine months of the war was mini-
mal, as will be shown in the next chapter. For the most
part, the military were occupied with thoughts of home, land
acquisition, and post-war careers. With few exceptions, the
officers and soldiers gave little or no thought to demanding
by force what was owed them, believing they would eventually
be compensated. Nevertheless, many revolutionary leaders
still believed their restless and uncompensated army posed
a threat to the Revolution.
171James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson
Papers of James Madison, 6:348; James Madison to Edmund
'
Randolph, March 18, 1703, ibid., 356; Nathanael Greene toGouverneur Morris, April 3, 1783, Sparks, Go^uve£neur_Morris
,
CHAPTER XII
THE REVOLUTION SAFELY CONCLUDED
Because of the fears that the army could still turn
violent and undermine the Revolution, and because the cost
of keeping the army in the field was such a strain on the
limited resources of the continent, most civilian and mili-
tary leaders wanted to have the army disbanded as soon as it
could safely be done.
Discussion about disbanding the army actually began
after Yorktown as peace seemed assured and therefore the
army unnecessary. And som.e disbanding did occur during 1782
and early 1783 .''"
During the early part of 1783, there was apparently
some thought given to weakening the power of the army by
decentralizing it to various parts of the country until such
time as peace was finally concluded. Alexander McDougall,
late in February, writing under the name "Brutus," informed
Knox there were some members of Congress who were considering
dividing the army up by dispersing units to different parts
of the country to lessen their influence and the threat of
^Ford, JCC, 22:209
,
210-212
,
451-452 ; 23:797
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a military tyranny. To some degree, this was actually done,
as during April, Congress ordered the Virginia, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania Lines, as well as the artillery and cavalry
units under Greene's command be removed to their home
states .
^
The first major congressional concern about disband-
ing the army came with the news on March 23, 1783, that a
provisional treaty of peace had been signed. Immediately
after receiving news of the peace, a congressional committee
asked Washington his opinion of their proposal of disbanding
the army with the promise to do them justice, reminding him
how expensive it was to keep the army in the field, particu-
larly if it were until their accounts were settled and
permanent funds raised."^
Expense was a very important consideration for
Congress, as Robert Morris continually reminded them of the
lack of finances and the cost of keeping the army supplied.^
Fear of what the army might do was another important consider
ation in congressional decisions with respect to disbanding
2
"Brutus" to Henry Knox, February 27, 1783, Henry
Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Champagne, Alexander
McDougall
, p. 195; Ford, JCC, 24:275-276.
3John Francis Mercer to George Weedon or William
Fitzhugh, March 24, 1783, Burnett, LMCC , 7:97; Theodorick
Bland to George Washington, March 25, 1783, ibid., 106-108.
^Robert Morris to Alexander Hamilton et al., April 14,
1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 3:323.
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the army. it was a consideration that was also shared by
the military leaders.
Because of the continued unrest in the army after
the Newburgh incident, Knox and Huntington notified
Washington on the sixteenth of April the sooner the "for the
war" soldiers were discharged, the better. The next day,
Washington informed Congress about the continued unrest and
a week later wrote Hamilton that he wished all the troops,
except those to be retained under a peace establishment, be
discharged. If the army was not disbanded, he believed
their claims would only increase, and "our perplexities
5
multiply .
"
Many officers and soldiers wanted to be discharged.
Anxious to resume their civilian careers, they were unwill-
ing to remain in camp until Congress fully compensated them.^
5Henry Knox to George Washington, April 16, 1783,
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United
States During the ConfederatTon 1 7 83^1^7^7' p"7 SOT'j'ed'ed'iah
Huntington to George Washington, Aprif 16
,
1783, ibid.;
George Washington to the General Officers of the Army,
April 17, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:328-
329; George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783,
ibid
.
, 351
.
^George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22,
1783, ibid., 350-351; George Washington to the General Offi-
cers of the Army, April 17, 1783, ibid., 328-329; George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
April 18, 1783, ibid,, 330; George Washington to Nathanael
Greene, May 18, 1783, ibid., 443; George Washington to
Jedediah Huntington, May 14, 1783, ibid,, 429; Jedediah
Huntington to George Washington, May 11, 1783, ibid.,
429n.53; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates, April 29,
1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:144n.3.
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Thus, beginning during the suininer of 1782
, and especially
after April 1783, when news of peace arrived in camp, many
soldiers deserted, not waiting to be formally discharged.^
Most officers and many soldiers, however, did not want to be
discharged until they were compensated, or at least their
o
accounts settled.
Some civilian leaders also did not want extensive
discharging to take place, for several reasons. Among them
was the continued nationalist desire that the uneasiness of
the army would compel the states to agree to their financial
program; the practical necessity of the army as long as the
enemy remained on the American shores; and the usefulness of
a strong army as a bargaining chip to the American diplomats
9m their negotiations.
7Jedediah Huntington to Jonathan Trumbull, August 4,
1782, MHSC
,
7th ser., 3:370; William Heath to Benjamin
Lincoln, July 24, 1782, ibid., 5:379-390; Jonathan Trum-
bull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., September 21, 1782,
ibid., 3:383; Jedediah Huntington to Andrew Huntington,
July 21, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923): 454;
General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
25:118-
119, 212-213, 222, 252-253, 424; Edward McCrady, The History
of South Carolina in the Revolution 1780-1783
,
pp^. 701-702 ;
Hugh F. Rankin, The North Carolina Continentals
, pp. 389-390;
Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer,
Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 3:486; Nathanael Greene
to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17, 178 3, Nathanael Greene Collec-
tion, vol. 77, WLCL.
g Baron von Steuben to Henry Knox, February 25, 178 3,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #11); Timothy Picker-
ing to Rebecca Pickering, March 14, 1783, Timothy Pickering
Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #1)
.
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"Brutus" to Henry Knox, February 12, 1783, Henry
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on April 11, 1783, Congress proclaimed an end to
hostilities, and four days later they ratified the peace
agreement. Nothing was said to Washington about demobili-
zation, for Congress at this point did not know what they
wanted to do. They did know, however, as the Rhode Island
delegates wrote their state's governor, "The disbanding of
the army is a matter of great consequence." On the twenty-
third of April, Richard Peters wrote Steuben the problem
previously had been one of how to raise an army, "The only
one which now embarrasses us is how to dissolve it."-'-^
Compromising on the twenty-third of April, Congress
decided that although the soldiers enlisted "for the war"
would not be officially discharged until the ratification
of the definitive treaty of peace, Washington, at his own
discretion, could grant furloughs to them. This decision,
Madison observed, was a compromise "between those who wished
to get rid of the expence of keeping the men in the field,
and those, who thought it impolitic to disband the army
whilst the British remained in the U. S. ""'""'"
During May, Congress frequently debated the question
of disbanding the army, and Morris constantly reminded them
Ford, JCC, 24:238-240; John Collins and Jonathan
Arnold to William Greene, April 23, 1783, Burnett, LMCC,
7:143; Richard Peters to Baron von Steuben, April 23, 1783,
ibid
.
, 150 .
"'""'"Ford, JCC, 24:269-270 ; James Madison's "Notes on
Debates," Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison, 6:486.
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of the cost of keeping the army in the field. Finally, on
the twenty-sixth of May, Congress unanimously agreed to
furloughing the "for the war" soldiers, and a proportionate
number of officers. They would receive their discharges
upon the ratification of the definitive peace treaty. Addi-
tionally, they agreed that the North Carolina troops who had
enlisted for eighteen months and a proportionate number of
officers also be furloughed, a provision that had already
been made for the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania troops
under Greene. ^he latter decision had been made because
of the continued unrest in the southern command throughout
1
3
the spring.
Congress, realizing they could not let the army
leave without a reward, decided to give each soldier three
months pay, a figure that had been suggested by Washington
as appropriate. Three months pay, however, was a sizeable
sum: estimated around $750,000--an amount that Congress did
12
James Madison's "Notes on Debates," ibid., 109n.l3;
7:53-54, 66-67, 67n.2, 80; Robert Morris to the President of'
the Continental Congress, July 18, 1783, Wharton, Revolu-
tionary Diplomatic Correspondence
,
6:563-566; Morris's Diary,
ibid., 432n; Ford, JCC, 24:358, 364-365.
13Nathanael Greene to George Washington, March 16,
1783, Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the
United States During the Confederation 1781-1789
,
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Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21, 1783, Palmer,
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tion, vol. 77, WLCL; Hugh Rankin, The North Carolina
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not have access to, without Morris issuing notes on his
personal credit. Morris, however, had detern^ined to resign
by the end of May if no permanent source of revenue had been
agreed to, and it had not. Nevertheless, he was prevailed
upon to issue notes on his personal credit, in anticipation
of loans. "'^
On the second of June, Washington, having received
news of Congress's twenty-sixth of May resolution, issued
furlough orders to the "for the war" soldiers and a propor-
tionate number of officers. Upset that the army was being
released without pay, nor a permanent source of revenue to
pay them, as V7ell as to commutate the officers' half-pay
pension, a committee of general officers and commanding
officers of regiments met on the fifth of June and drew up
a petition to Washington. In it they requested that no
14 George Washington to Robert Morris, April 9, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writ ings of Washington
, 26:309; George Washing-
ton to Theodorick" Bland, April 4', 1783, ibid., 285-291 ;
George VJashington to Alexander Hamilton, April 22, 1783,
ibid., 351-352; Robert Morris to a Committee of Congress,
April 14, 1783, Wharton, Revolutionary Diplomatic Corres-
pondence, 6:376-377; Same to "same. May T5",~T7 8"3~^b^dT7~4 29-
432; Robert Morris to the President of the Continental
Congress, May 1 , 1783 , ibid., 399-403; Same to same. May 3,
1783, ibid., 405-406; Robert Morris to Alexander Hamilton
et al., April 4, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton
,
3:323; Ford, JCC, 24:295-297, 283-285; 25:906-907; Young,
Robert Morris
, pp. 150-151; E. James Ferguson, The Power of
the Pur se : A History o f American Public Finance 1776-1790
(Chapel hTII: University of North ~Carol ina "Press foF the""
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1961), p. 169
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,
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,
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forced furloughs take place until Congress had a chance to
hear of their plight and that Washington urge Congress to
ascertain balances, liquidate accounts, and provide adequate
funds for all payments, including commutation
. Washinaton
responded the next day by informing the army in his general
orders that if the "for the war" soldiers did not want to be
furloughed they would not, provided soldiers enlisted for
three years took their place, and informed the army that
three days previously he had called upon the Superintendent
of Finance to provide the three months pay that had been
promised . '^'^
Washington made this unauthorized decision based on
the fear that the army might revolt if it appeared they were
being forced home without any hope of payment. VJith respect
to those soldiers who might turn violent if they v;ere not
released, Washington, on the fourteenth of May, issued
orders to Knox and Huntington, that if any soldiers showed a
1
6
Petition to Washington signed by William Heath
on behalf of the generals and officers corimanding regiments
and corps in the cantonment of the Hudson River, June [5],
1783, Sidney Kaplan, "Pay, Pension, and Pov/er: Economic
Grievances of the Massachusetts Officers of the Revolution,"
BPLQ 3, no. 2 (April 1951): 139-140.
17General Orders
,
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,
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Washington , 26:471-472 ; George V7ashington to the Superin-
tendent of Finance , June 3, 1783, ibid., 463-467.
mutinous disposition because of a desire to be discharged,
they were to be immediately furloughed
.
Washington's fears about his army revolting were
relieved as many officers and soldiers, eager to return
home, peacefully disbanded, not waiting to receive their
three months pay. By June 20, 1783, when Washington
re-organized his army and ordered them to march to West
Point, most of his army had melted away. The same was true
of the general officers, with only Knox, Paterson, Greaton,
Huntington, and Howe still remaining with the northern
19
army
.
Late in April 1783, Steuben had called on Washington
to have the discharging done with dignity, with appropriate
2 0discharges presented to the soldiers. This did not happen,
as the officers and soldiers were simply released. As
Colonel Stev7art observed, "the dissolution of our army was
unexpected, as it was sudden, and I can assure you had you
been a spectator of the scene, your heart would have bled
for the poor fellows who were in so disgraceful a manner
1
8
George Washington to Jedediah Huntington, May 14,
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,
ibid.
,
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1783, ibid., 430.
19 George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 24, 1783, ibid., 27:34; Boynton,
General Orders of Geo. Wa shington
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20
Baron von Steuben to George Washington, April 26,
1783
,
Kapp, Steuben
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turnea off.'.^l The sarne was true of the southern and
western armies.
By late June, when Greene received news of Congress's
eleventh of June resolution ordering the furloughing of those
soldiers of the Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Virginia Lines agreeable to their resolution of the twenty-
sixth of May, a good portion of his army had already
departed peacefully, not waiting to be formally discharged.
The rest would drift away during the summer, some waiting
for water transportation home, others not. Greene, once
Charleston was re-occupied and the rest of his army fur-
loughed, left the south on the eleventh of August. During
mid May, General Irvine arrived back at Fort Pitt and seeing
the troops were restless because of the lack of supplies,
furloughed most of them on the first of July. By the first
of October, Irvine and the remainder of the western army,
except a small garrison at Fort Pitt, had departed the west
22
and were furloughed.
21Walter Stewart to Horatio Gates, June 20, 1783,
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For the .ost part, the disbanding was peacefully
done, as Washington and the other officers ensured it was
done with strict discipline enforced, with soldiers leavino
on furloughs properly officered. There was so.e concern
about letting the soldiers carry their ar.s with the., but
Washington successfully prevailed upon Congress durxng April
to let the soldiers leave with their arms and accoutrements
.
There were several reasons and factors why the dis-
banding was peacefully accomplished, and why the army
remained relatively peaceful the last year of the war. One
of the most important factors was the appearance that the
civilian authorities were attempting to make good on their
promises. This was the result of the improved economic
condition of the states during the last years of the war.^^
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And, although the finances of Congress were, for all
practical purposes, non-existent, there were reasons for the
n^ilitary to be optimistic about eventually receiving all
that was due them. Among them were the decision by Robert
Morris not to resign at the end of May, as he had intended
to; the adoption of the impost by Congress in April; and the
late March decision to commutate the officers' half-pay to
a fixed one time payment. The military were also pleased
by receiving, in early June, three months pay, and by the
efforts, during the summer, of the Paymaster General to
settle their accounts. Particularly gratifying to the
officers were the issuance that fall of commutation
certificates and the decision by Congress in September to
promote all officers who had served over five years without
a promotion. This decision meant a larger commutation
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farm will satisfy my ami.ition," he wrote.
^^^^^^
the whole war, Washington was especially eager to return
home, to "the pleasure of a little repose and retirement
In June 1783, he wrote that he was awaiting the definitive
treaty, for it would end his military service, thereby
allowing him to spend the rest of his life "in that kind of
ease and repose which a man enjoys that is free from the
3
1
load of public cares."
Domestic concerns filled a large part of the minds
of the military during the last two years of the war. Many
officers were eager to marry and settle down to peaceful
pursuits. Some officers, early in the war, decided they
would not consider the questions of love and marriage until
29 .William North to Benjamin Walker, [November 1783]
,
Feinstone Collection #1031; Lewis Morris, Jr., to Jacob
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31George Washington to John Augustine Washington,
June 15, 1783, ibid., 27:12.
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the war ended. ^2 ^.^^ York town behind ihom, such
considerations absorbed the attention of many. Courtships
began in earnest, with some officers even set on courting
and marrying well-to-do widows as a means of diminishing
their financial plight. '^^ ^^^^ courtships and
lengthy engagements culminated in marriage during the last
two years of the war, as many officers did not want to wait
until the army was disbanded before beginning life in a
married state. And most of these officers left tl)e military
34service to do so.
32Jedediah Huntington to Jabez Huntington,
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others were just as concerned about the health and well-beinc,
of their wives, some of whom died the last year of the war
Gates even left the army in March to take care of his sick
Wife, Who died that .une.^^ ,13,
and interest of the fathers in uniform, was the birth, well-
being, and education of their children. Some officers, such
as Rufus Putnam, left the army to be with their pregnant
wives; while others ^uc^h c^k-^^j- •ui-ie , s c as Sebastian Bauman
, remained at
camp, anxious about the impending birth of their children.
And all fathers must have simply missed their children.
General Greene certainly did. Although his wife joined him
during 1782, their children remained in Rhode Island. He
wrote a friend late that year how much he missed his children
and his desire to return home.^^
36^
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"Nathanael Greene's Letters to 'Friend Sammy' Ward," RIH 17,
no. 1 (January 1958): 18-19.
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Washington also had personal and domestic concerns,
which increased his desire to return ho.e
. of immediate
concern was his health, as both his eyesight and teeth had
worsened during the war.^^ His family and relatives were
also of great concern. When his stepson died late in 1781,
he left behind a wife and four children. They, in part,
became Washington's responsibility. His nephew, Bushrod
Washington, had to be educated. So, in 1782, Washington
arranged for him to study law under James Wilson. He was
concerned about the debt his brother, Samuel, had accumulated
and that Lund Washington had not done an adequate job of
managing Mount Vernon during his absence, especially his
not forcing the tenants to pay their rent. Although Martha
being with him must have been of some comfort, he still
worried about her, as she was sick with the fever during the
summer of 1783. Washington was most concerned about his
financial plight. Despite having made purchases of land in
New York, which he was anxious about, he believed he had
suffered considerably during the war. To some degree this
was true as, with the 6 percent interest on money he laid
out himself during the war, Washington was owed over $400,000
by Congress. For these reasons, he greatly desired to return
39 George Washington to William Stephens Smith,
May 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick, VJri tings of Wa shington
,
26:434;
George V^ashington to Tlndrew Billings, June 17
,
1783
,
ibid.,
27:19.
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to Mount Vernon, to ta.e care of Ms fa.ily, Ms affairs,
and himself. °
Jedediah Huntington observed early in 1783 fro. his
west Point ca^p that
.'The Peace will undoubtedly brin, about
a great Revolution in Conferee; it will ^ difficult to know
where
,
how to take Advantage of rt."" indeed, „,any
officers' attention during the last years of the war focused
on their economic futures. Some officers and soldiers,
already by 1781, had started planning their post-war
42pursuits. Others had business plans, such as Pickering,
for a mercantile business and General Greene, for becoming
40
1783 lbid''''°^I^
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a rice planter. See officers and soldiers started their
business ventures at or near the end of the war/^ Colonel
Walter Stewart, for example, during 1782, set up a shipping
company, and upon his discharge early in 1783, sent out ships
for Havana and France/^ Private Samuel Smith, of Providence,
upon his discharge during mid 1783, shipped out on a whaling
brig bound for the Brazilian coast During the spring of
1783, Washington allowed Colonel Matthias Ogden to go to
France to begin a business venture on behalf of a number of
New Jersey officers. ^"^ Also that spring. Lieutenant
Colonel Samuel Ward, having left the military, sailed on the
"George Washington" out of Providence for Canton, in hopes
of beginning a trade with the orient. The following
43 .Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January 4,
1783, Timothy Pickering Papers, r4HS (Microfilm Reel #1)
;
Timothy Pickering to George Williams, February 17, 1783,
Pickering, Timothy Pickering
, 1:401; Thayer, Nat_hanael
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, p. 405.
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45Joseph A. Goldenberg, "The 'William' and 'Favorite':
The Post-Revolutionary Voyages of Two Philadelphia Ships,"
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46 Charles I. Bushnell, [ed.]. Memoirs of S amuel
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, pp. 22-23
.
47George Washington to Matthias Ogden, April 7,
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February, he and another officer sailr-H r.,,^ ^'-^Lj-xcer led out of Imgw York City
on the "Empress of China" with a similar view in mind/^
While many in the army thought about their families
and post-war pursuits, many others turned their attention to
obtaining the land they had been promised. Land was a major
factor in preventing the military from taking other property
from their fellow citizens. it served as a safety valve to
the frustrations of the military. Instead of plotting a
military overthrow of the central government or the state
governments, many in the military during the last two years
of the war, spent hours discussing their plans for the land
they would obtain upon the peace. Before the end of the
war, many even left for the new lands, frequently in the
far west. This removed from the scene many v/ho might have
abetted, encouraged, and participated in some form of
military tyranny.
Actually, some began consideration of moving west-
ward as early as 1778
, even before the war terminated.''^
Despite objections that to open the western lands to
48Qumcy, Samuel Shaw, pp. 110-112, 133; RIHSC, 6
(1867) : 87.
49William Russell to William Fleming, October 7,
1778, Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation; An
Interpretation of the Socral-Constitutional ~Hrstory"~"of~the
American Revolu tion 1774-1781 , ^pp. 19 9-2 0'o7"~Samuel ~H7"^Parsons
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, 5:505; Francis Lewis , William^FToyd /"jolirT"
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Morris, John Jay, pp. 548-549.
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settlement before the war ended would deplete the armies
and provide an asylum for deserters, by the end of 1781,
several states had not only set aside lands for their
soldiers, but established land officers to distribute the
land
.
The actual exodus to the west began after George
Rogers Clark's success in the Illinois country, and continued
at an increasing pace once land was opened for settlement
in Kentucky and Tennessee.^'''
During 1782 and 1783, more land was opened and more
land offices were established
. During those years a land
rush to the west took place, as many veterans took advantage
Mordecai Gist to Robert Munford, October 24, 1780
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of settling the lands they had been granted. Interest in
settling in the west picked up dramatically after the so-
called Newburgh incident, as many officers believed their
only future lay in the western lands owed them. If they
were not to imnnediately receive their pay and pensions, at
least they would receive their land.
Many officers undertook to have a tract of land set
aside in the v/est specifically for veterans. During May,
over two hundred officers signed a petition, requesting that
Congress set aside the Ohio country for the veterans, and
that it eventually be admitted to the Confederation as a
state. Early in June, Washington forwarded the petition to
Congress, with the endorsement of it, reasoning that such an
53
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5 4 Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon, April 7,
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area would protect their boundaries, especially since it
would be primarily settled by veterans. His lobbying
efforts were joined by many officers, who no longer desired
to reside in the east once the war ended.
Washington also kept himself busy during the spring
and surmner thinking about the development of the western
lands, particularly since he owned approximately 58,000
acres of land beyond the Alleghenies and was in the process
of purchasing several thousand acres in the Mohawk Valley.
Congress did not accept the plan endorsed by
Washington, in part because Virginia's cession of her west-
ern lands had not been accepted and peace had not been made
with the Indian tribes in the Ohio country. Thus, by the
time the army was disbanded, no arrangements had been made
by Congress for the settlement of the west. Nevertheless,
the veterans made other arrangements, involving themselves
in other pursuits or going west on their own.
55 Copy of the petition in Buell, Rufus Putnam
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1783, ibid., 133-140; Charles H. Ambler, George VJashington
and the West (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1936), pp. 173-174.
The various factors just discussed kept the military
busy, giving them less time to contemplate their concerns
and problems, as well as less time to foment violent means
of redressing their grievances. Also keeping the military
occupied the last year of the war were another set of
factors. These involved the mxlitary engaging in a variety
of domestic, social, political, and military activities.
With respect to social and domestic activities, many
officers kept themselves amused in a variety of ways.
Several had their wives join them at camp, such as Washing-
ton and Greene. ^"^ Others found women for company wherever
5 8they could. Steuben spent many hours fishing and playing
chess. One young officer, quartered near York, Pennsyl-
vania, during 1782 and 1783, bought a flute with the
intention of learning how to play it.^° Some officers,
including Washington, spent time reading and purchasing
books. ^"^ Others, including Gates, Pickering, and David
57Greene, Nathanael Greene
, 3:486.
5 8Alexander McDougall to Henry Knox, October 19,
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Humphreys, wrote poetry and essays. Although Washington
did not write poetry, he did correspond on the subject during
the summer of 1783. He also spent time corresponding about
food, furnishings, and furniture for Mount Vernon. And once
New York City was occupied, he shopped for adornments with
which to furnish Mount Vernon. He also spent many hours
during 1782 and 1783 writing thank you letters to American
and foreign officers. Several officers kept amused during
1783 by being tourists. During the fall, Pickering and
several other officers took a tour of the northern battle-
fields. During the summer, Washington, Governor Clinton,
and most of V7ashington ' s aides took a similar tour, travel-
ling some 750 miles during a three week period. That fall,
6 2 Timothy Pickering to Rebecca Pickering, January 12,
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,
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Washington made plans for a grand tour of America the
following spring.
Another thing keeping the officers busy was their
political careers, as many contemplated entering or
re-entering the political world upon their discharge. Early
in 1784, Edmund Randolph wrote Jefferson that "the elections
for this year have proved the readiness of the citizens to
6 9incorporate the military with the civil." This was indeed
true of the elections held during the fall of 1783 and the
70
winter of 1783-1784. Jackson Turner Main, in his studies
of political parties before the Constitution, found that
over 40 percent of those elected to the Massachusetts
Assembly between 1784 and 1788 served in the military during
the war, and nearly 60 percent of those elected to the
71Virginia House for the same period were veterans. He did
6 8 George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette,
October 12, 1783, ibid., 187. '
^^Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, April 24,
17 84, Conway, Omitte d Chapters of History , p. 54.
7 n
Howard Thomas, Marinus Wil l ett: Soldier -Patriot
1740-1830 (Prospect, New York : Prospect Books, 1954), p. 155;
Isaac Q. Le ake , Memoir of the Life and Times of General John
Lamb , an Officer of the Revolution, who Commanded the Post
at West~Point at the Time of Arnold's Defection and His
Correspondence with Washington, Clinton, Patrick Henry and_
Other Distinguished Men o f His Time (Albany: Joel Munsell,
18 5TyT"^pr'2 96T
"
'^"'"Jackson Turner Main, Politic a l Parties Before__the
Constitution, pp. 93, 246; for similar statistics for other
"sFat^'sT^e ibid., pp. 124 , 159, 175 , 214, 272.
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not disti.ujuish betwoon Continonlal
.nul .nil i , i a Borvice, In.t
tlu>re is sufficient evidence to indicate nu.ny wore Conti-
nontn-1 offi.ors. The afterglow of apotheosis of nnl.t.uy
service ondow-nl many veterans vv i I li political prestige.
SaimiM SinUh roucUHi rarly in 1 782 that vluMu-vor an ot l icer
run., against a non-voteran, 1 ho veteran won. A year later,
he reported that Maryland preferred to an,uMnt (.rficers,
rathoi ihan civilians, to appointive posts in I lu> state
72government
.
nu. inq 1 783 and 1784, many officers, havnuj jnr.t
recently l,>rt the military, were elected sheriffs and
jucicjos. Amonq (lu-m wore Calnm^lr, David Cobb, Samuel Elbert,
George Ilandley, i;i)luaiu) Brown, John Faiioliorand Ciimko, and
7 3Marinus WiLlett. other officers were oJccted to tlioir
state legislative bodies. Among them were GontMals Waynt>,
Morgan, McDougall, Maxwell, and Colonels Kdward Carrinyton,
James Jackson, and John B. Ashe, and Surgeon Ebenezer
72 Samfuel] Smith to Otho H[olland] Williams,
Fob 1 ua
1 y 1 4 , 1782 , Calendar of the General Otho Holland
Williams taper s in the Maryl and Historical Soc iety
,
^^7^(-> 0
;
Same to same, January 9, 1783, ibid., p. 75.
73Whi te , Historical Co llections of Georgin
, pp . .MS,
218; Edwin Stone, Our French Allies
, p. 153n.; "Order Book
of Jolm Faucherand Grimke (August 1778-1780)," SCHGM 13,
no. 1 (January 1912): 42-4 3; Ralph Davol, ^Vo Men o f 'I'auntcn
In the Course of Human Events 1731-1829, p. 176; Willett,
Marinus Willett, p. 14 4; Fi .nicis S. Drake, Memoria ls of the
Society of the Cincinnati of Massachusetts, p. 259.
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El.er.^^ So.e officers were elected to the executive branch
of the state governn^ents
.
m Pennsylvania, for example,
during 1783, the Council of Censors was composed of Generals
St. Clair, Wayne, Irvine, and Major James Moore. m Georgia,
during 1784, Major John Habersham became President of the
Executive Council. other officers were elected to less
important positions. General John Paterson in 1784 became
town moderator of Lenox, Massachusetts, and Colonel Richard
Varick, who would be elected to the state legislature during
1784, served during 1783 and 1784 as the Recorder of the
City of New York.^^ other officers were appointed to
civilian positions. Major John Armstrong, Jr., and Lieuten-
ant John Rose served as secretary and clerk respectively
during 1783 for the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council
74 [Rufus W. Griswold]
,
Washington and the Generals
^LJ^^_^?:i£^^evol u tion , 1:12 6; Don HigaiFb^thiH7~DiHii'l
Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill: University of
'
North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia, 1961), p 175-
BDC, pp. 527, 912, 1371; J. H. Griffith, "William Maxwell of'
New Jersey, Brigadier General in the Revolution," PNJHS, 2d
ser., 13, no. 2 (1894): 121; Garland Evans Hopkins, Colonel
Carrington of Cumberland (Winchester, Virginia: Drivately
printed, 1942), p. 33; Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of
Major General James Jack son, p. 50.
75Charles Colcock Jones, "A Biographical Sketch of
the Honorable Major John Habersham of Georgia," MH , extra
no. 2, no. 7, pt. 2 (1886): 246.
^^Egleston, John Paterson
, p. 146; Baxter, A God-
child of Washington, p. 21'2.
and the Council of Censors. The for.er body appointed
colonel Andrew Porter as commissioner to run the boundary
lines with Ohio, Virginia and New York.^^ m the latter
state, right after the war. Colonel John Lamb was made the
collector of the Port of New York and the Chief Geographer
of the Army; Simeon DeWitt was made Surveyor General
.
Washington and the other conmianding officers attempted
to keep the minds of their officers off their problems and
prospects by a variety of social and military activities.
A public building was built during the winter of 1782-1783
at NGwburgh. Besides keeping the soldiers busy building it,
Washington had it built so it could be used for both mili-
tary and social events. It was used for religious services,
and such social gatherings as the anniversary of the French
alliance. Other celebrations were held at Newburgh, such
as on April 19, 1783, when the declaration of the cessation
77
Robert D. Arbuckle, Pennsylvania Speculator and
Patriot: The Entrepreneuria l John Nicholson, 1757-1800, p. 2 5
;
Linn, Pennsylvania in" the War of the Revolution, lT60Tn
.
7 8
David R. B. Nevin, Con t inental Sketches of
Distinguished Pennsylvanians
, pp. 135-136.
"
79Jones, History of New York
,
2:342-343; Albert H.
Heusser, ed
. & Intro, by Hubert G. Schmidt, George
Washington's Mapmaker : A Biography of Robert Erskine (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1966), pp. "185-I86n . 6
.
8 0General Orders, Boynton, General Orders of Geo.
V7ashing ton
, pp. 5 3-59 ; General Gates's Genefal'~Order¥^
January 6, 13, 1783, Peter Casper Order Book, Special
Collections, USMAL; The New-York Packe t, January 16,
February 13, 1783.
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Of hostilities was proclaimed, and previously, on May 31,
1782
,
upon the news of the birth of the dauphin of France.
During the su^^er of 1783 at West Point, soldiers were kept
busy erecting a colonnade and creating fireworks for the
anticipated celebration of the news of the definite treaty
. 82
P^^^^- Celebrations were also held by the southern
army. On April 23, 1783, Greene had a fireworks display at
James Island for the soldiers and civilians from Charles-
ton. Other social activities were also engaged in by
both the southern and northern armies. For example, at
the headquarters of the southern army at Ashley Hill, South
Carolina, during 1782, the comedy, "Much Ado About Nothing,"
was performed by a cast composed of officers. During
December 1782, some officers held a fox hunt and dinner near
their camp at New Windsor with citizens of the nearby
General Orders, Boynton, Gener al Orders of Geo.
Washington
, pp. 2 0-22 , 66-69 ; Jonathan Trumbull," Jr.,'To~
Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., April 23, 1783, MHSC, 7th ser.,
3:414.
8 2Timothy Pickering to Samuel Hodgdon
,
August 21,
1783, Pickering, Timothy Pickering
,
1:476.
8 3Greene, Nathanael Greene
,
3:489.
84 [Feltman] , Journal of William Feltman
, p. 40;
[Denny], Military Journal, pp. 50-51; Hugh F. Rankin, The
North Carolina Continentals, p. 38 7 ; Robert VTharry to Reading
Beatty, February 5, 1782, Joseph M, Beatty, Jr. [ed.],
"Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty
,
1781-1788," PMHB, 54, no. 2 (1930): 163; Samuel Story to
Reading Beatty, March [6] , 17 82, ibid. , 164.
^^Will iam Pierce to St . George Tucker, July 10, 1782,
"Original Documents," MAH 7, no. 6 (December 1881): 442.
790
communities. Social gatherings at Washington's head-
quarters were frequent occurrences, with Washington playing
host to foreign visitors and to a weekly levee of officers
and daily dinners for different officers.
Another social activity were Mason meetings, which
were held at Newburgh, West Point, Fort Pitt, and other
military sites. Throughout the war, freemasonry brought
a stability to the revolutionary army, with its built-in
prohibition against political participation.^^ Its primary
influence was furthering the concept of. an aristocratic and
benevolent revolution
. Order was the hallmark of masonry.
The 1723 Mason constitution stated "a Mason is a peaceable
86 ^The New York Packet and American Advertiser
December 12
, 1782 .
~ ~
Gouverneur Morris to Henry Knox, October 6, 1783,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15); Clement Biddle
to Henry Knox, October 7, 1783, ibid.; Count Wengieski to
Henry Knox, October 17, 1783, ibid.; J. T. Headley, "Last
Days of Washington's Army at Newburgh," Harper's New Monthly
Magazine 67, no. 401 (October 1883): 6527~65TT
8 8 Hugo Tatsch, Freemasonry in the Thirteen Colonies
(New York: MaCoy Publishing and Masonic Supply Company, 1929),
pp. 202, 215; Sidney Hayden
,
Washington and His Masonic Com-
peer^, pp. 85-87; Butterfield, Washing ton-Irvine' Correspond-
ence
, pp. 172-173n.l; Carl H. Claudy"^ "Washington's Home and
Fraternal Life," Pamphlet no. 14 in Albert Bushnell Hart,
ed
. ,
[In] Honor to George Washington and Reading about
George Washington (Washington , DC: United States George
Washington Bicentennial Commission, 1932), p. 177.
89
Ibid., p. 168; Bernard Fay, Revolution and
Freemasonry 16 80-1 800
, p . 315.
Ibid
. ,
passim
.
subject to the Civil Powers, wherever he resides or works,
and is never to be concern'd in Plots and Conspiracies
against the Peace and Welfare of the Nation."^!
Masonry was popular in the American Continental Ar.y
throughout the war. The first lodge was established in New
York during July. m all, ten or eleven lodges were
organized during the war. Washington, who had joined the
Masons during 1752, encouraged the creation of the military
lodges and personally participated in their act ivi ties . ^
^
During the spring of 1783, several officers, includ-
ing Knox, Steuben, and Huntington, organized the Society of
the Cincinnati, as an institution that would perpetuate
friendship among the officers once the war ended, and would
provide funds for their future relief. Meetings were fre-
quently held during April, May, and June at the Public
Building and at Steuben's headquarters near Fishkill, to
draw up a constitution and elect officers. The first
officers included Washington, as president; McDougall, as
treasurer; and Knox, as secretary. During the summer and
Ibid., appendix B, p. 320; for other masonic
statements on the subordinate role of the individual to
the civil magistrates, see ibid., appendix C, p. 321, and
appendix D, p. 322.
92
Ibid., pp. 245, 250; Hugo Tatsch, Freemasonry in
the Thirteen Colonies
, pp. 202-222; Sidney Hayden,
Washington and His Masonic Compeers
, pp. 42-45, 5 2, 73-74.
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fall, most state Lines formed their state chapters of the
9 3organization.
Keeping the military occupied during the last year
and a half of the war, was the war itself. Victory at
Yorktown did not bring an end to hostilities or the threat
of such. During 1782 and 1783, the British still occupied
wide tracts of land in the west, Savannah, Charleston, New
York City, and Fort George, in Maine. The Indians were
still of great concern, as warfare continued with them on
all the frontiers during 1782 and 1783.^^ The domestic war
93
Drafts of the Institution and other relatedpapers dated between April 15 and June 19, 1783, are to befound m the Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12)-Charles Lukens, North Carolina Society of the Cinc innati'(Boston: n,p., pRnted for the North Carolina Society of
the Cincinnati, 1907), pp. 5-7, 24-26, 30, 32; Baron von
Steuben to Henry Knox, November 11, 1783, Francis S. Drake,
Memorials of the Soc iety o f the Cincinnati of Massachusetts
p. 19. ~" '
94
Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American
Revolut ion
, pp. 252-253; William Irving to Benjamin Lincoln,
April 16, 1783, C. W. Butterfield, An Historical Account of
the Expedition Against Sandusky under Col. William Crawford
in 1782
, p. 2 80; Stevens, A History of Georgia
, 2:412-4T5T~
Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary
War, pp. 236-240; Joseph Doddridge, Notes on the Settlement
and Indian Wars of the Western Parts of Virginia from 176 3
to 1783, Inclusive, Together v;ith a Revl^ew of the State of
Society and Manners of the First Settlers of the v-Jestern
Country. Republished with the addition of new and valuable
materiaT (Pittsburgh : John S . Ritenour and Wm. tT Lindsey
,
1912), pp. 188, 207, 217, 232; Bodley, Our First Great West,
p. 208; Isaac Craig to William Irvine, April 5, 1783, "Notes
and Queries," PMHB 36, no. 4 (1912): 507; Isaac Craig to
William Irvine, April 5, 1783, Ryan, A Salute to Courage,
p. 283.
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continued as well, especially in New Jersey and in New
York.^^
Washington kept actively involved in the preparation
of the army for action, keeping them disciplined and plan-
ning future strategies should the need arrive. Realizing
the army, long-suffering, might take matters into their own
hands if not properly controlled, Washington, Greene, and
other commanding officers attempted to maintain a high state
of discipline during 1782 and 1783. And, for the most part,
the army was better organized, clothed, fed, and was better
disciplined that at any other time of the war.^"^
95 .Richard J. Koke
,
ed., "War, Profit, and PrivateersAlong the New Jersey Coast: Letters of 1782 Relating to an
Obscure War Front of the American Revolution," NYHSQ 41
no. 3 (July 1957): 279-337.
96 B^enjamin Lincoln to Artemas Ward, February 18,
1783, Artemas Ward Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #3).
97 Samuel Cogswell to Mason Cogswell, August 29, 1782,
Ryan, A Sal ute to Courage
, pp. 272-273; Peter Clayes to
Lieutenant [ ], January 24, 1783, Feinstone Collection
#171; Oliver Rice to Jonathan Rice, October 23, 1782, ibid.,
#1207; The New York Packet and the American Advertiser,
[Fishkill]
,
January 16, 1783; E. W. Balch, trans., "Narra-
tive of the Prince de Broglie 1782," MAH 1, no. 5 (May 1877):
30 7; Acomb
,
Revolutionary Journal of Baron Ludwig von Clo sen
,
p. 2 39 ; John Smith Hanna, A History of the Life and Services
of Captain Samuel Dewes
, p. 159; Brown, Revolutionary War
Journals of Henry Dearborn
, p. 236; Joseph Reed to Nathanael
Greene, March 14, 1783, Kirkland, Letters on the American
Revolution
,
2:95; Silas Goodell to Joshua Huntington,
November 11, 1782, "The Huntington Papers," CHS^, 20 (1923):
166; George Washington to John Jay, October 18, 1782, Fitz-
patrick. Writings of VJashington, 25:275; George Washington
to Benjamin Harrison, November 13, 1782, ibid., 336; George
Washington to William Heath, February 5, 1783, ibid., 26:97;
George V.'ashington to John Armstrong, Sr., January 10, 1783,
ibid., 27; Baron von Steuben to George Washington,
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TO n^ake sure discipline was enforced, despite pleas
for furloughs, Washington lin^ited the number of officers he
allowed to be away from camp.^^ He decided to stay with
the troops, as well, explaining to James McHenry that he'
would "try like a careful physician to prevent if possible
the disorders getting to an incurable height. "^^ To keep
the troops at Fort Pitt under strict discipline, during the
spring of 1783, he sent General Irvine back to that post
to take con^and.l°° To maintain discipline at his own army,
Washington provided for a provost and two field officers of
the day to superintend the police of the army; and to keep
the army confined to camp, he provided for patrols, few
passes, and roll calls at irregular hours at night. "''^-^
Another way Washington kept the army occupied, as
well as instilling discipline, was by encouraging church
service attendance. During the spring of 1783, he provided
there would be no fatigue duty on Sundays, and that the
January [ ], 1782, Kapp, Steuben, pp. 484-485; Baron von
Steuben to George Clinton, April 10, 1782, Spaulding, Georoe
Clinton
, p. 137.
~
98General Orders, Fitzpatrick, Writings o f
Washington
,
25:421-423. '
99George Washington to James McHenry, October 17,
1782, ibid., 269-270; see also George Washington to Joseph
Jones, December 14, 1782, ibid., 430.
''"^^George Washington to William Irvine, April 16,
1783, ibid., 26:322.
"'"'^'"General Orders, Lauber, Orderly Books, pp. 702-
703 .
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army would maintain a sense of decorum and order on the
sabbath. Many of the sermons preached during the last year
Of the war discussed decorum and order, not just on Sundays,
but every day of the week, and the necessity for remaining
subordinate to civil and military leaders and avoiding any
seditious or mutinous behavior . """^^
To keep the military occupied, Washington also
authorized officers to engage in minor military adventures,
if it appeared they would be successful. Most of these
involved sending troops into the neutral area of New York
and allowing officers to participate in special projects,
such as a contemplated capturing of Prince William Henry,
who was serving in New York City with the British navy.^°^
Even after news of peace arrived, Washington still
actively involved himself in military affairs, especially
making arrangements for the transfer of prisoners, property.
General Orders, Boynton, General Orders of Geo.
Washington
, p. 62; Patrick J. Furlong, "A"Sermon for the
Mutinous Troops of the Connecticut Line, 1782," NEQ, 43,
no. 4 (December 1970): 624-631; William B. WeedenT^ed
.
,
"Diary of Enos Hitchcock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolution-
ary Army. With a Memoir," RIHSP
, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900):
100-106.
103Peter Clayes to Lieutenant [ ], January 24,
1783, Feinstone Collection #171; George Washington to
Matthias Ogden , March 28, 1782, Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 24:91; Thos. F. De Voe , "Prince William Henry
in New York," HM, 2d ser., 5, no. 2 (February 1869): 130-132;
Lord Stirling to Marquis de Bouille, June 25, 1782, Duer,
Stirling
, pp. 248-249; Katharine Metcalf Roof, Colonel
William Smith and Lady: The Romance of Washington's Aide and
Young Abigail Adams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929),
pp . 36-37.
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and territory. During the suim.er of 1783, he sent Ephraim
Douglass to Detroit and Niagara to get the British to vacate
the posts there, and Steuben to Canada to request the
British to turn over their western posts to the United
states. Neither were very successful. However,
Washington was successful in his dealings with Guy Carleton
in making arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, keep-
ing fighting to a minim.um, and arranging for the evacuation
of New York City.^°^ Developing a recommendation for the
post-war military establishment was another activity that
kept Washington busy. Throughout the spring and summer, he,
assisted by several officers, including Knox, Heath, and
Pickering, formulated a recommendation for Congress to
• ^ 106consider
.
104^ ^Instructions to Baron von Steuben, July 12, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington
,
27:61-63; Ephraim
Douglass to William Irvine, July 6, 1783, "Notes and Queries,"
PMHB 37, no. 1 (1913): 126; Ephraim Douglass to Benjamin
Lincoln, August 18, 1783, Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st
ser., 10:83-90. —
"'"'^^
"Substance of a conference between George
Washington and Sir Guy Carleton," May 6, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington
,
26:402-406; Richard Varick to Henry
Glen, May 18, 1783, "Original Documents," MAH 14, no. 5
(November 1885): 513-515; Douglas Southall Freeman, George
Washington: A Biography
,
5:441.
106 Henry Knox to George Washington, April 17, 1783,
(draft), Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #12); Lewis
Nicola to Henry Knox, October 26, 1782, ibid. (Microfilm
Reel #10) ; "Thoughts on the Military Establishment Proper
for the United States at the Conclusion of the War in 1783,"
draft by Timothy Pickering, April 22, 1783, Timothy Picker-
ing Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #5); George Washington to
Alexander Hamilton, April 16, 1783, Fitzpatrick, VJritings of
With the army relatively busy and peaceful, occupied
with thoughts of their post-war lives and careers, most
civilian and military leaders believed that disbanding the
army would be done without incident. This did not happen.
Although most officers and soldiers believed they would
eventually be compensated after leaving military service, a
few did not. They believed the best time to obtain what was
owed them was while in uniform, united and armed. They were
fearful that once they were disbanded the civilian govern-
ments would renege on their promises of pay and other
benefits. Acting on these beliefs during the summer, some
soldiers decided to demand by force of arms that the civil
governments immediately give them what they were owed.
During mid May, about one hundred troopers of
Virginia's first regiment of cavalry marched off from their
South Carolina camp to Richmond to lay their grievances
before the legislature. Greene sent an officer after them
to coax them back with a promise of a full pardon and wrote
the chief executive of Virginia, warning him of the troops
and urging that he punish them if they threatened the
Washington, 26:323; Washington Sentiments on the Peace
Establishment in Letter to Alexander Hamilton, May 2, 1783,
ibid., 376; Observation on an Intended Report of a Committee
of Congress on a Peace Establishment, September 8, 1783,
ibid., 27:140-144; William Heath to George Washington,
April 17, 1782, MHSC, 7th ser., 5:386; Buell, Rufus Putnam,
pp. 205-209.
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civilian government. Governor Harrison, after consulting
with the legislature, had General Morgan and Colonel Baylor
visit the mutineers in hopes they could bring their, under
some form of discipline. Additionally, he had foodstuffs
sent to them, believing this would keep them from plunder-
ing. Although these measures quelled the mutinous spirit
of the soldiers, it was not until the legislature late in
June provided three months pay be given to them, as well as
all other Virginia Line soldiers returning from the south-
ward, that they were satisfied, and peacefully furloughed . "^^^
Also during May, another unit in Greene's command exhibited
mutinous behavior, but did not march from camp. A more
serious incident happened the first days of June, when
many Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia troops threatened
to resolve their grievances by force. Greene had the ring-
leaders taken into custody and quelled the mutinous soldiers
by drawing up the army into battle formation and threatening
107Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Harrison, May 21,
1783, Palmer, Calendar of Virg inia State Pape rs, 3:486;
Same to same. May 27 , 17 8 3 ibid.
, 493; Ben5"amrn Harrison
to the Virginia Delegates at Congress, May 31, 1783,
Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison
,
7:96-97, 99n.l2;
Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia. Genera l
Assembly Begun and Holden at the Public Buildings in the
C ity o7~ Richmond, on Monday the Fifth of May , i n the Year
o f Our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighth-Three
(n . p. :~nTd . ) , pp. 41-4T7~T61, 1 7 7 .
799
. , 108them. Late m November, an officer of the Maryland Line
warned Governor Paca that a body of soldiers planned to
surround the legislature and seize the state treasury in
hopes their grievances would be resolved. Paca reacted to
this news by ordering a company of militia to stand by to
put down any insurrection. None happened.
This was not the case with the Pennsylvania troops.
On June 13, 1783, some Pennsylvania troops at Lancaster,
most of whom had been enlisted during late 1782, upset by
the news of being furloughed and not receiving the pay that
was due them, sent a memorial to the Secretary at War stating
they they would not disband until their grievances, particu-
larly pay, were met. When it appeared to these soldiers
they would be marched further away from Philadelphia,
approximately eighty of them marched on Philadelphia to
lobby the civilian authorities. There they v/ere joined by
several hundred other soldiers then in town. Together they
sent a memorial to Congress threatening to take action if
that body did not act to meet their grievances. To demon-
strate the seriousness of their demands, they surrounded the
108,, ^, , ^ . .Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, May 17,
1783, Nathanael Greene Collection, vol. 77, WLCL; Nathanael
Greene to Joseph Egleston, May 17, 1783, ibid., Nathanael
Greene to Benjamin Lincoln, June 3, 1783, ibid., vol. 78.
109 .William Paca to the General Assembly, Bro\-me,
Maryland Archives, 48:483; VJilliam Paca to James Brice,
November 25, r78 3, ibid., 4 8 3-4 84; Scharf, Hi story of
Maryland, 2:502, 502n.l.
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State House, where Congress sat, with their bayonets fixed.
Since the Pennsylvania government was too weak to stop these
soldiers. Congress vacated Philadelphia and relocated in
Princeton, New Jersey. Before leaving, on the twenty-first
of June, they ordered Washington to send troops to put down
the mutiny.
When Washington received news of the mutiny, he
inmediately ordered General Howe with fifteen hundred
soldiers and a detachment of artillery to Philadelphia to
put down the mutiny. This force reached Philadelphia the
first week of July, to find the mutiny had failed, its
leaders having left the city, and probably the country. The
mutiny had collapsed once the mutineers realized the civilian
authorities would not consider their grievances until they
disbanded and that the Pennsylvania militia, supported by
Continentals, would be used against them. Although the
mutiny had been quelled, Congress called on Howe to bring to
trial all the mutineers and to examine all the circumstances
related to it. In doing so, he was directed to consult with
the Pennsylvania Council on all matters touching on civil
authority. Howe and his force remained in the Philadelphia
area for several weeks, ensuring that there would be no
further outbreaks and rounding up and court-martialing the
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mutineers .^'^^
Not only did the military not turn on the civilian
authorities at the end of the war, with the exception just
mentioned, they, as they had the whole war, upheld the
civilian governments and contributed greatly to the peaceful
transition from war to peace. This prevented military
tyranny and anarchy, two things they shared the same fear
of as their civilian brethren. And, like many of their
civilian brethren, the military wanted stronger governments,
which would prevent military tyranny and anarchy. As
Ebenezer Huntington wrote during the summer of 1783, "God
grant us Government, as States, free & independent, or give
us a king, even tyranny is better than Anarchy- [.]"-'--'-
^
"'""'''^For a comprehensive study of the mutiny, see
Kenneth R. Bowling, "New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny
of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the
War for Independence," PMHB 101, no. 4 (October 1977): 419-
450; see also George Washington to the President of the
Continental Congress, June 24, 1783, Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington
, 27 : 32-33; Instructions to Robert Howe"7~
June 25, 1783, ibid., 35-36; Arthur St. Clair to George
Washington, July 2, 1783, Smith, The St. Clair Papers
,
1:588-589; James Madison's "Notes on Debates," Hutchinson,
Papers of James Madison, 7:141; James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, July 8, 1783, ibid., 216; Elias Boudinot to
George Washington, June 26, 1783, Burnett, LMCC, 7:200; Same
to same, June 21, 1783, ibid., 194; Same to same, July 1,
1783, ibid., 208; John Armstrong, Jr., to Horatio Gates,
June 16, 1783, ibid., 189n,4; Ford, JCC, 24:410, 411-413;
Jonathan Trumibull, Jr., to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., July 2,
1783, MHSC, 7th ser., 3:432; Oliver Ellsworth to Jonathan
Trumbull, Sr., July 10, 1783, ibid., 433.
"'""'""'"Eben [ezer ] Huntington to Z-^ndrew Huntington,
August 12, 1783, Blanchfield, Let ters Wr itten by Ebenezer
Huntington, p. 106.
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Many in the military shared the nationalists' belief
that only a strong central government would prevent those
conditions which made for military tyranny and anarchy, both
of which seemed possible if America continued to be governed
by the weak Articles of Confederation
. One officer at
West Point during December 1782, wrote that unless power
was "vested in some suprem.e head, sufficient to enforce a
compliance with such regulations as are evidently calculated
for the general good, adieu to all government- [.] " He
believed that "Thirteen wheels require a steady and powerful
regulator to keep them in good order, and prevent the
machine from becoming useless '''^ Early in 1783, Knox
wrote Gouverneur Morris that something must be done about
improving the government before a peace takes place or they
would be in a worse situation than they were in at the
beginning of the war. "As the present Constitution is so
defective," he wrote, "why do not you great men call the
people together and tell them so; that is, to have a conven-
tion of the States to form a better Constitution." Greene
wrote Congress that "some alteration . . . must take place
or ruin must follow." Lafayette told Washington he could
spend his time in no better fashion than inducing the people
112Nathanael Greene to Benjamin Guerard, March 8,
1783, Nathanael Greene Papers (Read Collection), 1:27, WLCL
113 Samuel Shaw to [John] Eliot, December 22, 1782,
Quincy, Samuel Shaw. p. 100
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of America to strongthen their union, by revising the
Articles of Confederation. "it is," he wrote, referring to
a stronger union, "the finishing stroke that is wanting to
the perfection to the Temple of Liberty." Agreeing,
Washington was quite active the last year of the war in
urging a stronger central government. Competent powers
must be given Congress, he wrote, "or Anarchy and Confusion
will soon succeed." In the same vein, ho wrote James Duane
during the summer of 1783, suggesting a government be estab-
lished in the west so as to maintain order among the
frontiersmen .'^'^^
Although the military were unable to liave a stronger
central government created before the war was over, they
were able to ensure the weak state governments were
strengthened by active military participation, much as they
had throughout the war. And they were able to prevent
anarchy
.
114 Henry Knox to Gouvorneur Morris, February 21,
1783, Drake, Henry Knox
, p. 77; Nathanael Greene to the
President of the Continental Congress, March 11, 1782,
Nathanael Greene Letterbook, Nathanael Greene Papers, LC
(Microfilm Reel #1) ; Marquis de Lafayette to George Washing-
ton, February 5, 1783, Louis Gottschalk, od
.
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Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799
, p. 261; George Washington
to John Augustine Washington, June 15, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington
,
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Duane, September 7 , 178 3, ibid., 13 3-1 '10; see also George
Washington to William Gordon, July 8, 1783, ibid., A9-S2;
George Washington to Alexander Hamillcm, March 31, 1783,
ibid., 26:277; Same to same, March 15, 1783, Syrett, Papers
of Alexander Hamilton, 3:310.
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In the South, Wayne was responsible for ensuring the
orderly transfer of authority in Savannah from the British
to the Georgia officials on July 11, 1782. He did this by
making sure the property and people of Savannah were not
depredated and insulted by his soldiers, and by maintaining
good order in Savannah and its vicinity until the civil
government was re-established .
^ The South Carolina
officials, wanting the evacuation of Charleston and the
re-establishment of government in their state to go as
smoothly, requested Washington to have the southern army
remain in their state until such time as Charleston was
re-occupied and government re-established. Washington refer
red this request to Congress who ordered it be done.'''"'"^
Because of the concern of the inhabitants of Charleston
that when the city was evacuated there would be anarchy,
Greene was adamant about keeping both the military and
civilian populace under control until the civilian
'"'"^General VJayne ' s General Orders, July 11 , 1782
,
Stevens, A History of Georgia , 2:288.
116 John Rutledge, Ralph Izard, David Ramsay, Arthur
Middleton, and John Lewis Gervais to George Washington,
August 17, 1782, Burnett, LMCC , 6:446; The South Carolina
Delegates at Congress to John Mathews, September 10, 1782,
ibid., 469; John Mathews to the South Carolina Delegates at
Congress, August 17, 1782, Charles Gregg Singer, Sout h
Carolina in the Con fede ration, p. 110; George Washington to
the Secfet'ary at War, September 2, 17 82 , Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 25:105-106, 107; George Washington
to the South Carolina Delegates at Congress, September 2,
1782, ibid., 109-110; Thayer, Nathanael Greene , p. 410.
government was re-established
. Charleston was evacuated
on Deceraber 14, 1782, and was quickly occupied and secured
by a force comnianded by Wayne. Once the governr.ent was
re-established, Greene maintained his army of fourteen
hundred at James Island, near Charleston, where they were
available to assist the civilian authorities, if necessary.
While the army remained in Charleston's vicinity, the town
remained relatively peaceful, but once the army began dis-
banding during the spring and summer of 1783, bitter hatreds,
generally involving Tories, erupted into riots and violence.
Fortunately, a small military force led by Colonel William
Washington and Major Thomas Pinckney were able to keep the
mob actions to a minimum."'""'"^
The military were also successful in keeping peace
in the west and in New York. During the sumjner of 1783,
General Irvine and Colonel Hull ensured their soldiers were
correct in their dealings with the civilians in the Fort
Pitt area and Westchester County, respectively. Hull,
117Thaddeus Kosciuszko to Nathanael Greene,
November 14, 1782, Miecislaus Haiman, Kosciuszko in the
American Revolution
, p. 137; Nathanael Greene to FrFhcTs
Marion, November 15, 1782, "Madison-Gadsden Correspondence,"
SCHGM 41, no. 2 (April 1940): 55.
118 Richard Walsh, Charleston ' s Sons of Liberty: A
Study of the Artisans 17 6 3-178 9 (Columbia -"UniversityoT"
South Carolina Press, 1959), pp. 117-121; Marvin R. Zahniser,
Cha rles Cotesv;orth Pinckney
,
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,
22";~y9, 30r7"'r7"8^37 GazeTtF^ the State of
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assisting New York's chief justice, administered justice,
and protected the inhabitants of the county from Tories
'
until the civil government was re-established. To provide
for the orderly transition of New York City from British to
Ai^erican control, Washington had nine hundred soldiers under
General Henry Jackson occupy the city upon the British with-
drawal on the twenty-fifth of November. This force remained
in the city for a month, giving security to its inhabitants
until elections were held and the civilian leaders assumed
their offices."'"-'-^
With the peaceful re-establishment of the governments
and the expected news of the definitive peace, all that
remained for Congress to do with respect to the army was to
disband it, except for the peacetime establishment. On the
nineteenth of June, Congress endorsed Washington's decision
to make the furloughs voluntary for his army, and two months
later directed the Secretary at War to furlough those troops
119George VJashmgton to Commanding Officer of the
troops in Westchester County, May 21, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
Writings o f VJashington, 26:447; George Washington to Ralph
Izard, June 14
, 1783; ibid., 27:10; Francis S Drake, Memor-
ials of the Society of the Cincinnat i of Ma ssachu s e 1 1 s
,
p. 345; Council of the State of New'York to Henry^Knox,
December 18, 1783, ibid., pp. 554-555; Timothy Pickering to
Samuel Hodgdon, November 16, 1783, Pickering, Timothy Picker-
ing
,
1:485-486; Alexander C. Flick, ed.. History of the"
State of New York, 4:268-270; Theodore Oscar Barck, Jr., New
York City During the War for Independence. With Special
Refer e
n
ce to the Pe riod of British Oc cupatTon (New^ork :
ColumbTa University' Press
,
1931), pp'r"'22"0^2T; Inhabitants
of Pittsburgh to William Irvine, September 13, 1783, C. W.
Butterfield, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against
Sandusky under Col. William Crawford in 1782
, p .~'30T.
in Maryland and Virginia.
^^^^^^^ Washington wanted
to discharge the army, believing it was cheaper and safer
121than furloughing. Agreeing with Washington, Congress on
the twenty-fourth of September authorized him to discharge
such part of the army as he deemed proper and expedient, and
two days later authorized the furloughing of those general,
medical, staff, and engineer officers no longer needed. ""-^^
These decisions prompted the North Carolina delegates at
Congress to write their state's chief executive that had
they kept the army in the field a few weeks longer, they
might have been faced with the army demanding at the point
of a bayonet what was owed them.
On the last day of July, Congress requested
Washington personally give them his advice on the peacetime
military establishment and discuss the disbanding of the
remainder of the army. About three v^eeks later, Washington
turned over command of the army to Knox and departed for
Rocky Hill, New Jersey, where Congress had assembled after
120 Ford, JCC, 24:403, 496; George Washington to the
President of the Continental Congress , June 7, 1783, Fitz-
patrick
,
Writings of Washington , 26:478.
121George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, June 15,
1783, ibid., 27:14; George Washington to Samuel Huntington,
September 25, 1783, ibid., 167-169; Fitzpatrick, Spirit of
the Revolution
, p . 210 .
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leaving Philadelphia as a result of the June
.utiny. while
there. Congress, learning that Carle ton planned to evacuate
New York City, on the eighteenth of October issued a procla-
mation announcing the definitive peace and provided for
discharging the officers who had been furloughed. This
discharging would take effect on the third of November in
the north and, on the twenty-ninth of October, Congress
provided that on the fifteenth of November all the troops in
Pennsylvania, except for a small detachment at Fort Pitt,
and the southern command would be discharged. Congress
expected the only military that would still be serving by
the end of November would be small detachments at Fort Pitt
and West Point, and the force that would assist in the
re-occupation of New York City.^^^
At Rocky Hill, on the second of November, Washington
issued his farewell orders to the army. In them, he urged
the arm.y to go back to civilian life with conciliatory dis-
positions and to maintain a disciplined steadiness of
conduct, and to be virtuous and useful citizens . "^^^ The
army responded by an address to Washington on the fifteenth,
thanking him for his efforts on their behalf and promising
124Ellas Boudmot to Robert Morris, October 23,
1783, ibid., 348; Ford, JCC, 24:452; 25:702-703, 753; George
Washington to Henry Knox, October 23, 1783, Fitzpatrick,
VJritings of Washing ton, 27:206 .
125
Ibid. , 222-227.
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not to turn on the civilian authorities . ^^6
Washington returned to West Point during the latter
part of November and led what remained of his army into New
York City. After seeing the town was peacefully occupied,
and the civilian government re-established, Washington bid
adieu to the army, leaving what remained of it under the
12 7command of Knox. Leaving New York the first week of
December, Washington traveled to Annapolis, where Congress
was sitting to resign his commission, now that the war was
won and the army peacefully disbanded.
Arriving in Annapolis on the nineteenth of December,
Washington the following day asked Congress to resign.
Congress agreed that he tender his commission to them on
the twenty-third in a formal ceremony. At noon on the
appointed day, Washington entered the senate chamber of the
State House where Congress was sitting, and in a very digni-
fied manner tendered his resignation in a short address.
"Having now finished the work assigned me," Washington stated,
"I retire from the great theatre of Action; bidding an
Affectionate farewell to this August body under whose orders
I have so long acted, I here offer my Commission, and take
my leave of all the employments of public life." The
12 6 Signed by Alexander McDougall, Henry Knox, and
Timothy Pickering, Pickering, Timothy Pickering, 1:488-491
127George Washington to Henry Knox, December 4,
1783
,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of I-Jashington , 27:259.
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ceremony was a solemn spectacle, with almost not a dry eye
among those present. Even the usually unflappable Washington
was moved by the event, his hands shaking as he read his
address and once almost losing his composure. President
Mifflin, on behalf of Congress, thanked Washington for
everything he had done, observing that he had "conducted the
great military contest with wisdom and fortitude, invariably
regarding the rights of the civil power through all disasters
and changes." With this said, Washington retired from the
chambers and the next day left Annapolis, in hopes of spend-
ing Christmas day at Mount Vernon. """^^
With Washington retired and most of the army
disbanded. Congress now had to make arrangements for its
peacetime military establishment. The question of the
necessity of such a force was discussed and debated fre-
quently during 1783, both in and out of Congress. At
12 8Washington's Address to Congress Resigning his
Commission, [December 23
, 1783] , ibid. , 2 84-2 85 ; ' George
Washington to the President of the Continental Congress,
December 20, 1783, ibid., 277-278; James Tilton to Gunning
Bedford, December 25, 1783, ibid., 285-286n.68; Ford, JCC^
25:810, 818-819, 838-839; James McHenry to Margaret Caldwell,
December [2 3] , 178 3, Steiner , James McHenry
, pp. 6 9-70 ;
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in Maryland. 1649-1887
, pp. 201-203, 206, 221, Scharf, His-
tory of Maryland , 2 : 498-499 .
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Papers of James
Madison, 7:354; Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton,
October 3, 1783, Syrett, Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 3:466.
811
Yale, in March, seniors were reaniT-^rq •quired to give an extempore
disputation on "Whether p, c+--,r^^^^n n a standing array would be dangerous
in America?" Thomas Welsh, in his Boston Massacre oration,
certainly believed it was dangerous to rely on a standing
army. Using all the cliches regarding standing armies,
welsh explained that reliance upon standing armies could
result in a military tyranny. ^any Americans agreed,
believing it was safer and cheaper to rely on the militia,
the natural safeguard of a free people. g^^^ ^^^^
questioned the legality of a peacetime standing array under
the Articles of Confederation
. Despite opposition, raany
desired a strong standing army to protect the frontiers and
to deter any foreign power from making war upon the weak
Araerican states. Such difference of opinion prompted
130^ ^Dexter, Literary Diary of E zra Stiles, 3-63-
Niles, Principles a^^T^^tF'"^FTh^^¥^7?VhTFrnn in a^^^^^;
pp. 56-57\ ~
131^. ^ .Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, January 5
1784, Lee, Memoir of the Life of Richard Henry Lee, 2-223-
C. Joseph Bernardo and Eugene H. Bacon, Amer ican Military'
Policy: Its Development Since 1775
, p. 44~
~
132 .William Ellery and David Howell to William Greene
September 8, 1783, Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental
Congress
, pp. 444 , 445 . ' ~
133Samuel Shaw to Henry Knox, October 11, 178 3,
Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm Reel #15); Washington's
"Sentiments on the Peace Establishment," Fitzpatrick,
Writings o f Washington
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26:375-376; Lawrence Delbert Cress,
"Republican Liberty and National Security: American Military
Policy as an Ideology Problem, 1783 to 1789," WMQ, 3rd ser.,
28, no. 1 (January 1981): 85-88.
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Edmund Pendleton to observe "The question touching Garrisons
in ti.e of peace, is in its nature delicate as well as diffi-
cult and therefore I don
' t wonder there should be diversity
of opinions about it." standing armies, he wrote Madison,
"seem useful
, indeed necessary , yet have their certain
evils, among which not the least considerable is that they
lead to a standing Army, that bane of Society; nor is it
less difficult to decide the question, if they are admitted,
whether they ought to be Continental, or supported by &
under the Government of the respective States where they
are kept. "-^^^
Congress took up the question of the peacetime
military establishment during the spring of 1783. During
that time, they had the military give their opinion on the
subject and appointed a committee to make recommendations
.
The issue was hardly discussed during the summer as Congress
was involved in other issues and was frequently on the move.
By the fall, however, it was a major issue of debate, as the
army still numbered over one thousand officers and soldiers;
134 Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, October 6,
1783, Hutchinson, Papers of James Madison
,
7:372.
135Committee's report in Ford, JCC, 25:722-744; see
also Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, April 9, 1783,
Syrett, Papers of Al exander H amilton
,
3:322; James McHenry
to George Washington, July 31, 1783, Varnum Lansing Collins,
The Continental Congress at Pri nceton (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1908), p. 95;' James Madison to Edmund
Randolph, June 17, 1783, Hutchinson, Papers of Jame s Madison,
7:159.
a figure that seemed too high to many members of Congress.
The Virginia delegates reported to their state's chief
executive on the first of November that Congress would
only probably make a temporary provision for the peacetime
military establishment, as "permanent measures on so import-
ant & delicate a subject, will no doubt be postponed untill
our Constituents have time to deliberate & to express their
sense on such plans as may be submitted to their considera-
tions."^^^
After the British evacuation of New York City,
Congress, having not made a definitive decision on the
peacetime army, allowed Washington to make a temporary
arrangement. Washington, late in November, began disbanding
his army, and on the third of December discharged all the
soldiers in New York except for five hundred; those with the
longest time of service remaining. As 1784 began, the Con-
tinental forces numbered less than seven hundred. This
figure declined during the winter as those that closed out
their accounts were discharged. Thus, by the spring, the
Continental Army was virtually non-existent."'"'^^
136
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137Washington's Proclamation, November 20, 1783,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27:247; George Washing-
ton to Henry Knox, December 3, 1783, ibid., 256; A Return of
the Troops to be Continued in Service after the First of
January 1784 under the command of B. Genl. H. Jackson as
Colonel, December 10, 1783, Henry Knox Papers, MHS (Microfilm
814
Congress finally provided for the peacetime
establishment on June 2, 1784, when they voted for a stand-
ing army of eighty, doing so on the premise that "standing
armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles
of republican governments, dangerous to the liberties of a
free people, and generally converted into destructive
engines for establishing despotism." The following day,
however, in a realistic vein, Congress called on four states
to furnish seven hundred soldiers for one year frontier
138
service.
With the army disbanded the American revolutionaries
had come full circle. Fear of standing armies, and the
desire for civil control of them, were important factors in
bringing about their revolutionary war. They were even more
important factors during the war itself, influencing greatly
the civil-military relationship. Now with the war concluded,
these same concerns played an important role in shaping the
post-war army, the constitution, and the army established
Reel #16); Henry Knox to George Washington, January 3, 1784,
Drake, Henry Knox, p. 86; William Lee, "Record of the
Services of Constant Freeman: Captain of Artillery in the
Continental Army," MAH 2, no. 6 "(June 1878): 355.
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139under it. And they remained important considerations in
the Ainerican mind throughout the nineteenth century,
influencing military policy until the first world war.
Throughout this dissertation the factors that pre-
vented the Revolutionary War from collapsing from anarchy
or being subverted by military tyranny have been discussed.
What follows in the concluding pages is an analysis of those
factors in the context of several current studies of
civil-military relations and revolutionary armies.
In order for military forces to subvert the civilian
authority in any society, the opportunity has to exist, and
the military has to have the ability, motive, and desire
to take advantage of the opportunity. To some degree, the
opportunity was always present during the American Revolu-
tion in that Congress and the state governments were weak
and ineffective most of the war, and in several instances
barely functioning. Thus, they relied heavily on the army
for their existence. According to Samuel Finer, the oppor-
tunity for military intervention in civil affairs increases
139
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,
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with the increased dependence upon the military and with the
increased popularity of the military. studies by Morris
Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington make similar observations
regarding the status and prestige accorded the military.
AS was discussed in this dissertation, the civilian govern-
ments relied heavily on the military, but the army was not
very popular with the American people except for brief
periods during the war. For the most part, they were viewed
as a necessary evil, and often in a worse light, as they
infrequently violated the lives, liberties, and properties
of those they were supposed to protect. This, in addition
to the belief in civil supremacy, resulted in the limiting
of the power and authority given the military. And, although
the military was heavily relied upon, it was done so in a
limited and controlled manner. Thus, the opportunity for
military intervention in civilian affairs was greatly limited
during most of the war.
Also limiting the opportunity for military involve-
ment in and interference with civil affairs was the
overv/helming public attachment to civilian institutions. By
no means was revolutionary America a militaristic society,
140 .
Finer, Man on Horseback
, pp. 72-80; Morris
Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959), p. 34; Huntington,
Soldier and State, pp. 88-89.
dominated by military institutions and values. America
was very much a civilian society, with no history of a
professional standing army, other than that forced upon
them by the British. Finer makes the point that where
public attachment to civilian institutions are weak or
non-existent, military intervention in the political life
of the country will find wide scope, both in manner and in
1 4 2
substance. As has been discussed in the early chapters
of this dissertation, revolutionary Americans put great
faith in their civilian institutions, and the concept of
civil supremacy, for they realized to do otherwise was to
provide an opportunity for anarchy or military tyranny, the
two things they feared most and wished to avoid, probably
even at the expense of renouncing their declaration of
independence
.
M. D. Feld states a general rule of civil-military
realtions is that the need a society assumes it has for an
armed force is inversely related to the degree of control
it can exercise over its operations, i.e., the greater the
141
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dependence the lesser the controls. The Ai^erican
Revolution presents an exception to this rule, as the
civilians were able to exercise a great amount of control
over the n^ilitary, despite their great dependence upon them.
The revolutionary leaders knew, as studies by Bengt
Abrahamsson have shown, that the extent to which the
civilian authorities wish to avoid military interference in
politics they themselves would have to interfere in
14 4
strategy. As we have seen, the ,^erican civilian govern-
ments not only involved themselves in strategical decisions,
but all facets of military activity. And, as important, the
military leaders allowed themselves to be controlled and
directed by the civilians with a minimum of objection.
"The one prime essential for any system of civilian
control," according to Samuel P. Huntington, "is the mini-
mizing of military power. ""'^^ One major way this was
accomplished by the American civilians was by relying on
the militia and limiting the size of the Continental Army.
Another way the military power was minimized was by the
14 3
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civilian leaders ensuring whenever possible that the
officers were selected, and later promoted, based on their
political, economic, and social backgrounds. The civilian
leaders realized, as Kurt Lang's study shows, that one of
the most effective controls over an army of revolutionary
origin requires that it be penetrated by men ideologically
committed to the new regime at every level. gtanislav
Andreski states the military is likely to be a decisive
factor in politics in a society where there are no crystal-
lized and universally accepted beliefs about the legitimacy
14 7of power. As has been discussed in the earlier chapters
of this dissertation, the officers accepted the legitimacy
of the civilian governments, and for the most part, complied
with the principles of civil supremacy. And, as has been
shown, the civilian leaders ensured that their control, and
civil supremacy, was complied with, thereby lessening the
opportunity for military intervention in or interference
with the civilian governments.
146,Lang, !li-Jii::t^y_j:jT^t i t^ut p. Ill; see also C.
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Another factor limiting the opportunity for military
intervention during the revolution was the
.ini.al a.ount of
social unrest and anarchy that took place. According to
Kurt Lang, the relative absence of popular unrest will keep
the military politically neutral. This certainly was
the case with respect to the American Revolution, particu-
larly as the military was used to ensure that social unrest
and anarchy was kept to a minimum.
Although there was little social unrest and anarchy,
there were many sectional and local differences in American
society. According to Edward Luttwak
, societal differences
are an obstacle to military interference in the political
process, particularly in the form of a coup d'etat involving
the central government
. Even if the army had seized the
central authority from Congress, it would have been impos-
sible to have all the states give their allegiance to them,
for they barely even gave it to Congress, let alone each
other. America at this time was by no means a nation. Yet,
according to one scholar, this lack of nation state develop-
ment is a major factor in allowing military intervention in
civil affairs, as the military fills the political vacuum
148
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Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
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and beco.es the central authority and power. aohn Ellis,
writing about the American Revolution, observes "the
essential military features of the War of Independence
derive fro. the fact that
. . . feelings of nationalise were
.ost significant by their absence Indeed, nationalis-
tic feelings were, for the .ost part, absent during the
American Revolution. The ar.y was not fighting to create a
national government, thus they did not feel the need to
intervene in the political process to create or foster a
national government, or to establish themselves as the
central authority.
The American army was basically a conservative
instrument, as has been discussed throughout this disserta-
tion. But in any revolution there is social and political
unrest, and there was some in the army during the war. Not
only did the civilian leaders expend their energies to keep
this unrest in check, but so did the military leaders, pre-
venting the opportunity for any form of anarchy or military
tyranny
.
The officers kept the army in check by their profes-
sionalism and by their discipline. Although neither the
150
R. D. McKmlay, "Professionalization
, Politiciza-
tion and Civil-Military Relations." M. R. Van Gils, ed., The
Perceived Ro le of the Military, p. 26 2.
151, ^ ,
.
John ullis. Armies m Revolution, p. 46.
822
military nor the civilians came to see the army as a dis-
tinct professional body, especially since the members of the
army came and went with regularity, the American army did
become a professional body, especially its officer corps.
And professional bodies, as studies have shown, tend to be
more conservative than liberal in their political behavior.
Studies by Huntington, Abrahammson, and Katherine
Chorley indicate the longer the service, the less likely the
officer corps would be amenable to influence from the
15 3political left. This is especially true of those offi-
cers, having risen in status, are not eager to undermine a
system that provided the opportunity for them to rise in
status. In the American Revolution, many officers came from
middle and lower classes and they had risen in prestige by
their military service, if only in their own eyes."'^^^ They
152
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For discussion of the officer's prestige and
status, see Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War:
The Con tinental Army and the AmericarPcharac ter , 17T5-1783
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the
Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979),
pp. 343-353, passim. Royster also devotes considerable
space to a discussion of the professionalization of the
Continental Army, see especially pp. 195-254, 319-320,
331-333.
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certainly did not want to lose the reputation and status
they had gained by subverting the system that had given them
their reputation and status. The military leadership, com-
posed primarily of the relatively well-to-do, did not want
to undermine their own social status by undermining the
political and social status quo. As one scholar has
observed, the Continental Army was "the bastion of conserva-
tism and privilege. "1^5 And as has been sho^^ the officers
ensured the army was well-disciplined, not only to be mili-
tarily successful, but also to keep the army from contribut-
ing to any form of anarchy or military tyranny. John Ellis
observes that discipline was used during the American
Revolution "as a counter-revolutionary tool to suppress any
radical tendencies among the rank-and-file ." '''^^
Besides no real opportunity for the military to
intervene in or interfere with the civilian governments, the
military also lacked the ability. For the military leaders
to have imposed their will upon the civilian governments,
they would have had to have the support of their own
soldiers, been able to defeat the British and the militia,
as well as to neutralize the French forces on the continent.
With respect to the latter, Luttwak observes that a military
155
John Ellis, Arm ies in Revolution, p. 72.
"^^^Ibid .
, p. 71
.
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coup d'etat is not worth attempting if a great power has
significant military forces in the country. The French
looked to congress as their best guarantee that the war
would be conducted and concluded to their best interest and
that their loans would be repaid. Had the American army
turned on Congress, the French army might have not only
fought the Continentals, but used America's internal dispute
to seize part, if not all, the American states.
Defeating and neutralizing all these military forces
was unlikely primarily because the Continental Army lacked
the necessary human and economic resources; resources
according to Huntington the army must have to be able to
influence the political life of a country. As for econo-
mic resources, the army certainly lacked them. And had they
attempted to obtain them by force, the revolution would have
collapsed, as the Continental Army would have replaced Great
Britain as America's primary enemy. As for human resources,
the military was never that large or concentrated, except
during the first and last years of the war. Additionally,
the army did not have that much control over the militia.
Abrahamsson states the closer and more intimate the connec-
tions of the army with the other military forces, the
157Edward Luttwak, Coup D' Etat: A Practical Handbook,
p. 41.
"
15 8 Huntington, Soldier and State, pp. 88-89.
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greater the military's resources for the exertion of
159power. Although America's military forces were closely
intertwined, at least from an individual standpoint, had the
army threatened the state governments, the militia would
have fought them.
As for a pretorian military intervention, such a
force, under Washington or some other officer, would have
had to have been not only completely loyal to their commander,
but of sufficient size to seize power. And, as pointed out
by Andreski, such a force would not have to be imbued with
any particular ideology. Additionally, they would have
had to count on the other military forces remaining neutral,
if they did not join them. This is the most important
prerequisite for a successful military coup d'etat according
161to D. J. Goodspeed. All of these conditions were not
likely during the American Revolution. With some exceptions,
most of the army shared the republican ideology which did
not lend itself to military coups. Had a military force
threatened the governments, not only would have the state
forces opposed them, but so would have the remaining Conti-
nentals. With respect to a sufficient force loyal to a
159Abrahamsson, Military Professiona l ization
, p. 141
160 .Andreski, Military Organization
, p. 105.
161
D. J. Goodspeed, The Conspir ato rs: A Study of
the Coup d'Etat (New York: Viking"Press7~r961 ) , p. 2Tl
.
military conunander, few officers cominanded such a force.
Washington's personal guard rarely numbered over a hundred
soldiers and the independent corps cor^anders rarely had a
force of .ore than two hundred soldiers, often foreigners,
subject to their orders. ;.nd these soldiers were .ore
often than not .ore loyal to the republican revolutionary
ideology than they were to their com.anding officer,
especially the native born soldiers.
But even if the military had the ability, and even
if the opportunity existed, rarely did the American army
have the motive or desire to intervene in or interfere with
civilian affairs, especially overthrowing the state govern-
ments or Congress. """^^
For the most part, the military had little motive
because they shared the same goals and the means of achiev-
ing them as the civilians, and because the goals were not
betrayed by the civilian governments. Unlike many revolu-
tions, the American one was not begun to obtain social or
unrealistic goals, such as "Peace, Bread, and Land," or
"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." Therefore, the American
Revolution never experienced the "revolution betrayed" phase
16 2Carlos E. Godfrey, The Conunander-In-Chief s
Guard: Revolutionary War (Washington , DC : Sevenson-Smith
Company, 1904), pp. 14-103.
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,
. ^For a brief discussion of motives and desires of
the military intervening in civil affairs, see Finer, Wan
on Horseback
, pp. 2 3-24 .
other revolutions would, where the military interjects
themselves into the political process to ensure the initial
revolutionary goals were obtained.
Another important reason why the American military
did not attempt to undermine the civilian governments was
their belief that to do so would bring about the collapse of
their revolution and result in anarchy and military tyranny.
For the most part, the military were content to let the
civilians direct the course of their revolutionary struggle.
In part this was due to the reasons just mentioned, and in
part, because of their faith in the civilian leaders and
General Washington.
The American army, for the most part, was composed
of civilians in uniform; not professional soldiers, who had
few or no ties to the civilian life of the country. The
officers were particularly tied to the civilian society and
many soldiers, by v;ar's end, were, as they were given a
stake in society in the form of land. Huntington maintains
the "principle focus of civil-military relations is the
relation of the officer corps to the state. ""'"^^ As has been
shown in this dissertation, the TVmerican officers, in many
instances, were closely tied to the civilian leadership at
all levels. Not only were they closely integrated v/ith the
civilian leadership because of personal connections, but
164 Huntington, Soldier and State, p. 3
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also because they themselves often held civilian positions
Of leadership before, during, and after their military
service. This close association tended to support and
reinforce conservative political values, keeping with the
findings of Abrahamsson and Lang, who observe that the
military will remain politically neutral if there is a close
integration of the officer corps with the governing stra-
. 165
^tum. Abrahamsson also points out the military will have
no desire to undermine the political system if they have
direct access to the civilian leadership. A^^erican
military did have access, by their personal contacts, by
their lobbying efforts to generally receptive civilian
bodies, and by their ability to take positions in government
This access, particularly the ability to leave military
service for a position in the government, according to
Chalmers Johnson, is a very important factor in giving
greater strength to the concept of civil supremacy and
military subordination."*"^^
165,
. .Lang, Mil itary Ins titutions, p. 110; Bengt
Abrahamsson, "Elements of Military Conservatism: Tradition
and Modern," Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds .
,On Military Ideology
, pp. 71-72; Abrahamsson, Military
Profess ionalization
, pp. 106, 111.
"
166
Ibid., p. 141.
16 7Chalmers Johnson
,
Revolutiona ry Change (Boston
:
Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. lOl-ioT^
Thus, being able to bring thoir needs and desires
directly to the civilian leaders, the military found it
unnecessary to bring undue pressure on the yovern,„e„ts
, nor
the need to supplant or replace the™, things that would
happen in uti.er revolutions, particularly those involving
less mature political culLurc^sJ^^
The other major factor in keeping the military from
desiring to interfere with or inLc.vcne in civil affairs was
Washington's lack of desire. Washington's role in keeping
the army within bounds should not be underplayed by anyone
studying the American Revolution. Washington, for many
civilians and most of the army, was the revolution itself.
Many would have followed him in whatever direction he took
them, even down the path of military tyranny. Hut fortu-
nately for the revolutionary Americans, Washington shared
the same goals as the civilian leaders, and more importantly,
the same means to obtain them. As two historians have
recently written, "Above all else, Washington did not want
to see the republican cause undermined by a military dicta-
torship, and that turned out to be one of his greatest
contributions to the Revolution cjnd its legacy . ""'"^^
168^.Finer, Man on Horseback
, p. 139.
169,
,James Kirby Martin and Mark Edward Lender, A
Respectable Army: The Military Or igins of (lie Republic,'
1763-1789, p. 42.
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Because the niilitary leaders were so closely tied
to the civilian governments and because the military shared
the same goals as the civilians, as well as the means t
obtain them, the army exhibited little desire to interven
in or interfere with the civilian governments. And when
they did, it was relatively insignificant and was usually
condemned by both the civilian and military leaders.
There was no one factor which kept the military from
subverting the civilian governments during the American
Revolution, but a number. These factors, when viewed in
the context of the revolutionary Americans' fear of anarchy
and military tyranny go a long way in explaining why the
American Revolution was successful; successful in that the
same men who began the revolution and who conducted the
course of the Revolutionary War, were able to conclude the
war without their revolution being undermined by the military
as had happened and would happen in other revolutionary
struggles
.
Perhaps the most important factors in explaining
the success of the American Revolution was the insistence
by the revolutionary leaders that their military forces
subordinate themselves to civilian control, and the willing-
ness of those forces to be guided by the principle of civil
supremacy. That the Continental Array remained subordinate
is perhaps one of the greatest legacies of the American war
for independence. Since that ti^e, civil supremacy has been
the guiding principle for American civil-.ilitary relations.
It is something we now take for granted. Because America
has never been dominated by militarism, nor has the martial
spirit long prevailed, most Americans are willing to assume
their military forces will ever remain subordinate to
civilian control.
Few Americans are sufficiently av/are that civil
supremacy is only a concept, one requiring constant atten-
tion if we are to avoid military power subverting or
supplanting civilian authority. The American revolution-
aries certainly realized that. They believed that in
delicately balancing liberty and security, civilian control
would have to be maintained if both liberty and security
were to be achieved.
Before the point is reached where militarism has
undermined civilian control, under the guise of "national
security," Americans will have to have not only lost sight
of their republican and revolutionary heritages, but also
have become complacent about the role of the military in
their society. The likelihood of this happening will always
be minimized if Patrick Henry's warning that "Eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty" is remembered. It
certainly was by the revolutionary generation.
BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
In writing this dissertation I have relied on
hundreds of primary and secondary sources. As most of the
secondary sources are cited only once, with full publication
data provided in the footnotes, and because the frequently
cited printed primary sources are included in the Short
and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited, with full
publication data, I have not provided a standard biblio-
graphy. More useful for anyone studying the civil-military
relationship during the American war for independence is an
analytical bibliographical essay.
For those who want a standard bibliography, John
Shy's volume on the American Revolution in the Goldentree
Bibliographies in American History and the bibliography
published by the United States Army's Center for Military
History are excellent."'" Don Higginbotham ' s bibliographical
essay in his The_JVar_of^_Amerd^can_^ Military
Attitudes, Policies, an d Prac tice, 176_32l789 (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1971) is a valuable supplement, as is
"""John Shy, comp. The American Revol ution (Northbrook,
Illinois: AHM Publishing Corporation, 1973); Robert W.
Coakley and Stetson Conn, The Wa r of the Ame rican Revolution:
Narrat ive, Chronology, and Bibliography (Washington',"~D"."c71
Center for Military History, 1975').
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the note on sources in Ja.es Kirby ^,artin.s and
.ark Edward
5£Pl^Mi£^^Z63^1Z89 (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan
Davidson, 1982). Also useful are the essay on sources in
Richard H. Kohn's E^gl^_and_S^^
^^^^^-^^^^^^-^^-^^^^-^^^^
(New York: Free Press, 1975), and the standard bibliography
in Lawrence Delbert Cress's Citizens_i^^^
^^^^-^^i^-^--A!L^^^££i^^ (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
As I indicated in the preface, there are very few
works on the American war for independence that comlDine
civil and military attitudes, activities, and relationships.
The best works doing so are those by Higginbotham and Martin
and Lender. Although Jonathan Gregory Rossie's Politics of
Command in the Ame rican
.ReX^l^jtion (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1975), and Kohn
' s work address important
aspects of the civil-military relationship, they are limited
to the 1776-1777 and 1782-1783 periods, respectively.
Charles Royster's A Revo luti onary People at War: The Conti-
nental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of
Early American History and Culture, 1979), although provid-
ing valuable insights into military attitudes, is limited
B34
by the r,-,ct that it concentrates on the early years of the
Revolutionary War.
The host sources for studying the civil
-n.i li tary
relationship during the Revolutionary War are still the
primary docun.ents. This is particularly true with respect
to the congressional-military re 1 . , n.nship
. Although there
have been numerous books and articles wM l l on about Congress
and its members during the American Revolution, few have
adequately addressed questions relating t.o how Congress
conLrolled and directed the military and how it responded
to acts of military insubordination and threats of military
tyranny. To answer those questions one must go back 1o the
journals and papers of Congress and the letters of its
members
.
The journals of Congress contain a wealth of
information about the congressional-military relationship
during the war. Unfortunately, the one-volume index to
the journals is of minimal usefulness. Thus, to fully
exploit this source, one must patiently read over ten
thousand pages. The official papers of Congress, which
are available on microfilm, until 1978 were, because of
their volume and complexity, difficult to use without an
adequate index. Tn that year, the National Archives and
Records Service produced a comprehensive five-volume index
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which rnakos their use more accessible. ^
Although Edmund C. Bornetfs edition of the writings
Of the me^^ers of Congress is current!, being superseded by
a nev; edition, it is still ^the best single collection of the
letters and diaries of the congressional members. The
letters are particularly useful in the explanations given
for congressional policies and actions. Such explanations
are also included in Francis Wharton's edition of diplomatic
correspondence, which contains, among other things, letters
from Congress to its representatives abroad.
^
Other collections of letters and diaries of members
of Congress contain a wealth of information about the
congressional-military relationship, as well as providing
n ^-
^Worthington C. Ford et al., eds. Journals of the;2^en^tal_Congre ss 1774-1789 ed ited from-Th-F^ff^^f^if^in the Li^y o^C^Hg^^
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904-1937)
; KenAeth e'Harris and Steven D. Tilley, comps
. Index: Journals of 'theg2£t^'l^ntal_C_ongress 1774-1789 (Washn^t^iTT^C—- N^tj^-^fArchives and Recor-di-sFFVi^ig 76 ) ; The P^pe^sof ?^eContinental_Coi^ 204 R^rs~-<SrTn:^7FfiTm(Washington, D.C.: Nationil Archives and Records Service,1959); John P. Butler, comp. Index: The Papers of theContinent_aJ^_C^ongre_s^l^
,National Archives and Records Service, 1978)
.
^Edmund C. Burnett, ed. Letters of Members of theContinental Con gress. Carnegie Institution of Washington
—
Publication No. 229. 8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1921-1936); Francis VJharton, ed.
The Revolution^y_Di^p]^omat^i of the United
St ates
. 6 vols. (Washington; D.C.: U.S. Government Printinq
Office, 1889) . ^
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-Sights into the private relationship between the
.e.bers
of congress and the military leaders. Most of these collec-
tions are well-.nown and utilised by scholars/ A.ong those
that are not, and which can be used to advantage are the
letters, diaries, and autobiographies of Elbridge Gerry,
Benjamin Rush, Samuel Huntington, Caesar Rodney, Samue/
Holten, John Fell, and Elias Boudinot.^
There is much significant information about
congressional policies, attitudes, and activities in
several secondary works. Among the more useful, with
respect to a better understanding of the civil-military
4
T^Mo Z?."" ^^^^^ publications see my Short and Abbreviateditles of Works Frequently cited under Adams, Ballagr Bo5dButterfield, Gushing, Ferguson, Hutchinson, ind Sy^Iti.^
5^
n
^'
"^^Y^y Gardiner, A Study in Dissent, The Warren-G^y Corres_pondence^
South Illinois University Press, 1968); George W Cornert2_biography of Tr avel s ' through
'
^ili^ Togeth_e_r_with Jiis_' Coii^onplace B6^F*~f^r789^^1813(Princeton: Princeton University" Pre sF^fbT-thi-ASiB^iH-
.n^no??^''^^
Society, 194 3); "The Huntington Papers," CHSC20 (1923); George Herbert Ryden
, ed. Letters to and froi^i
Caes_a_r^odneyj^6^]^ 4 (PhiladelphiaTlJ^i^eTsTt^ of Penn syl-yania Press for the Historical Society of Delaware, 1933)-Journal of Samuel Holten, M.D. While in the Continental 'Congress, May 1778, to August, 1780," HCEI 55-56 (July 1919-April 1920) : passim; Donald W. Whisenhut, ed. Delegate fromNew Jersey: The Journal of John Fell (Port Washington, New
York: Kennikat Press, 1973); Elias Boudinot, Journal or
Historical Recollections of American Events During the
Revolutionary War by Elias Boudi not; President of the Conti-
in the Army
of Ameri ca during the Revoluticma
r
y War, D i rector of the
Mint, etc. Copied from His Own Manuscript (PhiladelphiaT
Frederick Bourquin , "1894 ) .
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relationship, are Edmund Cody Burnett's The Continental
Congress (New York: MacmiUan Company, 1941), Lynn Montross's
The ReluctanJb_Rebels_^jIj^e^to^^ the Continental Conares^
1774-1789_ (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1950),
Jennings B. Sanders's Evoluti^n_of_th^xecutive Departments
of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1935), E. James
Ferguson's The Power of the Pursej_A_His torv of American
Public Finance, 1776-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History
and Culture, 1961) , and Herbert James Henderson's Party
Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1974) .
The journals of the provincial congresses, committees
of safety, legislative, and executive bodies, as well as the
correspondence of the executive and legislative leaders, are
the best sources for the state government-military relation-
ship. A wealth of this material has been published, often
being included in state record collections and archives.^
For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Bartlett, Bouton,
Browne, Chandler, Clark, Hazard, Hemphill, Hoadly, Lincoln,
Mcllwaine, Saunders, and Walton. Also, Minutes of the
Council of the Delaware State, from 1776 to 1792 (Dover:
James Kirk and Son, Printers, 1886); Minutes o f the Provin-
cial Congress and the Council of Safety o f the State of New
Jersey (Trenton : Naar, Day and Naar, 1879); Minutes of the
Council of Safety of the State of New Jersey (Jersey City:
John H"T~Tyon, l¥7 2) .
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The state government-military relationship is,
unfortunately, documented in very few secondary sourcls.
Two which can be used to advantage, despite their age, are
American Revolution (Cleveland: Winn and Judson, 1904),
and Margaret P.urnham MacMillan's TheJ^ar_Gov^^
Ainerican Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press,
1943)
.
As the state official who most often dealt with the
military, the chief executives were in a key position to
direct and influence the military, as well as to be
influenced by them. Thus, their correspondence is a very
important source for understanding the dynamics of the
civil-military relationship. Many of the chief executives
have had their official and private correspondence published.
The private correspondence is especially valuable, in that
some chief executives, such as Joseph Reed and Thomas
Jefferson, were very candid in their letters to the military."^
7
For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Boyd, Browne, Chand-
ler, Clark, Hastings, Hazard, Henry, Mcllwaine, and Reed.
Also, Selections from the Correspondence of the Executive
of New Jersey, from 1776 to 1786 (Newark: Newark Daily
Advertiser Office, 1848); "Official Letters of Governor John
Martin, 1782-1783," GHQ 1, no. 1 (December 1917): 281-335;
Matt B. Jones, [ed.], "Revolutionary Correspondence of
Governor Nicholas Cooke 1775-1781," PAAS, new ser., 36
(April 14-October 20, 1926): 2 31-352 ; Helen Lee Pcabody, cd.
"Revolutionary Mail Bag: Governor Thomas Sim Lee's Corres-
pondence, 1779-1782," MHM 49-50 (March 1954-June 1955):
passim.
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The public and private correspondence of the general
officers of the Continental Army provides another valuable
source for studying the civil-military relationship. Many
of the general officers, including Washington, Greene,
Lafayette, Sullivan, Clark, Irvine, Parsons, Stirling,
St. Clair, Mcintosh, Lee, and Huntington, have had, or are
having, their letters published.^ Unfortunately, three
valuable collections have not been published. They are the
writings of Knox, Lincoln, and Gates. They are, however,
available on microfilm.^
Also meriting attention is the correspondence of the
field grade and staff officers. In the writings of Samuel
B. Webb, James McHenry
,
John Laurens. Philip Van Cortlandt.
Alexander Hamilton. Timothy Pickering, Rufus Putnam,
Ebenezer Huntington, Lewis Morris, Jr., and Alexander Scam-
mell, one will find a wealth of material about the civil-
military relationship. In part, this is because several of
these officers, especially Laurens and Hamilton, were very
g
For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Fitzpatrick, ShouTnan,
Idzerda, Hammond, James, Butterfield, Hall, Duer, and Smith.
Also, Lilla M. Hawes, ed. "The Papers of Lachlan Mcintosh,
1774-1799," GHQ 38-40 (June 1954-June 1956): passim; "The
Charles Lee Papers," NYHSC 4-7 (1872-1875); "The Huntington
Papers,' CHSC 2 0 (1923).
9Henry Knox Papers, MHS , 55 Reels of Microfilm;
Benjamin Lincoln Papers, MHS, 13 Reels of Microfilm; and
Horatio Gates Papers, Microfilming Corporation of America,
20 Reels of Microfilm.
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opinionated, particularly with respect to the shortcomings
of the civilian governments . "^^
The diaries and memoirs of several general and field
grade officers, including Artemas Ward, William Hull,
William Moultrie, Marinus Willett, Henry Dearborn, and
Israel Angell, provide many interesting observations about,
and insights into, the civil-military relationship.
Probably the most valuable is Moultrie's memoirs, as it
provides a wealth of information about the problems the
military had with the South Carolina government throughout
the war.
The correspondence, journals, diaries, and memoirs
of the field grade officers and enlisted personnel are a
relatively untapped source for studying the military's
attitude towards the American governments and people. Among
those that can be used to advantage are the journals and
"""^For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Ford, Kite, Steiner,
Simms, Judd, Syrett, Pickering and Buell. Also, "The
Huntington Papers," CHSC, 20 (1923); "Letters to General
Lewis Morris," NYHSC
, 8 (1876): 433-512; "Colonel Alexander
Scammell and His Letters, from 1763 to 1781, Includina His
'Love Letters' to Miss Nabby Bishop," HM 2d ser., 8, no. 3
(September 1870): 129-146.
'''"For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Abbatt, Campbell,
Moultrie, Willett, and Brown. Also, Edward Field, ed.
Diary of Colone l Israel Angell Commanding the Second Rhode
Island Continental Regimen t during the American Revo lution
1778-1781
"
(Providence: Preston and Rounds Company, 1899TT~~
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diaries of Ebenezer Hitchcock, Jere.iah Green.an
, Cavid How,
Ebenezer Denny, willia. Felt.an, and James Thacher; the
™rs of Alexander Graydon
, Alexander Garden, and Joseph
Plum Martin; and the correspondence of Herbert Wade,
Robert A. Lively, Ebenezer David, Samuel Shaw, Enos Reeves,
and the Beatty brothers. "^^
There are several secondary works on the military
which can also be used to advantage as was mentioned in the
preface and the beginning of this essay. Additionally,
some older works still provide useful insights into the
attitudes and activities of the military. They include
Allen Bowman's The Morale of th
_^Amerj^an_^evo]^^
Army (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Public Affairs,
1943), Louis Clinton Match's The Administration o f the
Revolutionary Army (New York: Longmans, Green and
Company, 1904), Lynn Montross's Rag, Tag, and Bobtail: The
12
For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Bray, Dawson, Denny,
Feltman, Graydon
,
Garden, Quincy, Scheer, Thacher, Wade, and
Black; Also. William B. Weeden, ed. "Diary of Enox Hitch-
cock, D.D., A Chaplain in the Revolutionary Armv. With a
Memoir," RIHSP, new ser., 7 (1899, 1900): 87-134, 147-194,
207-231; John B. Reeves, "Extracts from the Letter-Books of
Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania Line," PMHB
20-21 (1896-1897): passim; Joseph M. ^Beatty, Jr., "Letters
of the Four Beatty Brothers of the Continental Army, 1774-
1794," ibid., 44, no. 3 (1920): 193-263; Joseph M. Beatty, Jr.,
"Letters from Continental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty,
1781-1788," ibid., 54, no. 2 (1930): 155-174.
story of the Continental Army
, 1775-1783 (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1952), and Charles K. Bolton's Th^ Private
Soldier under Washington (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1902)
.
The observations recorded by the foreign officers
and diplomatics are a relatively untapped source for those
studying the civil-military relationship during the
Revolutionary War. Among those providing the most interest-
ing observations and insights are the journals of Baron
Ludwig von Closen and Claude Blanchard; the memoirs of the
Marquis De Chastellux, the Abbe Robin, and the Prince De
Broglie; the autobiography of Peter Stephen Du Ponceau; and
the letters of Conrad Alexandre Gerard. Their observations
and opinions, besides providing a unique perspective for
studying the relationships between the American civil and
military leaders, greatly add to our understanding of
1
3
Washington's political and symbolic roles.
A wealth of primary source material for studying
the civil-military relationship is contained in various
collections of published letters. Many of these are
13
For these publications see my Short and Abbreviated
Titles of Works Frequently Cited under Acomb, Balch,
Chastellux, Robin, and Meng. Also, E. W. Balch, trans.
"Narrative of the Prince De Broglie 1782," MAH 1, nos. 3-4
(March-June 1877): 180-186, 231-235, 306-309, and 374-380;
James L. Whitehead, ed. "The Autobiography of Peter Stephen
Du Ponceau," PMHB 63-64 (April 1939-April 1940): passim.
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well-known and utilized by scholars of the American
Revolution. 1^ Not so well-known, but containing many
significant letters and other information, are Frederic R.
^tJlK^rolfred,:;^ (2 vols.; Philadelphia: privately printed,
1941; New York: Coward-McCann
, 1952), Robert Wilson Gibbes's
Documentary
_jUstory_of_Ui^^
of Letters and_^aper^^Re]^ting_t^^^
Chiefly in South Carolina^_fro^
of the Editor, and Other Sources^_[r7 6 4-178 2
]
(3 vols.; New
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1853-1857), Gaillard Hunt's
Fragments of Revolutionary History. Being Hitherto Unpub-
lished Writings of the Men of the American Revolution,
Collected and Edited, under the Authority of the Di strict
of Columbia Society, Sons of the Revolution (Brooklyn:
Historical Printing Club, 1892), John Durand ' s New Materials
for the History of the American Revolution translated from
Documents in the French Archives and Edited (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1889), W. T. R. Saffell's Records o f the
Revolutionary War: Containing the Military and Financial
Correspondence of Distinguished Officers 3d ed. (Baltimore:
14
For several of the better known collections see
my Short and Abbreviated Titles of Works Frequently Cited
under Commager, Force, Kellogg, Niles, Palmer, Sparks, and
Thwaites
.
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Charles C. Saffell, 1894), and Dennis P. Ryan's A^lut^
Courage: The American RevcjAaion^a_s_Se^
Writings of Officers of the Continental Army ,.n^ ^..-^ ,no„
York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
Several periodicals and historical society publica-
tions also contain a wealth of primary source material
useful for studying the civil-military relationship. Many
letters and diaries have been published in the Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography
. Maryland Historical
Magazine, The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical
Magazine
,
Historica l Collections of the Essex Institute
,
Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society
, The
Historical Magazine
,
The Magazine of History
, The Magazine
of American History
,
and the various publications of the
Massachusetts Historical Society- Surprisingly, The American
Historical Review
,
The Journal of American History
, and The
William and Mary Quarterly contain few articles or documents
that contribute to our understanding of the civil-military
relations during the American war for independence.
Over forty years ago in the preface to a book on
democracy and military power Charles A. Beard observed that
"To find in American literature a realistic discussion of
this vital theme, it is necessary to go back to the Fatliers
of the AjTierican Republic," because "They had the advantage
of poignant experience, and intelligence enough to see the
845
intimate relations between civil and military establish-
i.ents."15 I, ^^.^ dissertation, I have found that
in a literal sense Beard was correct in his observation.
The primary documents of the Revolutionary generation are
still the best source from which to understand the American
civil-military relationship, and in understanding it, having
a clearer understanidng why the American Revolution was not
undermined or subverted by military tyranny.
Silas Bent McKmley, Democracy and ?^ilitary Powernew and enlarged ed. (New York
: ^H^¥Fd~T^^i¥7T9Tr)r-T^:
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